The trend to standardization: product development in the British motor cycle industry 1896-1916 by Russell, Bernard
Russell, Bernard (1985). The trend to standardization: product development in the British motor 
cycle industry 1896-1916. (Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City University London) 
City Research Online
Original citation: Russell, Bernard (1985). The trend to standardization: product development in 
the British motor cycle industry 1896-1916. (Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City University London) 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/14789/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
THE TREND TO STANDARDIZATION 
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT IN THE BRITISH MOTOR CYCLE INDUSTRY 
1896-1916 
BERNARD RUSSELL 
Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD 
THE CITY UNIVERSITY 
BUSINESS SCHOOL 
October 1985 
i 
.. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Data Collection 
CONTENTS 
The Theoretical Background 
Empirical Support 
The Aims of the Research 
An Outline 'of the Research 
The Research Method. 
2. THE TREND TO STANDARDIZATION 
Introduction 
Standards and Standardization 
Standardization as a Natural Trend 
Functional Efficiency Standardization 
Production Efficiency Standardization 
3. MARKETING EFFICIENCY STANDARDIZATION 
Introduction 
The New Product 
Does it Pay to Innovate? 
The Consumer 
Conclusions to Chapters 2 and 3-
4. THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
Introduction 
The Development of the Standard Product 
Characteristics of the Standard Product 
The Propositions 
Review 
5. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BICYCLE 
Introduction 
The Experimental Phase: Early Developments 
ii 
1 
2 
4 
5 
7 
8 
9 
11 
11 
13 
15 
20 
25 
33 
34 
34 
38 
46 
50 
54 
54 
55 
57 
58 
61 
.. 
63 
63 
64 
Mechanical Propulsion 
The High-Wheeled Bicycle 
The Tricycles 
The Safety Bicycle 
Standardization and its Consequences 
Conclusions 
6. THE EXPERIMENTAL PHASE (1): THE MOTOR CYCLE, 
1869-1893 
Introduction 
Steam Motor Cycles 
Electric Motors 
The Internal Combustion Engine 
Experimentation and Continuity 
Conclusions 
Appendix: Definition of a Motor Cycle 
7. THE EXPERIMENTAL PHASE (2): THE FIRST COMMERCIAL 
PRODUCTION, 1894-1900 
Introduction 
The First Attempt 
The New Industry: Entry 
H.J. Lawson: How Not to Start an Industry 
The Size and Structure of the Industry 
The Motor Cycle as Technical Product 
de Dion-Bouton and the Tricycles 
Motor Bicycles: Some Brave Attempts 
The Werner: A Commercial Success 
Summary and Conclusions 
The Motor Cycle as Consumer Product 
The Basic Motor Cycle 
The de Dion Type Motor Tricycle 
The Ariel Motor Tricycle 
The Motor Bicycles 
The Werner 
The Singer 
Summary and Conclusions 
The Experimental Products: Evaluation 
iii 
65 
66 
70 
71 
73 
75 
77 
77 
78 
80 
81 
86 
88 
90 
94 
95 
95 
97 
99 
101 
104 
105 
109 
114 
116 
117 
118 
121 
123 
124 
126 
127 
129 
132 
Conclusions 
8. THE DEVELOPMENTAL PHASE, 1901-1907 
Introduction 
Entry 
The Motor Cycle as Technical Product 
The Minerva 
The New Werner 
The Pace of Development 
Approaches to Product Development: Phoenix 
136 
139 
140 
140 
148 
149 
151 
155 
and Triumph 164 
Comparisons and Conclusions 170 
The Motor Cycle as Consumer Product· 173 
The Rider's Response 176 
The Machine on the Road 178 
The Developing Standard: Evaluation 183 
Conclusions: The Development of an Industry 187 
9. STANDARDIZATION, 1908-1916 (1): THE INDUSTRY 192 
Introduction 192 
Entry 194 
The Newcomers 195 
The Growth of the Industry: A Statistical 
Review 209 
The War 213 
10. STANDARDIZATION, 1908-1916 (2): THE MOTOR 
CYCLE AS TECHNICAL PRODUCT 
Introduction 
The Standard and its Further Development 
New Directions? 
The Machine of the Future 
Conclusions 
11. STANDARDIZATION, 1908-1916 (3): THE MOTOR 
221 
221 
222 
226 
235 
238 
CYCLE AS CONSUMER PRODUCT 240 
Introduction 240 
The Machine on the Road 240 
iv 
The Consumer: Was He Satisfied? 253 
12. STANDARDIZATION, 1908-1816 (4): CONCLUSIONS 259 
The Standard and the Trend 259 
Summary and Conclusions 264 
13. CONCLUSIONS 269 
1. The Industry, 1896-1916 269 
2. The Trend to Standardization 275 
3. The Analysis of the Trend 279 
Summary 289 
4. Integration 290 
The Standard Product 290 
Product Development and the Three Phases . 291 
5. Further Research 293 
Product Development in History 
14. CONCLUSIONS (2): PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
Production Technology 
Prices 
Marketing 
The Step Untaken 
Concluding Remarks 
Appendix: Production Technology 
NOTES 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
v 
295 
296 
297 
299 
305 
312 
317 
322 
324 
333 
355 
TABLES 
3.1. New Product Types based on Cluster Analysis 42 
7.1. Numbers of Motor Cycles Displayed at Stanley 
Shows 
8.1. Firms Entering and Leaving the Industry, 
1901-1907 
8.2. Duration of Continuous Motor Bicycle 
Production for Firms Entering the Industry, 
1901-1907 
8.3. A Rider's Running Costs 
9.1. Firms Entering and Leaving the Industry, 
1908-1916 
9.2. Increase in Motor Cycle Use, 1901-1918 
9.3. Exports and Imports of Motor Cycles, 
1907-1916 
10.1. Technical Statistics of Machines Displayed 
102 
143 
144 
177 
210 
211 
213 
at the Stanley Show, 1908 223 
11.1. Repairs to Harry Long's Triumph 246 
13.1. Firms Entering and Leaving the Industry, 
1896-1916 271 
14.1. Triumph Prices compared with those of other 
British-made 31hp single cylinder machines 
(3hp for 1906), 1906-1913 306 
vi 
2.1. 
2.2. 
2.3. 
2.4. 
5.1. 
5.2. 
5.3. 
5.4. 
5.5. 
5.6. 
5.7. 
5.8. 
, 
ILLUSTRATIONS 
Some stresses acting on a horizontal beam 
The "Ordinary" Bicycle 
A Diamond Frame Bicycle 
Diamond Frame Design 
The Hobby Horse 
Macmillan's Bicycle 
The Michaux Bicycle 
The Ariel Bicycle 
The Coventry Tricycle 
The Sparkbrook Tricycle 
The Rover Safety Bicycle of July 1885 
Humber, Cripps & Goddard Bicycle 
6.1. The Michaux-Perreaux Steam Motor Bicycle of 
1869 
6.2. Daim ler' s "Einspur" of 1885: The First 
Internal Combustion Engine Motor Bicycle 
6.3. Butler's "Petrol-Cyc"le" 
6.4. The Humber Motor Tandem 
6.5. The Beeston Motor Quadricycle 
6.6. The Humber Motor Tandem Tricycle 
6.7. The Singer Motor Tandem Tricycle 
7.1. Duncan & Suberbie's version of the 
Hilderbrand & WolfmUller Motor Cycle 
7.2. Beeston version of the de Dion-Bouton" 
Motor Tricycle 
7.3. The Ariel Motor Tricycle 
7.4. The Holden Motor Bicycle (sectioned) 
7.5. The Beeston version of the de Dion Motor 
Bicycle 
vii 
22 
23 
23 
24 
65 
66 
67 
68 
70 
71 
72 
74 
78 
83 
84 
92 
92 
93 
93 
96 
106 
108 
110 
111 
7.6. Advertisement for the Singer 113 
7.7. The Werner Motor Bicycle 115 
7.8. Coventry Motor Company Experimental Motor 
Bicycle 124 
8.1. Noble Motor Co. Advertisement 142 
8.2. Rex Advertisement 147 
8.3. The Minerva 149 
8.4. The Excelsior "Minerva Pattern" Motor 
Bicycle 150 
8.5. "only a copy of the Werner" 152 
8.6. S?me' ｍｾｴｯｲ＠ Cycles at the Crystal Palace Show 154 
8.7. The Binks "Four" Advertisement 157 
8.8. The Belgian F.N. "Four" Advertisement 158 
8.9. The Phoenix Cob 159 
8.10. The Zenith "Bicar" 
8.11. J. van Hooydonk and his "Phoenix" 
8.12. The Triumph 
8.13. "200 Miles in a Day" 
8.14. Advertisement for the Quadrant 
9.1. The First BSA 
9.2. The Rudge 
9.3. Advertisement for New Hudson 
9.4. Douglas Advertisement 
9.5. James Advertisement 
9.6. Scott Motor Cycle AdvertIsement 
9.7. The P & M 
9.8. Rom Tyres Advertisement Showing War-time 
Clynos 
10.1. 
10.2. 
.10.3. 
10.4. 
10.5. 
10.6. 
The Wilkinson TAC 
Matchless Advertisement 
Williamson Advertisement 
The Levis 2ihp Two-Stroke 
The "All-Electric" Indian 
The-ASL equipped with Air Springs 
viii 
160 
165 
170 
179 
181 
197 
198 
200 
202 
204 
206 
215 
217 
227 
229 
230 
233 
236 
236 
11.1. Albert Catt 243 
11.2. Muriel Hind "Tests" a 1ihp Singer 
Lightweight 251 
13.1- The Roc 287 
14.1. Wauchopes 316 
14.2. Plan of the Raleigh Cycle Company's Works 
at Nottingham 329 
14.3. Plan of the new A.J.S. Factory at 
Wolverhampton 329 
ix 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
First I must express my sincerest thanks to 
Dr Jonathan Boswell, who supervised the last two and a half 
years of the research, for his much valued advice and 
encouragement. 
Acknowledgement is due also to Dr Ronnie Lessem, 
Dr Axel Johne, and particularly Professor Gerald Goodhardt, 
for help along the way. 
The research was carried out in a number of libraries, 
and particular acknowledgement is due to the staffs of the 
Science Museum Library and the Newspaper Library, 
Colindale, for their untiring assistance. Also deserving 
of mention here are the staffs of the City University 
Library, the University of London Library at Senate House, 
the University of Warwick Library, and the public libraries 
of Hackney, Camden, and Birmingham. 
Acknowledgement is due to the Director of the 
University of London Library for permission to quote from 
the letter about the manufacturers of the Corah motor 
cycles, and to the Veteran Car Club of Great Britain for 
same; and to the Trustees of the Science Museum for the 
use of illustrations numbered 5.1,5.2, 5.3,6.1, 6.3 and 
7.4. 
The early part of the research was carried out wth the 
aid of a SSRC research studentship. 
x 
ABSTRACT; 
Th e thesi s is a historical study of the fi rs t twen ty 
years of the British motor cycle industry in terms of the 
development. of its product. 
The main theoretical issue is standardization, not in 
its usual sense as a formal activity aimed at the setting 
up of standards, but as a trend the effect of which is for 
products to become more and more alike across the industry 
as a whole. Standardization in this sense is to a large 
extent an unintended consequence of the wish on the part of 
producers to design products which operate more efficien-
tly, which can be produced more cheaply, and which have the 
widest possible appeal in the marketplace; and of the 
preference, on the part of the majority of consumers, for 
products which are familiar and of known reputation and 
performance, as against those which are new and untried. 
The trend to standardization is analysed into its main 
components, functional efficiency, production efficiency, 
and marketing efficiency, and these are used as the basis 
of a number of propositions which make it possible to 
consider in more depth the development of the product 
during the three phases of industry development: experi-
mental, developmental, and standardization. 
The more substantive chapters of the thesis are orga-
nized around three main themes, the development of the 
industry as a whole, and the development of the product 
from a technical point of view, and from a consumer point 
of view. 
The main conclusion is that the development of its 
product into a standard form--one on which newcomers to the 
industry can base their own products and which consumers 
can recognise as reliable and worthy of purchase-is the 
most critical stage in the development and consolidation of 
a new industry. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Much interest was generated in the British motor cycle 
industry when it was supplanted by relative newcomers to 
motor cycle manufacture, the Japanese, during the 1960s and 
early 1970s. The British industry, still world leaders in 
1960 and suppliers of by far the greater part of the world 
trade in motor cycles, had declined to virtual extinction 
in little more than ten years. This was a major disaster 
for British industry. Why had it happened? 
A review of several studies in which particular atten-
tion was given to this question produced several reasons 
ranging from the inadequacies of the British industry in 
terms of poor leadership by top management,1 out-of-date 
production methods,2 and the lack of forward product plan-
ning,3 to the particular advantages of the Japanese indus-
try such as a large home market and financial support.4 
While explanations of this nature can be convincing, 
they are usually unsatisfactory when they are intended to 
accoun t for a major historica 1 even t because they tend to 
concentrate on more immediate issues. There was, however, 
. 
no serious study of the history of the British motor cycle 
industry to provide the longer-term perspective. This was 
partially remedied, if only to a rather limited extent, by 
the popular histories of motorcycling which, although not 
primarily concerned with the industry, did offer a few 
clues to its decline. 
Among these was the fact that in 1960 almost all the 
firms in the industry were offering products of rather 
conventional design with little variation.5 But British 
motor cycles had not always been so dull and conventional. 
In earlier days and particularly in the earliest days of 
the industry, there had been a great variety of product 
design and a relatively high degree of innovation. 
1 
I t was from these observa tions tha t the present 
research developed. There was clearly a need for a more 
rigorous historical study of the British motor cycle indus-
try than was ｯｦｾ･ｲ･､＠ in any of the popular histories ｯｾ＠
motorcycling. Such a study would focus on the tendency for 
the innovative and rather diverse product make-up of the 
industry in earlier days to evolve into one that was rela-
tively standardized and conventional. 
Further investigation revealed that this tendency was 
not a recent development but was apparent well before the 
first world war,6 which suggested that the earliest period 
of the industry's history would be one of the most interes-. 
ting to study since it was a time when the most profound 
changes were taking place. It was decided therefore to 
concentrate on the first twenty years, particularly as it 
would have been difficult to write the complete history of 
the industry within the time-scale of a PhD. 
The thesis thus became a study of product development 
in the first twenty years of the British motor cycle indus-
try, with emphasis on the relationship between product 
innova tion and standardiza tion. The ma in problem of the 
research was to explain how the relatively diverse and 
innovative product make-up of the industry in its earliest. 
days had first begun to evolve into one that was rather 
more standardized and conventional. The research would 
also be concerned with innovation and the circumstances 
under which more innovative products would be accepted or 
rejected. These topics would indicat e the direction the 
research should take but would in no way detract from it as 
a history, and in fact they would be very much a part of 
that history. 
Data Collection 
Research of this nature might be tackled at various 
levels: the industry itself, the firm, and the consumer, 
or perhaps all three at the same time. Primary emphasis on 
the firm proved to be impracticable because of the lack of, 
archive material. Neither did the other approaches look 
2 
particularly promising since the data needed to support 
them seemed to be equally lacking. 
At this point the research might well have been aban-
d?ned since not only was there no serious historical study 
ot the British motor cycle industry, but "there were no 
usable archives either. Thus there was no previous 
research on which to build and no obvious source of data. 
There were many popular histories of particular marques but 
these were rather like the histories of motorcycling in 
that they were largely confined to technical data and 
accounts of sporting events. The only promising source of 
data turned out to be the journals, the trade and popular 
press of motorcycling. 
A preliminary examination of some early motorcycling 
journals revealed that they contain a great deal of ｾｳ･ｦｵｬ＠
data particularly from the point of view of product deve-
lopment. Not only is there a far more complete account of 
, 
the technical deve lopme nt of the motor cyc Ie than can be 
found anywhere else, but also a considerable amount of 
material relating to the consumer point of view in the form 
of road tests, accounts of riders' experiences on the road, 
and readers' letters which are often concerned with perso-
nal experiences and current controversies involving tech-
nical and other issues. Information about the progress and 
development of the industry itself is ｲ｡ｴｨ･ｾ＠ less abundant, 
but what there is is to the point and often of a kind which 
is almost impossible to find elsewhere. 
In adopting this approach to data collection the main 
deficiency was likely to be the lack of specific informa-
tion on operations within the firm. Something might be 
inferred about the nature of a firm from the nature of its 
product, but there would be little or nothing concerning 
the actual decision-making processes related to product 
development. This was less of a disadvantage than it might 
seem, however, since the main concern was with the industry 
as a whole and its overall product make-up and there was a 
reasonable amount of data in this area. 
3 
The Theoretical Background 
Thus the research was practicable at least from the 
poin t of vi ew of data co llect ion, bu t wha t of the the 
theoretical background: what kind of conceptual or theore-
tical base might underpin the research so as to take it 
beyond the merely empirical? 
Given the limitations of the data, there were two 
approaches which looked promising, starting from either 
standardiza tion or product development. The literature of 
product development, as will be seen in Chapter 3, provided 
some explanation as to why the product make-up of an indus-
try might tend to become increasingly standardized, but 
offered little or nothing in the nature of theory. 
The literature of standardization was at first disap-
pointing since almost everything published appeared to be 
mainly concerned either with general issues like measure-
ment and mass production, or with the specifications of 
standards in particular industries. There was nothing at 
all on standardization as a stage in the development of 
industries except for one source, Gaillard (1934), whose 
approach did not prove helpful. 7 Further rna terial on the 
development of standardization was found only by searching 
through the literatures of likely industries and the histo-
rical journals, but these sources although useful did not 
provide anything of a theoretical nature. 
The theoretical background to the research came even-
tually, not from any established concept or theory, but 
from the observation that standardization is a'universal 
trend: "A little reflection will show that standardization 
in its broader sense has furnished the base on which nature 
has created the universe".8 Such a far-reaching statement 
requires examination which would be too big a task for'this 
brief introduction, the reader therefore is referred to 
Chapter 2 for further discussion. In the same chapter also 
'will be found further support for the concept of a t rend to 
standardization in Darwin's theory of natural selection. 
In the light of these ideas, the trend to standardiza-
tion was defined as the tendency over time for diverse 
4 
entities to be formed into classes according to activity, 
function, or other factors of correspondence, and, within 
each class, to become more and more alike. It was diffi-
cult, however, to find theoretical support for suCh a 
, 
concept in studies of industry, because standardization is 
usually treated as a deliberate, formal process only con-
cerned with setting up standards. In contrast, the trend 
to standardization is to a large extent independent of 
intention; it ,follows, not as a result of deliberate 
policy but from the day-to-day activities of production, 
marketing and consumption, and the gains which come from 
developing and using better products. Thus the present 
concern is wi th the tendency of products to become s tan- , 
, 
dardized across'a whole industry in a way that has little' 
connection with the formal attempt to set up standards. 
Empirical Support 
Some empirical support was found for the trend in the 
literatures dealing with research on particular indus-
tries.9 As will be seen in Chapter 5, the early history of 
the cycle industry was characterised by a variety of dif-
ferent product designs. The number of these did not begin 
to diminish until the development of the safety bicycle in 
1885. From about 1889 onwards the efforts of product 
developers were largely confined to improving the standard 
safety bicycle and ｯｴｨｾｲ＠ designs were"gradua11ydropped.10 
A similar pattern of development occurred in the motor 
industry. In the ･｡ＧｲＱｩｾｳｴ＠ days, modification of existing 
, ,.' 
designs was an almost'constant process:, nIt.' must, however, 
be understood that ｮｾｴ＠ ｏｾｬｙｨ｡ｖ･Ｇ＠ ali the' or'iginal continen-
tal motors previously ｮ｡ｾｾ､＠ been ｳｵｾｪ･｣ｴ･､＠ to alteration in 
､･ｴ｡ｩｬｾｦｴ･ｮｯｦ＠ the,'most radical in character-almost 
every: year since ｴｨ･ＬｩＮＱｾｴｴ･ｲ＠ eighties, but also that 'during 
. " . ... •. ", 'r .. "" :" ＬＧｾ＠ ," . . ｾ＠ . . ｾＢＮＧ＠ .' . 
, " ' ,that period ､ｯｺ･ｮｳｯｦＧＩｮＧｾＧｦｩＬ［ｦｩｲｭｳ＠ have ,sprung up with still" ."<'"y 
,.. . 11" I" '. ,j , ' • ,"'- , '"",, 
otherimprovementstt • ＾ｾＺＮＬＮＬ［ＬＺＧ［＠ ',: ",' Ｌｻｾ＠ " ',' :, \ 
ｾ＠ " ':. ｾＱ＠ .• ｾ＠ .... ' .' l .:, 
Thus: there was ''oo,.'&.rly Ｇｳｴｩｵｩ､｡ｲ､ｩｾ｡ｴｩｯｮＺＧ＠ "In ,1900 no ' 
t public stand&;rds had, ｹ･ｴ［ｾ＠ been de've1oped as to wha t ｴｨｾＧ＠
automobile" 6ught ｴｾｬｯｾｫ＠ like and how it ought to be 
5 
powered".12 To the contrary there was still grea t variety 
of design: "Divers, and sometimes weird and wonderful, 
were the early motive a nd transmission systems ••••• ,,13 
The first move towards a standard car came earlier 
than might have been expected, however, through imitation. 
Early in the 1900s the American company, Locomobile, intro-
duced a four-cylinder water cooled car of French 
design-"the first direct imitation by an American manufac-
turer"-and wi thin a year 14.5% of all American-made auto-
mobiles were of this type. By 1904, 19.6% were of the same 
type, and by 1906, 56%.14 
The beginnings of product standardization in the air-
craft industry would have taken much longer to achieve if 
it had not been for military flying. The Royal Flying. 
Corps soon discovered that the "multiplicity of types was 
burdensome" .15 The solution was. sought via a competition 
to decid e which was the bes t aircraf t so a s to set iIi trai n 
measures to mass produce it. Unfortunately, the winner was 
almost impossible to mass produce, and another aircraft was 
chosen. 16 
The first world war increased the need for standardi-
zation. In 1916 forty different engines types were under 
construction; the number was reduced to seven but four of 
these proved to be failures. 17 
In this case product standardization was hurried for-
ward because of particularly pressing circumstances, and it 
is therefore ｵｮｴｹｰｾ｣｡ｬＮ＠ It supports the idea of the trend, 
nevertheless, and what was enforced in war-time would in 
more normal times almost certainly have happened eventually 
as a matter of course. 
Despite the lack 9f research in which the trend to 
standardization or a related issue has been the main point 
of fOCUS, these studies provide a degree of confirmation 
that the product make-up of an industry will tend to deve-
lop in the way indicated by the concept of a t rend. This 
is no more than we would expect, however, and it is likely 
that a similar process takes place in most industries. To 
what extent it is universal is an empirical question, but 
6 
there are some fairly obvious cases where it may not apply 
to any great extent. Among these are industries in which 
one of the most important characteristics of the product is 
its exclusiveness, as in the fashion and jewellery trades, 
and w her e the prod u c tis sol a r g e 0 rex pen s i vet hat i tis 
usually built to the customer's specifications, as in the 
case of large civil engineering projects. But these are 
rather special cases and the kind of exceptions which do 
not really challenge the rule. 
The Aims of the Research 
The purpose of research is (or should be) to solve 
prob1ems.18 The main problem of the research as set out in 
the earlier part of this chapter, is to explain how the 
relatively diverse and innovative product make-up of the 
industry in its earliest days first began to evolve into 
one that was rather more standardized and conventional. It 
should be remembered therefore that the following more 
specific aims are to some extent secondary, or perhaps 
better described as methological, in that they are suppor-
t i ve of the main dr i ve of the research and have been 
derived from it, and are to be treated therefore as subor-
dinate to it rather than as ends in themselves. These aims 
are: 
1. Historical: -to carry out a first serious study of 
the early development and growth of the British motor cycle 
industry. Thus the research fills a gap in our knowledge 
of what was once a major British industry. 
Note the next three aims, conceptual, analytical and 
integrative, are presented separately for analytical pur-
poses although they do to some extent overlap. 
2. Conceptual: to develop a new concept, the trend 
to standardization, which promises to have a much wider 
"range of usefulness than the idea of standardization, per 
se, in its usual application. 
3. Analytical: to explore and analyse the trend to 
standardization, and to conceptualize and invest igate its 
components; also to investigate the relationship between 
7 
product innovation and standardization and the circum-
stances in which any tendency towards innovation or stan-
dardization either weakens or strengthens. 
4. Integra ti ve:; to merge empir ica I fac t wi th concep-
tual analysis with a view to achieving a better understan-
ding of the historical processes at work, and learning 
something also about the operation of the trend to stan-
dardization and product development in a historical 
setting. 
5. Further research: to suggest new directions for 
research particularly in industrial history, standardiza-
tion and product development. 
An Outline of the Research 
In Chapters 2 and 3 the trend to standardization is 
developed further as a concept. It is analysed into three 
main component parts: functional efficiency standardiza-
tion (FES), production efficiency standardization (PES), 
and marketing efficiency standardization (MES). 
Each of these is examined with a view to discovering 
its relationship to the others and its overall signifi-
cance. FES is discussed largely with reference to engi-
neering design; PES, with reference to historical develop-
ments in production technology; and MES, with reference to 
ｲ･｣･ｮｾ＠ research in product development. 
In Chapter 4 the conclusions of the previous two 
, 
chapters are organized into a series of propositions which 
are intended to serve as a partial guide to the development 
of the research on the industry. 
The development of the standard product (and by exten-
sion, the industry) is divided into three phases: experi-
mental, developmental, and standardization. Some of the 
propositions are related specifically to these three 
'phases, and the remainder to the industry as a whole and 
the product in general. 
Chapter 5 deals with the development of the bicycle. 
The motor cycle is based on the bicycle and if there had 
been no bicycle there would probably have been no motor 
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cycle. This relationship is reinforced by the fact that 
the motor cycle industry was parented by the cycle 
industry. 
Chapter 6 discusses the pre-commercial phase of motor 
cycle development, a period of experimentation covering the 
years 1869-1893. 
Chapter 7 examines at length the first commercial 
phase, a period when products were still largely experimen-
tal covering the years 1894-1900. It is divided into three 
main sections dealing with industry as a whole, the tech-
nical development of the motor cycle and its development as 
a consumer product. It is concluded with.a discussion of 
the propositions relevant to this chapter formulated in 
Chapter 4. 
Chapter 8 follows broadly the same pattern as Chapter 
7. It covers the developmental phase, 1901-1907, when the 
motor cyc Ie was first developed into a viable and reason-
ablysatisfactory machine from the consumer point of view. 
Chapters 9-12, taken as a single unit, follow the same 
general pattern as Chapters 7 and 8. They deal with the 
standardization phase, 1908-1916, wh:t'ch covers the first 
signs of product standardization across the industry as a 
whole. Chapter 9 traces the history of the industry in 
general up to the early war years: Chapter 10 examines the 
standard product and its further development: Chapter 11 
considers the effectiveness of the standard product from 
the consumer point of view; and Chapter 12 presents the 
conclusions to this section of the research. 
Chapter 13 discusses the main findings of the thesis 
and Chapter 14, while examining the orientation to product 
development and ways it may have changed during the period, 
considers whether the trend to standardization evolved into 
a deliberate policy. 
The Research Method 
The research method varies from chapter to chapter 
depending on the subject matter. The methods used include 
concept development, conceptual analysis, literature search 
9 
and review, and factual and statistical data analysis. 
The main units of analysis are the industry and the 
product. Where data allows, individual firms are discussed 
but mainly for purposes of illustration. 
For the purposes of data collection, about one hundred 
thousand pages of material from the early trade and popular 
motorcycling press were examined, plus a substantial number 
of other publcations and a small amount of archive 
material. 
Several different areas of literature were studied 
including those of motorcycling and motor cycle history, 
the histories of the cycle and motor industries, and to a 
lesser exten t transport history in gEmeral and the histo-
ries of several other industries; those of standardiza-
tion, design, and production methods; those of product 
development, consumer behaviour and marketing; and also to 
some extent, those of the theory of the firm, entrepreneur-
ship, business and industry history in general, and English 
economic history. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE TREND TO STANDARDIZATION 
The aim of this chapter is to prepare the way concep-
tually for the empirical analysis which follows later. 
Thus it is concerned primarily with developing the idea of 
the trend to standardization into a concept, and then 
formulating, analysing and discussing that concept. 
Standardization is viewed initially as part of a deve-
lopmental process which characterizes all life, and from 
the analysis of this process' there emerge the. various kinds 
of standardization: functional efficiency standardization 
(FES), production efficiency standardization (PES), and 
marketing efficiency standardization (MES). 
The treatment of each of these categories varies more 
for substantive than analytical reasons. FES is discussed 
largely in design and engineering terms. PES is examined 
both from a technical and historical point of view, but 
with the emphasis on the latter. MES, which follows in 
Chapter 3, is analysed in seme detail in terms of various 
ideas current in marketing and product development practice 
and research, and it is from this chapter more than any 
other that we begin to arrive at an explanation of the 
tendency for products of industries such as the motor c'ycle 
industry to become increasingly standardized. 
As Chapter 3 is a con tinua tion of Chapter 2, the 
conclusions to the two chapters will be found at the end of 
Chapter 3. 
Introduction 
Standardization is usually thought of as the process 
of devi.sing and establishing standard's the main purposes of 
which are to improve industrial efficiency and to provide 
guidelines to producers and consumers as to what should be 
expected from a given type of product. Standards created 
:i.l 
in this way may be simply formal and have no reality in 
fact, that is, there may be little or no relationship 
between the standard as it is formulated and the standard 
as it exists, 1 fit exists, in the fiel d. From this star-
ting pOint, a great deal has been written on standardiza-
tion and the establishment of standards in particular 
industries, treating standardization as entirely a formal 
process involving the setting up of standardization commit-
tees at a national or industry level, and related activi-
ties performed as a management function in individual com-
panies. 1 The result is to emphasize the political aspect 
of standardization even sometimes at the expense of econ-
, 
omic considerations and always at the expense of the more 
immediately personal or human element. 
The fact is, however, that standardization is a 
natural process which takes place much of the time uncon-
sciously, that is, without the intervention of deliberate 
decision-making. It operates in this way through something 
akin to natural selection. The driving force behind 
natural selection is efficiency, not in its narrow econo-
mic sense, but in the biological sense as "survival value". 
Standardization has survival value in that it contributes 
to those essential activities which enable the organism to 
survive and prosper in its particular environment: activi-
ties which involve various kinds of efficiency. 
The survivors in the biological context are those 
species which have adapted more efficiently to their 
environment. The survivors in an industrial context are 
likely to be the firms which are most capable of manufac-
turing products which people want to buy, usually those 
products which perform most effectively and are manufac-
tured most efficiently so as to ensure the most attractive 
combina tion of price and qua·li ty. In any market such 
·products will sooner or later emerge and become recognis-
able standards, but this is not the end of the matter • 
• 
It may seem that standardization as an activity is 
brought to an end as soon as the requisite standard has 
been established not merely as a formula but as ｡Ｎｾｩｶｩｮｧ＠
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entity, at which point the standard itself becomes a per-
manent feature of the landscape. In practice, however, 
standards are rarely permanent. A particular standard is 
rarely considered to be the ultimate development of its 
kind. There is nearly always room for improvement and 
often need for it as times change. Thus if there is any 
constancy it is not in the standard but in the process of 
standardization which is why it is so aptly described as a 
trend. The trend signifies a continuing movement towards 
a given kind of end which mayor may not be achieved, a 
point which is not always recognised in the more conven-
tional definitions of standards and'standardization which 
follow. 
Standards and Standardization 
There is little to be gained from discussing defini-
tions of standards and standardizatiQn separately except to 
note that standardization is the process while standards 
are the end product. We may assume therefore that what 
applies to one will apply to a large extent to the other 
also. 
Standardization has been defined in various ways. 
,Early definitions, paticularly, emphasized the more static 
formal element. Thus it was seen as "the definition of 
specifications for products, parts, and materials recommen-
ded or adopted by an entire industrY"., 2 or, in similar vein 
but with a slightly different perspective, as "the preparJ.-
tion and application of definite specifications which are 
either compulsorily enforced or voluntarily adopted in 
connection with production or manufacture or with the sale 
or marketing of raw materials, natural products and food-
stuffs".3 Thus, rather than being recognised as an evolu-
tionary process, it might be recommended or enforced: a 
.matter for advice, or more than that, for governmental 
activity in which an element of compulsion could be 
involved. 
IJ 
Various levels of standardization have been recog-
nised: 
1. interchangeability of parts of different 
models ;: 
2. production of similar parts in the same fac-
tory; 
3. decreasing the number of types of product; 
4. standardization of the products of groups of 
manufacturers as a result of common components; 
5. determination of standards for the whole indus-
try, such as for screw threads; 
6. standardization by the military authorities for 
control layouts, etc.4 
In a wider perspective it has been seen as an all-
embracing concept covering not just manufactures, but beha-
viour as well: "A standard is a formulation established 
verbally, in writing or by any other graphical method, or 
by means of a model, sample or other physical means of 
representation, to serve during a certain period of time 
for defining, designating or specifying certain features of 
a unit or basis of measurement, a physical object, an 
action, a process, a method, a capacity, a function, a 
performance, a measure, an arrangement, a condition, a 
duty, a right. a responsibility, a behavior, an attitude, a 
concept or a conception". 5 
Later definitions shifted from the overemphasis on 
the purely formal aspect of standardizati'on to the subject 
of efficiency and they also began to recognise the time 
factor: "Standards are practicable, profi t-proving solu-
tions to recurring problems. Established tentatively, they 
are couched in objective terms and are based on the consent 
of those affected. They facilitate and often promote 
general usage of the best thoughts and practices on the 
·subject being standardized. Standardiza tion is an evolu-
tionary process whereby standards are established".6 
Possibly the ultimate development of the concept has 
been its ·presentation as a distinct discipline froiD which 
very little is excluded: "applied sCience, techr;lolcgy, 
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industry and economics play extremely important parts. 
Human phychology, public relations, management and other 
social sciences are also involved. In very general terms 
its object may be described as the regulation of man's 
relationship to man in respect of the daily exchange of 
goods ｡ｮｾ＠ services. Each one of ｴｨｾｳ･＠ wide fields of 
knowledge contributes to standardization".7 There is 
little to quarrel with in this statement if we interpret it 
to mean that standardization is one of the main organizing 
concepts of human existence. But as a definition it is too 
general and too wide-ranging, and whether standardization 
should be treated as a separate discipline is debatable. 
We can arrive at a more satisfactory conclusion 
through a definition formulated by the International 
Organization for Standardization: Ｇｾｴ｡ｮ､｡ｲ､ｩｺ｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ is the 
process,of formulating and applying rules for an orderly 
approach to a specific activity for the benefit and with 
the cooperation of all concerned, and in particular for the 
promotion of optimum overall economy taking due account of 
functional conditions and safety requirements. It is based 
on the consolida ted resul ts of science, technique and 
experience. It determines not only the basis for the 
present but also for future development, and it should keep 
8 pace wi th progress". 
This definition acknowledges:both the formalizing and 
efficiency aspects of the standardization process, the role 
of present standards and the need for future change, and so 
far as it goes it is the most realistic of the definitions 
discussed here. However, it fails like all the others, in 
that it gives no account ot standardization as an unplanned 
activity somewhat in the nature of a natural trend. It is 
to this we now turn. 
'Standardization as a Natural Trend 
Standardization is much more than a formal activity 
carried out in the interests of achieving greater efficien-
cy in human affairs. It is a natural process9 rather than 
initially a man-made one in that it occurs ｾｩ､･ｬｹ＠
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throughout the natural world without the operation of con-
scious direction or will (unless one believes in the effi-
cacy of divine intervention). The universe, insofar as we 
know it, has been built up of standard units, atoms (and 
proba bly subatomic partic les), which are identical wi thin 
each particular class. Atoms of iron are identified by 
their standard qualities-their similarities, and distin-
guished from other atoms by their differences. 
Similarly, species are identified as distinct groups, 
the members of which have many characteristics in common, 
while being different in varying degrees from the members 
of other species. Species are subject to processes of 
natural selection and a; concept of fitness. 
The theory of natural selection is so crucial to the 
present argument, that it is worth a closer examination. 
Darwin's theory is based on three observable facts and two 
deductions which can be made from them. These are: 
1. The tendency of all organisms to increase in a 
geometrical ratio; 
2. Despite this tendency, the numbers in a species 
tend to remain constant, indicating that "there must be 
competition for survival"; 
3. All organisms vary appreciably. 
Thus, since there is a struggle and all organisms 
, 
are not alike, some variations will be advantageoul? in 
the struggle for existence and others less so. Conse-
quently, a higher proportion of-those with favourable 
variations will survive and a higher proportion of those 
with unfavourable variations will die or fail to 
reproduce. 10 
In sum, survival of organisms is not simply 'a matter 
of chance, but is dependent on factors or characteristics 
which operate systematically to distinguish those more 
.capable of surviving from the remainder. 
A species tends to become defined by those factors 
• 
which contribute to its survival potential and mark it out 
from others. As the nature of the environment varies, so 
the characteristics which favour survival will vary also. 
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Species survive or decay to the extent that they are well 
adapted to their environment and thus they will become 
specialised and localised, and, for the survivors, 
increasingly efficient. 
Efficiency is the prime driving force behind standard-
ization, even more so when it is the result of an autono-
mous natural trend than when it is a formal and deliberate 
activity. A species tends to take on that form which most 
favours survival in its particular environment, and this 
applies no less to human activities where we find that, 
even in the distant past, standards have developed as a 
result of the natural and unplanned outcomes of human 
existence. Thus it has been observed that "Whenever we 
find people living together in groups, whatever be the 
group· basis upon which they live, we find habitual, set, 
and highly routinised behavior".11 Such habits and 
behaviours, customs and rules, were lithe first standards of 
life" .12 
The same kind of trend also applies to man-made 
objects which tend to be developed more or less uncon-
sciously into those forms which are most suitable to serve 
the given purpose. Stone-age axes occur in much the same 
shape and form wherever they are found.13 The most ｬｩｫ･ｬｾ＠
explanation for this is the need for functional efficiency. 
A tool- which has to fit the hand, ｷｨｾ｣ｨ＠ requires a cutting 
edge and a certain amount of weight to increase the power 
of the cutting stroke, would tend to evolve into a common 
form because that form is more convenient and efficient in 
use than alternatives. 
Standardization of tools and technologies, then, 
evol ves around the superior method or "one best way" of 
performing a given task,14 subject to various factors which 
may modify performance such as, for example, prevailing 
.social and economic conditions, the level of technological 
advancement, the availablilty of materials, etc. Standard-
ization which develops in this way will be termed 
functional efficiency standardization (FEB). 
But standardization is not confined to the adoption of 
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designs and technologies which are intrinsically the most 
efficient available for a given purpose. Often the major 
iss u e i s p r act i calor prod u c t i ve con ve n i en c e and the p a r-
ticular standard adopted ｾｩｾ＠ arbitrary rather than func-
tional in that what is most important is that a s'tandard 
exists, rather than that the standard should be one thing 
rather than another. There is often no apparent functional 
efficiency standard but it is advantageous to have some 
kind of fixed standard rather than none. Weights and 
measures belong to this category, the category of arbitrary 
standardization. 
Weights and measures arose haphazardly through prac-
tical necessity and custom. Linear measurements developed 
literally by "rules of thumb". 'The breadth of a thumb was 
an inch; the length of the foot, 12 inches; the yard was 
the distance from the centre of the body to the fingertips 
with the arms outstretched.15 Such measurements would have 
been satisfactory for individual workers, but rather less 
so for trade or for people working together in groups. 
Thus more objective standards would become necessary and 
would be set up arbitrarily, perhaps at first by group 
leaders, later by local officials or governments. And 
howeve r systematic such ｳｴ｡ｮ､｡ｾ､ｳ＠ may be, there is a s yet 
no logic by which weights and measures may be devised 
without so.me arbitrary element.16 The basic unit of any 
system of measurement is arbitrary, and therefore all stan-
dards based primarily on measurement are in some degree 
arbitrary also. 
However arbitrarily it may be devised, a system of 
weights and measures though not easily related to func-
tional efficiency, has a clear and obvious relationship to 
production efficiency. Standard measurements are essential 
for efficient ,production, and really are a subsection of 
,what will be termed production efficiency standardization 
(PES). 
PES occurs when a manufacturer standardizes his prod-
uction by the universal adoption of a particular component 
or set of components in order to simplify his manufacturing 
18 
operations and reduce costs. This is the one situation 
where standardization is more likely to follow as a result 
of deliberate policy than from the operation of an uncon-
scious trend. 
However a particular production efficiency standard is 
arrived at, it can easily clash with the demands of func-
tional efficiency. Too much emphasis on production effi-
ciency may result in the production of goods which sacri-
fice quality or performance. Too much emphasis on func-
tional efficiency may result in goods which are rather more 
expensive than others in the same product class. Depending 
on the nature of the market, the majority of manufacturers 
are likely to concentrate on one type of product rather 
than another, emphasizing either quality or price, or they 
may seek some kind of compromise between the two. 
In presen t-day condi tions it is more often the mass 
market which offers the greatest potential reward to the 
manufacturer, than the more limited market for higher-
priced, quality goods. The nearest approach to a standard 
product in a mass market is the kind of product (in terms 
of basic format, price range, etc.) which sells in the 
largest numbers, the product with the widest possible 
appeal. Market research aims to investigate the nature of 
this appeal by trying to identify the product characteris-
tics which are most important to the majority of consumers. 
The successful product will tend to incorporate such char-
acteristics, and when a particularly successful product 
appears on the market, other manufacturers will attempt to 
emulate it. Thus in a mass market there usually exists a 
trend to standardization in terms of the kind of product 
which appeals to the largest number of consumers. Any 
movement in this direction, and particularly the copying of 
successful products by other manufacturers, will be termed 
.marketing efficiency standardization (KBS). 
MES is largely a result of the pressure of consumer 
demand. Thus it may be differentiated from the more 
general concept, "product standardization", which bas been 
defined as "a process by whicb increasingly specific 
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product aspects become similar across firms".17 Product 
standardization will generally be taken to indicate stan-
dardization which results from the effects of all the 
different kinds of standardization discussed here: 
arbitrary, functional, production, and marketing. 
Standardization is a continuous process rather than a 
finite one. The standards that arise from these various 
kinds of standardization are more likely to be transient 
than permanent as new technologies are developed, new 
materials become available, and consumer preference is 
influenced by changes of taste and fashion as well as 
advertising. We can' get a better understanding of this 
issue by examining in more detail and to some extent his-
torically the different kinds of standardization. 
Functional Efficiency Standardization 
Functional efficiency standardization (FES) refers to 
the trend for makers and users to adopt the most efficient 
design of a given product. The most efficient design is 
that which serves a given purpose or function most effec-
tively. Thus there is no simple answer to the question-
What is the best designed product?-since the answer 
depends on the product's intended use. A dining table, for 
example, may differ considerably from a table required to 
serve as a firm work 'surface capable of taking heavy loads 
without upsetting. While both tables are likely to have 
four legs and a solid top, the dining tal:ile could well be 
round rather than rectangular. Given that room space is 
adequate, a round table can be far more convenient for 
seating several people than a rectangular one, since it 
makes it easier to allow each person the same amount of 
space and avoids cramping or waste of space at corners. 
A round table, however, would not serve very well as a 
.work surface intended to support heavy loads, since between 
each pair of legs there would be a section which overlaps 
the axis of support provided by the legs. A heavy weight 
placed on any such Bection would be likely to upset the 
table. A rectangular table, therefore, with legs at each 
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corner and little or no overlap, would be a far better 
design as a work table than a round one. 
Even though there may be a best design for any given 
function, it is not always possible to design a product in 
, 
accordance wi th it. Many products are expected t'o serve 
several different and sometimes divergent functions, and so 
some compromise is necessary in their design, some trade-
off between designs for one function and another. A round 
table might be supplied with fixings to attach it to the 
floor so that it becomes more stable at the cost of reduced 
mobility. A square table might be fitted with flaps to 
convert it to a round one when required. 
Thus there are always likely to be gains and losses in 
the des ign of a produc t. Effect i ve des ign depends on the 
principle of "totality", that is, taking all relevant 
factors into account,18 and often some degree of functional 
efficiency will be sacrificed in order to simplify produc-
tion and reduce costs, or to give the consumer what he 
wants in some other respect. 
As we have already seen in connection with stone axes, 
the trend to FES has existed since the earliest man-made 
artefacts. It seems likely also that it has continued 
throughout the history of technology. But rather than 
attempting a general review here which would go beyond the 
scope of the ｰｲ･ｳｾｮｴ＠ research, the ｦｯｬｬｯｾｩｮｧ＠ discussion 
will concentrate on the development of the bicycle frame 
which is not without relevance to the development of the 
motor cycle which is discussed in later chapters. The aim 
will be to demonstrate how technical issues in design may 
be compromised by other considerations.19 
The development of the bicycle frame has been based on 
two distinct kinds of activity: 1. solving the practical 
problems of designing and manufacturing a bicycle which 
,will sell at a profit, and 2. the application of basic 
mechanics. 
. 
The parts of the bicycle frame are likely to be 
subjected to various different kinds of stress, of which it 
is sufficient for present purposes to consider only 
21 
compression and tension stress (figs. 2.1a and 2.lb) which 
act parallel to the axis of a beam, and bending stress 
which acts transversely (fig. 2.1c). 
ｾｾＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭｾｾ＠
a. compression stress 
ｾｾ＠ ____________ ｾｈＭ
b. tension stress 
I 1 
f 
ｾ＠
I 
c. bending stress 
Fig. 2.1. Some stresses acting on a horizontal beam 
The arrows indicate the directions of the forces applied 
The 'frames of the earliest bicycles were constructed 
from solid metal bars. This form of construction made the 
machines very heavy while the extra weight added little or 
nothing in strength as compared with tubular construction, 
which soon became the standard form. 20 
The transition from solid to tubular frames took place 
relatively early in the development of the bicycle, but the 
form of the standard frame itself was rather longer in 
developing. The frame of th,e high-wheeled "ordinary" (or 
penny-farthing) consisted of a single beam, known as the 
spine, which curved around the large front wheel on its way 
to meet the small trailing wheel (fig. 2.2). With the seat 
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Fig. 2.2. The "Ordinary" Bicycle 
("The 'eye list", 22 June 1881) 
placed near the top of 
the spine, the latter 
would be subject to a 
bending ｳｾｲ･ｳｳ＠ acting 
downwards and across its 
axis. The spine there-
fore had to be particu-
lar ly strong. 
A more scientifi-
cally designed bicycle 
frame, constructed so as 
to eliminate bending 
stress, could be lighter 
without 'loss of 
strength, but this could 
not be achieved until the safety bicycle was developed. 
The first safety bicycle designs appeared from about 1876 
onwards, but a mechanically satisfactory and commercially 
effective design was not constructed until the mid-1880s. 
By 1890 the safety bicycle had been developed into its 
modern form wi th diamond frame (fig. 2.3) • 
.' 
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Pig •. 2.3. A Diamond-Frame Bicycle 
(liThe Cyclist", 28 November 1894) 
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However, the frame illustrated which dates from 1894, 
does not eliminate bending stress. In order to do so it 
would have to satisfy the condition that "the axes of the 
top and bottom tubes should if produced, intersect. at a 
point vertically over the front wheel",21 the point P. As 
may be seen by the dotted lines AB and Be in fig. 2.4, (an 
outline of fig. 2.3), the necessary condition is not met in 
this design. The reason for this is that in designing a 
cycle frame, other factors also have to be taken into 
account, like, for example, wheelbase, which makes it dif-
ficult to meet such exact design prescriptions.22 
Fig. 2.4. Diamond Frame Design 
There are two ways of dealing with this problem. One 
is to stay with the standard diamond frame but to 
strengthen those members which are subject to bending 
stress, thus making the frame heavier than it would other-
wise need to be. The other is to insert an extra tube, as 
represented by the dotted line DE (fig. 2.4), which would 
.convert any bending stress into a compression stress on the 
new tube. The result would be a better designed frame 
which would be, however, more expensive to make. 
The majority of cycle manufacturers preferred the 
former course, that is, to stay with the simpler, standard 
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frame, strengthened to resist bending stress, cheaper to 
produce, but heavier and therefore slightly less efficient 
in operation than the best designs. This represented a 
trade-off between functional efficiency and ｰｾｯ､ｵ｣ｴｩｯｮ＠
efficiency, and also, in view of the lower price, marketing 
efficiency. The outcome was a design which has survived to 
the present day and still retains considerable popularity. 
Functional efficiency therefore may be the initial 
consideration when it comes to design, but it can rarely be 
the final one. The most efficient designs from a technical 
pOint of view may be difficult and expensive to produce. 
Ease of production, cost-effectiveness, and marketability, 
may all be more important at times than the ultimate in 
performance.' Much will depend on the nature of the product 
and the kind of market it serves. With luxury products 
aimed at a very limited market like, for example, the 
Rolls-Royce car, a ten per cent increase in price would 
probably have little effect on demand, so that manufac-
turers can afford to place maxima 1 emphasis on technical 
efficiency. In contrast, ten per cent on the price of a 
small car intended for the mass market might lead to sub-
stantially reduced sales, so that a much greater degree of 
technical efficiency is likely to be sacrificed to ｰｲｯｾｵ｣ﾭ
tion and price considerations than with the luxury car. 
Thus for many products and ｰ｡ｲｴｩｾｵｬ｡ｲｬｹ＠ for those in the 
lower price ranges, production efficiency will often prove 
to be more ｩｭｾｯｲｴ｡ｮｴ＠ than functional efficiency. 
Production Efficiency Standardization 
Production efficiency standardization (PES) refers to 
the tendency for products to be standardized in order to 
facilitate manufacture by more efficient and more cost-
effective technology. Although we might think of PES as 
.largely a 'modern development, there 1s no reason why it 
should not have existed in simple form far back in time • 
• Any craftsman working alone is likely to develop his own 
standard methods of working when producing the same kind of 
article again and again over many years. The use of parts 
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of the body for purposes of measurement was an early step 
in this direction. 
Perhaps the first positive move towards a production 
efficiency standard with effect beyond the activities of 
the individual worker, was the adoption of a measurement 
system. Standard forms of measurement have been traced 
back as far as 3000 BC. 23 But for the development of a 
system of measurement to serve the particular requirements 
of a firm or industry, we have to come much more up to da te 
and almost to modern times, to the sizes of type bodies in 
the French printing industry in the eighteenth century.24 
The sizes of ancient type bodies25 were arbitrary and 
varied considerably. In 1737 Pierre Simon Fournier first 
formulated his point system. The need for the new system 
arose when, in attempting to establish his own foundry for 
the manufacture of type, Fournier "found no rule to guide 
me in fixing the body of the characters which I am obliged 
to make" .26 
The point system was published in its final, perfected 
form in 1764. The basic unit was the point of which there 
were 72 to the inch, which was later standardized on the 
"pied du roi" containing 12 French or 12.7892 American 
inches.27 Thus the size of the point was quite arbitrary, 
but the development of a system of standard sizes was of 
great benefit. Much the same thing could be said about 
most forms of production technology. It is not so much 
what the standard is that matters, but the fact that a 
standard exists at all. 
Meanwhile, accurate official standards of measurement 
were being established for more general purposes. These 
were usually based on standard weights or lengths of metal 
, 
kept at an official repository, and from which reference 
gauges could be constructed for local use. Once the stan-
dardization and accuracy of measurement was assured, it 
'became possible in theory if not yet in practice to manu-
facture components of standard size which would be readily 
interchangeable wi th others. Wi th hand-crafted products 
this was unnecessary since nonstandard components could be 
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adapted to each other at the final fitting and assembly 
stage, and, indeed, it was not expected that parts would 
fit easily together without a considerable amount of work. 
In Birmingham ｧｾｮＭｭ｡ｫｩｮｧ＠ in the 1850s it required more 
workers to finish and fit together the separate components 
than was required for their original manufacture.28 
Among the first to develop manufacture by the system 
of interchangeable parts, was the firm of Bolton and Watt 
which had an interest in Cornish mining., The firm supplied 
pumping engines for the mines and in 1780 ｩｴｾｲ･｡ｬｩｳ･､＠ that 
there was a need for a stock of certain engine parts for 
the pumps, otherwise a mine might be ruined before the new 
part could be made. 29 . Later on, in response to a rush of 
orders for its products, the firm began to build engines to 
standard patterns in order to concentrate production on a 
limited number of engine sizes.30 
But much more inipressive than the efforts of Bolton I 
and Watt or anything else of the sort so far achieved 
elsewhere, was the Portsmouth blockmaking machinery--prob-
ably the first powered machinery capable of mass producing 
interchangeable parts to precise specifications.31 In the 
days of sail, pulley-blocks were in great demand. A 72-gun 
ship required 922 blocks, and it was estimated that con-
sumption by the·Royal Navy early in the nineteenth century 
was 100,000 a year. 32 The machinery was developed as a : 
result of the suggestion of Brigadier General Sir Samuel 
Bentham that the government should manufacture blocks for 
naval stores by power-driven machinery. It was BruneI, 
however, who actually deSigned the machines and installed 
them, and they proved so effective that, according to 
claims made at the time, they enabled 10 unSkilled men to 
do the work of 110 skilled blockmakers.33 
These early efforts would seem to have given Britain a 
·significant lead in the development of standardization and 
ｭｾｳｳ＠ production technology. Much of British industry, how-
ever, was rather slow to follow the example of the pioneers 
with the result that, perhaps unfairly,34 most of the' 
credit for originating mass production is usually given to 
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the Americans, Eli Whitney and Simon North. About the time 
the blockmaking machinery was being developed in England, 
Whitney and North were given contracts by the American 
ｾｯｶ･ｲｮｭ･ｮｴ＠ to manufacture firearms by the interchangeable 
parts method. 35 The advances they made were of great 
significance, but were, nevertheless, a good deal short of 
full interchangeability and progress was much slower than 
is sometimes thought. 
In the 1790s the. degree of uniformity in muskets 
produced at the Springfield Armory was limited to what was 
required by pattern, which meant that the finished product 
did not have to conform exactly to the given dimensions. 
Muskets might vary as much as 1.5 inches in length (3%), 
and although they had to accept standard bullets, even 
these could vary to some extent "as empty paper cartridge 
was wadded over the ball".36 Under this system, one gun-
smith would make the whole gun himself. Great skill was 
needed to fit the parts together and if one part broke the 
gun would to totally useless and could only be repaired by 
a skilled armourer. 
When Whitney came on the scene, his aim of full inter-
changeability was far from reality and would remain so 
until ,the development of better machinery. With only 
rather crude machinery at his disposal, he depended on 
filers to finish off parts.37 Thus the level of inter-
changeability he achieved "meant little more than a degree 
of similarity sufficient to aliow relatively unskilled 
armorers to fit parts from broken weapons with a small 
amount of fitting or adjustment".38 
In 1812 the US Ordnance Department began to call for 
stricter adherence to the contractual terms regarding 
interchangeability, and in 1815 Congress called for greater 
standardiza tion in ordnance supplies.39 A new musket was 
·designed by Lt. Col. Roswell Lee of the Springfield Armory, 
but it was much as before, based on handicraft design, 
since full interchangeability was still not possible with 
the machinery then available. 
It was Lee, however, who promoted the most important 
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advance. During his time at Springfield he encouraged 
inventors by offering them "space, power and economic 
incentives".40 One man he invited to Springfield was 
Thomas Blanchard who ｾ｡ｳ＠ already involved in producing 
lathes for arms manufacturers. In two years Blanchard had 
developed a lathe for duplicating irregular forms which 
could produce a gun stock in nine minutes. From this 
beginning various other lathes were developed which could 
turn out accurate components in both wood and metal, making 
it possible to manufacture parts with unskilled labour 
which had previously required a high degree of skill in 
their production.41 Until then it had been impossible to 
produce a truly standard musket. 
Full interchangeability was first achieved at the 
Springfield Armory in the 1840s and it set an example for 
industrial production which spread rapidly to other parts 
of American industry and overseas, so much so that the 
system of mass production by standard interchangeable parts 
became known as the American system of manufacture. 
Meanwhile, there were comparable advances in some 
parts of British industry while others lagged. In the 
1830s James Nasmyth began to manufacture machine tools in 
standardized form.42 In 184l;Joseph Whitworth proposed the 
first standard for screw sizes in a paper read before the 
Institu.tion of Civil Engineers.43 In the same decade the 
Great Western Railway began to build its locomotives to 
standard patterns, but the British market was not 'big 
enough to enable any British manufacturer to build standard 
locomotives for stock on a large scale.44 
Despite t his progress most custome rs in the machine 
tools industry continued to insist on machines designed to 
their own ideas,45 and even in newer industries and much 
later in the cen tury, Bri tain continued to lag in the 
.adoption of new methods •. Thus in the eye Ie industry, an 
industry in which Bri tai n led the world, it was on 1y the 
combination of competition from cheap American mass 
produced bicycles plus .overproduction in the home industry 
during the mid-1890s, that led the British to reduce prices 
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by standardizing their production and adopting more modern 
methods. 46 
But while British technology lagged, the Americans 
continued to move ahead. The most revolutionary step for-
ward in mass production technology came soon after the turn 
of the century with the development of the assembly line, 
and, perhaps more important still, the kind of product that 
made it worthwhile. This took the form of Henry Ford's 
Mode 1 T. 
There was little or nothing innovative about the Model 
T as a motor car. It was a standard model, intended to 
appeal to the typical conserva tive, average consume r. 
Every feature has been fully tried and tested in practice. 
It was designed so as to minimise cost and simplify produc-
tion to the greatest possible degree. But Ford carried the 
standardization process to absurd lengths, as illustrated 
by his famous remark: "Any customer can have a car painted 
any colour that he wants so long as it is black".47 In 
production efficiency terms this decree was probably justi-
fied; in marketing terms, less so. But this idiosyncracy 
did not detract from the success of the Model T. 
It was a success which owed much to the new technology' 
and yet it owed even more to the market and the product 
that was created to serve it. Henry Ford's genius was in 
being the first to appreciate fully the nature o.f the 
potential market for.cars, and in creating the kind of 
product that would make ita reality: "Actually he inven-
ted the assembly line because he had concluded that at $500 
he could sell millions of cars".48 
Thus it is the market more than any other factor which 
gives substance to the trend to standardization in manufac-
ture. But as will be seen in later chapters and, if we are 
to take the example of the mot-or cycle industry as illus-
.trative, before the market can be developed to any great 
degree, the product itself must be approaching some degree 
. 
of s tanda rdiza tion. Henry Ford c oul d not have c rea ted a 
mass market tor cars if consumers did not already have an 
idea of what a car should look like and what it should do. 
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Only then could they have seen their ideas realised in such 
as the Model T. 
Yet whatever the influence of the market, PES is the 
most obvious form of standardization, the most obvi:eusly 
beneficial form, and is probably the most easily applied. 
If manufacturers can standardize their components and the 
technologies they use in manufacture they can often sim-
plify production and reduce costs over a wide range of 
activities. In the past, however, these advantages were 
usually far from obvious, and it was only as a result of 
specific problems and attempts to solve them that standard-
ization developed. 
The efforts of Fournier in France, and Boulton and 
Watt in ｅｮｧｬ｡ｮ､ｾ＠ were not prompted initially by any parti-
cular wish to standardize their products but represented a 
response to particular problems,and are best to be under-
stood as evolutionary developments. The revolution some;;' 
times implied by accounts of the development of the so 
called American system of manufacture, was not wrought 
practically overnight by Whitney and North but was the 
result of decades of development work most of which was 
completed after they had left the scene, and much of it 
elsewhere. 
The early advances which took place in Britain were 
less than enthusiastically received by much of British 
industry. The "reason for this is not hard to find. The 
first mass ｰｲｯ､ｵ｣ｾ､Ｌ＠ standardized products often seemed 
cheap and poor quality compared to the hand-crafted 
product. Possibly they were. Also, British consumers were 
accustomed to products made to their own particular 
requirements and many did not wish to risk ordering some-
thing which might prove to be of doubtful quality. 
Ultimately, it is always the consumer who decides 
-whether a new product will succeed or fail in the ma rket-
place. It is the consumer who will ｣ｨｾｯｳ･＠ between the high 
priced product of maximal functional efficiency and the 
cheaper mass-produced article. Thus although manufacturers 
might set out to develop technically superior products or 
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alternatively to implement a programme of component or 
product standardization, there 1s no certainty that con-
ｾｵｭ･ｲｳ＠ will buy the new products. Acceptance of standard-
ized products in place. of traditional hand-crafted, custom 
built articles, requires a fundamental change of attitude 
which is likely to be as much an evolutionary process as 
the development of standardization technology itself. As 
will be seen in the next chapter, few consumers are quick 
to adopt a product that is in any sense radically new. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MARKETING EFFICIENCY STANDARDIZATION 
The last chapter defined standardization and discussed 
how it takes place much of the time unconsciously as a 
trend rather than as a policy requiring the intervention of 
deliberate deciSion-making. It went on to analyse the 
trend into three main components, functional efficiency 
standardization, production efficiency standardization, and 
marketing efficiency standardization, and then proceeded to 
discuss the first two of these at length, arriving in each 
case at the conclusion that the market is likely to be a 
major determining factor. 
In this chapter the discussion is extended to the 
influence of the market on the trend to standardization. 
The market, for present purposes, involves just two main 
factors, the product (including by extension, the producer) 
and the consumer. 
The product is examined in terms of two issues, the 
meaning of "new product" and how far it pays to innovate. 
The term "new product" is analysed into five categories in 
an attempt to:overcome the ambiguity of so called new 
products which are not really new, but represent nothing 
more than minor modifications to existing ones. As the 
discussion develops, it emerges that the most successful 
new products are likely to be only moderately innovative 
and not substantially different from established ones. 
The typical consumer is found to' be inclined to 
caution where the purchase of new products is concerned and 
this is in line with what has already been learnt about 
,product development in general, and gives further support 
to the idea of the trend to standardization. 
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Introduction 
Marketing efficiency standardization refers to the 
trend for the products of a particular industry to become 
more and more alike through the pressure of consumer 
demand. It is a result of the tendency of most consumers 
to prefer the safe, reliable product of known reputation 
and performance, to that which is new, unfamiliar and 
untried, combined with the inclination of most producers to 
cater for existing demand rather than to embark on the 
uncertainties of innovation. 
This does not mean that producers will never innovate, 
nor that consumers will invariably reject the innovative 
product.; What it usually means is that the majority of 
, 
both ｣ｯｮｾｵｭ･ｲｳ＠ and producers will tend to hold back from 
adopting the radically new product until somebody else has 
proved, for the producer, that it can be manufactured and 
sold at a profit, and for the consumer, that it works and 
offers a discernible advantage over other products--until 
in fact it is no longer particularly new. 
This conclusion raises various problems: What is a 
radically new product? If most consumers are likely to 
reject such a product, how is it possible for producers to 
innovate at all? Are less radically innovative products 
which, nevertheless, seem to be new, new, only as a result 
of illusions crea ted by some ki nd of conjuring t rick of the 
marketers, or do they offer something new though of a 
lesser order? But the first thing that must be considered 
even before examining the meaning of "radically new" is to 
define "new product". 
The New Product 
The product can be defined from the point of view of 
the producer, the "marketer, the potential consumer, or the 
'buyer. Thus there are various definitions of which the 
following are intended to be merely iLlustrative of the 
ma in approaches: 
(1) "thing or substance produced by natural process 
or manufacture,,;1 
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(2) "anything which requires marketing to anybody,,;2 
(3) "a c luster of anticipated customer benefi ts,,;3 
(4) "a material item, or service that is purchased 
; 4 
in the course of fulfilling a business goal". 
The last of these refers to an industrial rather than a 
consumer product, but for the purposes of the present 
discussion this makes little difference. The main point to 
be made is that the product isusually defined according to 
the perspective of the definer, and therefore it is hard to 
define product in a meaningful way except with reference to 
a particular context. It is scarcely an exaggeration to 
say that the context defines the product. This is particu-
ｾ｡ｲｬｹ＠ the case with the new product. 
The term "new product" is usually defined as Ita 
product that is new to the company".5 But, as we shall 
see, this means it can be applied to almost anything. As 
one writer observes, it "seems to be applied to any product 
tha t requires a change in marketing direction".6 Further-
more, new products can represent replacements, extensions 
or additions to a previous range7 , or they may be old 
products presented in new packaging or delivered to new 
markets.8 They can introduce changes in cost, convenience 
in use, performance, method of use, and appearance.9 Thus 
there may be very little that is new about the new product, 
al though it has been s'uggested that they "must be suffi-
ciently different from the existing alternatives to consti-
ｴｵｴｾ＠ a basis for genuine consumer preference".10 
What is defined as new may vary in novelty from the 
highly original product which has not been seen before, to 
the old, long established product, presented and marketed 
in a new way. Such a concept of new product has little or 
no analytical value and does nothing to indicate just how 
new is a radically new product. Is it something which has 
'never been seen before in any form or can it be an old 
product which has ｢･･ｾ＠ given a new function or greatly 
improved performance? There is of course no ultimate 
answer to this question because words only have the 
meanings which we give them. The problem then becomes one 
35 
of analysis rather than words, and as a step in this direc-
tion it is worth attempting to identify and define the 
different kinds of new product. Five are suggested below 
but no claim is made to suggest that this list is 
exhaustive. 
1. The imitation - the product that is new in that it 
is new to the company, but is otherwise identical to some 
previously existing product, except, that is, in terms of 
brand name. Patent-expired drugs are a good example. 
2. The new package - the product that is basically as 
before in terms of function and use, but has been subjected 
to changes in packaging, colour scheme, styling, price, 
marketing, etc. Many own-brand supermarket goods come into 
this category. 
3. The improvement - the product which is the same in 
principle as before but which has been subjected to 
improvements which amount ·to small changes in efficiency 
and use. A good example is the development of five-speed 
gear boxes to replace the old four-speed ones. 
4. The major improvement - the product which is still 
the same in principle as before but which has been subjec-
ted to improvements which result in major changes in effi-
ciency and use. In ｴ･｣ｨｮｩ｣ｾｬ＠ performance alone ( not in 
commercial terms) the Concorde is an example of this since 
it subs.tantially reduces flying time. But as an aircraft 
it is much the same in principle as subsonic aircraft 
despite the new technology associated wi th supersonic 
flight. 
5. The new concept - the product, the like of which 
has never been seen before. When first introduced, motor 
vehicles, telephones, radio and television, computers, 
etc., were all in this category. There is no way it can be 
argued that the motor vehicle was simply an improved form 
.of horse-drawn carriage, since it was "horseless", an 
entirely new concept. 
Of these five categories, 1 and 2 are new primarily in 
marketing terms only, since what is new has been added on 
by the marketer rather than the designer. They couid never 
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be described as radically new though some of them might be 
genuinely new in a very limited way in that they may offer 
the consumer additional choice as, for example, in the case 
of new cp10ur schemes. 
Category 3, the improvement, is genuinely new in that 
it will usually offer some technical improvement resulting 
in improved performance, but this will be achieved without 
changing the basic design and format of the product. 
The major improvement, category 4, would certainly be 
new in a way that was beyond dispute, but not necessarily 
radical. Returning to the example of the Concorde, this 
might be seen as radically new from the manufacturer's 
pOint of view as it is based on new technology. It might 
be considered no less radical from a marketing point of 
view, in that it offers a unique service to those few who' 
can afford it and for whom every minute counts. But the 
uniqueness of the service offered rests in ｩｴｳＧｳｨｾ･ｲ＠ speed 
and does not amount to anything in the nature of an 
entirely new concept; the increased speed is an improve-
ment on other services rather than something radically new. 
The new concept, category 5, is always radically new 
by definition. 
It is possible now to reduce these five categories to 
three main coricepts: (a) the product that owes its novelty 
mainly to the marketing process; (b) the product that 
offers improved performance in operation as a result of 
some kind of technical advance; and (c) the product that 
will perform the kind of function that has never been 
available before. In general, products in category 
(a) will be looked upon as noninnovative, and those in 
categories (b) and (c) as innovative. 
In the later chapters of the thesis, the most 
important distinction, and a critical one, is that between 
. (a) and (b), the non-innova t i ve and the improved product. 
The motor cyc Ie could only be invented once, a nd so t he new 
concept product does not play much part in the discussion. 
Whichever category a new product belongs to, ,there is 
never any certainty that it will succeed commercially. 
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Many new products are put on the market, but evidence 
suggests that most of them fail, perhaps as many as 90% for 
some categories. 11 There is no indication as yet of what 
proportions of the successes and failures of such new 
, . 
products are genuinely new, but there is evidence to sug-
gest that innovative products may sometimes dO'less well 
than products based on old technology.12 Thus we come to 
the question, does it pay to innovate, or is it better to 
concentrate on the development and sale of products which 
are little changed except for the rather cosmetic improve-
ments generated by the marketing process? 
Does It Pay To Innovate? 
The constant emphasis on the need to innovate, not 
only in the speeches of politicians but in the literatures 
of social science in general, and economics, management and 
marketing in particular, leaves little doupt of the exis-
tence of a popular assumption that it does pay to innovate. 
This assumption would seem to be borne out by the fact that 
many new products are put on the market and survive to 
achieve substantial profits. According to one source, "It 
is commonplace for major companies to have 50% or more of 
｣ｵｲｲ･ｮｾ＠ sales in products new in the past ten years".13 
And thIs, we may observe, occurs despite the high failure 
rate of new products previously noted. The problem is that 
such statements tell us very little about just how innova-
tive are the new products in question. It is possible that 
many of these products are not innovative in the sense 
previously defined, and this would not be surprising, since 
there is considera ble evidence that it often pays to 
develop non-innovative new products. 
Many new products are imitations. Imitation of a 
successful new product is likely to pay not simply in terms 
.of sales but in avoiding the risks of developing new 
products for which there is as yet no sure indication 
either that they will work or that they will 8ell.14 Just 
how· important imitations are will depend ontthe size of the 
market, the nature of the product itself, and the industry. 
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Once a genuinely new product has been developed and proved 
a commercial success, imitative products will appear and 
15 
may in time take a major share of the market. 
Like imi tations, old products which are re-presented 
to the consumer in new forms of packaging are also essen-
tially noninnovative. Newly packaged products come in many 
different forms. Many otherwise familiar products can be 
found on supermarket shelves as "own brands" and often at 
bargain prices. 16 Here the method of presentation, or the 
price, may be more important than the brand name, and there 
is little doubt that it often pays to re-package products 
into such form particularly for chain-stores with large-
scale purchasing and marketing facilities. 
But new packaging can go much further than this. An 
old prod u c t can bee n t ire 1 y res t y led and yet s t i 11 ret a in 
its original character at least in terms of function and 
performance. Restyling ｲ｡ｾｨ･ｲ＠ than genuine innovation has 
been particularly prevalent in the motor industry where 
efforts tend to be "mainly concerned wi th constant minor 
development of traditional designs and with fashion 
changes" .17 Neve rthe less, companies have increased their 
market share substantially, and with little or no change in 
basic technology. IS 
Such efforts often belong under the heading "product 
differentiation" which is,a characteristic response when 
products have become too m,uch alike or when it is desired 
to increase their competitiveness without innovating more 
radically: "A general class of product is differentiated 
if any significant basis exists for distinguishing the good 
(or services) of one seller from those of another".19 
Differentiation may be based on "exclusive patented 
features; trade-marks; trade-names; peculiarities of the 
package or container, if any; or singularity in quality, 
,design, colour, or style".20 
What this often amounts to is to make products look 
different while they remain very much the same. A good 
example is the Ford Model A which was introduced in 1927 to 
replace the Model T. Other manufacturers had turned to 
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styling in order to compete with Ford with the result that 
Ford's market share had fallen. In response, the Model T 
was restyled and became the Model A which "was significant 
not because the design was innovative but because it was 
not".21 
The fact that it often pays to develop new products 
which are essentially noninnovative, does not necessarily 
mean that it does not pay to innovate more radically. The 
problem here for the producer is the risk and uncertainty 
involved.22 Radically new products often need a great deal 
23 of development work before they are entirely effective. 
New technology may lead a firm into unfamiliar territory 
where it has little experience. And when the technical 
problems have been 'overcome, it is always possible that 
consumers are not interested in the new product which 
emerges. Some new products turn out to be too advanced for 
the ･ｸｩｳｴｩｮｾ＠ market. Others may prove to be insufficiently 
superior to older products to command the kind of price 
24 
needed to recoup the original investment. 
New products fail more often than they succeed, and 
many different reasons have been given for their failure or 
success. Some writers find a major cause of either in the 
way product development is organized.25 Extensive lists of 
reasons for failure have been produced which include every-
thing from.design and the nature of the product itself, 
through technical and manufacturing difficul ties, to 
various factors related to selling, the market, price and 
competition.26 Equally extensive lists have been given of 
reasons for success, including, particularly, factors 
related to the effectiveness of the product, knowledge of 
the market, skill in applying new, technology, and in 
carrying out product development procedures.27 A factor 
which receives ｡｣ｫｮｯｷｬ･､ｧ･ｾ･ｮｴ＠ in almost all of these 
studies is market orientation, that is, planning all 
stages of product development with reference to the needs 
of the market. But excellence in a particular area is 
insufficieQ,t to ensure new product success and it is 
generally more important for a firm to achieve a 
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satisfactory performance in all departments.28 
There remains, however, one unresolved problem with 
almost all of these studies: their failure to distinguish 
between more and less innovative new products. There is 
usually little or no attempt to deal with the questions of 
how innovative is a new product, and how does degree of 
innovativeness relate to success and failure. In what is 
probably the best attempt so far to deal with these ques-
tions, the approach is to relate different types of new 
product to clusters of factors which the analYSis has found 
relevant to their success or failure. 29 Nine categories of 
"new product scenarios" are identified. These are summa-
rized as follows: 
I.' The better mousetrap with no marketing. Theie 
were ｾ･ｳ｣ｲｩ｢･､＠ as innovative products which offered defi-
nite advantages over other products. They involved the 
firm in new technologies and a new product class, but they 
tended to occur in firms with poor marketing skills. The 
result was a rather low success rate, 36%, as compared with 
an average success rate of 52% (see Table 3.1, next page) 
for all the new product categories in the sample. 
2. The innovative mousetrap that really wasn't 
better. These were genuine innovations which failed tq 
of fer a ny ad vantage ove r other products. They we re a sso-
ciated with firms which performed ｴｨ･ｾｲ＠ product development 
activities badly, and had little knowledge of the rather 
poor market in ｷｾｩ｣ｨ＠ they were operating. All products in 
this category failed. 
3. The close to home "me too" product. Thes e we re 
noninnovative products of average quality offering no 
economic advantage to the consumer. They "were not new to 
the firm, and were aimed at existing customers, utilized 
existing production facilities, relied on in-house techno-
.logy, and involved familiar advertiSing/promotion 
methods".31 Production was efficiently organized, but 
marketing was weak. This was no great disadvantage, 
however, because the market was nondynamic, noncompetitive 
and dissatisfied. The result was a slightly above average 
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Category (cat. number) 
The synergistic "close to 
home" product (9) 
The innovative superior product 
with no synergy (8) 
The old but simple money 
saver (6) 
The synergistic product that 
was new to the firm (7) 
The innovative high technology 
product (4) 
The close to home "me too" 
'product (3) 
The better mousetrap with no 
marketing (1) 
The "me too" product with no 
technical/production synergy (5) 
The innovative mousetrap that 
really wasn't better (2) 
Total 
% 
Successes 
:72 
, 
70 
70 
67 
64 
56 
36 
14 
0 
52 
Number 
of cases 
25 
20 
30 
21 
28 
16 
14 
21 
20 
195 
Table 3.1. New Product Types Based on Cluster Analysis30 
(in descending .order of successful outcomes) 
ｳｵｾ｣･ｳｳ＠ rate, 56%. 
4. The inDovative high technology product. These 
were innovative products, unique to the market and offered 
distinct advantages to the consumer compared with other 
products. They were technically complex, high priced and 
involved new technology, but production was well organized 
.. and ma rketing strong, with the resul t tha t thei r success 
.rate was well above average, 64%. 
5. The -me too" product with no technical/production 
synergy. These were similar to existing products and 
offered no special advantage to the consumer. Where they 
occurred, "There was a very poor company/product fit in the 
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areas of R&D, engineering and production".32 The tech-
nology required was new to the company, and product devel-
opment activities were poorly carried out. The market was 
competitive and existing consumers were well satisfied. 
, 
The result was a very poor success rate, 14%. 
6. The old but simple money saver. These were 
simple, small, low technology products. They were familiar 
to the firm in terms of customer needs and product class. 
Their main advantage to the customer came in terms of lower 
cost, but they also offered small improvements (i.e., they 
were "marginally unique") which made them superior in 
meeting customer needs. Production was efficient but the 
market competitive. However, the advantage offered by 
these simple products gave them a high success rate, 70%. 
7. The synergistic product that was new to the firm. 
These products were not just new to the firm, but involved 
new customers, new product class, new competitors and new 
production process. There was, however, a strong match 
between the product and the firm's capabilities, and par-
ticularly high efficiency in the way product development 
activities were carried out. Technology requirement was 
low and the product simple, but it offered advantages to 
the consumer and superior p.roduct quality. The success 
rate, 67%, was well above average. 
8 •. The innovative superior product with no synergy. 
These were "breakthrough" products, technically complex and 
requiring a high level of technology. They were unique 'and 
superior, and offered cost and performance advantages to 
the consumer. The firms involved lacked synergy between 
technology and production, and between marketing and man-
agement, and were low in marketing knowledge and poor in 
financial analysis. The market, howeyer, was only weakly 
competitive with the result that the products did well and 
.achieved a high success rate, 70%. 
9. The synergistic "close to home" product. Products 
in this category "were most notable for their similarity to 
the company's existing products and markets".33 They 
involved high technology and offered the consumer 
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advantages as compared with other products, but they were 
neither unique, nor new to the company, Ｇｾｮ､＠ kept the firm 
close to home in terms of product class, production 
process, technology used, distribution and salesforce, 
advertising and promotion, and competitors faced".34 
Product development activities were performed adequately 
rather than particularly well. The market was competitive 
and growing. This product category was the most successful 
of those studied with a success rate of 72%. 
The importance of this study rests in the fact that it 
is almost the only one toexamine in any detail the success 
and failure of different kinds of ｮｾｷ＠ product. It is of 
. little help to know that the majority of new products fail. 
It is only slightly more helpful to know that firms which 
perform their product development activities more efficien-
tly achieve a higher success rate with new products than 
others. This is no more than we would expect. But we can 
learn a great deal from evidence to the effect that new 
product success is related to the nature of the product and 
how it·has been developed. 
In this connection we find that of the more innova-
tive new product categories, only two did well (4 & 8), 
while two did rather badly (1 & 2). And of the two catego-
ries Judged noninnovative (3 & 5), one achieved average 
success while the vast majority of 'products in the other 
failed. 
In comparison, the three moderately innovative catego-
ries (6, 7, & 9), all did very well. The most important 
factor in their success seems to have been the relationship 
of the new product to the firm's existing strengths. The 
products in question were old and familiar to the firm (6), 
new to the firm but having a strong match with the firm's 
capabilities (7), or "close to home" (9). In two of these 
.categories (6 & 9), the products were familiar to the firm 
in terms of customer needs. 
What these conclusions suggest is that the most suc-
cessful way to innovate is to aim at markets in which the 
firm already has experience, to concentrate on ｰｾｯ､ｵ｣ｴｳ＠
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which are already familiar to the firm and which require 
familiar technology,and to keep the level of innovation 
fairly low. 
Some degree of innovation is necessary, however, but 
for the majority of firms, not too much. The least innova-
tive product categories did least well. The more highly 
innovative did a little better, but nowhere near as well as 
the moderately innovative. Thus the most successful new 
products appear to be those that represent small gains. 
Such products are the easiest for firms to develop and 
market. They tend to consolidate existing markets, and, in 
that they usually involve little significant change in 
design, they strengthen the trend to standardization. 
The trend then, far from being challenged by ideas 
and research related to product development, is in general 
supported by them. Successful innovation, except in those 
rare cases when an entirely new concept product is 
developed, is to a large extent a matter of going with the 
trend rather than working against it. Even in the 
generally accepted definition of new product--a product new 
to the firm-there is the suggestion that such a product 
need not be intrinsically new. Thus there is much apparent 
ambiguity in work on product development where new products 
are concerned-what is a new product if it is not really 
new?--but this may be less an ambiguity than a reflection 
of day-to-day commerce where most business is done by 
selling long-term standard products which have been little 
changed in principle for many years, and where it is 
recognised that new products should build on existing 
strengths rather than supplant them. 
As we shall see in the next section, it is such 
products, those which have been available for some time or 
which have known capabilities, which are most likely to 
·appeal to the majority of consumers. 
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The Consumer 
Consumers are people who buy goods for their own use 
as against those who buy in the furtherance of business 
activities.35 Buying itself is a simple activity, but a 
great deal can happen between the buyer's realization that 
he wants or needs to buy something and the act of buying. 
The consumer must make a decision and many things can 
influence that decision. The decision-making process may 
be influenced by the consumer's own experience,36 the way 
his mind works,37 his fami1y,38 the social groups he iden-
tifies with,39 the mass media,40 aspects of the proposed 
purchase such as price,41 and so on. Thus a purchase must 
usually be matched not only. to particular needs and econ-
omic circumstances, but also to the purchaser's self-image 
and his sense of position in the world at large. Conse-
quently, the degree to which a consumer is inclined to buy 
more or less ｩｮｮｯｶ｡ｾｩｶ･＠ products is as likely to be related 
to his personal circumstances as to the product itself. 
Early research on consumer innovativeness usually 
emphasized personality and social position. Consumers were 
divided into several categories of innovativeness ranging 
from the innovator, the first to adopt a new product, to 
the laggard, the last to do so. The innovator was charac-
terized as "venturesome" and tending to seek "the hazar-
dous, the rash, the daring, and the riskY",42 while the 
laggard would usually base his purchases on past exper-
ience. There is an interesting relationship between the 
innovator and the laggard, in the suggestion that the 
innovator will often buy a new product simply because it is 
new, while the laggard will reject it for the same 
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reason. 
Between the innovator and the laggard, come various 
groups characterized by lesser ､･ｧｲ･ｾｳ＠ of innovativeness or 
conservatism. These represent the majority of consumers 
who, while willing to innovate to a degree, are more 
cau tious and tend to take ra ther more trouble ove r the". 
decision to purchase. Thus those in the category "early 
adopters" have been characterized as "respectable", the 
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"early majority" as "deliberate", and the "late majority" 
as skePtical".44 A point often emphasized is the element 
of risk, not simply in terms of the financial loss which 
mayresult from a bad purchase, but in the social loss off 
face which may also arise. Those of average wealth par-
ticularly are seen as socially conformist and having a high 
need to maintain the material symbols of their station in 
life. 
Various methods may be adopted to reduce the apparent 
risk in buying. Some consumers seek information about the 
product from advertising, friends, or reference groups, or 
ｴｨ･ｾ＠ may seek to establish particular rules or routines to 
follow when;undertaking a purchase, such as, for example, a 
self-imposed restric'tion on the use of credit cards, or a 
preference' for plain, sensible designs.45 Others may 
depend largely on brand 10yalty,46 or use price as an 
indicator of quality.47 
The wi sh to avoid or reduce risk and the tendency to 
routinize buying, will tend to militate against innovative 
behaviour. In the desire, which is widespread if not 
universal, to keep up with the Jones', most consumers are 
followers rather than leaders. In the American context, 
people identified as "middle majori ty"-a concept sugges-
tive of the average consumer in an affluent society--have 
been characterized as wanting "solid ｲ･ｳｵｬｴｾＢ＠ in satisfying 
personal needs; results which match the individual's sense 
of his own worth. Economy is desired yet at the same time 
there is a willingness to pay "a higher price for genuine 
qua Ii ty". Suc h peopl e wan t "not radica 1 departures from 
the past but products which help them reach smoothly the 
next step in self-fulfilment, be it a rose bush, a new 
sauce for the meat loaf, a cake mix with a more refined 
image".48 
The suggestion that the average consumer is rather 
conservative, gets further support elsewhere. The impor-
. 
tance of personal characteristics and social class as indi-
cators of consumer innovativeness, bas been disputed by 
some researchers on the grounds that they are unimportant 
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as predictors of innovativeness. 49 In contrast, certain 
characteristics of the product are strong predictors. 
Among these, relative advantage and compatibility, that is, 
the correspondence of ｾｨ･＠ product with existing values and 
past experience, are strong positive indicators, while 
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complexity and perceived risk, are strong negative ones. 
Of these factors, relative advantage, the advantage of 
a new product over others, is exclusive to the product and 
is obviously a characteristic of the product rather than 
the consumer. Compatibili ty, however, is hard to distin-
guish from the personal characteristics of the consumer, 
since, in that it refers to his own values and experience, 
it is as much related to him personally as to the product. 
Also, it is surprising thit compatibility can be a good 
predictor of consumer innovativeness, since how innovative 
can a new product be if it must be compatible with the 
consumer's existing values' and past experience? A radic-
ally new product will not serve if it clashes with the 
consumer's existing values. It would be reasonable to 
conclude then that the products which are successful 
because they are compatible, are those moderately innova-
tive products which we have already found to be preferred 
by most consumers. 
The negative innovation attributes, complexity and 
perceiyed risk, that is, the factors which will tend to 
deter the consumer from adopting a new product, also sug-
gest limits on the degree to which new products can be 
innovative. The unknown is always risky compared to the 
known, and an increased degree of complexity will heighten 
the risk. 
Thus, as we have seen elsewhere, new products which 
are to appeal readily to a consumer who does not belong to 
the fairly limited class of high innovators, must not be 
.too radical in concept or design. The majori ty of consu-
mers will tend to look for products which are improved, 
which offer some advantage over previous products, and yet 
which are familiar in basic form, design and performance. 
Anything which does not quite measure up to such standards, 
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and which appears to be a rather risky purchase, is likely 
to deter the majority of consumers at least in the short 
run. In the long run, almost any innovation might become 
widely adopted, but by then; the more typical consumer will 
have had time to familiarise himself with it, either 
through advertising or through the experience of acquain-
tances. It will no longer be so new. 
The effect of the tendency to caution on the part of 
the consumer particularly where new products are concerned, 
clearly encourages the trend to standardization. So long 
as consumers prefer products with which they are familiar 
and which are in line with their previous experience and 
existing values, at the expense of those which are more 
radically new and relatively unfamiliar, so long will 
producers find it expedient to develop new products mainly 
within an existing product format. The result will be the 
continuing tendency to standardize products on those basic 
designs which have already proved successful in the market-
place. 
This conclusion does not mean that product innovation 
will never take place to more than a minimal extent. What 
it means is that the more innovative products will be 
unlikely to gain a substantial share of the market until 
they have been available for a considerable time, and 
certainly a.longer period than would be required for many 
less innovative new products. 
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Conclusions to Chapters 2 and 3 
The trend to standardization refers to the tendency 
over time for diverse entities to be formed into classes 
according to ;activity, function, or other factors of cor-
respondence, and, within each class, to become more and 
more alike. It is in many ways an autonomous trend in that 
it is not governed by outside intervention or deliberate 
policy. But neither does it represent some supra-
individual entity. Rather it is in the nature of a system 
or organizing factor in that it occurs through the opera-
tion of natural selection among biological organisms and 
comparable processes in human activities. These processes 
take the form of a tendency on the part of populations or 
people in general to seek the most efficient solutions to 
problems, and they are fostered by the gains which greater 
operational efficiency brings to those having to act in 
competitive situations. 
Species tend to become subject to particular standards 
because by being so they maximise their efficiency as 
survivors. Human customs become established and standard-
ized because they serve a purpose, they are funct ional in 
that they contribute to the survival of the community. 
Technologies tend ｴｾ＠ evolve into standard practices in the 
cause of greater efficiency since no one willingly works 
harder than he has to. Similarly, products tend to become 
standardized in the adoption of more efficient designs, but 
also because of economy in manufacturing, custom, habi t, 
taste, fashion, a nd the gains to the producer or rna rketer 
from giving the consumer what he wants. 
On the level of functional efficiency, the best design 
is that which performs a given task in the most satisfac-
tory and effective way. It is almost inevitable that the 
producer will aim to develop better designs himself or to 
,imitate and improve the better designs of his competitors. 
Thus it is to be anticipated that a good design will tend 
to drive out poorer designs, and develop into a widely 
adopted standard product. 
In practice, however, there is often a discrepancy 
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between the best design to serve a given function and the 
widely adopted standard. This happens because there is 
much more to developing, manufacturing and marketing a 
successful product than the pure mechanics of design. A 
. . 
best design may be much more expensive than one which, 
although not quite so good, still performs reasonably well. 
Price, which usually reflects manufacturing cost, is a 
major factor in the marketability of a product. A lower 
price will often compensate the consumer for a product 
which is not quite as good as it might be. The low-priced 
"almost-as-good" product is likely to achieve much greater 
sales than the product of high-priced perfection. Thus 
from the producer's point of view it often pays to trade-. 
off some degree of design efficiency for greater ease of 
manufacture and reduced costs. 
It is in pursuit of these aims that the producer will 
tend to standardize production methods and product,specifi-
cations even at the cost of some reduction in product 
performance. Thus production efficiency standardization 
will tend to shift the trend of design away from a sole 
emphasis on functional efficiency towards greater manufac-
turing convenience. But there is a limi t to how far this 
process can g.o. Consumers will not buy a product simply 
because it is cheap. At the same time, few of them can 
afford to insist on the best irrespective of price. Thus 
the successful consumer product almost always represents a 
compromise between price and quali ty. 
But there is more to satisfying the consumer than an 
appropriate combination of quality and price. The stan-
dardization of the market-place is the outcome of competi-
tion, the emphasis on what will sell. And what sells may 
reflect less quality or price than caution or inertia on 
the part of the consumer. 
Consumers, if not necessarily conservative, are, in 
the main, cautious. Most of them will not readily adopt a 
radically new product. They will, on the contrary, tend to 
buy goods not very different from those they have bought 
before and with which they are already familiar. The least 
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known a new product is, the greater the risk would appear 
to be in purchasing it. After all, it may not work or the 
consumer may feel he has little need for what the new 
product can do, particularly when he has not experienced 
anything quite like it before. 
This caution on the part of the consumer is not at all 
a bad thing from his pOint of view. New products often do 
fail .to do what they are intended to do, and even when they 
work, they often provide services which few people have 
much use for. 
Companies, therefore, are not to be condemned for 
pursuing a rather conservative new 'product policy. It is 
no good being radically innovative if nobody will buy the 
product. Companies have to make a profi t; they have to 
make goods which sell. Many of them can do this best by 
being only moderately innovative and developing new prod-
ucts which meet consumers' ･ｸｰ･｣ｴ｡ｴｾｯｮｳ＠ and do not deviate 
too much from existing standards. 
Ultimately then it is the market which determines the 
standard product, which itself emerges as a compromise 
between functional efficiency, production efficiency and 
what the consumer wants. The degree of innovation that can 
; be absorbed at anyone time will be limited by these prior 
considerations. 
The main aim of the thesis in·its examination of the 
motor cycle industry, will be to analyse standardization as 
a trend which is apparent particularly in product develop-
ment. The trend, although it may be influenced by policy, 
usually operates without conscious direction. Thus it 
develops not through the intentions of individuals but as a 
characteristic of a population, and, in a sense, the fact 
that an element of standardization is the result may appear 
to be fortuitous. An engineer does not develop a better 
.engine for the sake of creating a new standard--for commer-
cial reasons he may prefer to keep his product exclu-
sive--but for the gains that result in terms of performance 
and efficiency. It only becomes a .standard because others 
think it is worth copying. Thus in the chapters which 
follow, the analysis will concentrate on the industry as a 
whole rather than individual firms. 
In the next chapter, some of the theoretical ideas 
which have already. been introduced will be developed 
further a nd used as the basis of a series of proposi tions 
which will be applied to the analysis of various phases in 
the development of the motor cycle industry. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
The purpose of the last two chapters was to define and 
analyse standardization and to show how it occurs much of 
the time unconsciously without the deliberate intervention 
of formal policy, and takes the form of a trend which is 
driven by the search for efficiency, and in which the more 
efficient solutions will tend to prevail even when they are 
not deliberately sought. 
In this chapter the analysis is taken further so as to 
consider in more specific terms some issues related to the 
development of an industry. Three phases of an industry's 
early, growth are defined: experimental, developmental and 
standardization. These are based on the development of the 
standard product which is analysed into its main charac-
teristics. Finally, the various concepts developed so far 
are used as the basis of a series of proposi tions which are 
intended to assist the analysis and discussion which fol-
lows in the remaining chapters. 
Introduction 
If we treat arbitrary standardization as largely a 
subsection of production 'efficiency standardization, then 
product standardization can be divided into three main 
components: functional efficiency standardization (FEB), 
production efficiency standardization (PES), and marketing 
efficiency standardization (MES). 
In practice FES, PES and MES are a lmos t always below 
current potential-their maximum theoretical level-
. because too much emphasis on anyone will often conflict 
with performance in another. Thus the degree to which they 
. 
are realised in the industry-what might be called the 
functional standard (FS), the production standard (PS), and 
the market standard (MS)--will almost always involve some 
54 
element of trade-off. The MS, which represents the kind of 
product with the largest proportion of the total market, 
will normally incorporate the most effective relative 
weightings of the other" two factors Ｈｦｵｮ｣ｴｩｯｮｾｬ＠ efficiency 
and production efficiency) for the achievement of profi t-
able sales. 
The variables FES, PES, MES, FS, PS, and MS, are 
indicators of activity within the industry as a whole 
rather than the individual firm. Thus they are largely 
independent of policy or personal intervention. 
Standardization policy, and particularly policy within 
the firm, is beyond the intentions of the research. 
; Certain individual firms, however, will be considered 1n 
con n e c t t'o n wit h the i r pro d u c t s, and 1 t may b e po s s 1 b let 0 
infer something about a firm's activities by comparing its 
product with the industry standard. But this kind of 
analysis will generally be used to back up the argument 
about the growth of the industry as a whole rather than to 
draw conclusions about the activities of firms. 
The main aim of the research is to examine the growth 
of the industry in terms of the development of its product.· 
This will be done by exploring the tendencies of the indus-
try towards innovation and standardization, and ultimately 
by tracing the industry's progress towards the development 
of a standard product. 
The Development of the Standard Product 
For the purposes of analysis the development of the 
standard product (and by extenSion, the development of the 
industry) has been divided into three phases: experimen-
tal, developmental and standardization. This scheme bears 
some resemblance to that of Gaillard (1934) although his 
purpose is quite different.1 
The phases have been defined with reference to a 
preliminary survey of the ｭｯｴｯｾ＠ cycle industry, the discus-
sion on the development of other industries in Chapter 1, 
and some of the ideas of Chapter 3 together with related 
ma terial. 
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The experimental phase consists of two distinct 
periods: pre-commercial and commercial, but concern here 
will be confined mainly to the latter which begins with the 
first commercial production. Products at this time usually 
fall far short of consumer expectations. Thus any stan-
dards which emerge as a result of widespread imitation, are 
premature, will be short-lived, and the products they 
represent will tend to fail commercially. So also will 
those which are more innovative, because of the high devel-
opment costs for products which are still in some degree 
experimental--costs which will be difficult to recoup 
before the products are superseded. Thus although any 
product may sell in small quantities, few will be profit-
able and few firms will make much money. 
The developmental phase is marked by the appearance of 
potential standards. Potential standards are innovative 
products which are sound enough in basic design to be 
capable with further development of becoming definitive 
standards. 
Competition between the potential standards will even-
tually resul t in the emergence of one predominan t design 
which will probably become the definitive standard at 
least as far as appearance is concerned. Other aspects of 
the developing standard like price and technology will be 
subordinate to. the development of performance. Commercial 
success at this stage is problematic since even now the 
typical product will leave much to be desired for the 
majority of consumers. 
The standardiza tiOD phase begins with the appearance 
of the first definitive standard product. The latter 
emerges when the product of standard and by now conven-
tional appearance has been sufficiently improved in perfor-
mance to give it a widespread and more general appeal among 
·actual and potential consumers alike. The result will be a 
rapid ･ｸｰ｡ｮｳｩｾｮ＠ in the market and an increasing degree of 
imitation of the standard model while untypical designs 
rapid ly lose popul ari ty. The s tandardiza tion phase does 
not, however, mark the end of development but a ｣ｨｾｮｧ･＠ in 
56 
-------.--'---- ... ,._--,--
direction from the attempt to develop entirely new models 
to concentration on improving existing ones. Firms 
entering the industry at this time with a good quality 
product which:imitates the definitive standard, can expect 
to make good profits. 
While these phases are analytically distinct, they,are 
not exclusively demarcated in time since there is bound to 
be some overlapping between them. Experiment will not end 
with the experimental phase and neither will development be 
complete wi th the beginning of the standardization phase. 
Both are likely to continue but are never again likely to 
be as predominant a characteristic of the industry as they 
once were, since once a standard product has emerged it is 
unlikely to be replaced except by another standard product. 
The standard product is defined by its widespread 
adoption and popularity at the expense of other products. 
It is analysed in the following section. 
Characteristics of The Standard Product 
The standard product is likely to have four main 
characteristics: 
1. A given price range usually within fairly narrow 
limits; 
2. A conventional appearance and general format 
within narrow limits; 
3. Familiar and generally accepted technology; 
4. A widely accepted level of performa'nce. 
The standard price range is likely to be the first 
characteristic established--a result of the interaction 
between production cost and product market--followed later 
by appearance and general format, and last of all, the 
level of performance. (This conclusion is suggested by the 
concept of "potential standard" which is discussed below.) 
'The development of appropriate technology is related to all 
of the others and has no obvious time-scale. 
Only when a level of performance is achieved which is 
not less than that which the majority of consumers believe 
desirable, will anything approaching a definitive standard 
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be established and it is in these terms that the definitive 
standard will be defined. It requires a definitive stan-
dard to appeal to the average or typical consumer rather 
than the enthusiast alone, and therefore its development is. 
likely to mark the beginnings of rapid growth in output and 
the consolidation of the industry. 
New products which do not match up to the standard 
will eventually be ｲ･ｪｾ｣ｴ･､＠ by the consumer unless, and 
then probably only in a few cases, they offer exceptional 
advantages as compared wi th the standard in terms of 
either: 
exceptionally low price 
or exceptionally attractive appearance which overcomes 
the consumer's preference for conventional appearance ' 
or exceptional performance. 
If such a new product should succeed it could either 
replace the standard or bec orne co-existt;!n t wi th ita s an 
additional standard. There is no reason why there should 
not be more than one distinct standard product. 
The development and emergence of a standard product is 
an important result of the trend to standardization. Taken 
together with the trend itself and its components, and the 
ｴｨｲ･ｾ＠ phases of the industry's growth, it provides the 
basis of a number of propositions which can with profit be 
used as a guide to the research. 
The Propositions 
These propositions have been divided into three main 
classes: those concerned with the industry's long-term 
development, those related to the various phases of the 
standard product's development, and those concerning the 
product without reference to period • 
. .A. Proposi tions about the development ot the industry in 
general 
1. As a new industry develops, product design across 
the industry as a whole tends to change from highly diverse 
-a mul tiplicity of different models-towards convergence 
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around one or a few standard types. 
2. As a new industry develops, innovation tends to 
change from the more radical in character to the more 
conventional, such as improvements to standard models. 
B. Propositions about Phase 1: The experimental period 
and premature standards 
3. In the earliest days of an industry the only 
requirement to ensure the marketability of a product is 
that it works, however bad its performance may be. 
This proposition is based on the idea of novelty. Few 
people will know much about a new concept product or have 
any idea of how it should perform.: But provided it works 
some will buy it simply because it is new. 
4. In order to survive for any length of time, a 
product must reach a certain minimum level of performance. 
5. It will be ､ｩｦｦｩｾｵｬｴ＠ for earliest products to 
survive because new and better ones will soon be placed on 
the market. 
6. When there are no satisfactory products from the 
consumer's point of view, even poor products may be widely 
imitated and become premature, but acknowledged, standards. 
7. Premature standards which gain the loyalty of the 
consumer will be able to resist for a time competition from 
better products because of'the typical consumer's tendency 
to caution. 
c. Propositions about Phase 2: The developmental period 
and developing standards 
8. During this period there will be at least as many 
different product designs as at any other period of the 
industry's development, but the number will diminish 
rapidly as producers begin to imitate the more commercially 
'successful designs. 
9. Competition between potential standards will even-
tually leave one dominant design in each product class. 
This will become the developing standard and w:l.J.I be widely 
imitated. 
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10. Products which diverge considerably from the 
developing standard in terms of price, appearance, basic 
technology or performance, may enjoy short-run success but 
will eventually become difficult to sell. 
11. Products which deviate from developing standards 
may survive commercially if they offer the consumer 
compensation in nonstandard items. 
D. Propositions about Phase 3: Standardization 
12. The appearance of a defini tive standard will 
intensify imitation and stimulate research on improving the 
standard model. 
13. As the definitive standard becomes more entren-
ched, more innovative products will have to be increasingly 
outstanding in order to compete with it. 
14. As the definitive standard becomes more sophis-
tica ted, it will be easier to compete wi th it by of fering a 
similar but slightly inferior product at a lower price. 
E. Propositions which relate to all phases and the product 
in general 
15. Products which are innovative enough to diverge 
considerably from any existing standard, whether premature 
or otherwise, and whether in terms of price, appearance, 
basic technology or performance, may be difficult.to sell 
initially even when they offer the consumer distinct advan-
tages as compared with other products. 
16. When any product that is recognised or recognis-
able as a standard has appeared on the market, the only 
ways to innovate successfully are either to imitate and 
improve on the standard or to develop something obviously 
superior in terms of price or performance. 
17. Products are more likely to be imitated when they 
·are based on simple or familiar technology. 
18. Products based on new technology are more likely 
. 
to remain exclusive. 
19. New products which depart from the standard will 
be most successful commercially when they differ only in 
60 
terms of price or performance, will do less well when they 
differ in basic technology, and will do least well when 
they differ in appearance. In other words, it will be 
easier to trade off other factors in favour of price or 
performa nce than in favour of new technology or new 
appearance. 
This chapter brings to an end the theoretical section 
of the thesis. Its aim has been to take further some of 
the concepts developed in Chapters 2 and 3 and to develop 
them into a series of propositions which can serve as a 
guide to the more substantive part of the research. The 
progress of the research so far is summarised and ex-
plained in the following review. 
Review 
The rna in problem of the research, as set ou t "in 
Chapter 1, is to explain how the relatively diverse and 
innovative product make-up of the motor cycle industry in 
its earliest days first began to evolve into one that was 
rather more standardized and conventional. 
The trend to standardization is a concept which 
provides a means of approaching this problem and finding a 
solution. In analysing the trend, three main factors, FES, 
PES and MES, have been identified ｷｾｩ｣ｨ＠ help to explain why 
product development will tend to move in one direction 
rather than another, and why the product itself will tend 
eventually to become standardized across the industry as a 
whole. 
In considering the evolution of a standard product in 
the early days of an industry, three main phases have been 
suggested, experimental, developmental and standardization, 
which help to. trace the development of the product from its 
.first appearance in any form to its first realization as a 
definitive or relatively long-term standard. 
The standard product itself' has been defined and 
analysed into its main components so that it may be used as 
a measuring rod against which to evaluate less standard or 
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non-standard product s. 
Finally, these various concepts have been used as the 
basis for the development of a series of propositions which 
can help to guide the research in ｴｨｾ＠ direction intended. 
The next five chapters, although largely empirical in 
nature, all owe much to the development of the thesis so 
far. Chapter 5 which follows this one and is largely 
background material in that it deals entirely with the 
development of the bicycle and the cycle industry, has been 
arranged as far as possible in accordance with the three 
phases of product development suggested above. 
Chapter 6 has been organized in accordance with the 
concept of a pre-commercial experimental phase. Otherwise 
, it is largely empirical as it has little use for the other 
concepts so far developed. 
Chapter 7 is concerned wi th the first comme rcial 
production, the late experimental phase. Apart form the 
almost purely empirical section dealing with the general 
history of the industry, it has three mai n sections: the 
motor cycle as technical product, as consumer product, and 
the evaluation of the development of the product in terms 
of the propositions. The first of these, dealing with 
technical development, is concerned mainly with the func-
tional efficiency of the machine and in effect refers back 
to FES. The second deals with the effectiveness of the 
motor cycle from the consumer pOint of view and refers back 
ｴｾﾷｍｅｓＮ＠ Evaluation of the product in terms of the proposi-
tions provides a more direct way of relating concept to 
data and integrating empirical and conceptual aspects of 
the research as a whole. 
Chapters 8 and 9-12 as a single unit, follow much the 
same pattern as Chapter 7 while they deal in turn with the 
developmental and standardization phases. 
The production element of the trend to standardization 
(PES) has been deliberately neglected mainly because there 
is little evidence that production methods had any signifi-
cant effect on product design in the industry before the 
first world war. 
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· .. __ CHAPTER 5 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BICYCLE 
This chapter is devoted largely to a brief account of 
the technical development of the bicycle and the tricycle, 
failing which there could have been no motor cycles and no 
motor cycle industry. The discussion is organised as far 
as possible within a format comprising the three phases of 
product development, experimental, developmental, and stan-
dardization, presented in the last chapter. It covers the 
early experimental machines, the first commercial produc-
tion, the high-wheelers, the tricycles, and the safety 
bicycle which but for its lack of an engine was the proto-
type of the early motor cycles. The cycle industry is 
referred to from time to time but no attempt is made to 
write its history in any detail. 
The most important conclusion of this chapter is the 
great significance the development of a standard product 
had for the development and growth of the industry as a 
whole. 
Introduction 
The bicycle was a peculiarly nineteenth century devel-
opment. The various forms of horse-drawn carriage and'cart 
had a history going back thousands of years, but the 
single-track machine, despite its forerunners, was not 
developed into a practicable vehicle until the middle of 
the nineteenth century. Thus, it can be argued, it arrived 
only just in time, at least, that is, for the development 
of the motor cycle. If the bicycle had not been developed 
ｾｮｴｩｬ＠ thirty or forty years later, motor transport would 
ｩｮｩｴｩ｡ｾｬｹ＠ have been reserved to "horseless carriages", and 
if it had not been developed at all, there would certainly 
have been no motor cycle. Thus the history of the develop-
ment of the bicycle is in part also the historY.9f the 
(:)3 
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motor cycle. 
The first true bicyc les ,-"true" in the sense of being 
mechanically driven and not just pushed-to be produced in 
commercial quantities, were put on the market in the 1860s. 
These early machines were poor performers, however, and 
efforts continued to develop something better. Most of the 
models that followed during the next twenty years were 
largely experimental and fell short of what was desired-a 
safe machine which ordinary people could ride. The first 
effective "safety bicycle", the prototype of the modern 
machine, was not developed until 1885, the year which marks 
the beginning of the developmental phase. The new design 
had become the acknowledged and widely adopted standard by 
the early 1890s. Thus the developmental pbase was rela-
, 
tively short, particularly in comparison with the experi-
mental phase, but then the idea of the bicycle or one-track 
vehicle is of considerable antiquity. 
The Experimental Phase: Barly Developments 
The bicycle combines two different and quite distinct 
principles: propulsion by human muscular power and the 
one-track wheel arrangement which gives the vehicle 
stability only when in motion. The possibility of propul-
. sion by human muscular power had been considered in pre-
Christian ｴｩｭ･ｾＬ＠ and again during the middle ages. 1 For 
several centuries before the nineteenth, experiments were 
carried out and vehicles of various designs were built. 
One of the ｾｩｲｳｴ＠ of these, designed in. 1418-19 by Giovanni 
Fontana, Rector of the Faculty of Arts at Padua, was a 
four-wheeled vehicle operated by the rider pulling on an 
endless rope running around a pulley which drove the rear 
wheels through gearing.2 
The idea of a two-wheeled, one-track vehicle is of 
comparable antiquity. In Roman times there was a ·chil-
. dren's toy which resembled a ｴｾｯＭｷｨ･･ｬ･､＠ scooter.3 A more 
curious example dates from 1580 and takes the form of a 
stained-glass window depicting a bicycle-like vehicle. The 
• 
window was made in Italy and installed in the church at 
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Stoke Poges, Buckinghamshire,4 but it does not seem to have 
inspired contemporary design. The first vehicle resembling 
a bicycle which had any practical use, albeit rather lim-
ited, did not. appear:until 1791. It was known as a 
cel6rifere and was little more than a beam on wheels though 
sometimes it was constructed in the form of a horse. It 
was propelled by pushing with the feet. 5 The ｣ｾｈ･ｲｩｦｾｲ･＠
was renamed velocifere in 1793 and was gradually improved 
by lighter beams and bigger ｷｨ･･ｬｾＬ＠ but major· improvements 
did not come until 1816 when the Baron von Drais de 
Sauerbrun built a machine with a steerable front wheel.6 
The new machine which was known as the Draisienne soon 
became a craze. On one occasion a rider covered the 37 
kilometres from Beaune to DiJon at a speed of 15kph,7 which 
suggests it could be quite useful for the more athletic 
individual. In England the Draisienne, renamed the hobby-
horse or dandy-horse (fig. 5.1), achieved some popularity 
but soon went out of favour because of the ridicule of 
Fig. 5.1. The Hobby Horse 
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cartoonists and the wear and tear on riders who were liable 
to develop hernias. 
As a result, interest in two-wheelers waned and inven-
tors turned their attention ,to three and four-wheeled 
machines. Among these were quadricycles operated on a 
pedal principle similar to the child's pedal car, but such 
vehicles did not prove to be very practicable. 
Mechanical Propulsion 
The first bicycle that could be ridden with the feet 
entirely off the ground--in effect the first true 
bicycle--was the invention of Kirkpatrick Macmillan, a 
Scottish blacksmith, and dates from' 1839.8 Capable of 
, 
14mph, it was operated by a treadle, suspended from the 
steering head and linked by connecting rods to cranks 
fitted to the rear axle (fig. 5.2). Thus it anticipated by 
forty years the rear wheel drive safety bicycle which would 
eventually become the universal standard. But despite its 
good performance and advanced design it aroused little but 
local interest and never went into commercial production, 
although it was produced in small quantities by imitators.9 
Fig. 5.2. Macmillan's Bicycle 
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This outcome was a major opportunity lost as there was 
to be no commercial production of a mechanically propelled 
bicycle for another twenty years. In 1861 a machine which 
bore no relationship to that: of Macmillan, was invented by 
Pierre Michaux, a Parisian wa tch repairer and maker of 
perambulators. The velocipede, as it was called, was deve-
loped from an old draisienne which had been sent for 
repair.10 It was operated by pedals fitted to cranks 
attached to the hub of the front wheel (fig. 5.3). This 
method of propulsion was decidedly inferior in principle to 
that devised by Macmillan, but it was the most popular 
method used to drive bicycles for the next twenty years. 
The new machine was constructed largely of ｩｾｯｮ＠ inclu-
ding the diamond section frame, the wheel spokes and the 
flat iron tyres which were like those of wagon wheels. 
This made it very heavy, 59lbs, and awkward to ride. Even 
so it was put into production and was an' immediate success 
with 142 machines produced in 1862 and an output of more 
Fig. 5.3. The Michaux Bicycle 
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than 400 a year by 1865.11 
The velocipede soon began to interest English 
businessmen. In particular it interested the young Rowley 
Turner who was.in Pa'ris to study and also to act as agent: 
for his uncle's firm. His uncle was Josiah Turner, one of 
the founders of the Coventry Sewing Machine Company, and 
when Rowley returned to Coventry in 1868 he brought with 
him orders for four hundred velocipedes which he hoped the 
company would manufacture. The company agreed and, renamed 
Coventry Machinists Company, began production of the 
machines, but their export to France was prevented by the 
Franco-Prussian War. The company met this set-back by 
developing the home market, where it achieved considerable 
success partly as a 'result of publicity stunts based on 
long-distance runs. The velocipede was soon firmly estab-
lished in England becoming known as the "boneshaker".12 
The High-Wheeled Bicycle 
As its name would suggest, the boneshaker was a far 
from satisfactory machine, but it was soon to be improved, 
most notably by James Starley, one of the founders of the 
Coventry Sewing Machine Company and now foreman of Coventry 
Machinists. In 1870 Starley 
left Coventry Machinists and 
formed his own company with B. 
Smith and William Bilman. The 
outcome was the Ariel b1cycle, 
the Starley design which set 
the pace in the development of . 
high wheel bicycles.13 
The Ariel (fig. 5.4) was 
both lighter and stronger than 
the boneshaker. Iron-spoked 
I 
··wheels gave way to much' 
lighter ones with steel wire 
spokes under tension which Pig. 5.4. The' Ariel Bicycle 
could be adjusted as required. 
Solid rubber tyres replaced 
68 
(liThe Bicyc I ing Times", 
24 May 1877) . 
the iron ones, and other modifications included an improved 
brake and a step for mounting. Patented in 1870 by Starley 
and Hilman, the Ariel had the large front and small rear 
wheel that we identify today with the penny-farthing, but 
in its day it was known as an "ordinary" .14 
Michaux had already begun to make the front wheel 
larger, and now Starley made it larger still. The large 
. 15 front wheel reduced rolling resistance, allowing greater 
speed and easier running especially over uneven ground. 
The small rear wheel acted mainly as a stabilizer and 
helped to keep the weight down. The Ariel was one of the 
most popular of the early high wheelers and, ridden by 
experts, such machines could reach well over 20mph.16 
The 1870s marked the first period of substantial 
growth in the British cycle industry. In 1871 the number 
of firms in the industry has been estimated at about a 
dozen,l7 yet by the mid-1870s there were about 50,000 
bicycles on the roads of England and at least thirty firms 
making them. The main centres of manufacture were 
Coventry, Birmingham, Nottingham, Wolverhampton, Sheffield 
and Cheltenham.18 By 1879 at least sixty firms had entered 
the industry and between them were producing three hundred 
different models.19 
The high-wheeled bicycle remained popular for about 
twenty years, but it was neither particularly safe nor easy 
to ride and was rarely without its critics. The rider's 
position, almost directly over the centre of the front 
wheel, was precarious and he could easily be thrown over 
the handle-bars.20 Experiments began in the mid-1870s to 
construct a safer machine, one that would place the rider 
both lower and more centrally between the wheels. Two 
di fferent solutions were attempted: the tricyc Ie and the 
"safety bicyc 1 e". The tricyc 1 e wa s the easi e r and more 
'obvious solution. 
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The Tricycles 
For several years the tricycle was the main alterna-
tive to the high-wheeled bicycle. Many different tricycles 
were produced some of which would look very strange by 
modern standards. But from the appearance of the first 
commercially manufactured machine, the Dublin tricycle of 
1876, it was little more than ten years before the tricycle 
began to approach something like its "modern" form. The 
Dublin tricycle was propelled by treadles acting through a 
system of levers to drive the large rear wheel. It was 
steered by the two small front wheels.21 
Some other 
designs bad two 
large driving 
wheels, with the 
small steering wheel 
being somet imes I in 
the front and some-
times behind. One 
of James Starley's 
designs, the 
Coventry tricycle 
had the single, 
large driving wheel 
on one side and ｾｨ･＠
two small steering 
Fig. 5.5. The Coventry Tricyc Ie 
("The Bicyc ling Times", 7 June 1877) 
wheels on the 'other side, one in advance of the driving 
wheel and the other behind it (fig. 5.5). Patented in 
1876, it was the most successful of the single-driving 
tricycles.22 
But probably the most . important inventl.on to c'ome out 
of the work on tricycles was James Btarley's differential 
gear of 1878. ·A problem with two-wheel drive tricycles was 
··that when turning, the wheel on the inside of the turn 
would remain almost stationary while only the outer ｷｨ･ｾＮｬ＠
was driven. To overcome this effect, Btarley devised a 
gear which allow'ed both'wheels to take an equal share. of 
the driving power irrespective of the course the ｾＮ｡｣ｨｩｮ･＠
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was travelling. His differential gear originated a prin-
ciple which has since been applied to all motor vehicles 
with two-wheel drive, but the more immediate effect of his 
invention was to establish the superiority of the ｴｷｯｾ＠
wheel-drive tricycle. 24 
The prototype of the "modern" tricycle first appeared 
in 1884 in the form of the Humber "Cripper", which had 
pedal-operated chain drive to the two rear wheels and a 
single centrally placed front steering wheel. the Cripper 
had a particularly good performance and was named after 
Ropert Cripper, a professional rider who won many races on 
it.25 But in its fully developed form (fig. 5.6), the 
" 
. 
Fig. 5.6. The Sparkbrook Tricycle 
("The Cyclist", 28 November, 1894) 
tricycle was to become of greater importance to the devel-
, 
oping motor cycle industry than to cycling where it was 
about to be superseded by the safety bicycle. 
"The Safety Bicycle: The Pirat Step to Standardization 
Not everybody approved ｯｾ＠ the tricycle. Many thought 
it a machine for "elderly gentlemen, ladies and timid 
ｾｲｳｯｮｳＢＬ＠ 26 and development work on the safety bicycle con-
tinued. First attempts aimed to reduce the sizaof the 
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fron t whee 1, but th is approach could ach leve 11 t t Ie on its 
own and more radical modifications were introduced. The 
most important innovation was the shift from front to rear 
wheel ､ｾｩｶ･＠ in whicb the power was transmitted by chain 
from pedals placed between the two wheels. 
The best known of the earlier attempts to develop a 
safety bicyc Ie was the invention in 1879 by II.J. Lawson of 
his "Bicyclette", which was still rather like the ordinary 
with 40 inch front wheel and 24 inch rear. It was perhaps 
ahead of its time, but it was not apparently a very good 
design and it failed commercially.27 
Better designs followed, however, and early 'in 1885 
there appeared the first "Rover" safety bicyc Ie designed by : 
John Kemp Starley, the nephew of James Starley who had died 
in 1881. Later that year a much improved model was intro-
duced which approximated for the first time the modern 
diamond frame bicycle (fig. 5.7).28 
The development of the Rover marked the end of the 
experimental phase in the cycle industry. It would no 
Fig. 5.7. The Rover Safety Bicycle of July 1885 
("The eyc list", 6 November 1901) 
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longer be necessary to develop radically new models in the 
search for an effective bicycle. The Rover had shown the 
way and from now on new machines would be developed along 
simi lar lines. 
The Rover was the first potential standard bicycle in 
that'it promised to be good enough to satisfy the majority 
of cyclists. Thus its appearance on the scene marked the 
beginning of the developmental phase even though it can be 
argued that this had begun earlier with the first rear 
wheel drive safety bicycles dating from 1879. The latter 
were not so good, however, to preclude further radical 
experiment, nor were they good enough to achieve the smal-
lest degree of commercial success. The earlier date there-
fore is rejected. 
Standardization and its Consequences 
There is little more that need be said here about the 
development of the bicycle. The diamond frame safety 
bicycle was the most popular design from 1887 onwards,29 
and in time would replace most others. The development of 
pneumatic tyres in 1888 increased its popularity and by the 
1890s the high-wheeled ordinary had become a thing of 
ridicule. Other new designs were still to: appear like, for 
example, the fully triangulated, ultra lightweight model 
patented by Mikael Pedersen in 1893,30 but they would not 
seriously challenge the popularity of the standard diamond 
frame machines until the development of the small-wheeled 
Moulton bicycle of the 1980s. And when, after 1896, motor 
cycle production. began, most two-wheeled machines were 
based on the diamond frame bicycle. 
The standardization phase of the industry's develop-
ment dates from about 1889. In that year, it was observed 
with ｲ･ｦ･ｲ･ｮｾ･＠ to "safeties" at the cycle show, "So far as 
·these were concerned there was not much change from last 
year, except in a ｦｾｷ＠ details. This points to the fact 
tha t the age of novei ty Is passed for the present, and we 
think wlsely that makers are devoting more attention to the 
perfection of' known types ra ther than encouragi.ng new 
73 
31 ideas, which mayor may not be of value". By 1893 the 
bicycle (fig. 5.8) was not very different from the modern 
machine. 
Fig. 5.8. Humber, Cripps & Goddard Bicycle 
("The Cyclist", 8 March 1893) 
The development of a standard bicycle acted as a 
major stimulus to the growth of the industry.32 Manufac-
turers now had a model which they could and did imitate, 
confident that here was a machine with a widespread appeal. 
By 1895,' the boom year for the cyc Ie industry, hundreds of 
firms were producing bicycles and the number of cyclists in 
, , 
the United Kingdom was estimated at one and a half 
million. 33 
But the following year saw a slump in the industry as 
many firms had overreached themsel ves. The situation in 
the home market was aggravated by ｯｶｾｲｳ･｡ｳ＠ competition 
which challenged the high priced, high quality goods char-
acteristic of the British industry with an inferior, but 
"cheaper, mass-produced product. In order to meet the chal-
lenge, British firms were compelled to adopt more mO.dern 
production methods. Some succeeded, many failed, with the 
result that the number of firms in the industry declined 
substantially: in Birmingham from 309 in 1897 to .. l60 in 
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1913, and in Coventry from 75 in 1897 to 49 in 1912.34 
These difficulties for the cycle industry were, however, to 
the advantage of the new motor industries. With cycle 
manufacture no longer as attractive as it used to be, many 
firms turned their attention to motor cars or motor cycles. 
Conclusions 
The principles on which the bicycle was based emerged 
only after hundreds of years of experiment, but the first 
machine to resemble even remotely the bicycle as we know it 
today was not developed until the end of the eighteenth 
century. It was fifty years more before a mechanically 
propelled machine was developed, and twenty years beyond 
that before production began on a commercial scale. Even 
then experimen t had to continue for another twenty years 
since the volicipede or boneshaker and the high-wheeled 
bicycles which were derived from it, were hardly comfort-
able or safe enough to appeal to more than a fraction of 
the potential market. 
Not until the 1880s was a machine developed that could 
be looked on as a potential standard. This was the Rover 
safety bicyc Ie, the principles of which were taken up so 
rapidly by other manufacturers, that within five years it 
had been developed into the standard model for the whole 
industry. 
The success of the Rover was initially a technical 
one. The new machine solved various design problems which 
had been studied for several years, and established a 
format which was to prove not just a promise for the future 
but a prototype--it worked, it performed well, it suc-
ceeded commercially, it was copied, and beyond, it was 
developed further until there was little more to be done to 
it but relatively minor detail improvements. All this took 
place within the space of about five years. 
The developmental phase then was very short especially 
when compared with the long experimental phase which 
preceded it, but this is in no way surprising. The differ-
ence is accounted for by two factors: (1) the long period 
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of trial and error during the experimental phase before a 
potential standard was developed, and (2) the concentration 
of practically the whole industry on developing and impro-
ving the potential standard once it ｨｾ､＠ appeared, in con-
trast to the dispersal of effort during the experimental 
phase. 
The experimental phase was a long one and almost bound 
to be so, because it could not be brough t to an end except 
by the invention of a radically new principle of transport 
plus the development of that principle into a commercially 
viable product. The placing of such a machine on the 
market was what the whole industry had been waiting for for 
about twenty years. It was no surprise therefore that 
manufacturers wasted no time in developing it further with 
the result that a highly standardized version soon 
appeared. 
The standard safety bicycle has proved remarkably 
long-lived and is still the most popular model one hundred 
years after the first Rover was put on the market. 
The development of the standard machine initiated the 
cycle industry's take-off into its most rapid period of 
growth, and for that reason was almost certainly the most 
important event in its entire history. So lopg as manufac-
turers were committed to producing expensive and rather 
improbable machines ip the form of the dangerous high-
wheeler, the rather cumbersome tricycle, or experimental 
and'entirelyuntried models, the industry's future pros-
pects remained uncertain and its growth limited. 
But once a machine had been developed which was safe 
and easy to ride, and neither difficult nor expensive to 
manufacture, the outlook changed completely. From then on 
and for many years to come, competition in the cycle indus-
try would be mainly a ｲ･ｾｵｬｴ＠ of new and improved production 
.methods rather than the development of new designs, and it 
would be possible to introduce mass production technology 
", 
which would reduce costs to the manufacturer and 'prices to 
the consumer thus bringing the bicycle within reach of an 
ever increasing section of the community. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE EXPERIMENTAL PHASE (1): THE MOTOR CYCLE, 1869-1893 
As we saw in the last chapter, the first commercial 
production of a mechanically-propelled bicycle took place 
in the 1860s. It was only avery few years later and long 
before the development of the safety bicycle, that the 
first motor bicycle, a steam powered machine, was taken out 
on the ｲｯ｡､ｾ＠ This was the first of many experimental motor 
cycles which were developed during the twenty-five years 
before the beginnings of commercial production. 
In this chapter several of these machines are discus-
sed, some of them in detail, with reference to the parts 
played by both steam and the internal combustion engine in 
the development of the motor cycle. 
The main body of the chapter is followed by an 
appendix on the definition of a motor cycle, the purpose of 
which is to indicate how motor cycles were distinguished 
from motor cars, a matter which is of some relevance to 
this and following chapters. 
Introduction 
By 1862 when Pierre Michaux began to produce his 
pedal-driven velocipede in quantity, there already existed 
three sources of mechanical power which might with further 
development be adapted to propel a bicycle. The massive 
and rather inefficient steam engines of the eighteenth 
century had been improved and reduced in size. In the 
early nineteenth century they had been installed in road 
going carriages and wi th fur.ther miniaturization might be 
.suitable to power motor cycles. Lenoir's slow, inefficient 
gas engine of 1859 was already in production for stationary 
. 
use. With the application of theoretical work already 
under way,t such engines could soon be transformed into 
smaller, but far more powerful units. Electric motors had 
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been used to drive experimental vehicles as early as the 
1830s, and with improved batteries might soon become a 
practical proposition for all kinds of vehicles. Which of 
these, steam, the gas engine, or electricity, was likely to 
prove most suitable to power a motor cycle was a matter for 
experiment. The first to be tried was steam. 
Steam Motor Cycles 
Steam was the oldest form of mechanical power and the 
most highly developed, and it is not surprising therefore 
that the first motor cycles should have been steam powered. 
The first two of such machines of which something is known, 
one made in France and the other, America, are both usually 
dated 1869. The French machine (fig. 6.1) was the result 
of a join t effort by Pierre Mi chaux h ims el f, and L.G. 
Perreaux. It consisted of an extremely compact engine 
developed by Perreaux and installed in a Michaux veloci-
pede. The engine was double-acting, had a single cylinder, 
steel piston,and two flywheels. The multi-tube boiler was 
Fig. 6.1. The Michaux-Perreaux Steam Motor Bicycle of 1869 
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fired by alcohol-fueled burners. 1 Performance was good 
with a claimed speed of 15kph, but range was limited as the 
water carried was soon used up, and even then the machine 
was not really practicable ｳｾｮ｣･＠ the high-placed engine 
made it rather unstable. 
The American machine was constructed by Sylvester 
Howard Roper, who, according to at least one source, had 
been constructing steam cycles since 1865.2 It was based 
on an American bicycle buil t by the Hanlon brothers and not 
unlike that of Michaux, but the engine was rather different 
consisting of twin oscillating cylinders which drove the 
rear wheel by connecting rods and cranks as in a locomo-
tive. The boiler was heated by a charcoal fire.3 The 
result was a machine which differed from the Michaux-
Perreaux in appearance but was of comparable performance 
and limitations. 
Both of these machines were successful as experiments 
bu t nei ther offered any prospect of commercial exploi ta-
tion, and work on two-wheelers was abandoned for a time in 
favour of three or four wheeled machines. The next 
Michaux-Perreaux machine was a steam tricycle, while Roper 
turned to four wheels, but little more seems to have been 
achieved by these early pioneers. 
Experimentation continued, however, and in 1877 a 
Mr Meek of Newcastle-on-Tyne built a steam tricycle which 
was reported to have worked well. 4 This was followed in 
1881 by a much more important machine, also a steam tri-
cyc Ie, designed by Sir Thoma s Parkins and constructed by 
A.H. Bateman. It consisted of an efficient twin-cylinder, 
double-acting steam engine installed in a Cheylesmore 
pedal-tricycle. Steam was supplied by a boiler fired by 21 
petroleum burners.5 The machine was demonstrated success-
fully at the Stanley Cycle Show and a considerable number 
of orders was received for it, but it could not be produced 
commercially because the Locomotive Acts made operating 
such machines On the road impracticable. 
The most important of the Locomotive Acts, that of 
1865, had limited the speed of "locomotives" on the road to 
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4mph on the highway and 2mph in towns, and would not be 
repealed until 1896. Thus the development of motor 
vehicles in the United Kingdom was to remain for some time 
little more than an academic exercise. Any significant 
advance therefore was likely to come from overseas, either 
the USA or continental Europe. 
The first steam tricycle to be produced in any quan-
tity was the work of L.D. Copeland of Philadelphia. 
Copeland began in 1884 by fitting a steam engine to an 
American high-wheeled bicyc Ie, but then turned his a tten-
tion to tricycles. He built about 200 in all,6 possibly 
the first commercial production of any kind of motor ｣ｹ｣ｾ･Ｌ＠
although it is doubtful that such machines could have been 
a sound commercial. proposition. 
Elsewhere, efforts were still entirely experimental 
including models by Count Albert de Dion in 1887 and Leon 
Serpollet in 1888. By the early 1890s, however, steam 
cycles were so vastly improved in design and performance 
that they might soon have become commercially feasible, but 
this was prevented by the development of reasonably effec-
tive motor cycles powered by internal combustion engines. 
At the same time as inventors were working on motor 
vehicles powered by steam and even before the development 
of the internal combustion engine, there were attempts to 
construct a practical electric powered vehicle. 
Electric Motors 
The electric motor was invented by Michael Faraday in 
1821, and the first attempts to build an electric motor 
vehicle date from the 1830s. 
As early as 1837 Robert Davidson of Aberdeen 
built an electric carriage powered by crude iron-zinc bat-
teries and a simple electric motor.7 After that, interest 
in electric vehicles waned until the storage battery, 
. invented by Plante in 1859-60, was improved by Camille 
Faure in 1881. This made electric vehicles practicable and 
in the same year an electric tricycle, fueled by Plante 
cells, was driven in Paris.8 Various electric vehic\es 
80 
were built from then onwards including a number of tri-
cycles, one of which was the work of J.K. Starley.9 
There were few experiments with electric two-wheelers 
since the weight of the batteries made them unsuitable for 
most purposes, but electric tandems were produced com-
mercially for pacing in cycle races in the late 1890s. By 
then, however, the internal combustion engine had come into 
its own.and such vehicles were short-lived. 
The Internal Combustion Engine 
The internal combustion engine had a long development 
history. The concept originated from early studies in "the 
usage of a piston as a means of utilizing heat and 
10 ; pressure", and some of the early experiments were carri.ed 
out by Huygens in 1680 and Papin in 1690. . But it was 
another hundred years before something like a complete 
engine appeared with such examples ｡ｾ＠ Street's "explosion 
engine" on 1784, and George Cayley's "gunpowder engine" of 
1808. 11 
Neither of these was ever commercially produced, but 
from then on there was increasing interest in the idea and 
progress was more rapid. During the next fifty years or 
so, most of the elements of the internal combustion engine 
were developed including "the ignition systems, at first 
flame ignition and later electrical spark ignition; com-
pression of the explosive mixture; water cooling ofcylin-
der and pistons" .12 
In 1859 Lenoir simply by applying existing knowledge, 
was able to construct a practicable engine for stationary 
use capable of generating up to 3 horsepower. It was 
fueled by coal gas, the gas-and-air mixture being drawn 
into the cylinder for the first half of the outward stroke 
and then fired by an electric spark. The expansion caused 
by the explosion drove the piston to complete its stroke. 
But without initial compression the engine was inefficient 
and uneconomical. It could, however, be maintained by 
unskilled labour and it soon came into,widespread use.13 
Important developments soon followed which promised to 
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make the internal combustion engine a far better proposi-
tion. In 1861 Schmidt developed the idea of compression, 
and in 1862 Beau de Rochas laid the theoretical foundations 
of the four stroke cycle. The majority of internal combus-
tion engines are based on this cycle which is as follows: 
1. intake of gas during outward stroke of piston; 
2. compression by inward stroke; 
3. ignition at dead point and expansion to 
produce power of outward stroke; 
4. exhaust by second inward stroke to expel 
burned gases.14 
It was 1876, ｨｯｷｾｶ･ｲＬ＠ before the first four stroke 
engine was developed by Otto and Langen of Deutz. It ran 
on coal gas and was marketed for statio,nary use only, and 
would have been too cumbersome to install in a motor 
vehicle especially in view of its size and the quantity of 
gas which would have had to be carried. The possible 
: 
solution was to use liquid fuel, an idea which interested 
Gottleib Daimler and Wilhelm Maybach, employees of Otto and 
Langen. It did not interest their employers, however, and 
they left the Deutz company in 1882 in order to develop the 
project on their own.15 
By 1884 they had constructed their first engine. It 
was of 246cc capacity, and was capable of up to 800rpm 
which was very much ｦ｡ｾｴ･ｲ＠ than the stationary engines from 
which it had been derived. It generated about lhp. 
Technically, the engine was an ｩｮｴ･ｲ･ｾｴｩｮｧ＠ mixture of 
old and new features. It had two flywheels, one each side 
of the crankshaft, and the whole unit was enclosed in a 
cast aluminium crankcase. Cooling was achieved by a fan 
wheel which circulated air within a jacket ･ｮ｣ｾｯｳｩｮｧ＠ the 
cylinder. The inlet valve was operated by suction of the 
piston and placed directly above the cam-operated exhaust 
valve. Ignition was by "hot tube". This consisted of a 
platinum tube inserted into the cylinder close to the inlet 
valve. It was operated by heating the tube externally by a 
spirit lamp until it was hot enough to ignite the explosive 
t 
mixt ure in the cyl inde r. The carburettol' was of "floa ttl 
82 
ty pe de vi se d by Maybach. 16 
In th e following y ea r, 1 885 , t h e e ngi ne was s l ig h tly 
modifi e d a nd installed in a two-wh ee l e d mac h i n e d esig n e d 
sole ly to act as a test-bed fo r its app li catio n to road 
use . Th e machi ne, nam e d "Ei ns pur" or o n e track (f ig. 5.2), 
'J '.A.: , ' 
W. ' 
. :. . 
Fig. 6.2. Daimler's "Einspur" of 1885: Th e F irst 
Internal Combustion Engine Motor Bicycle 
("Motor Cycling", 7 February 1911) 
was constructed largely of wood with iron-tyred, wood e n-
spoked carriage-type wheels. There were two, additional 
wheels which helped to ｾｴ｡｢ｩｬｩｺ･＠ it when stationary but 
could be raised when in motion. Transmission was by a 
ｬ･｡ｴｨ ｾ ｲ＠ belt from a pulley on the crankcase to the rear 
wheel. For normal running the belt was tight e n e d by a 
jockey pulley which acted as a primitive clutch. Operating 
the brake would also loosen the belt and effectively di sen-
gage the engine. The engine itself was centrally mounted 
low down between the two main wheels, and the rider sat 
above it on a saddle shaped to resemble the back of a 
horse. 17 
The Einspur performed well. On one occasion Paul 
" Daimler, son of Gottleib, rode it from Canstatt to 
Unterturkheim and back, a journey of seven and half miles, 
during which the saddle was set on fire by the hot 
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engine. 18 Such problems could have b ee n overcome, how e ver , 
but the project was soon droppe d in favour of dev e l opi ng a 
motor car. 
While Daimler and Mayba c h we r e building their first 
e ngine, Edward Butler, an Englishman barely into his twen-
ties, was designing a motor tricycle. The des ign was 
patented as the "Velocycl e " in 1884, and displayed at th e 
Stanley Cycle Show. It took th e form of many lat er tri-
cars, steered by the front whe e ls and driven by the si ngle 
rear wheel. It had a two-strok e e ngin e , mec hanically 
operated valves, and two water-cooled cylinders. Trans-
mission was locomotive style with direct drive from the 
piston rods to overhung cranks on the hub; ignition was 
electrical with the spark generated by a Whim s hurst 
machine; and the carburettor was of surface type . 
It took Butler three years to obtain the financial 
backing he needed to build his machine. The first model, 
named the "Petrol-Cycle" (fig. 5.3), was compl e t e d in 
--.. - - --------- ----- --- -
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ＭＭＭ ＭｾＬＭＭｾＭＭＭ Ｍ Ｍ -·""-'P--...-
Fig. 6.3. Butler's "Petrol-Cycle" 
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1888. After testing it, Butler made further improvements 
so that eventually the machine had a float-feed carburettor 
of advanced design, ignition by Ruhmkorff coil and battery, 
a new four-stroke engine, and epicyclic gearing to replace 
the direct drive. Performance was now much improved and 
under test a speed of 12mph was achieved. 19 
But while technical difficulties were being overcome 
new ones began to arise including the problem of trying ,the 
machine on the road at a time when the Locomotive Acts 
limited speed to walking pace. As a result it was decided 
to concentrate on developing the engine for motor boats and 
industrial applications, but soon the money available to 
Butler from his backers was used up and the project was 
abandoned. 
By 1890 both the bicycle and the tricycle had evolved 
into their standard forms which must have encouraged 
efforts to construct motor cycles. In the years immediate-
ly preceding the first production of motor cycles on a 
commercial scale in 1894, there were many experimental 
designs. One of the most interesting of these was a motor 
tricycle constructed by J.D. Roots in 1892. It was based 
on a standard tricycle and had a rear mounted, water-
cooled, two-stroke, oil engine which drove the rear axle 
through bevel and pinion gears. The oil fuel was preheated 
and mixed with air, and after compression in the crankcase 
was ignited by a hot tube. Cooling water was circulated 
through the tubes of the frame. 20 
This machine has been described as the "true ancestor" 
of the tricycles which dominated the early motor cycle 
industry,21 but it could not be used on British roads 
because of the Locomotive Acts. But for the Acts, this 
and perhaps several other British designs might have been 
produced commercially some years before commercial produc-
tion first took place overseas. Instead, production of the 
first ｣ｯｭｰｬ･ｴｾｬｹ＠ British design had to wait until 1898. 
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Experimentation and Continuity 
/ 
As this chapter has been mainly concerned with 
the history of experiments in the development of the motor 
cycle, it has concentrated on technical issues. It does 
raise, however, a number of more general questions. 
One of the most remarkable things about the pre-
commercial experimental period, was not just the wide range 
of substantially different designs that were tried, but the 
fact that there was little sign of continuity, that is, of 
building on the advances made in previous models. Thus we 
find that Lenoir used a primitive form of electric ignition 
in 1859, but more that twenty years later, Daimler prefer-
red the hot tube. The reason that has been given for this 
is that Daimler was uncertain whether his engine would work 
effectively wi th electric igni tion.22 It certainly would 
have, however, and so we are left to wonder why he did not 
find out this for himself experimentally. 
Butler had no such doubts and all of his models had a 
form of electric ignition. Yet several years after 
Butler's experimental success, Roots preferred hot tube. 
Most other elements of these designs also differed from 
each other, including the engines, the transmission sys-
tems, and the type of frame. 
This lack of continuity would be more understandable 
if none of the early designs was in any way practicable, 
but this was not so. Even the Michaux-Perreaux steam cycle 
has been considered a practicable machine for the time it 
was developed.23 
There were various probable causes. The first and 
probably the most important, was the ignorance of inventors 
about how the new technologies being developed elsewhere 
worked, hence the preference mentioned above of some 
experimenters for hot tube ignition when electrical systems 
. were already available. 
The second and possibly no less important was that 
the experimenters were almost always individuals or small 
firms with very limited resources. Thus if experiments did 
not produce quick returns they were likely to be abandoned. 
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Butler had no funds of his own and was able to construct 
his machi ne on ly af te r others had pu t up the money. When 
the money had been used up the project had to be abandoned. 
ａｮｯｴｨｾｲ＠ was that bicycles, tricycles, engines and 
other related technologies, were still subject to expe-
riment so that it was never certain which model might prove 
to be the better idea. The high wheeled bicycle was an 
absurd vehicle for powered propulsion and it is not surpri-
sing that experiments on such vehicles were soon abandoned. 
A fourth cause was the question of patents although a 
clever inventor might defeat a patent by applying the new 
principle in a slightly different way. Otto and Langen on 
producing their four-stroke engine in 1876 took out a 
patent which was considered valid until it was discovered 
that Beau de Rochas had patented the four stroke principle 
back in 1862,24 and this was why Butler's first design was 
for a two-stroke engine and not a four-stroke. 
A fifth was that even after the development of inter-
nal combustion engines, most experimenters were still 
largely concerned with steam and one or two with electri-
city. Steam looked attractive as far more was known about 
it than internal combustion engines, but it required rather 
more ､･ｶ･ｬｯｰｭ･ｮｾ＠ to make it practicable for motor cycles 
than the latter. The internal combustion engine was late 
in coming but when it appeared it caught up rapidly to 
steam and soon overhauled it, bringing to an end much 
previous research and directing inventors onto a different 
track. 
Fi nally, there may have been a lack of communica tion 
between inventors so that new ideas had to be developed 
over and over again instead of being incorporated as a 
matter of course into the next experimenter's model. The 
result was a fragmentation of effort which was not resolved 
,until somebody had developed a motor cycle which was effec-
tive and convincing enough to encourage others to construct 
imitative models. This did not happen until after the 
first commercial production. 
One result of the lack of continuity of development 
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was the failure to exploit Daimler's engine in a motor 
cycle until ten years after it had been developed. The 
first machine in which an engine of this type was used 
apart; from Daimler's Einspur, was the de ｄｩｯｮＭｂｾｵｴｯｮ＠ motor 
tricyc Ie of 1895, the first commercially successful motor 
cycle. Such a machine might have been produced several 
years earlier. 
Conclusions 
For obvious reasons the development of the bicycle had 
to precede the development of the motor cycle, but there 
was very little delay between the first commercially 
produced bicycles and the first experimental motor cycles. 
, 
Yet, if we"ignore Roper's steam-powered machines, it took 
at least twenty-five years from the development of the 
first motor cycle to the first commercial production. 
There were two main reasons for this delay., The major 
one was that the first engine adequate to the task, that of 
Daimler and Maybach, was not developed until 1884 and then 
it was set aside for another ten years before anyone 
attempted to apply it to regular motor-cycle use. The 
other was that neither the bicycle nor the tricycle was a 
sui table vehicle for development into a motor cycle until 
the 1880s. Both cycle and engine had to be developed to an 
advanced stage before the two could be effectively combined 
so as to produce not just an experimental ｭ｡ｾｨｩｮ･＠ but a 
motor cycle with definite prospects of commercial success. 
Even so there are indications tha t wi th a more sus-
tained effort, a commercially viable motor cycle might have 
been produced several years earlier. But a sustained 
effort is not likely to come from individuals, whose 
resources are usually limited, and it was individuals who 
had so far performed all the important experiments. Major 
.firms had as yet shown little interest in the motor cycle. 
As will be seen in the next chapter, the period of 
experimentation did not end with the first commercially 
produced motor cycles, and the important experdments con-
tinued to come from individuals rather than major firms. 
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There follows an appendix on the definition of a motor 
cycle which is to some extent a preparation for the next 
chapter in that it explains how motor tricycles and even 
some kinds of four-wheeled machine, were no less to be 
considered motor cycles than the two-wheeled machines. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 6 
DEFINITION OF A MOTOR CYCLE 
The first problem in identifying a new industry is 
defining its product. What kind of product did the new 
industry manufacture? The motor cycle is conceptually 
distinct from both the cycle (which includes the bicycle, 
tricycle, quadricycle, and tandem) and the motor car. It 
was different·from a cycle, especially in the early days, 
simply in that it was motor-driven, but what made it a 
motor cycle rather than a motor ,car? Today we would think 
of a motor cycle as a two-wheeled vehicle. Thus a modern 
dictionary definition of a motor cycle describes it as a 
"two-wheeled motor-driven road vehicle wi thout pedal 
proPulsion".1' But in the early days just as a cycle could 
have up to four and sometimes more wheels, so also could a 
motor cycle. What made it a motor cycle rather than a car 
was not the number of wheels but the manner of 
construction. 
This issue raised a certain amoun t of controversy in 
the pioneering days, and although perhaps not settled to 
everybody's satisfaction, seems to have been dealt with in 
a reasonable way in a letter from E.T. Headech to "The 
Autocar" of 17 April 1897. The .wr iter defines a motor 
cycle as a "machine of approved tubular construction, with 
its motor an integral part of tha t tubework, and the 
apparatus connected therewith distributed about the machine 
so as not to mar its outline generally,. but certainly not 
to be boxed up in any way". In comparison an autocar is 
described as Ｇｾ＠ machine ｴ｡ｫｩｮｧｾｨ･＠ form of any horse-drawn 
vehicle, or, in fact, any form of which the seating accom-
modation is of the carriage type, with cushions, back-
rests, and pads, giving the comfort of a ｳｰｲｩｮｧＭｦｾ｡ｭ･＠
carriage, the, motor being boxed up or hidden away out of 
sight; wooden, or other wheels no matter, for cycle wheels 
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a re of ten u sed on horse-d ra wn carriages". 2 The essen tia 1 
distinctions made were between cycle-like construction on 
the one hand, and carriage-type on the other; and between 
single or tandem-style seating and side-by-side ｳ･ｾｴｩｮｧＬ＠
although one form of cycle, the sociable, did have side-by-
side seating and at least one motor cycle was built to this 
pattern, but it was not very practicable.3 
A more comprehensive definition of the motor cycle and 
one which gives a much more complete description of the 
machine at that time, was suppled later in what was 
possibly the first instruction book for the motorcyclist 
ever published: "A motor cycle is a machine constructed, 
like the everyday bicycle and tricycle, of steel tubing and 
pneumatic-tyred steel wheels, with a bicycle saddle and 
steering handle-bar, and pedal-cranks for the rider to 
propel the machine. It is, in fact, a pedalling bicycle 
or tricycle, with an auxiliary motor".4 
But the emerging motor cycle industry was not 
necessarily to be confined to the production of motor 
cycles. In a leading article in "The Cyclist" of 19 
October 1898, it was emphasized that the cycle maker could 
best enter the motor industry manufacturing, not just motor 
cyc les, but also "the lighter forms of cyc le-buil t cars, in. 
which tubular frame-work, cycle wheels, and ball bearings 
are the principle constructional ｦ･｡ｴｾｲ･ｳＢＮＵ＠
The opportunity then to apply further such skills as 
he already had, -plus the availabili ty of engines pur-
chasable from elsewhere, enabled the cycle manufacturer to 
enter the motor cycle industry as a manufacturer of motor 
cycles and light cars, later known as cycle cars. And 
motor cyc les could be, in effect any form of motorised 
cycle, including motor bicycles, motor tandems (fig. 6.4), 
motor tricycles, motor quadricycles (fig. 6.5), and motor 
,tandem tricycles which somet imes took the form of a tri-
cycle or tricar with one rear and two front wheels in which 
a passenger was carried in a forecar in advance of the 
driver (fig. 6.6), and sometimes that of the standard 
tricycle with an extra seat and pair of pedals added on at 
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the rear in normal tandem fashion ( fig . 6 .7 ) . 
Fig. 6.4. The Humber Motor Tandem 
(liThe Autocar", 4 December 1897) 
Fig. 6.5. The Beeston Motor Quadricycle 
(liThe Autoca;r", 14 January 1899) 
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----_ ._-_ ... Ｍ ｾ＠
Fig. 6.6. The Humber Motor Tamdem Tricycl e 
(liThe Autocar". 4 De c embe r, 1897) 
Fig. 6.7. ｔｾ Ｎ ･＠ Singer Motor Tandem Tricycle 
(liThe Autocar", 1 February 1902) 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE EXPERIMENTAL PHASE (2): THE FIRST COMMERCIAL 
PRODUCTION, 1894-1900 
Experimentation did not end with the first commercial 
production because, as we shall see in this chapter, the 
first products to be put on the market were simply not good 
enough to generate sufficient business to sustain an indus-
try. The account of the Hilderbrand and WolfmUller which 
ｦｾｬｬｯｷｳ＠ the introduction, explains how the first commerci-
ally produced motor cycle was a disaster both for the 
producers and the unfortunate souls who bought it. 
Some of the machines which followed like the de Dion-
Bouton motor tricycle and the Werner motor bicycle" were 
rather better and did make money for their producers. They 
achieved little for their British imitators, however, most 
of whose operations were abortive and lost money despite 
the grand efforts of H.J. Lawson to create a British motor 
industry. 
Lawson's operations are discussed in some detail. 
They are followed by an account of the structure of' the 
British motor cycle industry in its earliest years. Later 
sections deal with motor cycle development from both tech-
nical and consumer pOints of view. 
By the end of the period covered there were the first 
positive indications of a developing British industry in 
the form of the first successful motor cycles of British 
design. 
Towards the end of the chapter, the second experimen-
tal period.is put into a theoretical/conceptual perspective 
with the discussion of some of the propositions presented 
in Chapte r 4. 
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Introduction 
The second experimental period differed from the first 
much less in a qualitative sense than might be expected. 
The products of this period were often little better than 
the experimental models which preceded them. They were 
still essentially experiments in that they were built in 
order to be tried out in the hope that something might be 
learned from their performance. The main difference was 
that instead of having to tryout his inventions himself or 
through the cooperation of his friends, the inventor was 
now being paid to allow other people to tryout his inven-
tions for him. The results were largely hit and miss. 
Consumers in the main, did not take kindly to having 
to test new and largely untried vehicles which were diffi-
cult to control, of poor performance and dangerous propen-
sity. At the outset, however, buyers, lacking experience, 
and ignorant to the point of naivety, came forward in 
substantial numbers to tryout the new machines. There 
were soon many complaints and much early disenchantment, 
particularly with the motor bicycle if rather less so with 
the tricycle. Thus this premature effort may well have set 
back the cause of the powered two-wheeler several years. 
But from the many small disasters of .this period, there 
began slowly to emerge by the end of it the first signs 
that motor bicycles could work and might even be capable of 
giving to the consumer a small degree of satisfaction from 
riding them. 
The First Attempt 
The first motor cyc Ie to be produced on a comme rcial 
scale was the Hilderbrand and WolfmUller (H & W). It was 
the result of the joint efforts of the Hilderbrand 
brothers, Heinrich and Wilhelm, Alois WolfmUller and Hans 
·Geisenhof. The Hilderbrands had been building experimental 
motor cycles for ｾ･ｶ･ｲ｡ｬ＠ years and in 1889 constructed a 
steam cycle. In 1892 they joined up with up with 
WolfmUller and Geisenhof, and in the same year Geisenhof 
built a small two-stroke engine. It proved to be rather 
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und e rpo wered and unr e liabl e , how eve r, so together with 
WolfmUll e r h e set out to build so mething mor e powerful. 
Th e r es ult was an e ng in e of twin-cylinder, four-stroke 
d es ign, which was too hea vy for a standard safety bi c yc l e 
frame and so a s pecial frame had to be built for it. The 
machine that emerged from these e fforts seemed to pe rform 
we ll, was pat e n ted i n 1894 and put i n top rod u c t ion i n t h e 
same year.l Later it was produc e d in Paris by Duncan & 
Sub e rbie (fig. 7.1). 
Fig. 7.1. puncan & Suberbie's version of the Hilderbrand 
& WolfmUller Motor Cycle 
(liThe Autocar", 11 January 1896) 
The H & W was the first machine to be called a motor 
cycle ("motorrad" in German). Like many experimental 
machines it was a mixture of features of varying degrees o f 
practicality with the emphasis in this case on the less 
practical. The engine was very large, 1489cc capacity, 
which gave enough power for a speed of up to 28mph, but 
there were no flywheels with the result that road perfor-
mance was very uneven. The absence of flywheels also meant 
that there was insufficient power to enable the pistons to 
complete the return stroke so they had to be helped on 
their way by means of rubber straps. The engine was water-
cooled, ignition by hot tube and transmission by connecting 
rods from the pistons direct to overhung cranks on the rear 
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wheel. The primitive spoon brake was assisted in the early 
models by a sprag intended to scrape along the road.2 
The H & W wa s prema ture and its early production wa s 
in every way a mistake. It proved very difficult to.start 
and equally difficult to control once in motion. In the 
absence of gearing the minimum speed at which it could be 
ridden was 15-20mph since at lower speeds the engine would 
stop.3 The machine sold well but soon there were many 
complaints and demands for repairs. There were also finan-
cial problems for the company as it became apparen t tha t 
the machines were being sold at less than cost.4 
But before an unaware and inexperienced public had 
discove red the vices of the H & W, its production had grown 
into a considerable enterprise. At one time the firm, set 
up in Munich with the inventors' own capital, was employing 
830 personnel on the shop floor and fifty office staff.5 
Output was ten machines a day and estimates of total' prod-
uction have been as high as two thousand during the three 
years (1894-7) before the firm went into liquidation.6 
While pioneering motorcyclists were undergoing their 
first traumatic experiences with the H & W, motorists were 
doing somewha t bette r and there was increasing awareness 
even in ｂｲｩｴ｡ｩｮｾｨ｡ｴ＠ motor manufacture was the industry of 
the future. This resulted in the repeal of the Locomotive 
Acts by a new Act which came into operation on 14 November 
1896 making motoring on British roads possible for the 
first time. But what followed was hardly calculated to 
impress the world at large with Britain's mechanical skill. 
At that stage the British knew even less about producing 
motor cycles than the Germans had in 1894. 
The New Industry: Bntry 
There were four main kinds of entrant to the motor 
·cycle industry in the early years: inventors and inventor-
inspired firms, financiers, developers, and imitators. 
The inventors were firms like Motorfahrrad-Fabrik 
Hildebrand & WolfmUller which were set up to exploit the 
inventors' own products. The most important firms to enter 
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the industry up to 1900 were in this category. These 
included de Dion-Bouton, the first firm to produce a 
successful motor cycle, albeit a tricycle, and the Werner 
Brothers, the first to produce a commercially successful 
motor bicyc Ie. 
Inventor-inspired firms were those which entered the 
industry by producing a machine which the inventor was 
unable or unwilling to produce independently. In some 
cases the inventor sold his patent outright to the prospec-
tive manufacturer, in others, the manufacturer paid a 
royalty. The Singer (patented by Perks and Birch) and the 
Holden (produced by Motor Tractioi Co.) belong in this 
category. 
The financiers were firms promoted by people with 
large amounts of capital to invest and who saw the new 
motor industry as an outstanding speculation. H.J. Lawson 
was the chief initiator of this kind of activity and he 
promoted a number of firms including Great Horseless 
Carriage Co., Daimler, Beeston Pneumatic Tyre Co., and New 
Beeston Cycle Co. 
The developers were firms which picked out an interes-
ting design and set out to develop something significantly 
better. They were extremely rare at this stage of the 
industry's growth because so little was known in Britain 
about motor cycle technology, and probably the only firm of 
any significance of this type was Cycle Components 
Manufacturing, the producers of the Ariel. 
The imitators were firms which Simply imitated the 
products of other firms, sometimes under licence and some-
times illegally. They were certainly the largest group of 
firms in the industry numerically during this period, while 
at the same time being the weakest in terms of commercial 
performance since the products they imitated were rarely of 
·sufficien t quality and performance to justify imi tation. 
With one or two exceptions, little is remembered of these 
firms and they will not be discussed in any detail in this 
chapter. 
Since the inventors and developers are discussed in 
the technical and consumer sections of this chapter, they 
will not be discussed here. This leaves only the finan-
ciers which merit further discussion at this stage, and 
particularly the activities of H.J. Lawson. 
B.J. Lawson: Bow Not to Start an Industry 7 
Before becoming interested in motor vehicles, Lawson 
had been involved with the cycle industry for many years. 
He had some technical training, and a claim to a number of 
inventions •. Probably the most important of these was the 
safety bicycle of 1879 although his machine did not work 
too well and wasa commercial failure. In 1880 he took out 
a patent for "the first British motor car" but nothing came 
of it.8 Later he turned his ｾｴｴ･ｮｴｩｯｮＬ｡ｷ｡ｹ＠ from invention 
to business and he shared in'the promotion of a number of 
cycle companies. He was a director of the Dunlop Pneumatic 
Tyre Company when it was reconstructed in 1893, and in the , 
process the company's capital was increased from £75,000 to 
£3,000,000 making Lawson and the other directors very rich. 
Thus he was provided with sufficient funds to initiate his 
plans which were none other than to "corner" the British 
side of the motor industry by buying up all patents rela-
ting to motor vehicles.9 
Among the patents Lawson acquired on behalf of the 
various companies he,set up were those for the Daimler car, 
the de Dion-Bouton tricyc Ie, and the Pennington motor 
cycle. The purchase of the last of these patents, for 
£100,000, has been described as "the grea test mistake ever 
known in the motor industry,,10 since the machine proved 
impracticable and was never put into production. 
Yet to some extent at least there probably was justi-
fication in buying patent rights since, while British firms 
had been effectively prevented by the Locomotive Acts from 
developing motor vehicles, there had been no such limita-
tion overseas. A few overseas firms had been producing 
motor vehicles for several years and their products were 
reasonably good for the time. 
It was not possible, however, to set up a motor indus-
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try simply by importing overseas patents. It required also 
a certain amount of knowledge and ability in motor manufac-
ture and this was lacking. At that time there were few 
motor engineers in Britain and most of those that were 
available had obtained their ･ｸｰ･ｲｩ･ｮｾ･＠ in steam locomotive 
works. l1 They did know something about stationary gas 
engines which had been in use since Lenoir's time, but they 
had little experience of petrol engines.12 In these cir-
cumstances, where would Lawson find works managers, engi-
neers, ,designers and skilled personnel, and who would be, 
capable of acting as directors of his companies? Lawson 
alone perhaps had the necessary management experience and 
he has been described as being in the position of a "one-
13 ' 
man company". His remedy was to appoint to the boards 
of his companies what have been described as "dummy 
directors" who could never agree with each other so that 
management was able to govern them.14 
, 
The management, however, was in general no better than 
the directors. British engineers, according to Duncan, 
were, despite their lack of experience and know-how, un-
willing simply to copy the continental models, for which 
the patent rights had been acquired at such expense, but 
insisted on improving them. This meant that instead of 
using their vast capital to get rapidly into production and 
actually begin to achieve some ｲ･ｴｵｾｮＬ＠ the companies were 
bogged down for months and sometimes years in costly ex-
periments involving expenditures of 'thousands of ｰｯｵｮ､ｳＮｾＵ＠
These experiments, which were largely unsuccessful, were 
said to have cost the Beeston Motor Company up to £10,000 
in two years, and the Great Horseless Carriage Company at 
least £15,000.16 
There is little to be gained from taking this account 
very much further. Despi te periodic reconstructions, 
almost all of Lawson's firms eventually failed and most of 
them achieved little or no profit. The only long-term 
survivor was the Daimler Motor Company. 
There is much we can learn, .. however, from these 
accounts of the H & Wand the Lawson enterprises. It is 
lOO 
often thought that one of the prime requisites for the 
establishment of a new industry is an abundant supply of 
capital. But as we have seen, when producers set out for 
the first time to manufacture an entirely new product .which 
is still experimental, and largely untried in the real 
world of wear and. tear a t the hands of consumers, then a 
good supply of capital, far from being an advantage, may in 
fact be a disadvantage. Capital is clearly a necessity, 
but when it arrives too soon in the day it can easily 
encourage-manufacturers to rush their products onto·the 
market before they have been brought up to a satisfactory 
level of performance, a level which will encourage rather 
than dete r the consumer. Late r in the chapte r, we shall 
see how almost all the important motor cycles developed and 
put into production during this period were the work of 
people of relatively modest means. 
Lawson failed for various reasons, some of which were 
of his own making. But many of the problems he experienced 
confronted all firms which set out at that time to produce 
motor vehicles with the result that few made a profit 
before the turn of the century. 
The Size and Structure of the Industry 
There are very few statistics of any kind relating to 
the early motor cycle industry. An analysis of marques 
listed in Erwin Tragatsch's "The Illustrated Encyclopedia 
of Motorcycles" (1978), certainly the most authoritative 
work of its kind so far published, indicates a total of 24 
firms which manufactured motor cycles in the United Kingdom 
up to 1900.17 But since Tragatsch is mostly concerned with 
two-wheelers, we, must adjust this number to allow for firms 
which produced tricycles only. 
ACGording to Walford who was involved in the early 
motor cycle industry, there were probably about fifty firms 
. manufacturing motor tricycles by 1900.18 If we add these 
to Tragatsch's 24 and subtract "a number to allow for those 
of the 24 which also produced tricycles, we arrive at a 
total of something like sixty firms which produced motor 
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cycles up to 1900. 
before 1898. 
Few of these produced motor cycles 
There are no production figures for this period, but 
the numbers of machines displayed at the Stanley Show, the 
most important of the cycle shows, presented in Table 7.1, 
give some indication of the development of the industry and 
the growing interest in manufacturing motor cycles. These 
figures include some foreign machines, but the vast majo-
rity were British made although mainly copies of foreign 
machines and powered by foreign engines. 
1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 
Motor bicycles 8 6 1 1 110 
Motor tricycles 8 16 67 19 4 
Motor quadricycles 10 8 
Table 7.1.Numbers of Motor Cycles Displayed at 
Stanley ShOWS, 1897-190119 
The table illustrates the industry's slow start in 
1897, followed by the rapid development of interest in 
motor tricycles in 1898-9. For a time the two-wheeler was 
abandoned in favour of the safer tricycle, but by 1900, 
successful motor bicycles were being developed and had 
already begun to replace the tricycles. The development of 
the quadricycles represented a demand for passenger 
carrying capacity, but the design was to prove short-lived, 
soon giving way to the tricar. 
The industry even by 1900 was still more of a future 
hope than a present reality. No firm dominated the market 
which was very small. A few may have made motor cycle 
production pay, but the majority almost certainly did 
not.20 One of the more successful manufacturers, Eadie, 
advertised that "More motor cycles of Eadie manufacture 
have probably been so ld than a ny other make".21 Unfortu-
nately no figures were given and it is unlikely that Eadie 
could have approached de Dion's output even remotely,22 but 
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it is possible that they sold more machines in the United 
Kingdom than any other manufacturer at that time. It is 
doubtful, however, that their production could have been 
very great since they soon abandoned the manufacture of 
, 
complete machines in order to concentrate on cycle parts. 
Another firm which is said to have done well at that 
time was Cycle Components, producer of the Ariel. The 
Ariel was a substantial improvement on the de Dion and the 
first important British design. According to Walford, it 
was sold in large numbers after 1899-1900,23 but years 
later it was reported that its manufacture had been 
"unremunerative".24 Thus even the apparently successful 
firms failed to make money, . bu t then we shoul d not e tha t 
the "I a rge num bers" referred to above, we re probably no 
morethan a few hundred machines a year. 
One of the few machines of that time for which we do 
have a more definite production figure is "The Compact". 
This was the workof EdwinPerks, waspatentedin1899, and 
manufactured by him in partnership wi th J.N. Birch. Two 
hundred units of this machine had been sold by October 
1900.25 The patent was then sold to Singer in whose hands 
it wa s apparently even more successfuL Manufactured as 
the Singer, it was later described as the first British 
built motor bicycle to be" put on the market in any 
numbers.26 
It is apparent then that the annual output of even the 
most successful firms was to be measured in hundreds rather 
than thousands, and the total output of the industry by 
1900 could not have been more than a few thousand.27 
Furthermore, the successful firms--if, indeed, there were 
any that achieved real commercial success--were the excep-
tions. The vast majority of would-be motor· cycle manufac-
turers were not successful at all. An example of the 
.latter was a small firm which which attempted to produce a 
machine'it called the Buchet, the name of its bought-in 
engine: "The Buchet is an example of types which were 
certainly rushed on to the market by energetic cycle retai-
lers possessing no sizeable market and little capital. It 
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consisted of a small French engine mounted inside the 
diamond frame of a good cycle built in a small cycle shop. 
As far as I know, only two were ever built. As they 
produced no profit, the agent wisely withdrew from the new 
, 28 . 
business". 
The practice of dealers building a few machines of 
their own from bought-in parts, usually to special order, 
was common in the.cycle trade. But it was less successful 
with motor cycle manufacture.which required an understan-
ding of the new technologies of engine and ignition sys-
tems. As we have already seen, such ability was generally 
lacking even among firms which made a major effort to enter 
the industry. What then could the British industry do 
beyond the slavish copying of continental designs? Not a 
great deal until it had learnt a bit more about motor cycle 
technology. As we shall see in the next section, most 
British firms entered the industry with ｩｭｩｴｾｴｩｯｮｳ＠ of 
foreign mode Is. But by the end of the period, one or two 
very interesting and highly innovative British designs had 
been deve loped. 
The Motor ｃｾ｣ｬ･＠ as Technical Product 
The aim' here is to concentrate on motor cycle design: 
to look at 'design in specific terms, and to consider 
production processes from the point of view of how they may 
have influenced the emergence of one design or another. 
The emphasis then is on the motor cycle as a machine. its 
technical specifications. and its performance. Some atten-
tion will also be given, however, to the designers and how 
they first entered the industry and managed to get their 
machines into production. Consumer aspects are discussed 
in a following section. 
In the earliest days of the industry, few people were 
,willing to take the motor bicycle seriously: "We have no 
hesitation in saying that the motor cycle of the future 
will be the three-wheeler, at least, and possibly a 
quadricycle".29 These words were remarkably unprophetic, 
but they did .represent the feeling at the time. The 
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tricycles, large, heavy and slow, did at least have three 
wheels on the ground--most of the time. The two-wheelers, 
lighter and faster, were a good deal less stable and 
usually dangerous in all but the most favourable condi-
tions. Yet from the point of view of developing commer-
cially effective machines, the motor bicycle was not really 
vary far behind the tricycle. The first two-wheeler in 
this category, the Werner, was in production by 1897, only 
a year or two after the first tricycle, the de Dion-Bouton. 
These two machines overshadowed all others in the period. 
de Dion-Bouton and the Tricycles' 
Count Albert de Dion and Georges Bouton first met in 
1882. They established a partnership and in 1887 they 
constructed a steam tricycle. Seven years later in 1894 
they won ｾｨ･＠ Paris-Rouen race with a steam-powered machine, 
but noticing that all of the ｯｾｨ･ｲ＠ vehicles in the race 
were driven by internal combustion engines, they decided to 
develop one themselves.30 
Basing their design on the original Daimler engine, it 
took them only until the following year to build a proto-
type. It was a vertical, single-cylinder, air-cooled four-
stroke of 138cc capacity. It weighed 40lb and produced lhp 
at 1,500rpm. The engine was similar to Daimler's, but 
there was one major difference, the igni tion system. 
Initially they had used a hot tube as in Daimler's engine, 
but it was soon replaced by a coil, battery and contact 
breaker, which synchronized the spark with the stroke so as 
to fire at the best time.31 This was an innovation of 
great importance. 
de Dion-Bouton constructed their first motor tricycle, 
in 1895 by installing the engine in a standard pedal tri-
cycle. It was positioned immediately behind ｾｨ･＠ rear axle. 
,(fig. 7.2), the fuel tank and carburettor were placed under 
the saddle, and the battery attached to the top frame tub8. 
The complete machine weighed 200lb which was rather heavy 
for such a low powered engine •• Tests were encouraging, 
however, and larger engines were installed the following 
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year giving a level of performance which was good enough to 
win for the de Dion both the Paris-Marseilles-Paris race 
and the Paris-Mantes race of 1896, beating both the H & W 
and the Bollee.32 
The de Dion engine marked the effective beginning of 
the motor cycl e industry, and much more so than the H & W. 
Not only did it power de Dion tricycles, but it was offered 
in various sizes to any manufacturers wishing to build 
their own machines. As there were no comparable engines 
available at the time, de Dion engines dominated the motor 
cycle industry for several years and continued to do so 
despite the rash of imitations that soon began to appear. 
;The de Dion tricycle became the prototype for most of 
the early British made tricycles. Lawson had acquired the 
ｂｲｩｴｾｳｨ＠ patent rights for de Dion inventions, and after 
obtaining a specimen of the de Dion machine, he had it 
copied by Accles of Birmingham whose designer, Paul Renouf, 
modified it by putting the engine in front of the axle.33 
This was a desirable improvement in the design since 
Fig. 7.2. Beeston version of the de Dion-Bouton 
Motor Tricycle 
("The Autocar". 4 December 1897) 
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otherwise the machine was likely to be unstable, but when 
Lawson's firm, Beeston (later New Beeston) commenced prod-
uction, it adopted the original layout, producing a machine 
almost identical to the de Dion (fig. 7.2). The vast 
majority of British motor cycle manufacturers followed 
suit, some building it under licence, others copying it 
without regard to the patent. Thus the de Dion's worst 
fault was preserved. 
We can only speculate on why such a design was 
preserved and copied, and why it was adopted in the first 
place. Probably it was much easier to place the engine 
behind the axle than in front. Such a position would have 
simplified assembly and given better access to the engine. 
Thus a correspondent of "The English Mechanic" criticized 
the Ariel tricycle which had a different layout: "The 
first thing that strikes you is the position of the engine, 
which is ,placed in front of the back axle, the makers 
claiming a better distribution of weight resulting. This 
was tried by French makers some years ago and given up, the 
reason being not far to seek. In order to place engine in 
front everything has to be cut down as narrow as possible, 
several bad features introduced thereby, that more than 
counterbalances any supposed advantage".34 The writer, who 
signed himself "Monty", went on to support his argument in 
more technical terms, and his comments were reproduced 
elsewhere with apparent approval.35 . 
The issue was hotly disputed by Charles Sangster, a 
director of Cycle Components Manufacturing, manufacturers 
of the Ariel. According to Sangster, who was to be proved 
right, most of Monty's comments were fallacious, and even 
the suggestion that the French had previously tried such a 
design was incorrect.36 It also emerged that Monty has 
once worked for Sangster and been sacked,37 so he may have 
been motivated by personal grievance. However, he did get 
support from elsewhere, which would appear to indicate'not 
just a general lack of technical competence amon"g people 
involved with the industry, but also, even at this early 
stage, a remarkable degree of design conservatism. As will 
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be seen later, whatever technical j ustification Monty may 
h a v e had for h i s com me n t s , wit h ina y e a r 0 r two th e r e was 
nothin g but prai se for the Ari e l, a nd the de Dion type was 
itself a s ubj ect fo r criticism. 
Meanwhile, manufacturers lacking experience of mot or 
tricycles were naturally incline d to copy the original 
d e Dion product which was known and successful, rather than 
the Ren ouf design which, until Ariel dev e lop e d it and 
proved it, was little known and not yet in production. 
There is a considerable commercial advantage in being 
fi rst, and an original product that has become established 
often looks a safer bet than a new one however good the 
latter may be. According to another writer in "The English 
Mechanic", al so, coinciden t ly, replying to a poin t ma de by 
Monty, "the reason English motor-cycl e mak e rs follow the 
design of the De Dion motor so closely is that they do not 
want to go to the expense of experimenting with new types, 
preferring to build a machine which will work and be a 
source of income". 38 
The early motorcycling scene in this country, then, 
was dominated by motor tricycles most of which were to a 
large extent close copies of the original de Dion machine. 
The Ariel (fig. 7.3), dating from 1898, was th e first 
machine to represent a significant improvement on the 
Fig. 7.3. The Ariel Motor Tricycle 
("The Autocar", 25 March 1899) 
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de Dion. Designed with a longer wheelbase to allow the 
extra room required for the engine to be placed more cen-
trally, it was rather heavy. Nevertheless; it was vastly 
superior to the de Dion, and; it was soon earning high 
praise in the trade press: "the Ariel motor cycle is 
second to none in the world",39 and, from a letter writer, 
"I have examined and used the Ariel motor considerably, and 
every detail as well as the ensemble will compare with 
advantage to the French de Dion. Certain it is that the 
Ariel complete tricycle is far before any tricycle with the 
motor overhanging the back axle ••••• ,,40 Yet most manufac-
turers still remained faithful to the original design and 
some of them may have achieved good commercial results with 
it. 
The de Dion type motor tricycle was not the only 
doubtful machine--doubtful despite its commercial 
success-to be inflicted on an unsuspecting public in the 
late 1890s. There were tandem tricycles, quadricycles, and 
even sociables, about which one writer concluded: "we do 
not think two people would derive much pleasure from a ride 
on it".41 But worst of all were the motor bicycles where 
the problems of producing a practicable machine were far 
greater than for the tricycle 
Motor Bicycles: Bome Brave Attempts 
The development of the motor bicycle proceeded in 
several different directions all at approximately the same 
time, and almost all of which proved to be unsuccessful in 
one way 0 r anothe r. The fi rs t en tire ly British des igned 
motor bicycle that went into production was the work of 
Major (later Colonel) Henry Capel Lofft Holden of the Royal 
Engi neers. The ma chine wa sin some respects the last of 
the line of development which began with Butler's invention 
pf the 1880s., Like the latter and the H & W, the Holden 
(fig. 7.4) was driven locomotive style by rods direct from 
. 
the cylinders to overhung cranks on the driving-wheel axle. 
Even so it was a substantial improvement on the H & W. Its 
large, slow-running engine, consisting of four horizontally 
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Fig. 7.4. The Holden Motor Bicycle (sectioned) 
opposed cylinders, gave it a degree of flexibility far 
superior to the typical single-cylinder motor cycle of the 
time in that it helped to compensate for the lack of vari-
able gears. Ignition was electric and the automatic lubri-
cation system was very advance'd for the period. The 
machine was capable of 25mph and its later models were said 
to be capable of covering two hundred miles without stop 
42 for petrol or oil. 
Holden's motor bicyc Ie was relatively simple in ｣ｯｮ Ｇｾ＠
struction from a workshop point of view,43 yet, priced at 
about £80, it was expensive probably because, unlike most 
machines of its time, it was built almost from first prin-
ciples. There were none of those cost advantages which 
accrued to manufacturers who simply took a standard bicycle 
or tricycle frame and hung an engine on it. Such machines 
,could be put together--"developed" might be too flattering 
a term--if not quite overnight, then certainly within a 
relatively short time, while the Holden was under develop-
ment for about four years before it went into production. 
Thus by the time it was manufactured by Lawson's Motor 
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Tract ion Company of Coventry, it was probably too lat e . As 
a d es i g n i t was already nearing obsolescence, and it was 
much too ex pensive compared with the cheape r, simpl e r 
ma c hines now ｣ｯｭｾｮｧ＠ onto the mark e t. Production ceased in 
1902. 
Th e Holden was an unusual and highly original machine. 
This degree of originality became less necessary with the 
development of the de Dion engine which could at least in 
theory be installed in a modified bicycle frame. Unfortu-
nately, the earlier engines were rather too heavy and 
clumsy for easy installation in a bicycle frame, and the 
first results of such efforts were not at all promising. 
The de Dion motor bicycle was little short of a disaster. 
The British version of this machine was 'produced by 
Beeston under Lawson's British patent. It is illustrated 
in fig. 7.5 and, as can be seen, it was ugly in appearance, 
the engine was altogether out of proportion to the rela-
tively light frame, and it was placed too far back for good 
weight distribution. It was said to be capable of 27mph,44 
but it was jerky at low speeds and liable to skid, so much 
so that the manufacturers recommended it for use only on 
dry roads. It was no kind of success and ultimately it was 
reported that "Recognising the uselessness of the motor 
bicycle for general use, the company do not propose to 
Fig. 7.5. The Beeston ｶ･ｲｳｩｯｾ＠ of the de Dion Motor Bicycle 
("The Autocar". 4 December 1897) 
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continue their manufacture in large quantities".45 
The best that can be said for machines of this calibre 
is that they did at least go into production if only for a 
;brief period. The Pennington, an original design and 
Lawson's most expensive acquisition, did not even achieve 
that distinction since it lacked some of the most basic 
requirements of a motor vehicle. The engine projected 
behind the .rear wheel supported by frame extensions, pos-
sibly the worst engine position ever thought of. It had 
neither carburettor nor a means of cooling, and yet somehow'· 
it worked. The machine was capable of 30mph, but it 
rarely covered ten miles without breaking down.46 
A better design and one that did achieve a modest 
comme rcial success a 1 though it did not survive more than 
three or four years, was the work of Edwin ｐ･ｲｫｳｾ＠ Perks 
had worked for the Beeston Motor Company but was sacked for 
doing his own work in their time. In 189,9 he constructed 
his motor wheel, an engine built into a wheel that could be 
installed in any normal bicycle or tricycle frame. The 
idea was not original since Millet had done much the same 
kind of thing though with a vastly different engine in 
1894, but Perks' design turned out to be rather more effec-
tive. It performed well and a motor bicycle incorporating 
the motor wheel was manufactured in partnership with J .N. 
Birch under the name "Compact".47 
This achieved good sales and became even more popular 
after the design was sold to Singer who developed various 
other models along similar lines. The Compact had been 
aptly named as its neatness of appearance (fig. 7.6) and 
simplicity of control were outstanding. Its most important 
innovative feature, however, was the addition of a Simms-
Bosch low-tension magneto-- probably the first time such 
equipment had been installed in a motor cycle.48 Until 
.then motor cyclists had had to rely entirely on their 
batteries which needed frequent recharging. But the 
machine was not without its faults. Its transmission was 
rather harsh and it had the tendency to sideslip of most of 
the motor bicycles of the period. 
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Fig. 7.6. Advertisement for the Singer Motor Bicycle, 
formerly the "Compact" 
("The Autocar". 24 November 1900) 
1& r. 
The Singer was one of the more successful experimental 
machines, but it failed to solve the main techpical problem 
of this time: where to put the engine. The ideal position 
was low down in the frame between the wheels. This was not 
possible, however, with the standard bicycle frame because 
the pedalling gear was already situated there. Many other 
positions were tried with varying results. The Singer, 
wi th its engine installed in the rear wheel, worked well 
despite having its centre of gravity too far back. In 
comparison, the Werner had its engine in an even more 
unlikely position, and from a technical pOint of view 
should have been a commercial failure. 
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The Werner: A Commercial Success 
Michel and Eugene Werner were Russians, former journa-
lists, who settled in Paris where they established a small 
business, selling and sometimes experimenting on type-
writers, cinematographs, phonographs, and other recent 
inventions. There are conflicting accounts of how the 
Werner motor bicycle itself was invented and who invented 
it. I t may have been the work of Michel Werner himself, it 
may have been constructed by Werner but copied by him from 
a design originated by Johathan Young who had business 
connections with the Werners, or it may have been invented 
by Hypaulite Labitte who brought the machine to the 
Werners' workshop in ｲ･ｳｰｯｮｳｾ＠ to an advertisement for motor 
inventions.49 
Whatever its origin, it seems certain that Michel 
Werner was not in any wayan engineer and that would help 
to explain how sucn a fundamentally unsound design was 
taken seriously. Nevertheless, taken seriously it was and 
it was put into production with immediate success. Output 
was only a dozen in 1897 but had increased to three hundred 
in 1898 and over a thousand in 1900.50 
The Werner was the first commercially successful 
motor bicycle. It was manufactured in England by Lawson's 
Motor Manufacturing Company and copied with minor varia-
tions by several firms, but there is little evidence that 
the imitators achieved much success with the design. 
Technically the Werner was an innovation not for its 
engine which was of de Dion type,51 nor for its frame which 
was a fairly standard bicyc Ie frame, but for the way they 
were put together, with the engine placed in a vertical 
position over the front wheel and directly in front of the 
steering head (fig. 7.7). Whether or not the design was 
original the Werner was probably the first viable motor 
bicycle with this layout. And with the engine so close to 
the front wheel, it was extremely simple to connect the two 
by a belt. At that time the use of a belt in place of 
other methods of· transmission was a considerable 
improvement. 
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Fig. 7.7. The Werner Motor Bicycle 
(liThe Autocar", 30 April 1898) 
Machines such as the de Dion motor tricycle and the 
Compact (Singer) were built with the transmission direct 
from engine to wheel via gearing which was rather harsh in 
operation. Early chain driven models were not much better. 
The belt, on the other hand, was flexible enough to cushion 
such harshness producing a much pleasanter machine to ride. 
Following the Werner's lead the belt was widely adopted and 
remained the predominant form of transmission until the 
first world war. 
The engine placing was ingenious because of its sim-
plicity, and, together with the belt, produced a smooth 
running machine with good performance. It had the familiar 
appearance of the standard diamond-frame bicycle, for in 
fact it was little more than a bicycle with engine 
attached. It was free of the electrical equipment which 
few people understood, as the ignition in the first year or 
two was hot tube which could be set in operation by putting 
a match to the wick of a spirit lamp. Once lit uP. it was 
started by pedalling off in exactly the same way as with an 
ordinary bicyc Ie. 
But the Werner was both uncomfortable and hazardous to 
ride. The engine placing made the steering heavy and the 
machine as a whole top heavy. As a result skids were 
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common and potentially lethal with the flame of the lamp 
setting fire to petrol running from the carburettor. The 
necessary improvements did eventually follow, however, with 
the hot tube giving way to electric ignition, and in 1901 
the engine being placed where it ought to be (for which see 
next chapter). 
Summary and Conclusions 
The most remarkable thing about the Werner was that it 
was so successful commercially when it was so bad from an 
engineering point of view. However, it did have the most 
important attribute of any machine at that time: it worked 
and it worked well. Good engineering results in better 
products, but better for whom? The Holden, one of the 
better engineered motor cycles of its day, failed commer-
ci a lly a t leas t part ly because it wa s too expens i vee The 
de Dion tricycle, like the Werner, was poorly designed, but 
was a commercial success. In both of these cases poor 
design was compensated by short development periods and 
simplici ty of construction which kept prices low. There 
was some thing to be said then for these early products, bu t 
not too much. They made money for the firms which deve-
loped them, but they were so lacking in comfort and safety 
that they could hardly begin to attract the kind of rider 
whose custom wa s required in order to form a substantial 
market. Thus the market would remain small and would not 
expand until better products became available. 
The more successful motor cycles of this period were 
designed as simply as possible and put into production as 
quickly as possible. This was both a strength and a weak-
ness resulting in products that were cheap but crude and 
uncomfortable to ride. Development was lacking, but would 
it have been justified to spend very much on developing 
.such basically unsound designs? Almost certainly not. The 
Ariel tricycle, a result of a maJor effort to develop a 
superior machine, was far ｢･ｾｴ･ｲ＠ than the de Dion, but it 
made little or no money for its manufacturers. Imitators 
of the Werner appear to have achieved little from their 
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efforts to develop an improved model. The conclusion then 
is that this was still a time for experiment and it would 
remain so until there emerged machines of sounder basic 
design and which would justify a more sustained developmen-
tal effort. Meanwhile, those brave spiri ts who wished to 
indulge in the new sport were more than likely to find that 
the pains outweighed the pleasures. 
The Motor Cycle as Consumer Product 
The major problem in discussing the early years of the 
motor cycle from a consumer point of view, is how to inter-
pret the data. There are two main sources of data: jour-
nals and personal memoirs. The journals, whether aimed at 
the trade or a wider readership, contain the most compre-
hensive accounts. These vary from technical descriptions 
of the machines themselves, often if not always by highly 
skilled and experienced engineers, to brief, informal road 
tests (though nothing like those we get today either in 
terms of detail or systematic evaluation). There are also 
letters describing readers' experiences, and long, detailed 
accounts of particular journeys. Whether letter or tech-
nical article, most of these writings, especially in the 
earlier years, are by people who had some connection with 
the trade, although this is not always apparent and there 
were certainly some amateur riders.54 We should treat with 
caution therefore the opt imism of many of the early 
. accounts·of motorcycling, since the writers were often 
involved in selling the machines they were praising. 
It is possible to some extent to counter any 
overoptimism of this nature in purely technical terms. 
Most'of the early machines were bad designs and, given the 
poor roads of the day, any rider who did not occasionally 
falloff must have been extraordinarily lucky. 
Personal memoirs are another matter. They are usually 
written long after, the events they describe. The writer 
may look back wi th nostal gi a at day s long gone and regret 
their passing. It may be, therefore, that his account will 
be no less optimistic than contemporary material. Not so 
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the wr it ings of the Rev. Basil H. Davies, henceforth 
referred to as BHD, whose personal memoirs are the most 
important of those which concern us in this chapter. 
BHD was a true pioneer and one of the first ｡ｭｾｴ･ｵｲ＠
riders in the country. He began motorcycling in 1897 and 
had experience of riding all the important types of the 
period. His articles appeared in the motorcycling press 
from 1903 onwards, and in 1904 he was given a regular page 
in "The Motor eyc Ie" under the name "Ixion". From then on 
he was a regular contributor and in some issues he wrote 
articles under both his pen name and his real name while 
preserving the fiction that he was two different people. 
He continued to write for the magazine until his death in. 
1961, but although he wrote about motorcycling, rode in' 
competitions, and at one time had a connection with Triumph 
through his friendship with Mauritz Schulte, he never con-
sidered himself a professional motorcyclist. His profes-
sion remained the Church until he retired in 1940 because 
of poor health, but for which, it has been suggested, he 
would have finished up a bishop.53 His books which include 
instructional manuals, memoirs, and a history of the motor 
cycle, taken together with his contemporary writings, are 
almost certainly the most important single source for the 
history of the early motor cycle industry. 
If in some of the accounts which ｾｯｬｬｯｷＬ＠ BHD sometimes 
makes early motor cycles seem too bad to be true, he was 
probably not exaggerating. 
The Basic Motor Cycle 
Early motor cycles were generally primitive in design 
and simple in construction. The basic motor cycle of the 
1890s would have consisted of a cycle-type frame and 
wheels, an engine (usually air-cooled), and no more addi-
,tional equipment than was absolutely necessary to make the 
machine go. The latter included a means of transmission to 
• 
take the power from the engine to the driving wheel, an 
igni tion system, a petrol tank and carburettor in one 
piece, an oil tank although lubrication was usually manual, 
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and conrol levers and rods. Brakes were usually of cycle 
type. 
Many features were lacking that today would be stan-
darq equipment. There was little or no springing except 
for the seat. In most early models there was no clutch or 
device to free engine power from the wheels, so that the 
engine could only run when the machine was in motion. 
There was often no throttle to regulate speed although 
machines with electric ignition could be slowed by retar-
ding the spark. Finally, there was rarely any system of 
variable gears. This meant that many machines, especially 
those wi th hot tube igni tion, could ei ther operate at 
maximum speed or not at all except by pedalling with the 
engine swi tched off. 
To ride such a machine under modern conditions would 
be a hair-raising prospect, but it could it hardly have 
been less frightening in the 1890s. There was not the 
I 
volume of traffic in those days that there is today, but 
roads were unmade, inclined to be stony or pot-holed, and 
covered by an inch or two of dust in the summer and mud in 
the winter. What little traffic there was was inclined to 
be less disciplined than today so that slow-moving farm 
carts ｷ･ｲｾ＠ likely to be encountered travelling on the wrong 
side of the road and often unlit at night. 
But in order to consider the appeal of motorcycling in 
the 1890s, we have to forget about modern traffic and road 
condi tions and the sophistica tion of modern machines; we 
have to desregard our own expectations, and consider 
instead those of the prospective pioneering motorcyclist. 
The pioneer was almost invariably an experienced cyclist. 
He had experienced the road hazards of his day and was not 
put off by them. He was likely to anticipate the dangers 
of greasy roads and have some idea a t least of how to avoid 
them. He had no experience, however, of machines of the 
weight of the new motor cycles, and little understanding of 
how the ｵｮｾ｡ｴｩｳｦ｡｣ｴｯｲｹ＠ weight distribution of some poor 
designs might affect their handling. Nor did,he have much 
idea of how they worked or what to do if something went 
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wrong. 
Subject to these qualifications, the beginning motor-
cyclist may well have had the following expectations of his 
new machine: 
1. It should not be too complicated to understand 
and con tro 1. 
2. It should start easily and having been started 
it should keep going until the rider wants to stop. 
3. It should have reasonable performance on level 
ground, let us say, better than a pedal cycle,··other-
wise there was no point in the extra expense; and it 
should go up hills (if possiblel). 
4. It should handle in traffic, that is, speeds 
should be variable and brakes should work. 
5. It should be reasonably stable, and certainly 
no less so than unpowered machines. 
6. It should not be ｾｯｯ＠ uncomfortable to ride. 
Few early motor cycles measured up to all of these 
standards. Some idea of the state of the art and the 
attitudes of potential consumers in 1897 is provided by a 
letter from a "South African gentleman" quoted by Lawson in 
a speech at a shareholders' meeting of the British Motor 
Syndicate in January of that year: "We do not care how the 
machines stink or vibrate; but will they go? If they 
will, we can take hundreds of them in the Transvaal. There 
is an enormous market for them".54 
Unfortunately, the machines, especially these just 
purchased by novices, often would not go: "Incredible as 
it may seem, many people who bought motor cycles in early 
times, did not succeed in starting the engine for several 
days".55 Possible reasons for failing to start included 
gummy lubricating oil, ill-fitting cylinder heads, unreli-
able ignition, and petrol which "never gassed really 
furiously at low speeds".56 
When the machine had been started the problem was to 
keep it going. Before the development of the magneto, 
batteries would simply run down, so, ideally, a spare 
battery would be carried. Petrol would have to be carried 
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for the whole journey, or fuelling stops planned in advance 
at known suppliers, who were otherwise hard to find. But 
stoppages from other causes invariably occurred. Among 
these "The commonest was failure to climb a.hill. The most 
baffling was an ignition fault. The most monotonous was a 
broken or slipping belt. All three figured in absolutely 
every single ride". 57 
But what of particular makes? Some were certainly 
better than others. 
The de Dion Type Motor Tricycle 
The de Dion was an effective design if not altogether 
a good one. It was, however, almost certainly the most 
'praised and written about motor cycle in all of the early 
journals catering to the industry, but this was not 
surprising considering that it was the prototype for the 
greater part of the industry's entire output for at least 
the first three or four years. 58 
The first British copy of the de Dion, produced by 
Beeston, was very similar to the original except for the 
replacement of the de Dion's electric ignition by a hot 
tube, a rather retrograde step. Hot tube ignition was 
dangerous and not particularly efficient. ｾｮ＠ operation it 
meant that engines could only run at maximum speed. In a 
spill it could cause.a, fire, and according to BHD, "as a 
rule, the burner ignited the carburettor within a month of 
purchase".59 However, at a time when electricity was lit-
tle understood by most people, the mechanism of a burner 
was simpler for the average rider to handle than electric 
ignition which, when it went wrong, would in most cases 
leave him quite baffled. 
Yet both systems needed care. In "Notes on·the 
'Management of Motor Tricycles", Dr T. Pritchard Roberts 
,wrote that with tube ignition "a little tact is required to 
keep the lamp in goo4 order", and he goes on to list a 
number of operations needed to maintain the burner.60 Thus 
there could be maintenance problems even with a hot tube. 
Electric ignition was favoured by H.O.Duncan, but he 
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also discovered it was not wi thout its difficulties, and 
only learned to master it himself after "having almost to 
pick my machine to pieces to get the thing to gO".61 As he 
noted, electric ignition "does not require many hours to 
. 62 thoroughly understand i til. 
Thus there may have been sound commercial reasons for 
Beeston to revert to hot tube.ignition, but de Dion 
remained faithful to their electrical system, saw it 
through its teething troubles, and sold many more machines 
than anyone else. 
What the early British imitators of the de Dion tri-
cycle did not do was change in any way the basic layout of 
the machine. The engine remained in its original position 
behind the rear axle. This was poor design practice, yet 
published ma terial up to 1899 gives Ii tt Ie indica tion of 
dissatisfaction with it. Technical writers nearly always 
descri1;>ed the machine and its layout uncritically, and as 
late as 1900, A.J. Wilson, a writer with twenty years 
experience of the cycle industry and an acknowledged expert 
on motor cycle technology, appeared to be referring to the 
de Dion type tricycle when writing about what he considered 
to be the ideal motor cycle.63 
But eventually the tide of opinion began to turn: 
Ｇｾｨ･＠ motor tricycle is at best a makeshift arrangement, and 
gives to the onlooker the idea of a petrol motor having 
. 64 been tacked on to a standard tricycle construction". 
See again fig. 7.2. Such .machines, however, were not 
without their satisfied riders. A letter from the rider of 
a New Beeston tricycle stated: "it never gave the 
slightest trouble, did twenty miles easily in a little over 
one and a half hours, and ran up hills of, say, one in 
twenty wlthout pedalling, and up hills even as steep as one 
in nine or ten wi th hardly any muscular help. I am most 
amazed at the economy of working; forty miles with about 
. three pints of. petrol, . or about ten miles for one penny".65 
Thus it would seem' likely that to ｳｯｭ･｢ｯ､ｹｾｷｩｴｨ＠ little 
previous experience of motor vehicles, the gains were suf-
ficient to enable him to overlook the vices of a machine 
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which, according to BHD, was so constructed that Ｇｾｴ＠ speed 
any wee bump in the road flung the wheel up, and the trike 
tried to f allover backwards I ike a rearing horse" .66 The 
Ariel was the first machine to overcome this fault. 
The Ariel Motor Tricycle 
The Ariel, designed apparently with reference to what 
was already known about the de Dion, was a far better 
machine. It had a slightly longer wheel-base and a cen-
trally placed engine which -gave it-much greater stabili ty. -
It was soon recognised as the best motor cycle of its day, 
and in 1899 J.W.Stocks, a former racing cyclist, set out 
on an Ariel to discover what it could do. The summary of 
the published account of his run which follows,67 illus-
trates not only the capability of the machine but also the 
pioneering spirit that was essential to the rider of early 
motor cyc lese 
Starting from Yardley, just outside Birmingham, at 
6.15pm, Stocks chose a route to Doncaster via Barnet, 
intending to return the same way, a total of 488 miles, 
whil e avoiding "the picked roads usually chosen by cyc I e 
record breakers". He reached Barnet at 11.00pm only five 
minutes later than scheduled, a distance of 94 miles in 4 
hours 45 minutes. 
Between Barnet and Hitchin he lost his way in the dark 
. 
and reached Hitchin at 1.00am, an hour late. At Hitchin he 
refuelled and. had a meal before leaving for Doncaster which 
he reached at 7.40am, but by now he was 1 hour 45 minutes 
behind schedule. More time had been lost partly because of 
"the intense darkness between 11 pm and 2.30 am"-the 
Ariel's lights would not have been very good-and partly 
because near Retford, an inlet valve pin had worked out 
allowing the valve to fall onto the exhaust. The repair 
was a simple one but it took 25 minutes, most of which was 
taken up in allowing the engine to cool before it could be 
handled. 
The return journey to Barnet was completed at 3pm 
"having covered 396 miles in twenty and threequarter 
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hours ". Afte r turning for home, Stocks had covered another 
25 mil es when the inlet valv e again gave troubl e , ca usi n g 
a not he r s toppage of 20 minut es . A few mil es further on a t 
Stony Stratford, th e valve stem fractured and the valve was 
now b e yond repair. The time was 5.15pm and 434 miles had 
been covered in twenty-three hours, but the machine was now 
disabled and could not be repaired without a new valve 
which was not carried. 
Thi s was an outstanding performance for the period. 
Average speed was 19mph, which meant maintaining top speed 
most of the way. The rider was unaccompanied and made 
a r ran gem e n t s for f 00 dan d f u e l, a p par en t 1 yin a d van c e ·, a t 
only two places, Hitchin and Doncaster. The inevitable 
breakdowns occurred, however, and it is perhaps surprising 
that there were not more of them, but riders soon found the 
remedy in carrying a large collection of spares. 
,Stocks' run marked the heyday of the motor tricYyles 
and they would soon be of diminishing importance, as better 
two-wheelers became available. 
The Motor Bicycles 
Motor bicycles had several advantages over tricycles. 
They were lighter, cheaper, easier to store and more econo-
mical to run. One · of the earliest reported runs on a motor 
bicycle was undertaken by a "lady ｡ｵｴｯ｣｡ｲｩｳｾＢＮＶＸ＠ Riding a 
new machine (fig. 7.8) produced by the Coventry Motor 
Company, she covered the 
93 miles between 
Coventry and London 
"over shockingly muddy 
and heavy roads, in nine 
hours, including stop-
pages for her escort, ·as 
.well as the' necessary 
ha 1 ts for re freshmen ts". 
" This was an experimental Fig. 7.8. Coventry Motor Company 
machine with trans- Experimental Motor ｂｩ｣ｹ｣ｾ･＠
mission by a ·form of ("The Autocar", 11 September 1897) 
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friction drive acting on the rear tyre which, as was repor-
ted years later, "was worn through almost to the inner 
tube".69 
At much the same time, Mr S.F. Edge who was involved 
in the industry, len t a motor bicycle to a friend who was 
described as a "me re bicyc list". The ma chine wa s said to 
be "one of a practically obsolete type, which had to be 
started by running along side, and which was altogether 
harder to manage than the present perfected types such as 
are turned out by the Beeston Motor Co. or the Coventry 
Motor Co.,,70 
The friend wrote of his experiences to Mr Edge in a 
letter dated 6 October 1897, which was subsequently 
published. 71 Some extracts from it follow: ' 
This was my second ride on a motor. Part of the time I 
was in a considerable state of funk, as Croydon was all 
but under water, and I pictured myself, having a sideslip 
with a few hundredweight of motor bicycle on top of me. 
I t is difficult to keep it slow enough for town and night 
riding. The only way I find I can do it is by turning 
of f the sparking for a few strokes and then turning it on 
again. It caused three horses to run away ••••• l spent 
practically the whole evening having my first experience 
in t he repair of tyres ••••• Today' s ex ci teme n t. I 
started off rather badly, as 1t is not the easiest thing 
in the world to shove a 135 gear on a.120 lbs. bicycle, 
steer with one hand, stoop down, and manipulate the tap 
regulating the air supply ••••• l came to a hill out 
Shirley way. This I failed to mount the first time, so I . 
turned the machine round, ran down the hill, and went at 
it at a faster pace. I got up it with the greatest of 
·ease ••••• going down West Wickham ,Hill ••••• the pace had 
got up to I should think, twenty miles an hour. I rang 
the bell; yelled 10udly ••••• Luckily the hillwas·clear. 
What added to my fright was the fact that the brake would 
not act ••••• When I had got halfway down the hill some-
thing gave a jerk in the brake and it .came 1nto action, 
so much so ,that there was a strong smell of burning 
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rubber, and sundry lumps were chipped out of the non-
slipping band you had fitted to it. 
Whether or not this was a "practically obsolete type" 
rather than one of those "present perfected types", the 
problems encountered were typical of almost all motor 
bicycles at that time. Starting was not easy, the brakes 
did not work, it was difficult to regulate the speed, and 
it was of very poor performance going up hills. The Werner 
may have been no more comfortable to ride but it did 
pe rform bette r. 
The Werner 
As we have seen, the Werner was simple in design. The 
engine was perched in front of the steering head directly 
over the front wheel, an arrangement which one writer 
described as "daringly ingenious, but totally incorrect in 
principle".72 As a result, the machine had a tendency to 
sideslip which, combined with the hot tube ignition of the 
earlier models, could create a dangerous situation for the 
rider. Nevertheless, it led the field and set an early 
standard for others to emulate: "it will be necessary for 
the success of any machine of the kind that it has reliabi-
lity equal at least to the Werner we have at present in 
use" .73 
Riders' experiences, as reported in published letters, 
were varied but for the most part favourable. One corres-
pondent, found his Werner "a charming Ii ttle machine used 
in the right way, and with care not liable to any accident 
that an ordinary bicycle would not be liable to".74 He did 
advise caution, however: "who would ride a bicycle over 
greasy roads at any pace above a few miles an "hour, or go 
sharply round corners?,,75 Another praised the Werner for 
its "simplicity, fast running and reliability" and reported 
.a run from London to Brighton in three and· a quarter 
hours. 76 
The most impressive run on an early Werner, however, 
was undertaken by Mr" Hubert Egerton, who was the first to 
ride from Land's End to John-o'-Groat's on a motor bicycle. 
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It took him four days eight hours during which he covered 
almost nine hundred miles at a cost for lubricating oil, 
petrol and battery power of less than a pound. He reported 
little trouble with skidding even in wet conditions and 
few technical problems except for the inevitable puncture 
and a badly damaged rear tyre caused by a loose mudguard.77 
The Werner then was a useful machine in the hands of 
experienced riders willing to take care in difficult condi-
tions, and possessing' the technical skills to perform 
necessary roadside repairs, and the foresight to carry 
various spare parts with them. It could take them by road 
almos't anywhere they wanted to go, except up the steeper 
hills, and at ;better road speed than they had ever experi-
enced before. But not 'all riders were so experienced and 
not all rides on Werners were so trouble free. 
As BHD recalls, a ride on a Werner could be quite 
harrowing: "One very wet day I watched a soaked and dirty 
figure attempt to ride past Carfax. He skidded, and fell 
heavily, as well he might, for the machine was very tall 
and carried all its mechanism on a small platform above the 
front wheel, while his tyres were practically bald. As 
soon as the machine lay flat, it caught fire and burnt 
furiously. Small wonder, since much of its petrol was 
spilt from the tin swish-box which formed its carburettor, 
while the ignition consisted of a platinum tube rendered 
incandescent by a petrol burner. This front-driven Werner 
pardonably impressed me as' a unnecessarily complicated form 
of suicide".78 
The Singer 
By the time the Werner had' been converted to electric 
ignition, . the Perks and Birch "Compact" (later known as the 
Singer) had appeared equipped with a magneto. This was in 
.both practical and commercial terms probably the first 
really effective British designed motor bicycle to go into 
.. 
production. The engine and all its necessary supporting 
functions were built into the rear wheel, which made the 
machine more like a standard bicycle in appearance than any 
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other motor cycle. The result was a neat design with 
clean, familiar lines which were a good selling point and 
often noted. 
In an early report on the machine before;i t had passed 
to Singer, what impressed the writer was its relative 
freedom from vibration, its speed and good performance on 
hills, and simplicity of control.79 Under the name of 
Singer the machine was manufactured in standard form as a 
motor bicycle, and also as a motor tricycle, a tandem 
tricycle, a commercial carrier, and a iadies' motor 
bicycle. It would be interesting therefore to consider it 
from a female point of view as presented in an article by 
Isobel Marks.80 
The writer's extreme modesty belies her obvious com-
petence. The Singer she found: 
well suited to woman's but ofttimes limited knowledge 
of mechanics ••••• hill-climbing or running upon the level 
seemed equally within the compass of the bicycle ••••• in 
delightful contrast to the 'steering' of ahorse, which 
exacts much skill, the guidance of this little bicycle is 
quite within the novice's power, for it is as amenable to 
discipline as our own belovedpedal-powered mounts ••••• 
Sideslip does not apparently cause any more ｴｲｯｵｾｬ･＠ than 
that to which the bicycle of everyday life is ｾｸｰｯｳ･､＠
when half-dried mud abounds. When nearing a grease spot 
--a not altogether rare occurrence for winter roads--a 
very slow rate of speed was maintained ••••• ln a word my 
short experience served to show that the Singer motor 
bicycle has put within reach of cyclists a convenient, 
safe, and speedy means of long-distance locomotion ••••• 
anyone who can ride an· ordinary bicycle can at once ride 
the Singer. 
The Singer then did live up to its reputation as a 
,simple machine to ride and control. What better recommen-
dation could it have had than for a woman to ride it and 
write of it in such terms, at "a time when women were still 
considered to be the weaker sex? Isabel Marks clearly knew 
what she was about, yet one doubts that the machine could 
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have been so free of vices. According to A.J. Wilson who 
still preferred tricycles, the Singer was in general a good 
machine, but its one great blemish "(as of every other 
motor bicycle hitherto) is the )ubrication, and I am afraid 
that until this is improved the best class of riders-the 
class that will be attracted by the Singer--will speedily 
become disgusted by the unpleasantness of having to dis-
mount, unscrew and screw up dirty plugs,' and laboriously 
inject the thick slow-running oil into the crank 
chamber".81 Nevertheless, the Singer was still one of the 
best machines of its day. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Measured up against the list of hypothetical standards 
presented on page 120, few early motor cycles would have 
done well. Controls were often poorly designed, difficult 
to use, and located in inaccessible places. And even when 
such features were developed as far as was possible at the 
time, the basic technology of the machine was often too 
primitive to give the rider any real mastery of the road. 
He was also in trouble if, having mastered one machine, he 
bought another of a different make, since there was no 
standardization of control layouts •. (This matter did not 
even arise as a topic for serious discussion until about 
1914.) The Singer was noted for ease and simplicity of 
control, but it came late in the period and was certainly 
untypical. 
Starting was often extremely difficult. With hot tube 
igni tion the tube had to glow red before the engine could 
fire, and then, as with electric ignition, the machine 
w'ould usually have to be pushed or pedalled some way before 
it would start. This would require considerable muscular 
effort even with the lightest motor cycles. Once started, 
.few motor cycles could keep going for any length of time. 
A stall was inevitable in slow traffic because of the lack 
of a clutch or variable gear, and breakdowns were frequent. 
If they did keep going, however, most machines were 
capable of fairly good performance on level ground, but few 
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could ascend hills without difficulty. Tackling a hill 
nearly always meant assisting the engine with vigorous 
pedalling, and then the outcome might depend as much on the 
rider's strength; as on the power of the engine. 
, 
Few machines would handle well in traffic, not only 
from the lack of variable gears, but because many had 
engines which could only operate at maximum speed. In slow 
traffic this might mean .switching off the engine and 
relying on the pedals--not a pleasant prospect with a 
machine usually at least four times the weight of a 
bicycle. 
Early motor cycles were notoriously unstable. Even 
tricycles could turn over, especially the de Dion type, but 
they were far more stable than the two-wheelers. Almost 
any two-wheeler would "lay down" on a muddy road, but this 
was at least as much a result of the road surface as poor 
design. On modern roads even machines like the ｯｲｩｧｩｮ｡ｾ＠
Werner with the engine over the front wheel, can be ridden 
safely, and there is a French made moped, the Velo-Solex, 
with the engine in this position, which has been a best-
seller for the last thirty years.82 
There was much then to deter the would-be motor-
cyclist. Those who ｷｾｲ･＠ not deterred, and not in the trade 
and riding motor cycies to prove how simple and safe they 
ｾ･ｲ･Ｌ＠ had to be enthusiastic, willing to take a risk and 
not over-concerned with comfort. But they did not have to 
be record breakers. There were signs, judging' by some of 
the published letters, that there were some people who 
studied motorcycling and what it could do for them, how its 
dangers could be minimised and its utility increased. 
These were the pioneers, and, equipped with heavy leather 
coats, "leather chauffeur's cap with shiny peak, without 
which nobody ever dreamt of taking the road", 83 various 
.tools, numerous spare parts and a spare battery, they could 
and did make good use of motor cycles. They were few, and 
fortuna tely for the embryonic industry, rather long-
suffering. As BHD observed some years later: "Not a single 
machine would ever have been sold if the trade had frankly 
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informed customers of the exhausting experience which 
awai ted them on the road" .84 
This does not mean that the industry was indifferent 
to the plight of the motorcyclist. What it means is that a 
new industry cannot grow up overnight. It was relatively 
simple to develop some kind of working motor cycle, but it 
was not at all simple to manufacture motor cycles which 
would sell in sufficient numbers to make a profit. Much 
still had to be learnt about motor cycle technology before 
it would be possible to produce a machine that would 
sa tisfy the consumer. 
People in the industry, however, were not always wil-
ling to recognise the true state of the art. Rather they 
tended to be overoptimistic about their products and what 
it would take to create a viable industry. A published 
letter from Metropole Automobile Supply Syndicate identi-
fies at least part of the problem: "The tni tial faul t, 
that there is no sudden stride made in the industry in this 
country, seems to the writer to be that the experimenter 
expected his expenses to be refunded by turning out his 
fi rst lot of goods". 85 Thus many manufacturers rushed 
their new products onto the market at the earliest possible 
date ｷｾｴｨｯｵｴ＠ giving sufficient attention to even the most 
basic requirements of good design and development. Motor 
cycles which were described as "perfected" were usually 
uncomfortable to ride and extremely dangerous except in the 
most favourable conditions. But there was hope for the 
future. Some idea of what wa s to come was presaged by a 
comment in "The Cyclist": "out of our late experiences 
with both 'Singers' and 'Werners' we are bound to say that 
motor bicycling is glorious fun, and the pleasure hugely 
outweighs· its own peculiar little drawbacks".86 It would 
be some years yet, however, before this claim could be 
·justified. 
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The Experimental Products: Evaluation 
The experimental products fall easily into two main 
classes, the motor tricycles and the motor bicycles. There 
was very little variation among the tricycles as they were 
nearly all based on the de Dion pattern, and thus the first 
standard, if a rather premature one, was the de Dion type 
tricycle. There was much more variety among the motor 
bicycles, because even when they were based on the standard 
bicycle, there was a great variation of engine position. 
It would be rather stretching a point, therefore, to call 
anyone of them a standard, as in fact did happen at the 
time. 
The propositions of Chapter 4 are well supported by 
the evidence, as follows: 
3. In the earliest days of an industry the only 
requirement to ensure the marketability of a product is 
that it works, however bad its performance. 
There is no doubt that the first commercially produced 
motor cycle, the H & W, did sell in substantial quantities, 
perhaps as many as 2,000 in 1894-7. This performance was 
particularly impressive in view of the fact that it was an 
entirely new concept product. The de Dian tricycle, coming 
onto the market two years later (1896), sold consistently 
well for several years though we do not know how many 
machines were sold in the first year or two. 
As we have seen', nei ther of these machines performed 
well although the de Dian might have been considered 
adequate within the limited perspective and experience of 
consumers of the day. The H & W was difficult to start, 
difficult to ride, and unreliable, while the de Dian was 
unstable because of its rather poor weight distribution. 
Both were helped commercially because they came onto the 
·market before potential consumers had any idea of what to 
expect or demand from a motor cycle. It is relatively easy 
for the consumer to rationalise away the significance of 
poor performance when he has no standard against which to 
judge his new purchase. Thus, poor as they ｷ･ｲ･ｾＮ＠ these 
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early machines did sell for a time. 
4. In order to survive for any length of time, a 
product must reach a certain minimum level of performance. 
The de Dion tricycle clearly did reach this minimum 
level of performance as, together with many of its imita-
tions, it was still being produced in 1900. It survived 
because of its reliability rather than its comfort. At a 
time when most motor cycles did not work very well or very 
-consisten tly, one which kept going for any length of time 
was to be highly commended. 
Better than the de Dion and also relatively long-lived 
for the time, were the Ariel tricycle, and the Werner and 
Singer motor bicycles which, whatever their drawbacks, were 
reliable machines of considerable popularity. 
In contrast, the majority of other designs made only a 
rather brief ｡ｾｰ･｡ｲ｡ｮ｣･Ｎ＠ The Pennington motor bicycle did 
not even go into production despite lavish publicity, and 
that of the Coventry Motor Company seems to have suffered a 
similar fate. The Beeston motor bicycle, a copy of a de 
Dion machine, did go into production but was soon found to 
be rather dangerous and withdrawn. There were many other 
machines which appeared very briefly on the market and of 
which little is ｾｮｯｷｮＬ＠ like, for example, the sociable 
produced by the Burgess Cycle Company. Such machines were 
far short of that necessary minimum level of performance 
required for survival. 
5. It will be difficult for earliest products to 
survive because new and better ones will soon be placed on 
the market. 
The problem in dealing wi th this question is tha t we 
know so little about the less ｾｵ｣｣･ｳｳｦｵｬ＠ early machines. 
,The clear case of a machine which went out of production at 
least partly because of the appearance on the market of a 
much better one, was the H & W which gave way to the de 
Dion tricycle., There were many complaints about the H & W 
so that the firm was in trouble anyway, but it was capable 
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of improvement and might just possibly have remained in 
production if it had not been for the de Dion: "what 
really killed the Hilderbrand and WolfmUller motor-bicycles 
in that counry [Germany] was the wonderful vogue of the de 
Dion-Bouton motor-tricycles".8 7 
As far as more successful machines are concerned, 
this proposition depends very much on the time-scale adop-
ted. The de Dion tricyc Ie, the early Werner and the 
Singer, all went out of production because better products 
came onto the market. But they all survived for at least 
three or four years. The reason for this is that while new 
products were being placed on the market all the time, the 
vast majority of them were not significantly better. Motor 
, 
cycle ､･ｳｩｾｮ･ｲｳＬ＠ whoever they were, had little or no theory 
to guide them and would be more aptly characterised as 
experimenters than engineers. The de Dion tricycle and the 
Werner were in the nature of lucky experiments, and it was 
difficult to beat them until a more studied approach was 
applied to motor cycle design. Thus there was a particu-
larly high degree of chance where the more successful early 
machines were concerned, and where chance rules logic is of 
Ii ttle consequence. The one significantly better product 
to be developed in this period, the Ariel tricycle, did not 
rapidly replace the de Dion as would be expected. The 
reason for this is discussed in No. 7, ｢･ｬｾｷ＠ • 
. 
6. When there are no satisfactory products from the 
consumer's point of view, even poor products may be widely 
imitated and become premature, but acknowledged, standards. 
The most important motor cycle of the period was the 
de Dian tricyc Ie. This wa s 'widely imi ta ted and became an 
acknowledged standard. The only point of doubt is whether 
it could reasonably" be described as a satisfactory machine 
"from the consumer's point of view. There was little or no 
published criticism of the de Dion at least until 1899. 
Technical writers almost invariably seemed to consider it a 
good machine. It is possible then that consumers found it 
satisfactory in its day since there was no other standard 
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against which it might be judged. We must treat this idea 
with caution, however, since most of the published comment 
at that time came from people who, even if they did not 
have trade connections, were at least sympathetic to the 
trade. Furthermore, the machine did have one major weak-
ness in its poor weight distribution which, as we have seen 
in BHD's comments, could make it dangerously unstable. 
The question of the de Dion's instability was' not 
raised in the trade press until after the Ariel had been 
marketed. It is probable then that people only learnt how 
to be dissatisfied with the de Dion when they had something 
better with which to compare it. If we look at it with any 
degree of objectivity, however, it is clear that: it was of 
poor design, technically unsound, and potentially dangerous 
to ride. Yet it became a standard, albeit a rather 
prema ture one. 
7. Premature standards which gain the loyalty of the 
consumer will be able to resist for a time competition from 
better products because of the typical consumer's tendency 
to caution. 
The one case which illustrates this proposition is the 
relationship between the de Dion and the ArieL The de 
Dion was the original, the first machine to be successfully 
marketed, and ultimately, the famous name. When it came 
onto the market it replaced the H & W, which was at the 
time a subject of many complaints, and it proved to be a 
much better machine. The Ariel came from a well known firm 
of cycle manufacturers, but when it was first put onto the 
ma rket it had to compete wi th the rela ti ve ly long estab-
lished de Dion which was considered, at least by the trade 
press, a rather good machine. 
It is not al together surprising, therefore, that 
'initially the Ariel met with criticism which was less well 
informed than it appeared ｾｯ＠ be, and such criticism may 
have slowed sales. But what was probably of greater signi-
ficance was the fact that even after it had gone into 
production, manufacturers were still entering the industry 
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to produce their own versions of the de Dion and still 
managed to sell some machines. In other words, consumers 
were still willing to buy the de Dion and it remained the 
recognised standard ｴｲｩ｣ｹ｣ｬｾ＠ until tricycles in general 
began to give way to motor bicycles. 
Conclusions 
Wha tis itt ha t can t urn a collect ion of ra ther impro-
bable experimenters, engaged in producing some even more 
improbable machines, into an industry? The vast majority 
of experimenters rarely achieve anything of lasting signi-
ficance and very few of their inventions can be turned into 
viable products. Of those inventions that are put into 
production, few ever achieve comme rcial success. Those 
that do, however, will be imi tated or manufactured under 
licence so that very soon by far the greater part of the 
industry, in terms of the number-of producers, will be 
made up of imitators rather than experimenters. Experimen-
tation or invention, therefore, is no more than the first 
step. It does not create an industry. But neither does 
mere imitation. The imitators also must be successful 
before the industry is likely to become viable. 
Before an imi tator can be successful he must be 
capable of manufacturing a product at least as good as that 
which he is imitating and preferably one that is rather 
better. Otherwise the advantage must remain with the 
originator of the new product since he will have a much 
better command of the necessary technology and he is likely 
to receive particularly favourable publicity for his origi-
nality. Most of the would-be imitators of the de Dion tri-
cycle, however, lacking the extensive experimental exper-
ience of de Dion-Bouton offered products which not only 
failed to match the original but were inferior to it. 
Nevertheless, some British firms were capable of 
producing a ｲｾ｡ｳｯｮ｡｢ｬ･＠ copy of the de Dion, but in the 
final analysis they we re let down by the product itself. 
de Dion tricycles were just not good enough to attract 
enough buyers- to support and sustain an industry. Most 
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British firms involved in the motor cycle industry up to 
1900 almost certainly produced no more than one or two 
machines a week, and it is doubtful if even the most 
successful had an output of more than five or six a week, 
and there were very few who could have achieved this level 
of output. 
There was hope perhaps for firms which, starting with 
the basic de Dion model, set out to develop something sub-
stantially better and which would overcome the de Dion's 
weaknesses. The only machine to emerge as a result of this 
kind of effort was the Ariel. The Ariel was of high per-
formance but expensive to develop and arrived on the scene 
too late in the day: by the time its superiority was 
recognised, the two-wheeler was beginning to replace the 
tricycle. This demonstrates the particularly high risk of 
product development in the early days of an industry before 
it is known which type of machine Is likely to predominate 
in the future. The producer of the Ariel was not the only 
firm to spend a considerable amount of capital on develop-
ment, but it was the only one which had anything at all to 
show for its efforts. 
In contrast, the development cost of the first 
successful motor bicycle, the Werner, was minimal, but this 
was another of those quickly put together experimental 
. machines. The Werner was even more improbable in design 
that the de Dion tricycle, but two-wheelers had obvious 
, 
advantages over tricycles particularly when it came to 
price, simplicity of construction and weight. Thus it was 
only necessary to demonstrate that the two-wheeler was a 
practicable machine in order to generate a renewed interest 
in it. This above all else was the achievement of the 
Werner, and although it did not inspire a spate of imita-
tions as did the de Dion, it must have helped to set in 
·train in many minds the thoughts that, only two or three 
. years later, would lead to the invention of machines which 
could with further development meet the needs of consumers. 
Satisfying the consumer is always the key to success-
ful product deve lopme nt. For t his reason the bes t.way of 
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judging the viability of a new industry is to study the 
response of the consumer to the new products. So long as 
the consumer is dissatisfied, there is little chance of, an 
ｾｸｰ｡ｮ､ｩｮｧ＠ market, and so long as the market remains small, 
the industry will remain small and its future in doubt. 
Despite the many favourable comments about motor cycles 
that were published in the early days of motorcycling, it 
is doubtful that very many people were satisfied with 
machines such as the de Dion and the Werner, and those that 
were were probably for the most part in the category of 
"ad ven turers" or record-breakers ra ther than ordinary 
people trying to go about their normal business wi th the 
aid of a motor cycle. 
The failure of producers to manufacture safer, more 
comfortable machines was not a result of callousness where 
the consumer was concerned, but rather a lack of the tech-
nical competence to produce anything better. It was easy 
enough for the manufacturer to rationalise to the effect 
that consumers did not want electric ignition, when he 
himself did not fully understand how it worked. But in 
these circumstances, how was it possible for the manufac-
turer to produce a machine with electric ignition which did 
work? : At this stage, therefore, the future of the industry 
depended initially not on giving more attention to the 
needs of consumers, but on learning more about motor cycle 
technology. 
As we shall see in the next chapter, the necessary 
learning was not the easiest thing to acquire. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE DEVELOPMENTAL PHASE, 1901-1907 
The purpose of the last chapter was to consider the 
beginnings of the industry and the experimental machines on 
which it wa s based. The period then wa s one of trial and 
error out of which few firms achieved much in the nature of 
commercial success. Those firms which were successful were 
the lucky ones since no one knew in advance which machines 
would be of more than experimental value and whether or not 
such machines would sell. 
Against this the developmental phase began with the 
emergence of the first machines that were likely to be more 
than just experiments and which had ,the potential in terms 
of two factors, basic soundness of design and the possibi-
lity of widespread acceptance by the consumer, to be deve-
loped into long-term standard products. 
It was not obvious when these new types of machine 
first appeared that one or more of them would dominate the 
;market in the future, and so the first two or three years 
of the developmental phase were still a period of trial and 
error for many firms before the new Werner type was finally 
adopted as the recognised standard. It was only then that 
development began in ernest, development that is in ｴｾ･＠
sense of a systematic effort to improve an existing type of 
machine. 
This chapter is to a large extent the story of that 
effort. It begins,however, with an account of the growth 
of the industry. This is followed by-an examination of the 
progress of the developing standard from a technical point 
,of view and a discussion of the different approaches to 
product development of two firms, one of which concentrated 
on the developing standard while the other preferred to 
develop more innovative products. 
Later parts of the chapter deal with the consumer 
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aspects of motorcycling during the period and an evaluation 
of the developing standard in terms of the propositions of 
Chapter 4. 
Introduction 
In 1901, the majority of motor cyclists who had given 
up their motor tricycles for two-wheelers, were still 
riding machines like the original Werner with the engine 
perched precariously over the front wheel, and the Singer 
with the engine built into the rear wheel. Effective as 
these pioneering machines could be, they bore little resem-
blance to the motor cycles which would emerge within a few 
years. 
By 1907 the motor cycle had already evolved into the 
standard form which would eventually become almost univer-
sal. This period then was one of the most significant of 
the industry's ･ｮｴｩｲｾ＠ history for the development of its 
product. It was less significant, and in some ways disap-
pointing, for the development of the industry itself. The 
major problem was entry: how to enter the new industry and 
make it pay. 
Entry 
In order to succeed as a motor cyc Ie manufacturer, a 
company needed severa,l things including technical know-how; 
an appreciation of the market and the ability to recognise 
what kind of product would sell and what.would not; and, 
most important of all, sufficient capital or financial 
strength from other operations to be able to survive at 
least a year of substantially reduced profits and probably 
a loss. 
Few companies could fulfil these requirements, and 
even for those that could, motor ｣ｹｾｬ･＠ manufacture was 
,still an extremely hazardous undertaking. The motor cycle 
was still a rather unreliable machine. In expert hands it 
was capable of good performance, but it was as yet far 
short of the kind of .produc t tha t would appea I to a wider 
market. In their appreciation of the situation towards the 
140 
end of 1901, "The Cycle Trader", responding apparently to 
calls from other sections of the press for an expansion of 
output, warned that the demand for motor cycles was still 
rather limited and that: 
In this instance enterprise must be tempered with 
caution. If the trade responds to the cat-calls of some 
writers, every cycle manufacturer will be busy for the 
next few months making elaborate arrangements for an 
extensive output of motor bicycles next season. To do 
anything of the kind at the present stage would be the 
height of folly. The limited demand, instead of trending 
in the direction of two or three makers who were early in 
tapping it, will be absorbed by a hundred and one appli-
cants ••••• At the inception of the movement competition 
threatens to'be lively, and already we hear of impending 
introductions and paralysingly low prices.1 
The wa rning went largely unheeded but its prophetic 
element was borne out by what followed. Only five months 
later it was reported that 80% of cycle firms had started 
motor bicycle production.2 Before the end of 1902, "Motor 
Cycling" had 'noted, first that "More conservative firms are 
now fully satisfied that the motor-bicycle has come to stay 
and are busy preparing their new patterns for the shows",3 
and then that "practically every cycle manufacturer of any 
reputation" had sent one or severa 1 motor bic.yc les to one 
of the, cycle shows.4 
The majority of these ｾｲｯ､ｵ｣･ｲｳ＠ were assemblers rather 
than manufacturers, and turned ou t their machines almost 
entirely from parts manufactured elsewhere.5 This deve-
lopment was promotod particularly by manufacturers such as 
the Belgian firm, Minerva, which offered kits of parts 
containing everything required to 'convert the standard 
safety bicycle into a motor cycle. The result was that 
. the majority of firms which entered the industry in 1901-2, 
began with a Minerva pattern model whichwB.s usually 
• powered by a Minerva engine, thousands of which were sold. 
Few of the newcomers, however, sold many· machines or 
achieved much of a profit from their efforts. 
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Engin. 2f b.h.p. wit" mechanical Valves and apecial relief Cam. as ducribed in the .. Motor II o( 
December 291h. The Frame i • . a genuine Chater-Lea, wheela enamelted black, Frame 23in. only, with 26in. 
or 281n. wheels. D. R. Carbur.etler, Chicago Rawhide Belt, apecially effective and efCiciCllt Silencer, Tank with 
three comparlmenls. lubricating oil. cupboard (or two Accumulators and Coil, and capacity (or ahout two and a 
half gallons of petrol, P. and R. celluloid Accumulator, high apeed Trembler Coil, Brown and Muon Switch 
. Chater-Lea Front Rim Brake, and Bowden Back Brake, lood motor Saddle, and almo.t any make of Tyres. ｔｨｾ＠
above block represents the machine. Tank can be enamelled any colour. Plated Rims and linin, oul, 20/- ntra. 
ｎｾｂｌｅ＠ MOTOR' CO., Pocock St., Blackfriars Rd., London, S.Ea 
Work. and Faclory: Pocock Street and We .. John ,street, Blacklrlar •• Maulter: 11. J. HBASMAN. 
T elearaphlc Addre ... : "Iinolco, london." Telephene No. 2,080 Hop. 
Fig. 8.1. Noble Motor Co. Advertisement 
(liThe Motor Cycle", 26 January 1904) 
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As the "The Cycle Trader" had predicted, by 1903 or 
1904 there were too many firms serving too limited a 
demand. Competition was fierce and price cutting so severe 
that the same journal doubted that manufacturers were even 
covering their costs: "enormous capital has been sunk in 
experimental work, and ••••• it will take a long time to 
recover that capital with a proportional interest in its 
outlay, unless the price of motor bicycles is kept up. The 
time has not yet come when the net cost of production 
establishment charges can be fairly booked against any make 
of motor bicycle ••••• we believe that many of the machines 
which have been pu t on the market and shown a t the shows 
have been priced at a figure which has been actually below 
net· cost of manufacture".6 
One firm which sold motor bicycles at a particularly 
low price was Noble whose machines, of up-to-date design 
, 
and reported to be of good performance, were-made to sell 
at £34--already a low price--but were offered in limited 
quantities at £25. As they state in their advertisement 
(fig. 8.1), a typical price for such a machine was £45 to 
£50. 
Year Entered Left Remainder 
Before 1901 24 
. 
H?Ol 26 5 45 
1902 50 4 91 
1903 42 12 121 
1904 18 11 128 
1905 16 20 124 
1906 6 31 99 
1907 8 11 96 
Totals 166 94 
Table 8.1. Firms Entering and Leaving the Industry 1901-77 
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In the period 1901-7, as can be seen in Table 8.1, 167 
firms entered the industry, 92 of which entered in 1902-3. 
But by 1905, as a result of the slump in the industry, more 
firms were leaving than entering it. 
The majority of these firms were short-lived as motor 
bicycle producers, and as Table 8.2 shows, 90 of them, 54%, 
were active in the industry for not more than 5 years, and 
only 47, 28%, for 10 years or more. 
Duration Number of 
Firms 
Not more than 1 year 18 11 
" 2 years 8 5 
" 3 years 16 10 
" 4 years 28 18 
" 5 years 20 12 
" 5 years (cumulative) 90 54 
6-10 years 30 18 
More than 10 years 46 28 
Table 8.2. Duration of Continuous Motor Bicycle Production 
for Firms Entering the Industry 1901-77 
The ｣ｾｵｳ･＠ of the slump, at least initially, was over-
production rather than any falling off in demand.8 Later, 
a boom in the motor industry which also led to overproduc-
tion and substantial price-cutting,9 may have pursuaded 
many potential motor cyclists to buy cars instead. 
The number of firms entering the industry, therefore, 
is somewhat misleading as a guide to the industry's growth. 
Production figures, even estimates, would be a better 
guide. For example, from about 1903 onwards, the number of 
. firms in the industry wa s never much less than one hundred. 
This would indicate that for an annual output for the 
. 
industry as a whole of 10,000 machines, the average output 
per firm would have been no more than 100 or abou t 2 
machines a week, hardly enough to promise long term 
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survival. Production at this time was almost certainly not 
much more than 10,000 and might have been less. 
There are no reliable production figures but we can 
get some idea of output from registration statistics. From 
June 1904 to June 1905, the number of motor cycle registra-
tions increased from 21,521 to 34,706, a total of 13185.10 
As the excess of imports over exports in 1905 was just over 
1,000 machines,11 output in the industry could have been 
near 12,000. But registration figures are always inflated 
by transfers of old machines, and actual output therefore 
is likely to have been a good deal lower.12 Whatever 
figure output had reached by 1904, it was declining by'1905 
with the increase in registrations down to 11,029 in1905-6 
and 8,142 in 1906-7.13 
However, the decline in the industry may be exag-
gerated by these figures. Following adverse comments about 
the state of ｴｨｾ＠ industry in the national press, Ｇｾｨ･＠ Motor 
ｃｹ｣ｬｾＱ＠ surveyed some of the more important firms for their 
comments. Of these, Phoenix claimed to be working overtime 
to meet demand; Triumph said they were "exceptionally busy 
on motor bicycles, and have turned out much larger mumbers 
than last year"; Rex said "The demand, instead of 
diminishing, is greater by threefold than it was a year 
- 14 
ago"; and Singer was "busy wi th motor bicycles". 
But while these firms were doing well, others'were 
falling by the wayside: "The main fact that struck a 
visitor to the 1905 Stanley [Show] was the death of the 
waster. The firms that manufactured motor bicycles in an 
amateurish sort of way, who had no practical riders on 
their staff, and very little enterprise in their brains, 
have either died a natural death or have confined their 
enterprises to fields with which they were better fitted to 
deal, and the makers who exhibited are good examples of the 
,survival of the fi ttest".15 
Such firms did not necessarily fail because of poor 
products. An overcautious approach and poor marketing 
could be at least as important: "Among the 'dead' British 
firms there are some who made as good a machine as, any of 
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the foreign ones, but they entered the field so timidly. 
They planned a small output, which could only repay them if 
expenses were rigidly curtailed, competitions avoided or 
left to purchasers' enterprise, press .advertisements con-
fined to an insignificant paragraph in the 'miscellaneous' 
column".16 
Thus the reduction in the number of firms in the 
industry was at least partly offset by the improved commer-
cial performance of the leading ones. The leading firm in 
terms of output was Rex which advertised extensively and 
boasted a production capacity of 4,500 machines a year. It 
is unlikely, however, that they ever came anywhere near to 
this figure, and the best annual output reported in the 
press was only 2,000 machines some of which were second-
hand. 17 Just how many of these were new is not ·known. The 
second-hand machines had been taken in part-exchange for 
new ones and then resold after being reconditioned. 
Rex was the most aggressive company at that time when 
it came to marketing. For several years they offered 
allowances of from £25 to £40 for an 01 d machine of certain 
specifications against the price of a new one costing a 
little over £50 (fig. 8.2). This effort is said at one 
time tohave brought them near tobankruptcy,18 but for the 
most part it paid off and they were able to claim an output 
equal to that of the next three ｬ｡ｲｧ･ｾｴ＠ manufacturers. 19 
Which firms they were referring to and. how much they were 
producing was not made clear; but Rex's claim suggests that· 
there were at least three other firms producing something 
like 500 machines a year. 
Rover and Triumph are the only firms for which there 
are definite production figures in this period. Triumph 
produced about 300 machines in 1905,20 while Rover produced 
1250 machines in the three years, ＱＹＰＳＭＵｾＱ＠ This was quite 
ｾｯｯ､＠ given the state of the industry at the time, but it 
was not good enough for Rover who gave up motor cycle 
production in 1905 to concentrate on bicycles and cars. 
The slump in the industry saw a substantial decline in 
output to only 3,700 in 1907.22 However, a few firms and 
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REX ｅｘｃｈａｾｾｇｅ＠
10 0.' 
THfRTV-TVI!O POUNDS, TEN SHILL.INGS, a llowed 
fat' a c c ptain p eriod on 3} 1905 Rex m achin es, in part paym ent fop the 
new 5 h.p . twin-cylinder, with s prin g fork a nd cuntil ovep spl'ing brrck. 
Pl'ice 50 guineas. 
TWENTY-FIVE POUNDS a llowed on 1905 machines by athol' 
m a kel's in I'easo nable co ndition . 
1906 TWIN-CYLINDER SILENT REX, 5 H.P. 
Runs' as smooth as water. 
DECLARATION COUPON. 
. I declare my mnchlne to be 85 fo lo'w a: 
ｍ｡ｾ･＠ .. .. ..... .. ........... ................ ...... ........ ...... ...... .... _ 
H.P .... .. ... ... .... ........................... .. .. .. ...... ...... ......... .. . 
Tra n S"ll .slon ... ...... . : . .. ... . ... ... .. . .. . ........ . ... .. . ..... .. . ... . 
Co ndition .. ......... .................. .. ...... ................. .. _ . 
TyrOl .. .. .... ....... . ..... .. .. ....... . ...... .... . .. . .. .... ........ . .. 
" 
Whot II your be&t ft.llowance on oxchan.:e for Rex 
19('6 5 h .p . Twln'cyllnder? . 
Name ... .. .. .... .. ... ... .. . . ...... .. ...... ... ... .... .... ... .. 
Addrosa ...... ..... .............. :.. . . ..... .. .......... . .. . .. . .. ... . 
REX AGENCY: 
STORE S!REET, 
TOTTENHAM . COURT ROAD, 
LONDON. 
ALL MODELS STOCKED. 
REPAIRS AND SUNDRIES. 
Rex Motor Mfg. Co., Ltd., Coventry. 
Fig. 8.2. 
(liThe Motor Cycle". 8 January 1906) 
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particularly Triumph continued to do well and carried out 
major development work to improve their products, so that 
by 1907 many of the technical problems of early machines 
had been overcome. Only five or six years earlier, con-
tinental manufacturers, epecially the Belgians and the 
French, had led the world. Now, a commentator at the Paris 
Show was able to report how much better British machines 
were than foreign makes: "The English machine is better 
fitted and finished, the levers do not work loose, the 
controlling wires do not break, the brakes are more 
powerful and need less attention - in a word, the whole 
machine turned out "by the British manufacturer seems built 
to last".23 
Thus the outlook for the British industry was much 
improved. Until then it had been growing in fits and 
starts. Short-lived boom had led to fairly long-term 
slump, and many firms which had only recently migrated from 
the cycle industry to motor cycles, very soon abandoned 
motor cycle production in favour of cars or had gone out of 
business altogether. Nevertheless, progress was being 
made. The contraction in the industry was temporary and, 
as will seen in the following section, was less significant 
than the improvement in its product. 1907 was the indus-
try's low point in terms of output but the end of the year 
saw the first signs of recovery in the form of an increased. 
demand for motor cycles and reports of manufacturers' plans 
to increase output.24 Motor cycle ｲ･ｧｩｾｴｲ｡ｴｩｯｮｳ＠ for 1907-8 
were 11,149, 3007 more than for the previous year.25 
The Motor Cycle as Technical Product 
None of the motor bicycles which were developed before 
1900, except perhaps for one or two experimental models 
which never went into production, had the potential to be 
"developed into a definitive standard. Machines such as the 
early Werner and the Singer were simply not sound enough in . 
principle to be developed into products with sufficient 
consumer appeal to promote the development of a mass 
market. The necessary improvement in performance could not 
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come from small changes to existing models but required a 
radical redesign. 
The first two potential standards, models with the 
basic soundness of design to be capable of development into 
definitive standards, appeared in 1900 and 1901. The first 
of these was the work of the hitherto unknown Joah Phelon, 
a Yorkshireman; the second, a new model from the Werners 
of Paris. Nevertheless, the design which dominated the 
industry in 1901 and 1902, was unrelated to either of 
these. It was the Minerva, a machine from a Belgian firm 
based on An twerp. 
The Minerva 
The Minerva (fig. 8.3) was as simple in principle as 
the original Werner, but much more practical. It had 
electric ignition and belt transmission, but its most 
essential characteristic was the placing of the engine 
between the front wheel and the front down-tube, and 
clipped to the latter. This lowered the centre of gravity 
compared to the original Werner, and improved weight dis-
tri bution compared wi th both Werner and Singer, thus 
producing a far more stable machine. 
It was easy to assemble and the manufacturers were 
willing to supply all the necessary parts including the 
engine to any firm which wanted to convert orpinary safety 
Fig. 8.3. The Minerva 
("The Cyclist", 27 August 1902) 
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bicycl es into motor cycles. The Minerva engine of 211cc, 
though small, was capable of propelling machine and rider 
a t up to 35mph which was good speed in those days and even 
too f as tat tim e s g i ve nth est a't e 0 f the r 0 ads. 
The Minerva was significant beyond its importance as a 
new design. The majority of firms entering the industry at 
that time did so with a Minerva pattern machine, although 
some adopted the same design but with other engines, while 
others used a Minerva engine in other positions. 
The first British firm to develop a Minerva pattern 
machine was Bayliss Thomas, manufacturers of the Excelsior, 
whose first model was powered by a Minerva engine. This 
was followed by a more powerful machine, still of Minerva 
pattern but powered by a Ｒｾｨｰ＠ MMC de Dion type engine. In 
order to accommodate the larger engine, the wheelbase was 
increased giving the machine a more advanced look 
(fig. 8.4). 
ｾ＠ , " 
...... .; •• ｾ＠ ... ［［ＢＧＺＢＧ ｾＮＧ［Ｂ｜＾ｬｲ ＧＺｾ ｾ ＭＧ｜＠ - Ｎｾ＠ ... ;"I ｾＬＮ＠
Fig. 8.4. The Excelsior "Minerva Pattern" Motor Bicycle 
("The Cyclist", 10 December 1902) 
With its new engine, the Excelsior performed very 
well. It won several competitions and set a new world 
record for the ｭｾｬ･＠ in 1902. It was also well thought of 
by ordinary riders, among whom was BHD, who, in order to 
demonstrate "the reliability of the modern motor bicycle", 
set out to ride it 200 miles in a day.26 
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The Minerva appeared on the scene when, for the first 
time, and perhaps prematurely, British manufacturers were 
beginning to have some confidence in the future of the 
motor bicycle. It is not altogether ｳｵｲｰｲｩｳｩｮｧｾ＠ therefore, 
that the Minerva pattern was adopted so rapidly by so many 
manufacturers. In 1901 an observer at the Stanley Show 
counted 48 Minerva pattern motor bicycles out of a total of 
102.27 Since the remaining 54 included a number of dif-
ferent designs, the Minerva was clearly the predominant 
type at that time. 
In the first issue of "Motor Cycling", published 
12 February 1902, 8 out of 18 motor bicycles illustrated in 
;advertisements were of the Minerva pattern, while the other 
10 represented six distinct types. Towards the end of the 
same year, A.J. Wilson, commenting on the cycle shows, 
reported that over a score of exhibitors were still faith-
ful to the Minerva engine, presumably in a Minerva 'pattern 
machine, while there were "more than fifty exhibitors of 
motor bicycles no two of which were exactly alike".28 Yet 
the overall pattern was already changing decisively in the 
direction of the new Werner, and only a year later a visi-
tor to the Stanley Show reported ,"what may be termed the 
original Minerva pattern or position is now ｲ｡ｴｨｾｲ＠ the 
exception than ,the rule, the majority of machines now 
having the engine vertically placed and more or less built 
into the frame and forming part of i t".29 Only one or two 
Minerva pattern machines were advertised in 1904, and 
during January 1905, every machine illustrated in adver-
tisements in "The Motor Cycle" was based on the new Werner 
pattern. 
The Bew Werner 
As we saw in the last chapter, the Werner brothers 
·developed the first commercially successful motor bicycle. 
It was an even greater aChievem,ent to develop the machine 
which became the prototype of the modern motor bicycle. 
They did this by shifting the pedals slightly to the rear 
and putting the engine in their place (fig. ), wh;l.ch, as 
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Fig. 8.5. "only a copy of the Werner" 
("The Motor Cycle", 14 October 1903) 
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it turned out, was the most elegant and effective engine 
placing of all. Yet this may not have been fully realised 
at the time, since even the Werners themselves offered the 
new machine initially as ｾｮ＠ alternative to their older 
model rather than as a replacement for it. This probably 
explains why one or two firms still persisted for a year or 
two with their own versions of the original Werner. 
In the new model, the engine was almost exactly cen-
tral between the two wheels and as low down as practicable, 
thus ensuring good weight distribution, low centre of 
gravity, and far better handling than that of most earlier 
motor bicycles. The idea was not new. The engine placing 
was similar in Daimler's machine of 1885 (see Chapter 6), 
and also in the H & Wand the Holden (see last chapter), 
although none of these machines was based on the safety 
bicycle. Some others were, however, including an experi-
mental model designed in 1897 by Arthur Herschmann, chief 
draughtsman at Dunlop.30 
The Werners, however, did two things which nobody else 
did: they patented the idea, and turned it into a success-
ful motor cycle. They successfully defended their patent 
in court when Gamages offered a machine manufactured for 
them overseas which had the engi.ne placed in exactly the 
same position, and attached to the frame in exactly the 
same way.31 ·But it was quite easy to get round the patent 
by attaching the engine slightly differently, and most 
manufacturers did so with little difficulty either by 
looping the frame round the crankcase, by constructing a 
cradle to hold the engine, or by using the crankcase to 
form a part of the frame. The resul t was to preserve the 
main principle and the advantages of the new Werner without 
contravening the patent. 
The Minerva and the new Werner set the general pattern 
'of development of the motor bicycle in these years, but 
they come f,ar short of providing a complete picture. 
Before the Werner was widely adopted and even when the 
popularity of the Minerva was at its height, there were a 
great many different types of motor bicycle design, the 
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main disti ngui s hing feature of whi c h was always the e n gine 
placi ng . Some of these are illustrated in fig. 8.6. Of 
the twelve designs shown, only one, apart from the Werner , 
survive d fo r regular motor cycle use . This was t he Humber . 
Fig. 1. - The Hu mber, chai n driv en. Fig. 9.-The Clement. Fig. 2.-The Derby. chain an d belt driven . 
Fig. 3.-The King. The Werner tandem . The Mitchell 
Fig. 4.-The Princtps. The Wern ... Fig. 5.-The Vipen. 
Fig. 6.-The F.N. Fig. 7.- The Lady 's Ivel. .Flg. 8.- The Primus. 
Fig. 8.6. Some Motor Cycles at the Crystal Palace Show 
("The Autocar", 22 February 1902) 
The Humber motor bicycle ilustrated was designed by 
Joah Phelon in 1900. Lacking the resources to manufacture 
the machine himself, Phelon looked for a firm which might 
do so. Eventually Humber agreed, but rather than buy the 
patent rights, they preferred to manufacture it under 
license for a fee of 7s.6d. per ma chine. 
Phelon, built the engine himself in 1899, while in 
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partnership in a small tool-making business with Harry 
Rayner, his brother-in-law. It was too high, however, to 
fit vertically into the largest available cycle frame, so 
he remdved the front down-tube and put the engine in its 
place so as to serve as part of the frame. 32 As in the 
case of the new Werner, the idea was not original,but 
Phelon and Rayner were the first to patent it. It turned 
out to be a sound design which eventually became popular, 
but, meanwhile, progress was slow. The arrangement with 
Humber left Phelon and Rayner free to manufacture the 
machine themselves, but only six were produced in the first 
year. In 1904 Rayner was killed in an accident and Phelon 
went into partnership with Richard Moore, a young 
engineer.33 The machine became known as the P & M, and 
Moore, who was a motorcycling enthusiast, rode it success-
fully in reliability trials. 
The Humber version did quite well for several years, 
but was eventually dropped, and from then on it was left to 
Phelon and Moore alone to continue development of their 
design. 
As there were no imitators of the P & M at that time, 
the new Werner pattern was by 1903 the effective standard 
at least as far as engine placing was concerned. There 
were many other problems of design, however, which would 
not be solved so soon. 
The Pace of Development 
In 1901 motor bicycle frames were still almost iden-
tical to the standard bicycle frame. But good as it was 
for cycling this was too high and uncomfortable for the 
powered vehicle and it would take five or six years more 
before more suitable frames were developed. Transmission 
systems were a matter for continuing controversy which did 
'not end with the widespread adoption of belt drive. Free-
engine devices or clutches and two-speed gears were practi-
cally unknown. 
Carburettors could be either of the surface type as in 
the Minerva, or the more advanced spray type, ｮ･ｩｾｨ｡ｲ＠ of 
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which was new. By 1903, however, the spray carburettor, 
like the new Werner pattern, had become almost universal. 
The long-standing controversy of hot-tube versus electric 
ignition (see last chapter) having now been settled, the 
issue became magneto versus trembler coil. The latter 
meant carrying batteries which had tobe recharged after 
eve ry two hundred miles 0 r so bu twas easie r to pu t r igh t 
when faults developed. 34 The magneto was fundamentally 
more efficient and so was bound to win in the end, but not 
for several years. Engine lubrication meant for most 
machines that the rider had to stop every fifteen or twenty 
miles dismount in order to inject some oil into the crank-
case. Automatic oiling was still a long way off for the 
ordinary machine, but a partial solution came as early as 
1901 in the form of a manually-operated oil pump pioneered 
on the Phoenix which enabled the rider to carry out this 
chore without dismounting. 
Engines were still very much of the same type as that 
first developed by Daimler in the 1880s and subsequently 
adopted and popularised by de Dion-Bouton, and as such were 
air-cooled with four-stroke operation and automatic inlet 
valves. Superior alternatives were soon to appear but 
:there would be years of controversy before any of them was 
generally accepted. 
Thus at this time many areas of'motor cycle technology 
were in a state of flux or soon ｷｯｵｾ､＠ be. Yet there were 
already some definite pOinters towards the standard machine 
that would have emerged by 1908. From 1897 onwards the 
motor bicycle frame had been standardized on the safety 
bicycle format. At the same time belt transmission was 
developed and soon became standard, remaining so for the 
majority of machines for the next twenty years. With the 
development and widespread imitation of the new Wernerj the 
.motor bicycle began to look not very different from the 
machines of the future. But there was still much to be 
done and important developments now came almost every year. 
1902 saw the introduction for motor bicycles of mecha-
nically operated inlet valves (mov), V-twin engines, and 
1b6 
II -;:;:- 'BINKS'S PATENT '. . 
I FOUR .. CYLINDER MOTOR · CYCLE, 
OR TW'O-"W"HEELED CAR. 
5 h.p. 
WRITE FOR 
LISTS. 
PRICE £70, 
. with Forecarriage, 
£90. 
Is there a single improvement suggested in "Correspondence" 
that is not embodied in this wonderful machine? 
READ: 
1 A four-cyJlndered motor, giving two impulses 
each revolution. \ 
2 No shock or jar at starting, or any time. 
3 Free engine. 
4 A perfectly gradual ·all-metal clutch 
5 That can be a.llowed to slip to any extent 
6 Without Injury to It. 
7 All enclosed in an oil bath case. 
6 . Plen ty of power to 1 ake you anywhere. 
9 Engine 'itarted with one turn CJi handle. 
10 Control-hands never off bar. 
11 Great freedom from side-slip. 
12 Fest always within 'touching alsta.ncs of 
ground. 
13 Will run dead slow. 
14 Capable of immsnse speed. 
Rides like a £1)000 Car. 
No belts, only one chain. 
16 Chain runs In 011 bath caso. 
17 No gymnastic performanco In mounting. 
18 Can be mou nted by a cripple. 
19 Cannot overheat. 
20 Large outside flywheel. 
21 Enormou8 brake power- band and rim. 
22 Luxurlou8" Rol de Belgo" seat. 
23 2ain. Dunlop tyres. 
24 'No festoons Of wires or arrays of levsl'a. 
25 _None of the end lea. worries of the 
ordinary motor cycle. 
26 Bali bearings : 0 engine. 
27 !>trlctly flrst-clasB ,w!:lrkmanBhlp. 
28 The ﾷ ｯｮｬｾ＠ machine for a forecarrlage 
t{ 0 Noi$e , or ｖｩ｢ｲ｡ｴｩｯｮｾ＠
STAN D 5 CORRIDOR, VIEW, , CRYSTAL PALACE SHOW. ON 
THIS MACHINE REALLY DOES FULFIL ALL THE ABOVE-
CAN YOU BE CONTENT WITH THOSE THAT DON'T.? 
Charles Binks, 'Limitod, ｾｾｾｾｾｾｉ＠ ,Nottingham. 
Fig. 8.7. The Binks "Four" 
("The Motor eye Ie", 16 February 1906) 
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wat e r-cooling. Th e Phoenix of that year wa s one of the 
first mac hin es to be fitted with a two-speed gear. Of 
t h ese d e v e lopments, the mov and th e V-tw i n e n gi n e soo n 
began to achieve a degree of popul a rity, but ｷ｡ｴ･ｲｾ｣ｯｯｬｩｮｧ＠
was almost completely abandoned within two or three years. 
The two-speed gear, despite frequent calls fo r s uch equip-
me nt, was very slow to achieve any following. 
In 1903 Charl es Binks introduced his four-cylinder 
motor bicycle (fig. 8.7), on e of the first of its kind. 
But p erh a ps because of its weight and its initial unre li-
ability, and almost certainly because of its price, £70, it 
failed commercially. In contrast, a similar machine of 
lighter weight and lower pric e (fig. 8.8) that was intro-
duced by the Belgian firm, FN, th e following year, did 
quit e well. 
Anybody ""ho ha.,s ridden the 
FOUR-CYLINDER F. N a , FOUR-CYLINDER 
would never want to go back again to 'a single or twin-cylinder machine." 
The- Fa nwus Four-cyllndor 
ｆＮｎｾＮ＠
the &1 i, tocr.ll. t .. amon K motor bi. 
c,c1e s, combinu JUX'l.l ? .. od ea'W! 
¥l' ith hi£hut ､ｌ｣ｬｾ Ｎ ｃｙＮ＠
To 'en.ure ..... t., dollvory, ordO" .hould bo ' plac.d at onco 'wlth 
The F N MOTOR AGENCY " ' Temponry Adc!reM: 
, •• " • 139, QU EEN V;CTO!,IA STRF.ET. LONDO". E.o. 
Fig. 8.8 The Belgian F.N. "Four" 
("The Motor eye Ie", 29 January 1906) 
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However, the vast majority of motor bicycles still had 
single-cylinder engines. Almost 80% relied on belt drive, 
and 90% on coi I ignition charged by a ba ttery. This meant 
that desirable improvements like chain drive and magneto 
ignition lagged, but movs were making better progress since 
by the end of 1903, only a year since their first introduc-
tion, 30% of machines were already equipped with them. 35 
1904 saw the first all-Triumph motor bicycle. It was 
driven by an engine of Triumph design equipped with ball 
bearings: the first successful application of ball bear-
ings to the mainshaft in a motor bicycle engine. 36 This 
was the first major indication of the role that Triumph 
would play later in the development of better machines. 
The following year, 1905, saw the beginning of the 
slump in the industry and the fading away of many firms. 
But others still continued to do well, with Triumph and 
Quadrant reported to be "in the happy position of producing 
a machine that was already a proved success, and which in 
fact, could not be turned out fast enough to meet the 
demand for it". 37 
Not every firm, however, was content to concentrate 
solely on the developing standard. Of rather more original 
design were motor bicycles developed by Phoenix (fig. 8.9), 
, ....... 
'f'- ' " . ' ..: ...... ' 
.. 
i· 
." 
. , 
ｴ ｊＬＬ Ｂ ＺＧＺ Ａ ＧＯ ＿ ｾＢ ｾ＠ ｾｾ＠
ｾ Ｎ｜ ｾＭ Ｌ＠ ;.:.:> ... . , Ｚ ＮＺｾｾ Ｎ ＺＧ＠
. ' • ,J 
Fig. 8.9. The Phoenix Cob 
('!The Cycle Trader", 17 November 1905) 
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Ze ni t h ( fig . 8 .10 ), and Brown, r e presenting a type of 
mac hin e whi c h b eca me kn o wn as the "bicar" (suggesting, 
p e rhap s r at h e r too optimistically, a two-wheeled car). 
Chara c t e ri s tically, s uch ma c hine s had frames of e ntirely 
n e w d esig n, foot boards rath e r than footrests, and were 
u s ually eq uippe d with car-type starting handles so as to do 
a way with p e dals. The Brown bicar was particularly origi-
nal in co nstruction. The frame was made of sheet steel 
instead of tubes, s uggesting the pressed steel frames of 
more recent times. 
It 3lnile. at hills 
al'ld skims ligbtly 
ｯｶｾｲ＠ the roughesl 
ro"ds. 
No t unly the rider. 
htl t also the c n· 
r, inc:, carbu re tt er, 
,In<l a ll othe r 
lII achine ry are in · 
slIlatcd fro m vi · 
In-a tion, anel can· 
no t b ..: jolt ed to 
pi"c.:s nver rr:ug h 
rll:lt!s_ This atltls 
nlany yea rs of life 
t f) the ma c hi ne,; , 
wld eh nre bllil t to 
las t 
Fig. 8.10. Part of Advertisement for the Zenith "Bicar" 
("The Motor Cycle", 5 December 1906) 
These new designs were often highly praised, but not 
always--" ne ither did some of the weird shapes of cob and 
car bicycle tempt me" 38 __ and as it turned out, the latter 
view prevailed and few people were tempted. The bicar type 
wa s so on set a side a 1 though the scooters wh ich c arne much 
later were not unlike it. Clearly by now the trend was 
already set against radical innovation and towards the 
standard machine: "I predict the motor cycle will be 
substantially unaltered at the 1906 show in November. 
Models are becoming standardised, and probably fewer will 
be exhi bi ted. Those exhi bi ted wi 11 display the perfect ion 
of present tendencies rather than the introduction of 
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ent ire ly new principles". 39 
The above comment was borne out--admittedly by the 
same ｷｲｩｴ･ｾＭｩｮ＠ a review of motor bicycles at the shows 
the following year: "The Quadrant is practically the same 
machine as last year •••.• The Triumph catches the eye as 
being very similar to the 1906 pattern ostensibly, but in 
reality a vast amount of quiet improvement is hidden in 
it ••••• ln the 3!hp Brown I failed to find any alteration 
Of, the need of any, and the Vindecs are similarly content 
to rest on an old reputation". 40 
Thus BHD was able to conclude: "In summing up, it may 
be said that motor-cycle design as a whole, has already 
arrived at a permanence of essentials, including low 
frames, magneto ignition, belt drive, vertical engine in 
front of the bottom bracket, and a minimum of 3!hp, wi th as 
much more as faddist riders choose to ask ｦｯｾＬｾＱ＠
That the motor bicycle was at last settling down to a 
standard form probably owed more than anything else to its 
development into a reasonably satisfactory machine--a 
machine that would both satisfy the experienced motor-
cyclist and appeal also to the prospective newcomer to 
motorcycling. 
With the development of a standard machine now close 
to realization, it was at last reasonable for firms to 
start ｴｨｾｮｫｩｮｧ＠ about standardization in the interests of 
larger scale production, and this despite the slump in the 
industry. Rex, probably still the largest motor cycle 
manufacturer, put this pOint in a letter to "The Motor 
Cycle": "the motor bicycle has followed the evolution of 
other mechanical commodities, as e.g., the gas engine, the 
bicycle, the typewriter or the sewing machine, in the sense 
that scientific standardisation in quantities by special-
ists has reduced the percentage of establishment charges 
.and automatically brought about a cheapened cost. A 
properly organised factory with up to date appliances devo-
. 
ted exclusively to one kind of machine is capable of 
turning out sixty complete machines as easily as were six 
on the previous antiquated method before present day 
161 
42 
standardisa tion became possible." 
But with output for the industry as a whole still 
rather low--in fact a good deal lower than it had been a 
year or ｾｷｯ＠ previously--the majority of firms remained 
small and probably still produced their machines by "the 
previous antiquated method" that Rex had referred to. 
The temporary decline in the industry and the tendency 
for major firms to concentrate on minor improvements to 
their machines, did not prevent some firms introducing more 
significant improvements. Probably the most important 
development observed at the 1906 shows was the substantial 
increase in the number of machines equipped with variable 
gears, twelve altogether, when in the previous year there 
had only been two or three. Even so this was not very much 
when compared with the total number of machines exhibited, 
more than one hundred and fifty. In some other respects, 
however, there was rather more progress towards ｳｾ｡ｮ､｡ｲ､ﾭ
ization across the industry as a whole. An analysis of 167 
machines listed in "The Motor Cycle Buyers' Guide" for 1906 
shows that 152 had belt transmission, 164 were air-cooled, 
and 114 had some kind of springing. The mechanically 
operated valve was now almost as popular as the automatic 
valve and would soon surpass it.43 
In 1907 the trends of previous years intensified. 
Most machines now had some kind of variable speed gear 
although usually of a very primitive kind in the form of an 
adjustable pully in the transmission system. This mean t 
that in order to change gear it was necessary to stop and 
dismount, an inconvenient system but far better than having 
no choice at all. Magneto ignition was now in the majori-
ty, footrests were becoming more popula r and frames were 
"lower than ever".44 Spring front forks were by now so 
widely adopted as to be virtually standard equipment, but 
spring frames remained rare mainly because of the diffi-
culty of developing an effective system. 
Among the more interesting designs of the year was a 
Douglas machine equipped with a V-four engine, and the Max, 
a scooter-like machine intended as a "runabout". These 
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were interesting ideas for the future, but were probably 
ahead of their time and neither remained in production for 
long. 
Of much greater importance was a new trend towards 
lightweight machines. The increase in weight of the 
typical motor bicycle was an inevitable result of technical 
sophistication and more powerful engines. Riders had com-
plained about the weight of machines even from the earliest 
days of motorcycling, but until now little had been done to 
meet their complaints. In 1904 most of the few light-
weight machines on offer had been dismissed by one commen-
tator as little better than toys,45 but at last manufac-
turers were beginning to respond a'nd many new 1igb tweights 
of reasonable performance were coming onto the market.' 
"The Motor Cycle", recognising this development, sug-
gested there were now ｴｨｾ･･＠ categories of machine: light-
weight from 75 to 1001bs, middleweight from 100 to 1501bs, 
and heavyweight from 150 to 2001bs.46 This was possibly 
the first occasion on which the development of the motor 
bicycle into distinct categories was recognised. Even-
tually it would mean not just one, but three different 
types of standard machine. Meanwhile, the standard machine 
,was typified by the Triumph--a middleweight with a single 
cylinder engine, belt drive, magneto ignition, spring forks 
and rigid frame. 
This was the kind of design which every firm would 
want to imitate so long'as it was more concerned with 
establishing itself in the industry and making money than 
with developing something new and untried which, however 
good it might be, would very likely be rejected by the con-
sumer. Nevertheless, as will be seen in the next chapter, 
a number of firms still preferred to set out on the latter 
path rather than the former. 
In the following section the rise of Triumph is dis-
cussed in detail in comparison with the rather different 
approach to product development of van Hooydonk, the manu-
facturer of the Phoenix machines. 
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Approaches to Product Development: Phoenix and Triumph 
Phoenix. Phoenix was the marque name for the firm of 
J.van Hooydonk. van Hooydonk began cycling in 1886 and 
competed in many races ｳ･ｾｴｩｮｧ＠ a number of records. By 
, 
1889, at the age of twenty-two, he had established himself 
as a small cycle manufacturer.47 
He took up motor cycling because, in his own words, he 
"Liked to move with the times and had an idea there was 
scope for improvement".48 After riding his first machine, 
he decided that several improvements were desirable: 
"Stopping every fifteen miles to oil up did not agree with 
a man who would some time run to Peterboro' wi thout 
dismounting. Result: Oil pump. Second ride, ran out of 
petrol thirty miles from home, 12p.m. Result: Spare tank 
of registered design as fitted to all Phoenix machines".49 
Both of these developments were incorporated in the 
first Phoenix motor bicyc Ie pI aced on the rna rket early in 
1901. The machine was basically of Minerva pattern with a 
1ihp Minerva engine. The spare petrol tank was situated 
between the saddle tube and the back wheel. The result was 
a rather heavy machine for those days. It was highly 
pra ised, h oweve r, by A.J. Wi 1 son who though tit "the mos t 
advanced standard pattern motor bicyc Ie on the market", 50 
and had one made to his own particular requirements. 
Further improvements followed including the addition of a 
cycle-type two-speed gear,51 the machine's most important 
dis tinction. La ter on, al terna ti ve engi ne sizes were 
offered including a 2!hp model (fig. 8.11). 
The performance of the Phoenix motor bicycle was as 
impressive as its specifications. In one of his first 
attempts to use it for record-breaking, van Hooydonk set 
out to ride from Land's End to John-o'-Groat's, but was 
defeated by the weather after covering 357 miles in a day 
and half.52 The Phoenix did well also in competitions. 
One of its best performances was first place in the one-
hour race at Crystal Palace in August 1902 when van 
Hooydonk covered more than 42 miles in the hour, winning by 
more than three miles from many well-known ｲｩ､･ｲｳｾＳ＠
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OUT FOR SPEED. 421 Miles in 1 Hour (RECORD). 
Fig. 8.11. J. van Hooydonk on his "Phoenix" 
("Motor Cycling", 21 January 1903) 
Following his success with the two-wheeler, 
van Hooydonk turned to three wheels. The idea came to him 
after a.n unhappy time trying to . get out of London on two 
wheels "with many cars round me and slippery tram-lines to 
54 
cross". In response he "rigged up a rough contrivance, 
it went well, and open space in front appeared to ask to 
have a seat put on it, rigged up an old trailer body, and 
there was the Tr imo! ,,55 
The Trimo, a tricar-type machine, was first marketed 
in 1903. It was a popular success, so much so that it was 
widely imitated and the name "Trimo" became the generic 
term for this kind of machine, whoever the manufacturer. 
Meanwhile, the Phoenix motor bicycle remained in prod-
uction in much its original form while other manufacturers 
were turning from the Minerva pattern to the new Werner. 
The Phoenix was almost certainly one of the last Minerva 
pattern machines to remain on the market, saleable perhaps 
and still worth manufacturing, b ecause it was one of the 
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rare machines with a two-speed gear. Also, as the firm had 
remained small, a moderate output was still worthwhile. 
But in 1905 a new machine was put on the market, the 
Phoe:nix Cob.56 In describing the new machine, a commen-
. tator in "The Cycle and Motor Trader" first drew attention 
to some criticism of the original Phoenix motor bicycle: 
"Items coming under this head are such as excessive weight 
(chiefly due to the carrying of heavy high powered 
engines), difficulty of mounting and dismounting, general 
unweildiness due to weight and aggravated by height of 
rid e r' s wei gh t fro m g r ou n d, the two inc 0 m bin a t ion and i n 
turn being the prime factors in causing side-slip".57 By 
now the machine was almost five years old and, although 
still of good performance, had been left behind somewhat by 
developments elsewhere, particularly in terms of lower 
frames and longer wheelbase which made machines more stable 
and easier to ride. Thus a change was due. 
If at this stage van Hooydonk had developed a machine 
simi la r to the developi ng standard-tha tis, ra the r like 
the Triumpb--and improved it with some of his own ideas, he 
may well have created a best-seller. This was not to be. 
The Phoenix Cob was designed to correct the deficiencies of 
the older.machine, but it was too original in concept to 
gain easy acceptance from the general public. 
The new frame was of original design, fully triangu-
la ted and open in construction so as to make .the machine 
equally suitable for ladies (fig. 8.9). The standard 
engine was a 2hp Minerva, although a 2ihp model was avail-
able. It was fitted with a spring clutch and two-speed 
gear, and transmission was by two chains and countershaft. 
It was started by a car-type handle and, in place of pedals 
or footrests, it was fitted with footboards. 
In summing up his report, the writer concluded: 
ﾷＧｾｳｳｵｭｩｮｧ＠ all other things to be equal, we think the points 
which will appeal most especially to the class of rider the 
machine has been designed for are the starting of engine 
with machine stationary, the ease of mounting the low seat 
with both feet on the ground before throwing the clutch in, 
166 
and the roomy footboards with facility for easy dis-
58 
mounting". 
The Phoenix Cob was well made, of advanced design and 
good performance. Its fault from a commercial point of 
view was that it was aimed at a minority rather than a mass 
market. It remained in production for two or three years 
only. 
According to BHD, production of all Phoenix motor 
bicycles was brought to an end because of the slump in the 
industry.59 Against this we may judge that the Cob was an 
unconventional machine of a type which was not always well 
received, and it differed considerably from the developing 
standard in appearance, frame design, means :of starting, 
and chain drive. Did it really fail therefore, because of 
the slump or because consumers would not adopt such an 
untypical machine? The latter conclusion is almost cer-
tainly the correct one since Triumph ,and some other manu-
facturers of more standard machines survived the slump 
quite well. van Hooydonk left the motor cycle industry at 
the end of 1907 to concentrate on cars and his firm 
survived until the 1920s. 
Triumph. Triumph was founded by Siegfried Bettmann, a 
young German who came to this country in 1884. In 1885 he 
started an import-export business in London, exporting 
Birmingham made bicycles under a "Bettmann" label. He 
changed this to "Triumph" in 1886, a name he considered 
would be more easily understood by his customers. In 1881 
he was joined by another young German, Mauritz Schulte, who 
was an engineer, and the following year they moved from 
London to Coventry where they set up a small cycle manufac-
turing business.60 
Triumph machines soon became known for quality and 
were very well thought of in the trade, but the firm 
,remained small until it came to the notice of Harvey 
du Cros, the founder of the Dunlop Tyre Company, who 
decided to invest some of his spare capital in it. As a 
result the company grew rapidly and'by the late 1890s it 
was making a profit of about £7,000 a year,61 which put it 
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among the largest cycle manufacturers. 
Entry to the motor cycle industry had first been 
considered in 1896 when Schulte tried out one of the H & W 
machines wi th a view ｾｯ＠ manufacturing it, but he decided 
against the idea. In 1901 the company considered taking 
over the failing New Beeston Company, but decided instead 
to begin motor cycle manufacture more directly by producing 
a Minerva pattern machine. 
The machine, first produced in 1902, was well made but 
rather conventional in that it deviated little from the 
standard Minerva. It sold well,62 but was replaced in 1903 
by a design based on the new Werner pattern and powered by 
a British made JAP engine. The most important step for-
ward, however, did not come until the following year when 
the firm developed its own engine so as to produce the 
first all-Triumph machine. The engine was the "ball-
bearing" engine already mentioned above (p. 159). 
Triumph's performance so far had been solid rather 
than spectacular. They followed the trend in developing a 
Minerva pattern machine in 1902, a new Werner type in 1903, 
and an all-Triumph design, though still of conventional 
appearance, late in 1904 for production the following year. 
The new model was innovative but not in any way which 
., 
deviated significantly from 'popular taste. Modifications 
were carried out within the basic format of the emerging 
standard and were calculated to improve the performance and 
convenience of the machine in general rather than to offer 
something radically new. It is easy to understand, there-
fore, why it was from about this time that Triumph motor 
bicycles began to acquire a reputation for quality and 
reliability. 
But there was still much to be done and only now was 
the most important stage of developing the Triumph machine 
begun. The new engine, despite its improved design was as 
yet far from satisfactory. BHD described the Triumph of 
this ｴｩｾ･＠ as Ｇｾ･ｬｩｧｨｴｦｵｬ＠ when new, it rapidly weakened down 
to the power of a cat and a half",63 and it was BHD himself 
who did most to demonstrate the machine's weaknesses. 
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The guiding influence on the firm's design and engin-
eering activities was Mauritz Schulte. In 1905 he asked 
BHD to suggest a publicity stunt to demonstrate the 
Triumph's merits. The result was that BHD agreed to set 
out on a ride of 200 miles a day for six consecutive days. 
So as to add authenticity to the undertaking, an official 
timekeeper was engaged.64 
The machine used, a standard Triumph model of 3hp, had 
magneto ignition, and was single geared with belt drive and 
no clutch. Its maximum sped was 45-50mph. 
There have been two different reports of this event. 
In the first one, published in "The Motor Cycle" at the 
time, no breakdowns were reported except for four stops, 
one for a puncture and three resul ting from broken piston 
rings.65 But in his book, published much later, BHD ｴ･ｬｬｾ＠
a different story. Apparently things went moderately well 
until the end of the fifth day when the frame br'oke. But 
this was not all: "Moreover, the engine power had been 
steadily fading throughout the 1,000 miles already covered, 
and hasty examinations proved that the piston rings and 
cylinder bore had both worn unconscionably fast, while the 
exhaust valves were pitting almost to the scaling pOint".66 
It appears that the frame was non-standard, possibly an 
experimental model, so Schulte provided a second machine 
with a standard frame and the entire six day performance 
was repeated again the following week, this time with 
success. There was no point in bad publicity. 
Whatever these six runs may have achieved in making 
the Triumph better known to the public, they were more 
important in underlining the need for more development work 
on the engine. The main problem was the softness and 
generally poor quality of the metal, which was, however, 
the best available at the time. It was Schulte himself who 
-instituted the research to develop tougher steels, and by 
1907 the problem had been solved.67 The 31hp Triumph of 
1907 and later years (fig. 8.12) was, as BHD puts it, 
"reliable as Big Ben,,;68 it won the Isle of Man"n TT race 
in 1908 and set new records for the John-o'-Oroa tIs-Landt s 
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End run in 1909 an d 1911. It wa s pr o bably " th e first com-
plete ly sa tisfactor y machine of its type in th e world".69 
. . . ... .. . ,_ .. .... - .-.:' .. : " 
Fig. 8.12. The Triumph 
(liThe Motor Cycle", 8 November 1909) 
Th e success of Triumph machines was now assured. In 
1907 production reached 1,000 machines a year for the first 
time. By 1909 this had risen to 3,00070 and Triumph was 
the largest motor bicycle manufacturer in the country. The 
rise in profits was equally spectacular. In the years 
1905-6 and 1906-7, when many other firms were suffering 
from the slump, profits were £13,428 and £14,313 respec-
tively. The following year, 1907-8, they jumped to 
£22,048, and by 1911-12 they had reached £68,500.71 As 
"The Economist" observed: "The firm has stuck to their one 
model with few alterations, and the reputation which it has 
built up while rivals were struggling with imperfect 
machines, is really marvellous".72 It was no wonder that 
the Triumph became the standard which almost every other 
firm would want to emulate. 
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Comparisons and Conclusions 
Both Phoenix and Triumph began in the 1880s as small 
firms with limited capital. Both graduated' from the cycle 
industry to motor cycles. In both firms technical develop-
ments were initiated by one man who was either owner or a 
director of the firm, and both innovated significantly in 
one way or another; but here the similarity ends. 
Triumph was relatively important in the early 1890s 
while Phoenix was still. little known. Even so, had it not 
been for the substantial injection of Dunlop capital from 
Harvey du Cros, which was unexpected and unso 1 ici ted, 
Triumph might have remained a small ｦｩｲｾ＠ for very much 
longer. Against this it seems that van Hooydonk had dif-
ficulty in obtaining capital to expand even when he had 
full order books which was often the case. 
The greatest difference between the two firms was the 
style of their innovative efforts. Both began with a 
Minerva type machine, but the Phoenix was highly innovative 
while the Triumph was rather conventional. The innovations 
that van Hooydonk introduced were pragmatic and obvious, 
perhaps, to someone with much road experience and suf-
ficient technical know-how to put them into practice. 
Against this, Schulte's most important innovations for 
Triumph were engine developments which could only have been 
thought of and carried out by a trained' engineer. In 
contrast, van Hooydonk always relied on Minerva engines. 
However, van Hooydonk had the ability and the inclin-
ation to create new concepts, the Trimo and the Cob, while 
Schulte concentrated on improving the standard model. It 
is tempting to say here that the more radically innovative 
output of Phoenix was a result of its being a small company 
not subject to the constraints of the larger firm, like 
Triumph, which expects to serve a mass market with more or 
·less standard products. But this would be too simplistic a 
conclusion and probably not true. It seems more likely 
that these two men created their firms in their own images 
rather than being created by them. 
van Hooydonk was a "personality", in fact one of the 
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best known personalities in the industry at that time. 
Apart from running his firm and taking part in reliability 
trials and other competitions, he was always writing 
letters to the motor cycling press or giving lectures on 
technical subjects. By comparison, Schulte seems to have 
been a relatively quiet man. But both without doubt sought 
to develop products which would appeal to the consumer, 
though van Hooydonk seems to have been more concerned with 
producing the kind of machine he would like to ride him-
self, than something which would appeal to the mass market. 
Ultimately, Triumph succeeded by developing and con-
stantly improving a machine·which would appeal to the 
majority of consumers. van Hooydonk almost certainly failed 
as a resul t of developing a product which was too innova-
tive and too di fferent from the deve loping standard--too 
untypical of what consumers were coming to expect--to sell 
in sufficient quantities to keep the firm in the industry. 
Personalities played a significant part in this out-
come. Schulte was probably exactly the right kind of man 
for a firm like Triumph. van Hooydonk was the type of 
entrepreneur who sets up the kind of innovative firm which 
develops interesting products but never gets very big. 
Perhaps, if he had had more capital to expand, his firm 
might have grown substantially, but it seems doubtful that 
such growth would have been sustained at least as far as 
the motor cycle side of the business was concerned without 
some change in product policy. 
The early success of Phoenix and the later success of 
Triumph, both owed much to the ability to look at the motor 
bicycle from the point of view of the rider. But this 
"user-orientation" was far from typical of manufacturers "at 
the time as will be seen in the following discussion of the 
consumer's interest. 
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The Motor Cycle as Consumer Product 
By 1907 the motor cycle had evolved from a machine 
which was dangerous, uncomfortable to ride and generally 
unsatisfactory, into one which, although far from perfect, 
could give riders a great deal in terms of performance, 
convenience and relative comfort and safety. We can get 
some idea of the progress made if we reconsider the hypo-
thet ica I expec ta t ions tha t the prospect i ve motor cyc list 
. might have had of his machine (p. 120). 
1. It should not be too complicated to understand and 
control. 
Early motor cycles were bound to seem complicated to 
riders whose only previous experience was wi th unpowered 
machines, and efforts were made, as in the case of the 
Singer, discussed in the last chapter, to simplify 
controls. Such simplicity could not last. As machines 
were improved and performance raised, they would inevitably 
become more complicated. Electric ignition was far more 
difficult to understand and adjust than the old hot tube. 
Mechanically operated inlet valves could never match the 
simplicity of the automatic valve. The addition of a 
clutch and variable speed gears would add two more controls 
for the rider to think about. At the same time, however, 
riders did tend to' learn more about their machines and to-
become more capable of handling them and performing simple 
repairs. 
2. It should start easily and having been started it 
should keep gOing until the rider wants to stop. 
At the beginning of the period, machines were still 
far from easy to start. Since most of them lacked a 
clutch, starting could only be achieved either by pushing 
·the machine and then jumping on when the engine fired, or 
by pedalling. According to one memoir, this was impossible, 
with the early Minerva because of the height of the saddle, 
40 inches above the road. 73 The problem was eventually 
solved by providing a stand which raised the rear wheel off 
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the ground and enabled the rider to pedal while stationary 
until the engine fired. 
Another of the problems in starting was the gummy 
engine ｯｩｾ＠ which made it difficult to turn over the engine. 
The remedy was to inject some paraffin into the cylinder to 
dissolve the old oil, and most machines of the period were 
soon equipped with small paraffin containers. 
Once started, machines were expected to keep going, 
but this wa s of ten not the case: "On ma ny occasions my 
poor brother left home in the saddle; but never once did 
the Minerva bring him home again; always, it was he who 
brought it home with him, until I sometimes wondered ·why he 
bothered".74 
Nevertheless, the motor bicycle did gradually become 
more reliable and easier to start. 
3. It should have reasonable performance on level 
ground, let us say, better than a pedal cycle, otherwise 
there would be no point in the extra expense, and it should 
go up hills (if possible!). 
From 1901 onwards performance in terms of available 
power and attainable speed, improved rapidly. The Minerva 
could do only 35m ph, but wi thin a year or two there were 
machines which ·were capable of 50mph or better when the 
roads were good enough. By 1906 it was possible'to buy 
machines rated at anything from 2 to 8hp (that is, with 
engine size of up to 1,000cc), so even without variable 
gears it was not difficult to flnd one capable of ascending 
almost any hill. 
4. It should handle In traffic, that Is, speeds 
should be variable and brakes should work. 
Only one or two machines had variable gears before 
.1906, so driving at slow speed was difficult. A partial 
solution was to ride a machine with a multi-cylinder engine 
which would be much more flexible than a single cylinder. 
Twin and four cylinder machines began to appear from 1903 
onwards, but they were never in the majority. 
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Brakes, especially in earlier days, were very poor, 
and on one occasion riding an early Werner, a rider, 
finding that his brakes did not work, "had to steer into a 
hedge and get smashed up somewhat, to avoid a watery 
grave".75 But even by 1904 brakes were still so bad that 
one writer found it desirable to advise his readers how to 
stop when the brakes failed. The advice was to slip out of 
the saddle backwards and hold the machine up by the saddle 
thereby raising the rear wheel off the ground until the 
engine could be stopped.76 Such comments could hardly have 
encouraged people to take up motorcycling. 
The cycle type brakes of the earlier machines were, 
however, slowly giving way to better ones particularly for 
, 
the rear wheel. Probably the best motor cycle brakes of 
the period were those which operated on the belt rim. 
Better still would have been the internal expanding brake 
already developed for cars but this was still some way off. 
5. It should be reasonably stable and certainly no 
less so than unpowered machines. 
The abandonment of the old Werner pattern and the 
fitting of engines low down between the wheels, greatly 
improved stability, but there remained much room for 
improvement. The riding position on the standard bicycle 
was high to allow ground ｣ｬ･ｾｲ｡ｮ｣･＠ for the pedals. As 
engine power increased, the need to pedal became relatively 
infrequent and it was possible to reduce frame height even 
though the pedals were retained. Frames became longer and 
lower which made motor bicycles both easier and safer to 
ride (compare fig. 8.3 with fig. 8.12). 
But even this was not enough and skids still occurred 
too often. Apart from bad roads, a major cause was smooth 
tyres. Manufacturers responded by developing non-skid 
·tyres, but before the modern patterned tread appeared, 
various other ideas were ｴｲｾＮ･､＠ including tyres wi th 
protruding metal studs, and chains which could be fitted to 
ordinary tyres. 
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6. It should not be too uncomfortable to ride. 
The question of comfort on a motor bicycle is 
problematic. Even today any motor cyclist who rides for 
several hours with little or no rest is'likely to finish up 
with some aches and pains. The problem is that with any 
motor bicycle the rider is almost permanently confined to a 
single riding position. Normally he has only one place to 
put his feet and that is on the footrests, or with the 
earliest machines, on the pedals. Footrests were an 
improvement over pedals and increased the rider's comfort. 
Footboards, introduced from about 1905, were better still 
since they were fairly long and did allow a variation of 
position.77 
To judge by some of the accounts which follow, comfort 
was never the major consideration of the enthusiast. As 
the market expanded, however, new recruits to motorcycling 
would have to come ｬ｡ｾｧ･ｬｹ＠ from people with little road 
experience,78 and comfort would become of increasing 
importance. 
The Rider's Response 
As we have already seen, complaints about new tech-
nology are the rule rather than the exception. However 
advantageous new technology may be to the consumer, some-
body, somewhere, will complain about it. There were ｣ｯｭｾ＠
plaints about hot tube ignition because of its dangers, and 
electric ignition because of its complication. Despite the 
advantages of mechanically operated valves, people still 
found cause to complain about them. The lack of variable 
gears was a frequent cause for complaint, yet when they 
were introduced some riders found them an unnecessary 
complication. 
One aspect of motorcycling which 'riders were more 
,likely to praise than complain about was its economy, but 
even here they were not always satisfied particularly when 
it came to the cost of repairs. There were many letters to 
the motorcycling press kiving details of running costs over 
a given distance or period. Table 8.3 indicates the 
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50 gallons of petrol 2.16.10 
Lubricating oil 10.10 
Carbide 5. 8 
Bel;ts and fasteners 4. 8. 3 
Licences 2. o. 0 
Tyres 3.14. 6 
Repairs, replacements, etc. 10. 5. 7 
Total £24. 1. 8 
Table 8.3. A Rider's Running Costs79 
breakdown of one rider's costs for 3,024 miles on a Slhp 
twin- one of the heavier machines--over 3,024 miles: an 
average of 1.9d per mile. 
But repair and maintenance costs were not always as 
high as these figures indicate, and a rider of a similar 
machine did rather better in covering 8,000 miles with 
running costs, excluding depreciation, of £32. 7. 3, 0.971d 
per mile.80 
The problem of repair was exacerbated somewhat by the 
fact that spare parts often did not fit very well and were 
not always truly ,interchangeable. Screws were sometimes 
too large or the screw holes too'small, so that it required 
some filing to get parts to fit. 81 One correspondent 
complained that after dismantling a broken-down engine he 
found that "bolts and nuts were not interchangeable, each 
bolt and nut having evidently been fitted as a separate and 
complete piece of work" .82 
We may conclude then that maintenance was likely to be 
difficult and repair costs high for early motor bicycles, 
but, given the low price of petrol, overall running costs 
were usually low enough to represent one of the major 
·a ttractions of motorcyc ling to the novice. Thus despite 
the various pitfalls, progress was being made, and as the 
following accounts indicate, the motor bicycle was a far 
better machine than it had been in the previous decadei 
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The Machine on the Road 
The original Werner motor bicycle was discussed in the 
last chapter, but many people were still riding such 
machines in 1901 and to recall what they were like ｾｮ､＠ what 
they could do, it would be of interest to refer briefly to 
Hubert Egerton's run from Land's End to John-o'-Groat's, 
the first time this had been achieved on a motor bicycle. 
According to Egerton's report, he maintained full speed 
most of the way despite hours of pouring rain and greasy 
roads. He experienced occasional rear wheel skids but no 
serious trouble and the run was completed in four days 
eight hours.83 Thus although the early Werner was probably 
the;most dangerous and unstable machine of all those'to 
achieve any ｾｯｰｵｬ｡ｲｩｴｹＬ＠ in the hands of an experienced 
rider it could be ridden safely and for long periods. 
Probably the most important achievement in following years 
was to bring such performance within reach of riders of no 
more than average competence. 
The first rider to attempt to break Egerton's record 
was van Hooydonk on his Phoenix. The Phoenix was a much 
more advanced machine than the Werner, but van Hooydonk 
also had to contend with the weather. The first day's run 
went well, with 243 miles being covered, but on the second 
day the weather was wet and the road often slippery: 
"After Worcester, the surface of the road became clayey, 
and on reaching Kidderminster he had a bad slip, which 
meant a stop fo'r repairs. The roads then got from bad to 
worse, rain fell in torrents, and the spill made him very 
careful".84 He reached Warrington at 6pm but then "being 
wet, alone, and tired, he came to the conclusion that it 
was too late in the jear to do good time over so long a 
distance, for the roads, being a good deal cross country, 
one required daylight to find the way, unless the ground 
'had been previously covered".85 
Clearly motorcycling was ｳｴｾｬｬ＠ a rather hazardous 
activity. van Hooydonk was a highly experienced rider who 
would not have given up easily on a record attempt. But 
even without setting out to break records, most,riders 
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would have encountered simila r problems at that t i me . How 
quickly did things improve? 
Both Egerton and van Hooydonk covered 200 mil es or 
mor e on th ei r first day. Two yea rs later, BHD se t out to 
cover a similar distance in one day, not as a r eco rd-
breaking performance, but to demonstrate "the r e liabili ty 
of the modern motor bicycl e to an interested novice".86 
His machine was an Excelsior (fig.8.13) and the rout e was 
a circuit of Devonshire, starting and ending at Barnstapl e . 
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Fig. 8.13. "200 Miles In a Day": Mr B.H. Davies and his 
·Excelsior 2ihp motor bicycle, loaded up with spare battery, 
two toolbags, and a valise containing two gallons of 
petrol, a spare lamp, and carbide. 
(liThe Motor Cycle", 5 August 1903) 
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The run started at 7am and went well until the belt 
came off half-way up a hill. Before it could be put back, 
the fastener had to be retrieved from a bed of nettles: 
"Ten stung fingers are my reward for forgetting that there 
is a spare in my vest pocket. Then a fresh rush up the 
hill. Hills are the only place in Devon where it is safe 
to let a 2ihp 'rip,' and if the rider likes to take them 
fast, so does the M.M.C. engine".87 
Heading across Dartmoor for Tavistock, "The road is 
wide and deserted, surface splendid, and gradient downhill. 
Gradually the speed increases, till I am glued to the 
saddle by the rush of wind past me, and my cheeks are 
forced back against their bones, as if by the hand of some 
" 88 invisible giant. Surely we are touching '50'''. 
Then disaster struck. One bar of the carrier gave way 
and luggage and spares were spread over the road a mile 
back over the moor. Nevertheless, some amateur repairs 
were carried out on the spot and the going was continued to 
Ivybridge for lunch: "So far, barring the one stoppage for 
the belt and the other for the carrier, I dismounted only 
at my own pleasure, and so it was for many a mile more, 
until at last impending doom began to fall. But of the 
engine and the electrical gear I have "no word of 
blame".89 
The "doom" came in ·the form of the "inevitable dog" 
which dived under the front wheel and landed both machine 
and rider in a ditch, but neither was injured from the 
encounter. 
Later, BHD met up with two friends, one on a bicycle, 
and travelled on in their company. It was now dark, but 
one by one "all three lights failed and it was possible to 
continue only after obtaining a small paraffin lamp. 
The final disaster came when the carrier, which was 
"previously damaged, fouled the rear brake causing it to 
wrench "a score of spokes. out of the rear wheel".90 It was 
now llpm and the end of the run for BHD who, baving covered 
185 miles, had to borrow a bicycle to complete the journey 
home. 
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Va riou s co nclu sio n s ca n b e draw n from this acco unt. 
Th e Excelsior was a goo d motor bicycl e . It was sound in 
basic function: the e ngi ne wa s pow erful a nd r e liabl e , a nd 
th e frame did not br ea k d es pit e th e exceptional load of BHD' 
--no li g htw e ight--a nd unu s ually heavy luggage . It wa s l ess 
sa ti sfac tory in other r es pects. Th e b e lt came of f the 
pull e y, th e lamp failed, and the carrier broke. Fe w peopl e 
a t t hat tim e w 0 u 1 d h a ve bee n so am bit i ou sin the i r mot 0 r-
c ycling activities, but few would want to be until bett e r 
equipment was available . 
Motor bicycles were becoming more reliable but were 
often still far from we ll designed from the rider's point 
of view. An Indian army engineer who rode a Quadrant 
(fig. 8.14) found it could be remarkably difficult to oil 
the machine on the road: "one had to work the plunger, 
under and behind one's right leg, while leaning over to the 
ｲｩｾｨｴ＠ to see if oil was really being sucked into the glass 
cylinder of the pump with each stroke , and meanwhile 
avoid Indians, bullock carts and dogs. The plunger had 
be worked every 8 to 10 miles".91 In similar vein, 
to 
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motorcycling in 1903: "difficulty in starting, vibration 
and short circuiting in wet weather".92 
From 1903 to 1906 considerable progress was made in 
design, but was the motor bicycle yet quite the machine 
that someone would want to ride for business rather than 
pleasure, or was it still of interest mainly to adven-
turers, record breakers and publicity seekers? In 1906 an 
interesting assessment was published of "The Motor Cycle in 
Medical Practice by one who has tried i t".93 
The writer's machine "cost me, including an acetylene 
lamp, spare accumulator, spare plug, valves, and contact 
wipe, and a large well-equipped toolbag, about £42. My 
only repairs have been for punctures, of which I have had 
three, whilst the cost of oil, ｾ･ｴｲｯｬ＠ and charging accumu-
lators, averages from 7s. to lOs. per month. I use the 
machine daily in all w,eathers, and with the exception of 
occasional stoppages at first, due to ignorance of the 
mechanism and how to adjust it, I have not had to spend a 
penny on repairs".94 
The disadvantages of motorcycling were listed as 
vibration, dirt, side-slip, and unreliability, while the 
main advantages were cheapness, convenience, lack of need 
for a chauffeur and the ability to go through narrow roads 
unsuitable for other ,vehicles. Most of the complaints 
against motor bicycles were dismissed as exaggerated which 
suggested that much s till depended on the a. tti tude of the 
motor cyclist. 
A less optimistic view came from Mrs E. Kennard: "I 
have owned no fewer than five motor bicycles, but at the 
present moment I am bicycleless, much to my sorrow, simply 
because I cannot afford the expense of continuing to pay 
for experimental machines, which do not. satisfy my ideals 
when delivered, and also because I do not know where to 
turn to procure the article I desire".95 
Mrs Kennard complained also about difficulties with 
maintenance-how many -lady motorcyclists would do their own 
maintenance today?-"On one bicycle the accumulator case 
was made so small it took the best part of half an·hour to 
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force the accumulators in or out; it was a mathematical 
puzzle to arrange them. On another in order to clean the 
chain three gear cases required first detaching, and one of 
them would not budge unless the left pedal and crank were 
removed. Would such a state of affairs be tolerated on a 
man's machine? On a third possession of mine the carburet-
ter was practically ungetatable, and yet it required con-
stant cleaning. On a fourth the contact breaker case was 
wedged in such a manner that it could not be undone. These 
are a few instances amongst many I could ｣ｩｴｾＬｾＶ＠
Control was another cause of difficulty: "My latest 
machine was fitted with no fewer than four levers, all 
placed in row beneath the steering column. To manipulate 
them entailed riding the whole time with one hand". But 
perhaps the mos t significant poin t wa s the last one: "Up 
to the present we have laboured under the disadvantages of 
our pioneer machines being made by men who did not ride 
them themselves, and who viewed them rather from their 
masculine standpoint than from ours. They thought they 
knew best, and disdained to listen to the complaints and 
suggestions of the practical female rider. And yet most of 
us know what we want, if only we could get it".97 The 
point was well made, but it was not just women who suffered 
from this kind of attitude on the part of manufacturers, 
but consumers as a whole. 
Motor cycle technology was advancing rapidly, but good 
, 
design requires more than the' application of new tech-
nology. It requires consideration of the consumer and the 
use he will expect to make of the product. Many manufac-
turers still failed to recognise this point and produced 
machines which could, with a little thought, have been very 
much better than they were. 
·The Developing Standard: Evaluation 
The year 1901 marked the appearance of the first motor 
bicycles which had a potential for development which might 
eventually enable them to become recognisable, long-lasting 
standards for the entire motor cycle industry. The Minerva 
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was a major advance on earlier experimental models, but it 
was not quite good enough to become more than a rather 
transient standard when compared with the new Werner. (The 
phelon-designed machine was also a potential standard, but 
it was more complicated in principal than the Werner and 
took rather longer to develop so that it never became a 
serious callenger to the Werner design for the majority 
market.) 
The propositions of Chapter 4 are well supported by 
the evidence, as follows: 
8. During this period there will be at least as many 
different product designs as at any other period:of the 
industry's development, but the number will di.minish 
rapidly as producers begin to imitate the more commercially 
successful ones. 
The onset of the developmental phase of an industry's 
history does not mean that producers will abandon experi-
ment on innovative design. But as potential standards 
emerge, new designs will tend to become less original and 
to converge towards the developing standard. Thus as we 
have seen they are for the most part no longer signifi-
cantly:different designs but more in the nature of develop-
ments of an existing standard. In 1900-1 in addition to 
many older designs like the Singer and the original Werner, 
there were many new ones including the Minerva, the new 
, 
Werner, the Phelon and many variations on comparable 
themes, plus one or two that were entirely different. By 
1907 the only machines significantly different from the new 
standard were those of the bicar type which were highly 
innovative. These helped to set a pattern which has almost 
always been maintained in that however highly standardized 
the products of the motor cycle industry, there have 
usually been one or two rather innovative, unusual, and, 
more often that not, short-lived designs which might appeal 
to the enthusiast but have rarely achieved a major share of 
the market. 
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9. Competition between potential standards will even-
tually leave one dominant design in each product class. 
This will become the developing standard and will be widely 
imitated. 
The new Werner and the Phelon machine, although the 
first potential standards, were far from being the only 
ones during this period. The four cylinder Binks and FN 
machines and also the machines of the bicar type like the 
Phoenix Cob, were certainly potential standards in their 
basic soundness of design. The open-framed bicar was the 
precursor of the modern scooter and the Binks transverse 
four-cylinder model (not the machine illustrated) was the 
prototype of the Japanese "super-bikes" of the 1970s. But 
at the time none of these could compete with the basic 
single cylinder Werner type machine which soon became by 
far the most popular model. 
10. Products which diverge considerably from the 
developing standard in terms of price, appearance, basic 
technology or performance, may enjoy short-run success but 
will eventually become difficult to sell. 
The early Singer had sold for well over £60, and the 
Holden, for about £80, but from about 1901 onwards it 
required a very good motor bicycle to command a price of 
over £50 let alone £60 or mure. Most machines were now 
costing between £30 and £50, and those which were much more 
expensive, like, for example, the Binks, could find few 
buyers. Price alone could account for the commercial 
failure of this machine. In comparison, the FN, a similar 
but more advanced machine, priced at less than £50, seems 
to have sold well. 
It may be then that the new technology it offered was 
less of a deterrent to the consumer than price. On the 
'other hand, the FN and other four cylinder machines, des-
pi te moderate popularity, part icularly among enthusiasts, 
never seriously challenged the supremacy of the single 
cylinder. Neither did they really come to be viewed as 
reasonable alternatves to the more popular V-twin machine 
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for those activities where more power was needed. In 
effect fours was too far advanced to gain any great follo-
wing at a time when for the majority of motor-cyclists, 
even the twin was unnecessarily complicated. 
Appearance was clearly of major importance for the 
developing standard. With the widespread adoption of the 
new Werner type, most motor bicycles began to look rather 
similar. Thus the innovative bicar machines were at a 
handicap almost as soon as they appeared on the market and 
they did not do well. Possibly their open frame design 
suggested they were intended mainly as ladies' machines. 
This was not so, but, very likely, such a design was far 
from easy to sell to an Edwardian mal e. 
The lack of reliable comparative data for most 
machines makes it rather difficult to judge just how far 
absolute performance such as maximum speed, for example, 
influenced the developing standard and resulted in the 
early rejection of untypical machines. 
We can look at performance, however, in relation to 
technology since improved performance would be a major 
reason for rejecting old technology and replacing it with 
new. Automatically operated inlet valves eventually gave 
way entirely to mechanically operated ones because the 
latter were more efficient and gave better performance. 
But the transition was slow and took place in face of 
considerable scepticism from both uninformed and supposedly 
informed people alike. Thus out-of-date technology could 
some times survive much longer than might be expected 
although it would eventually be replaced. This suggests 
that few consumers would go out of their way to seek the 
ultimate in technology-based performance, but would be 
inclined to wait until the standard itself evolved in the 
new direction before committing themselves to it. 
11. Products which deviate from developing standards 
may survive commercially if they offer the consumer compen-
sation in nonstandard Items. 
Not many motor bicycles came into this category. Most 
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of the obviously nonstandard machines did not survive for 
more than two or three years. However, the original 
Phoenix design, although quickly outdated, lasted five or 
six years, rather longer than might have been expected, 
because it was one of the very few machines wi th a two-
speed gear. The Phelon, although nonstandard in basic 
design, survived partly for the same reason but also 
because it was particularly strong in construction as a 
resul t of the design itself. Its quali ty and performance 
were demonstrated in competitions and it became one of the 
long-term survivors of the British motor cycle industry 
remaining in production until the 1960s. 
The FN four-cylinder motor bicycle had a decided 
advantage when compared with more ordinary machines in the 
flexibility of its engine and the convenience and 
simplicity of maintenance of its shaft drive. It remained 
in production for about twenty years, a remarkable perfor-
mance for a machine which was about fifty years ahead of 
its time. 
Conclusions: The Development of an Industry 
If profitability is any criterion, then the British 
motor cycle industry was barely in existence in 1901. At 
that time there was a fair number of firms making small 
numbers of motor cycles usually at a loss. In order to 
achieve long-term viability the industry required not more 
entrants per se, but more firms capable of producing better 
machines and selling them at a profit. 
The large number of firms which entered the industry 
in 1901-3 was no guarantee that this would happen. 
Initially the reverse was the case. The majority of new 
entrants simply helped to swell the number of failures, 
their products were unsatisfactory, and most of them made a 
'loss. As was argued at the time, too many firms entering 
too soon and prcducing inferior products, was no advantage 
to the industry.98 It may indeed have been a setback as 
the poor products of many firms tended to give the motor 
bicycle a bad name,99 and to send many would-be 
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motorcyclists elsewhere. Thus although production 
increased rapidly from 1901 to 1904, the apparent consoli-
dation of the industry was illusory. From 1905 firms were 
leaving the industry :faster than new ones were entering it 
and production was declining. 
The industry was saved by a handful of firms, probably 
no more than half a dozen which, while observing the 
general trend of technical ､･ｾ･ｬｯｰｭ･ｮｴＬ＠ worked both to 
improve their products and to market them effectively. Of 
these the most notable was Triumph, but there others like 
Rex which supported their effort in producing good quality, 
competi tive products. Thus a I though 1907 saw production 
lower than it had been for,several years, the machines were 
now of much better quality and the surviving firms much 
better placed than previously to form the nucleus of an 
industry. The industry was at last all set for its real 
"take-off" and the end of the year marked a substantial 
increase in orders for motor bicycles. In the final analy-
sis, therefore, it was a case of the survival of the fi t-
test: if it had done nothing else, the large number of 
entrants had provided just a few firms capable of sus-
taining an industry which, as it turned, out was enough. 
The survival and growth of these firms probably owed 
more than anything else to the kind of products they manu-
factured and their quality. In earlier days firms like 
Werner and Singer may have done well while ｴｵｲｮｩｾｧ＠ out 
machines that were unlike the products of almost every 
other firm. This was no' longer possible. 
Since 1901 the motor bicycle had been evolving 
. 
obviously and visibly towards a standard form based on the 
new Werner pattern. The transient and rather unsatisfac-
tory early standards were being replaced though not always 
as quickly as migh t have been expected. The Minerva pa t-
'tern which seems to have been adopted almost overnight by 
dozens of producers, was replaced within a year or two by 
the new Werner pattern. But the more enduring standard 
which the Triumph model of 1907 represented was not a rapid 
development but an evolution resulting from years of 
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smaller advances most of which were adopted only slowly by 
the bulk of the industry. The mechanically operated valve, 
one of the most important developments in engine tech-
nology, was introduced at the end of 1902 and quickly 
adopted by a few firms like Triumph, but not incorporated 
into some firms' products until eight or ten years later. 
The path of technical progress is often far from obvious, 
but it soon became es'sential for a firm to copy the develo-
ping standard in principle if not in every detail in order 
to achieve significant sales. 
Thus the evolution of a standard product ,was a 
critical phase in the industry's history. Until some kind 
of standard existed, and a standard that would not be 
superseded within a year or two, there was simply no guide 
either to producers or consumers as to what would prove to 
be a worthwhile investment. Few producers could afford the 
financial risks of experimentation with untried technolo-
gies. Few consumers were willing to risk their cash and 
perhaps their lives testing unproven machines. 
The rapid entries and exits of many firms in the early 
days of the industry was in large part a result of this 
lack of experience in the industry as a whole. The prol-
iferation of dt.fferent models may have been no more than 
bewildering to the prospective consumer, but it could have 
been ruinous to the firm which chose to manufacture the 
wrong design. It is almost certainly no coincidence 'there-
fore that the slump in the industry from 1905 to 1907 did 
not end un til the motor bicycl e had been developed not just 
into a stable and recognisable form but also into a reli-
able machine, a standard that promised much to both produ-
cers and consume rs. 
The new standard was less promising for more radical 
innovators. New products like the water-cooled engine, the 
'four-cylinder engine, the V-four engine, the biear and 
other scooter-like machines, and many smaller scale innova-
tions, made only rather brief appearances on the motor-
cycling scene at this time. For the most part such con-
cepts were technically viable and potentially effective in 
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operation, but were ahead of there time either because of 
cost or because of the need for further development. But 
perhaps the most important factor in the rejection of new 
ideas was the high speed of technological development 
itself: many newer technologies were rejected simply 
because consumers had not yet had time to get used to the 
older ones. This was especially the case where new techno-
logy introduced added complication in a machine which was 
already being seen as too complicated. 
In the l890s, as we saw in the last chapter, consumers 
were quick to complain about the added complication of 
electric ignition as compared wi th the ho't tube, and many 
preferred the latter despite its dangers. When the mecha-
nically operated inlet valve was introduced there were 
efforts even from well informed commentators to prove that 
the simpler automatic valve was to be preferred. There was 
a similar response when the first variable ·speed gears were 
introduced with claims from a number of riders that the 
single speed machine was perfectly adequate to every pur-
pose. The greatest added complication was the introduction 
of the multi-cylinder engine, and here there was a good 
case for rejecting the innovation since single cylinder 
machines were of quite sufficienct power for most uses and 
particularly for newcomers to motorcycling. 
For innovation to be successful therefore it has to 
proceed at a reasonable pace, a pace at .which it can be 
readily absorbed by the market. Many innovations, however, 
came far too soon and so much so that almost all the signi-
ficant innovations in motor cycle development for the next 
fifty years were first thought of and tried out in these 
earliest years of the industry. Such a surfeit of innova-
tion could be disastrous for the firms which had put their 
resources into it, and in fact most of the the radical 
·innovators did rather badly especially when compared with 
more conservative producers.lOO 
Success came to Triumph and their imitators because of 
their commitment to the standard product'. As a result of 
this commitment, and as will be seen in the next chapter, 
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they paved the way for the entry to the industry of some 
larger and older firms which hitherto had waited on the 
sidelines. 
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CHAPTER 9 
STANDARDIZATION, 1908-1916 (1): THE INDUSTRY 
This chapter and the three following all deal with the 
final period covered by the research, the standardization 
phase of the industry's development. This one is mainly 
concerned with the expansion of the industry through the 
entry of many firms new to motor cycle manufacture. Of 
these new entrants, some were innovators, some were imita-
tors, but both groups played ;significant parts in the 
growth of the British industry into ｴｨｾ＠ world's largest 
exporter of motor cycles. 
The industry's growth was brought to an end, albeit 
temporarily, by the war. This was not the end of motor 
cycle production, however, as firms which produced motor 
cycles for military use were kept very busy. 
The chapter breaks down into three main sections: 
entry, the growth of the industry, and a detailed account 
of motorcycling during the first two years of the war. 
Introduction 
In the earlier days of motor cycle production and 
particularly after the development of the Minerva and the 
new Werner, ｾ＠ large number of firms joined the industry in 
a very short space of time. They did this despite a 
product, which, except for record-breaking purposes where 
the rider's comfort was of secondary importance, was still 
unproven and would need substantial further development 
before it could be seriously considered as a practicable 
form of personal transport. At that stage the market was 
extremely limited, with the result, as we saw in the last 
chapter, that surprisingly early in its history, the indus-
try became a victim of its own overproduction with many 
firms dropping out only'a year or two after their entry. 
By 1907 the industry's annual output of motor .cycles 
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had fallen to less than 4,000, substantially down on what 
it must have been two or three years earlier, and contem-
porary observers began to look upon the motor cycle as no 
more than a passing fad: "Motor-cycling was considered a 
new craze and a dangerous pastime which, like roller 
skating, would eventually die out".l 
Such a conclusion would have been unduly pessimistic, 
however, since the news was not all bad. Many of the drop-
outs were producers of poor quality machines which had been 
copied from elsewhere and put into production without sig-
nificant improvement. There was certainly no future in the 
industry for such firms. If a firm is to survive by imita-
ting the products of others, it must first find a product 
worth imitating, and until 1905 or 1906 there were few if 
any products in that category. Thus many of the firms 
which left the industry were no great loss, and meanwhile 
there were always at-least a few others which set out to I 
develop better products either along the lines of the 
developing standard, or in the form of des igns which were 
rather more original. If 1907 were the industry's low 
point, therefore, it was also probably the year of its 
greatest promise for the future to anybody who had any real 
understanding of motor ,cycles and motor cycle technology. 
Triumph was by now the leader in terms of both produc-
tion and the quality and performance of its product. If we , 
ｴｾｫ･＠ the figures2 as accurate, in 1907 Triumph produced 
more than a quarter of the entire output of the 'industry. 
There has always been some justification, therefore, in the 
claim that Triumph virtually saved the industry from 
extinction, and this claim has grown up not as a legend of 
more recent years, but was originated at the time by people 
close to the industry: "to it [Triumph] unquestionably is 
due the credit for rescuing the motor bicycle from oblivion 
to which it was being consigned".3 
But Triumph did much more than support the industry 
through the more difficult years of 1905-7: liTo the excel- ' 
lence of the Triumph workmanship and to the standardized-
design of their machine is largely due the gigantic 
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proportions to which the motorcycle trade has grown to-
day".4 In effect, by developing a product of high quality 
and performance and at the same time one that was easily 
imitated, they paved the way for many firms which had so 
far remained aloof, not just to enter the industry, but to 
do so with immediate commercial success. At last the 
imitators could come into their own and build motor cycle 
production into a really big industry. In the years 
immediately preceding the first world war the industry owed 
much of its rapidly increasing output to these imitators, 
but they fell far short of having things all their own way. 
As we shall see later, despite the trend to standardiza-
tion, the industry was never short of innovators. 
Entry 
Of the five categories of entrant suggested in Chapter 
7, the ,inventors and inventor-inspired firms were easily 
the most important group of firms in the earliest period of 
the industry's development because they were virtually its 
creators. Without a product, however bad, there could have 
been no industry. The main drawback at that time, as in 
the earliest days of almost any industry, was that the 
products were essentially experimental models. Early 
experimental models will work after a fashion, but are 
almost invariably lacking in one or more ｯｾ＠ the design 
principles which are required to produce a technically 
sound product. Thus without a radical redesign they are 
likely to lack the potential to be developed into the kind 
of product which can both sell in large numbers and survive 
for a reasonable length of time in the marketplace. 
The better models which emerged around 1900 and 1901 
were of fundamentally superior design to earlier products 
so that, although they may not have worked too well initi-
,ally, they did have the potential for further development 
. 
that had been lacking hitherto. Thus the most important 
. 
group of firms to enter the industry from 1901 onwards 
consisted of those which concentrated on improving existing 
models. These were the developers and they represented the 
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more successful firms of the period including such as Rex, 
Triumph and Phoenix. Out of this development effort from a 
relatively small number of firms, there emerged the Triumph 
model of 1907 which was to become the industry's ｾｩｲｳｴ＠
enduring standard, and the machine which the majority of 
entrants to the industry from 1908 and for several years 
thereafter, wanted and were almost compelled to imitate. 
The imitators had always represented the majority of 
firms in the industry. Lacking new ideas or the technical 
ability to develop something significantly better from 
existing models, imitators would offer a product almost 
identical to one already on sale elsewhere. This was 
｡ｬｷ｡ｹｾ＠ a poor strategy when existing products were of. 
doubtful quality or capability. But the situation changed' 
radically once it was possible to imitate a really good 
product. 
The arrival on the scene of a firm like Triumph 
producing, from 1907 onwards, a thousand or more high 
quality machines a year, left little doubt that the indus-
try was emerging a t las t from its rather frustrating and 
often disastrous pioneering years. This was the signal 
that many firms had been waiting for. They now knew not 
only that the industry offered good prospects for commer-
cial success, but also how that might be achieved: imitate 
Triumph. They did. 
The Bewcomers 
It would be rather misleading to suggest that all 
firms which entered the industry either set out to imitate 
Triumph or had any intention of doing so. Some set out to 
innovate before finding it commercially expedient to follow 
the lead of Triumph. Others probably set out to develop a 
machine in line· with popular taste only to discover, later, 
. that it had to be almost an exact copy of the Triumph. Yet 
others may have set out deliberately to copy the Triumph as 
. 
the only sensible path to take. There was a significant 
minority, however, which set out to innovate and succeeded 
in doing so. 
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According to a contemporary observer, the key factor 
was the background of the firm: "There is hardly an 
instance where a cycle firm introduced a machine which was 
not modelled on the Triumph. The list is extraordinary, 
and includes such well-known makers as the B.S.A., Rudge, 
Rover, Swift, Components, Bradbury, New Hudson, Sunbeam, 
Premier ••••• ,,5 In contrast, "although there were many 
designs differing from the orthodox 3! single cylinder, 
none emanated· from the cycle makers, but were made by firms 
distributed allover the country, who were quite unknown in 
connexi on wi th the cyc Ie trade, name ly, P. & M., Ba t, 
Scott, Douglas, Matchless, Clyno i, • 6 But before examining 
any of these firms, it would be of interest toconsider the 
performance of one which might fit into either category: 
Veloce. 
Veloce was the descendant of a firm known as Taylor 
Gue which had first produced cycles in the 1890s. I thad 
been briefly involved with the motor cycle industry as 
suppliers of frames to Ormonde during 1901-4, but had 
failed and gone into liquidation in 1905. A new company 
was soon formed to produce bicycles and in 1908 it decided 
to re-enter the motor cycle industry. Percy Goodman, the 
son of the founder of the company, decided at that point 
that the way to enter the industry successfully was to 
develop something radically ｮ･ｷｾ＠ The result was a unit 
construction model which aroused considerable interest. 
Sales were poor, however, and so the firm decide'd to 
increase their range by adding a new model designed along 
the lines of the Triumph.7 
Clearly, innovation was not an easy path to follow, 
especially when the industry standard had only recently 
been established. The company persisted, nevertheless, 
with its more innovative models and became well known as a 
,producer of lightweight two-strokes in the years immediate-
ly preceding the war. Thus although Veloce produced a 
Triumph type machine, it was really more to be ranked with 
the inventors than the imitators. ｾ＠ Much more typical of the 
imitator was BSA, the largest firm to enter the motor cycle 
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industry. 
BSA wa s a long esta bli shed firm, had been involv ed 
with the cycle indu st ry on and off si nc e about 1880, and 
from the 1890s onwards had s uppli e d frames in l a rge quanti-
ties, first to the cycle industry a nd l ate r to the motor 
cycle indu st ry. Th e first significant step to entering the 
motor cycle industry as a manufacturer of compl e te machines 
was the me rger in 1907 with Eadi e Manufacturing Company, 
the largest manufacturer of cycle parts after BSA itself. 
In 1908 Albe rt Eadi e , now a director of BSA, was given the 
task of looking into the matter of motor cycle manufactur e . 
He assembled a team of experts8 but the result (fig. 9.1) 
was a product virtually identical to the Triumph, in effect 
the kind of machine that almost any firm might have decide d 
to produce. Thus, as was observed at the time: "There is 
no radical departure in the design, for the new B.S.A. is a 
3! h.p. belt-driven model with 85 x 88 mm. engine, and the 
aim of the designers has obviously been to adopt we ll-trie d 
principles".9 The only significant diffe r e nce wa s in the 
Fig. 9.1. The First BSA 
("The Motor Cycle", 27 October 1910) 
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spring forks, but far from b ei ng a dr a wback this lack of 
innovativeness was an advantage. A thou sa nd machines we re 
pr od uc e d in the first yea r and e veryone was so ld. 
Another firm which produced its first motor cycle in 
1910 with a machine built according to what we re by now 
recognised as "accepted principles",10 was Rudge-Whitworth. 
Rudge was among the long es t established of cycle firms with 
a history going back to 1870. By 1909 it was one of the 
largest cycle producers with an output of 1,500 machines a 
week. In that same year the decision was made to produce a 
motor cycle, but this was to be no ordinary machin e . 
Secret experiments were begun in 1909 to develop a new 
engine. The first machine was assembled in July 1910, but 
there were problems with the cylinder head which had to be 
redesigned. The next model failed and the next, but the 
fourth proved a success and was soon setting new world 
records. 11 
As it turned out, the first Rudge motor cycle (fig. 
9.2) looked much the same as all the others which followed 
the lead of Triumph, but its performance was quite out of 
the ordinary. it was no simple copy and showed all the 
signs of becoming a world-beater, but it had cost them 
Fig. 9.2. The Rudge 
(liThe Motor Cycle", 6 October 1910) 
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dear. In 1908 their profits had been £15,860. These had 
fallen in 1909--when they commenced work on the motor 
cycle--to £1,733. In 1910 and 1911 they made losses of 
£ 11,857 and £25, 795 respective 1y12 , which were: part ly but 
not entirely the result of development work on their new 
machine. 13 These disastrous years for the firm, however, 
were followed by better things. In 1912 profits had 
recovered to £25,099, but the greatest success eluded them 
for another two years. In 1913 they took second place in 
the Senior TT and did not win it until 1914. Such a win 
would normally have consolidated and increased their share 
of the market, but coming just before the outbreak of war 
·it was too late and it is doubtful if the losses of 1910-11 
were evei fully recouped. 
Rudge was not the only firm which entered the industry 
with an improved but essentially standard machine. Another 
which was not content simply to imitate the Triumph was New 
Hudson. 
New Hudson entered the industry in 1910 and was among 
the first to introduce a machine with a three-speed gear at 
a time when many machines were single-geared. The firm 
engaged in a prolific advertising campaign which was able 
to exploit its competition successes as well as the.tech-
nical attributes of its product (fig. 9.3), and succeeded 
so well that within about two. years of its entry to the 
industry it had grown into one of the largest motor cycle 
manufacturers. By 1912 it was producing over fifty 
machines a week14 which, if sustained throughout the year, 
would have given it an annual output of near three thou-
sand. This was the most spectacular rise of a newcomer to 
the industry, but'not every firm wanted to aim at the mass 
market. 
Sunbeam was a producer of high quality bicycles with a 
·history going back to the 1880s. Quality was always put 
before price and consequently ｴｾ･＠ firm had remained small. 
The first Sunbeam car was produced in 1899 and Sunbeam 
eventually became one of the big names in the motor indus-
try, but John Marston, the firm's founder, was less 
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impressed by the motor cycle and did not seriously consider 
entering the motor cycle industry until 1911 when he him-
self was 76. 
A designer from outside the firm was brought in and 
instructed "to design and bring to production a motorcycle 
that was fit to bear the Sunbeam name, that was to be easy 
to ride, dignified in appearance and, in the era of stac-
cato exhausts and oil-spattered riders, would be quiet and 
free from mess 11.15 The machine turned out to be of con-
ventional design and appearance apart from luxurious 
features such as deeper mudguarding and chain covers. 
There were no concessions to price a t the expense of 
quality with the result that price was high and production 
was slow, not through any lack of demand but because manu-
facture was initially on a ''hand-buil tit basis so that there 
was usually a waiting list for Sunbeam machines.16 A later 
mode 1 took second place in the 1914 Senior TT, a remarkable 
performance for a machine which was originally intended to 
be a "gentleman's motor cycle". 
Apart from mi nor va ria tions, all of these firms 
entered the industry with machines which followed in prin-
ciple the standard pattern which had been established by 
Triumph some years before. The BSA was the nearest copy, 
the first Sunbeam was of 2ihp instead of 31 and had a 
countershaft gear, but did not change significantly the 
standard pattern. The ease with which such machines were 
sold in large numbers by newcomers to the industry'demon-
strates the wisdom of this strategy. There were many other 
firms, some old, some new to the industry, which did no 
less well at this time, most of them by producing the 
standard type of machine, bu t certainly not all. In many 
ways the more radical innovators are more interesting. The 
most important of these was Douglas. 
Douglas had no previous connection with the cycle 
industry. The firm originated in 1882 as a small black-
smith's shop and later developed into a foundry supplying 
lasts to the boot and shoe trade. It first became involved 
with the motor cycle industry in 1905 when it began to 
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s upply cylinder castings to a firm called Light Motors 
which produced a small motor cycle with a hori zontally-
opposed, twin-cylinde r engine. This was the first engi ne 
of its type intended for motor cycle use, and had been 
developed by the works manager of Light Motors, Joseph 
Barter, who was originally inspired by an e ngine of similar 
type developed for the Lanchester car. 17 
When Light Motors went into liquidation in 1907, 
Barter went · to work for Douglas. An improved e n gine was 
developed and installed in the first Douglas motor cycle 
but initially it met with ridicule: liThe Douglas was 
exhibited at the Show in 1907 and everyone went to look and 
laugh and not one order was taken".18 Yet apart from the 
engine, the Douglas was quite conventional in ｡ｰｰ･｡ｲ｡ｮｾ･＠
(fig. 9.4). The engine alone made it look rather different, 
and the machine's initial reception demonstra tes just how 
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ｍｾＮ＠ B. H. Da\' ies writes: II My appreciation of the little Douglas after such a tryin/t ride was naturallf 
profound . . Few magnetos a re so' I!ntirely waterproof. Its position high up on the top of the crank Case has 
doubtieSl much to do with this. The little engine sW:l llow5 all its own vibr:llion, (or I never once felt any Iremor 
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Fig. 9.4. Douglas Advertisement 
(liThe Motor Cycle", 2 Dec e mber 1908) 
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important it is for a product to conform to standard expec-
tations particularly where appearance is concerned. 
The machine survived, however, although progress was 
slow. In 1908 only 50 were sold, but in 1909 this had 
risen to 350. 19 The Douglas was to prove itself in various 
ways. First, the horizontally-opposed twin engine is an 
extremely smooth-running type, and at a time when motor 
cycles were notorious for vibration, riders were bound 
eventually to discover the advantages of the Douglas. So 
much development work on the machine followed, including 
the addition of a two-speed gear,20 that at the end of 1910 
it was noted that the firm Ｇｾ｡ｶ･＠ improved and developed it 
until it stands out as perhaps the most successful machine 
of its power on the market, and one of the sanest and most 
practical types".21 Competition success also was con-
siderable, so much so that in 1912 the firm took two full 
pages of "Motor Cycling" to advertise in small print and 
without the distraction of illustrations, all the Douglas' 
sport ing successes in that yea r a lone, which inc 1 uded 
first, second and fourth places in the Junior TT.22 
By now production had increased substantially as com-
pared with earlier days. In 1910 it had exceeded a thou-
sand, by the following year had reached two thousand, and 
in 1913 contracts for the following year to supply 6,000 
machines were reported.23 The only firm which might have . 
been produc ing more ma chines a t this stage of the i ndus-
, 
try's history, was Triumph. 
The success of Douglas as an innovator owed much to 
the fact that the basic format of the machine was very much 
in line with the accepted standard. If the main innovation 
had been in frame and not engine design, then the resis-
tance to it would have been much greater. This point can 
be confirmed by referenc e to some of the more innova t i ve 
-machines discussed in the last chapter, and also to the 
James. 
James origina ted as a cyc Ie firm and was not a new 
entrant to the ｩｮ､ｾｳｴｲｹＮ＠ It had been producing motor 
cycles since 1901 but always with proprietory engines, and 
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it was not until 1908 that it produced a machin e e ntir e ly 
of its own manufacture. The new model was exceptionally 
innovative and rather unconve ntional in appearance (fig. 
9.5). It was designed to answer many of the d eficie nci es 
of current machin es , and among its more unusual features 
were the "outrigger" spindles which carried the wheels. 
These made it possible to change the wheels in seconds for 
tyre repairs, an important feature when punctures were 
common. 24 
This and other advantages which made it one of the 
most innovative machines of its day were, nevertheless, 
insufficient to overcome the prejudice against radically 
new deSigns, and the machine which had taken three years to 
develop was dropped within three years. It was r e placed by 
a model which was no less innovative in detail features but 
The JAMES 
. ｍｏＡｾ＼＿ＡＺｔｒａｾＺｾｌｅ＠ 1 fff, 
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. ' . ＶｈｏｗｾｏｏＢｓ＠ IHRldlNGl1AM I Brrad S, .... , Cor ..... ·• -.- . . ' _ . 
Fig. 9.5. James Advertisement 
(liThe Motor Cycle", 2 December 1908) 
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cast wi thin the conventional mould.25 Thus once more the 
standard had prevailed against the more innovative product, 
yet under certain circumstances radically innovative 
machines could and did survive, and none more so than the 
Scott. 
The Scott was one of the most innovative motor cycles 
ever devised. I t was the invention of Alfred Scott who was 
born in Bradford in 1874, educated at a public school, and 
trained by apprenticeship as an engineer. 
Scott first began work on a twin-cylinder, two-
stroke engine in 1897, and mounted the finished article on 
a bicycle, Werner fashion. 26 It was early days yet, 
however, to think about manufacture, and Scott continued 
his development work for the next ten years before he began 
to arrive at a machine which might be marketable. Mean-
while, he had developed various other ideas including a 
marine engine and an electric clock which was taken up 
eventually by the Ever Ready Battery Company.27 
The first Scott motor cycles were manufactured in 
Bradford by Benjamin and William Jowett by arrangement with 
Scott who lacked the capital to set up his own firm. Only 
six were produced before the Jowetts decided to end the 
contract so as to concentrate on car manufacture.28 These 
first machines gave much trouble but even so, one of them, 
ridden by Scott himself, performed extremely well in hill 
climbs. The major problem now for Scott was to set up his 
own company. 
Capital of £4,000 was subscribed by Scott's relatives 
and a few others and the Scott Engineering Company was 
formed, but the path to radical innovation is rarely easy 
and the new machine had to undergo several modifications 
before it could be put into production in 1909.29 
As can be seen from the later but little changed 
·version of this machine illustrated in fig. 9.6, this was 
an unusual motpr cycle and of rather untypical appearance. 
The fully triangulated, open frame was of Scott's own 
design and intended to place the engine and petrol tank as 
low as possible so as to improve stability.3D The engine, 
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a twin cylinder, two-stroke, was original in conception, 
and it was this more than any other feature which had 
engaged Scott's attention during most of those ten years of 
development work. There were many other original features 
including a pedal gear-change, and a kick-starter, which 
made the machine of advanced specification in almost every 
detai 1. Pe r for mane e wa s extreme ly good, so tha t the on ly 
real problem whi-ch faced the new company was how to sell 
such an innovative motor cycle. 
The first factor which enabled the Scott to overcome 
the prejudice against almost anything so original in 
design, was the machine's immediate and continuing success 
in competitions. BHD recalls how it performed at one of 
its first competition appearances in 1908: 
In envious company it is seldom that spite and 
criticism automatically surrender to worship. Scott, in 
ten minutes, conquered the motor cycle world. The mere 
look of his epoch-making machine was sufficient. 
Gleaming wi th silver-plate and purple enamel, its sheer 
beauty immediately vanquished the onlookers. It made 
three ascents of the hill. We all felt that a new era 
had dawned on our world. He started the machine by a 
gentle depression of a short pedal-none of that ungainly 
run-and-jump business. He had scorned to fit pedals. 
The smooth, cat-like purr of the two-stroke engine put to 
underlying shame the staccato chatter of the super-tuned 
four-strokes which had mustered to steal all the day's 
glory. Amidships, the trim little projectile housed a 
two-speed gear, complete with clutch, daintily operated 
by a single rocking pedal. Finally, the entire drive was 
by very light chains.31 
On that occasion Scott collected three gold medals 
and, in time, Scott riders would collect many more, but 
·with such an untypical machine, wins in lesser competitions 
were, not enough to overc ome the resistance of the typical 
motorcyclist. In 1911 production was 300, far below the 
thousands of relatively unoriginal standard machines being 
produced by firms I ike BSA and New Hudson, after an 
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equally short period in the industry. What was needed was 
a win in the most important competition of all, the TT. 
The first machine, entered in 1909, failed to finish . 
. The following year two Scotts finished but were not among 
the leaders. In 1911 ,'as a result of technical problems, 
only one of three machines entered finished. Not until 
1912 did a Scott win and again in 1913. The effect on the 
company's business was startling. Production in 1912 
reached 550,32 the maximum capacity of the factory and 
Scot t production wa s booked up for years ahead. In res-
ponse, the company went public in order to raise capital to 
build a new factory. 
Scott was the exception which proves the rule. It was 
the only firm which succeeded unreservedly with an entirely 
original product, designed solely with regard to efficiency 
and which made no concession to convention. This success 
: was owed almost entirely to the ability and tenacity of 
Alfred Scott himself, a man to match the inventor of legend 
who succeeds in story books but very rarely in the real 
world. In comparison, firms like BSA could enter the 
industry and with very little development produce a highly 
successful motor cycle. The time was ripe in the industry, 
not for radical innovation, but for consolidation and 
expansion: Ｇｾｬｬ＠ that has appeared to be necessary was for 
a firm of repute to announce that they. were in a position 
.to supply a motor bicycle for their resources to be 
immediately taxed to supply the demand. We have notable 
examples of this in BSA, Rudge-Whitworth, Humber, Premier, 
Singer, Enfield, New Hudson, James, Alldays and Onions, 
Rover, Ariel, Swift, Hobart Bird, and other concerns".33 
Not all of these firms produced entirely standard-type 
machines and, indeed, it was not strictly necessary for a 
firm to produce'a close copy of the Triumph in order to 
make money. There was in fact still a fair number of 
successful firms which produced ｭ｡ｾｨｩｮ･ｳ＠ which were 
moderately different from the Triumph. 
Many of these were long established in the industry, 
like P & M, for example, which had its own unique def!3ign in 
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which the engine replaced the front down-tube of the frame. 
Others, like Levis, were newcomers and produced lightweight 
machines which were developing into an increasingly impor-
tant product class. The key factor for commercial success 
was to produce a machine which was of conventional layout, 
and therefore conventional appearance, whatever its weight 
or type of engine. An engine would survive or be rejected 
according to its performance, and not its appearance, but 
the motor cycle, the complete package that was placed on 
the market, had to look right. 
The more technical issues will be discussed in the 
next chapter. First we come to examine the progress and 
growth of the industry as a whole. 
The Growth of the Industry: A Statistical Review 
By the end of 1916, something like three hundred firms 
had entered the industry since its beginnings in 1896, of 
which about a hundred remained to continue or resume prod-
uction after the war. The complete table of the entrances 
and exits of these firms can be found in the next chapter. 
Of more immediate interest are the years 1908-1916, 
which included the second expansionary period and probably 
the most important one of the industry's ･ｮｴｩｲｾ＠ history. 
As can be seen in Table 9.1, 112 firms entered the industry 
in this period and 106 left it. In 1908, the tail-end of 
the slump, firms were still leaving the industry faster 
than new ones were entering, but from 1909 to 1912 only 21 
firms left while 60 entered. 
1913 found the industry bigger than it had ever been 
in terms of the number of firms in it, yet already there 
were fears that the market was becoming saturated and the 
industry might soon be in difficulties: Ｇｾｨ･ｲ･＠ are now so 
many firms producing motor-cycles, and such large outputs 
being accomplished, that apparently the limits of public 
absorption have been reached, and the mome nt has arrived 
when the business must assume a competitive aspect".35 As 
we shall see, there was little evidence to justify these 
fears. The outbreak of war in 1914, however, put qUite a 
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Year Entrants Leavers Remainder 
1908 10 16 90 
1909 12 3 99 
1910 10 4 105 
1911 20 8 117 
1912 18 6 129 
1913 26 12 143 
1914 11 30 124 
1915 4 20 108 
1916 1 7 102 
Total 112 106 
Table 9.1. Firms Entering and Leaving the Industry, 
1908-191634 
different complexion on things, and the number of firms 
remaining active in the industry fell sharply. 
1913 was also the first year in which there was a 
significantly greater number. of firms in the industry than 
in the previous peak year of 1905, but production was by 
now several times larger. While t.here are no production 
figures for the industry as a whole except for 1907, the 
Census of Proquction year, figures of motor cycles in use 
provide a much better guide to the growth of the industry 
than the number of firms. As can be seen in Table 9.2, the 
number of motor cycles in use was 34,664 in 1907, and had 
only risen to 36,242 by 1910. But from then on there was 
very rapid growth to the effect that by 1914 the total had 
increased almost three and a half times to 123,678. The 
peak year for growth, 1913, showed an increase of 28,283. 
In order that the British industry could have supplied 
all of this increase, it had to be producing well over 
thirty thousand machines a year so as to allow for the 
scrapping of old ones. In fact production was much higher 
since the excess of exports over imports, as shown in Table 
9.3, was 15,122 in 1913, and 18,318 in 1914, which would 
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Year 
1907 
1908 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1913 
1914 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
Table 9.2 
Motor Cycles in 
34,664 
35,247 
35,784 
36,242 
47,572 
69,501 
97,784 
123,678 
138,496 
152,960 
118,806 
69,206 
Use Increase 
583 
537 
458 
11,330 
21,929 
28,283 
25,894 
14,820 
14,464 
-34,154 
-49,600 
Increase in Motor Cycle Use, 1907-191836 
indicate that the total output of the industry was probably 
at least 45,000 by 1914.37 Thus there was something like a 
twelvefold increase in production from 1907 (3,700) to 
1914. 
The performance of some individual firms was no less 
impressive. Triumph's output had risen from a thousand in 
the whole of 1907 to 115 machines a week in 1911,38 about 
six thousand a year. Douglas which was a newcomer to the 
industry and produced only 50 machines in 1908, was, by 
1914, also producing at least six thousand.39 New Hudson, 
and P & M, and probably BSA, were producing at least two 
thousand machines annually by 1913,40 and several others 
probably a thousand or more. Thus it is likely that at 
this time the top ten or twelve firms were producing at 
least half the industry's total output, which would have 
left not much more than 22,000 machines to be shared 
between about 130 firms, an average output for the latter 
of· about 170 each. 
This mixture of large and small firms was a mark of 
the industry's strength. The larger would cater for the 
growing mass market which represented the best prospect for 
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future expansion. The smaller firms were always the best 
source of innovative ideas: "One of the best augurs for 
the future of the motor cycle is the fact that a number of 
smalfer firms whose more modest organisations do not permit 
them to compete on level terms with the big manufacturers, 
are turning their attention towards the development of 
special types of machines".41 
One such innovative small firm was Corah which deve-
loped an engine with rotary valves. The firm has been 
described in a letter from Neville Hall, a former employee, 
in a letter to John Pollitt, a collector of documents on 
motorcycling history: "In 1909 I was with a small firm at 
King's Norton. They made the Corah motorcycles in a small 
way. R.N. Corah's father was a bearded old gentleman of 
the Edward VII type, suffered from gout, retired and lived 
in the big house on the Redditch Road.· R.N., the only son, 
was somewhat mechanically inclined and started to make 
m/cycles in the stables at the bottom of the drive. There 
were about 7 of us all told. The machine shopl 1 lathe, 1 
vertical driller and 1 grindstone, were driven by a 4ihp de 
Dion engine ••••• Every time we sold a motor bike we had to 
take either an older m/cycle or car in exchange--it was 
lucky old man Corah had some money as we usually had quite 
a collection of 'take ins' in an old harness room".42 
In 1911 the firm marketed machines with its new rotary 
valve engines and equipped also with shaft drive, a very 
, 
advanced specification at that time. Later it dropped its 
own engines in favour of JAP engines, and in 1912 a Corah-
JAP set a new world record in its class. It ceased produc-
tion in 1914, like many other small firms, a victim of the 
war. While it survived, however, Corah turned out a high 
quality product, and its history demonstrates that the 
smaller firms could still play an important part in the 
'industry's development and growth. 
As a resul t of such growth, Bri tain had, by the pre-
war years, become the world's most important motor cycle 
manufac ture r. As can be seen in Table 9.3, 'exports of 
complete motor cycles had increased from 800 in 1907 to 
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over 20,000 in 1914, while imports remained more less 
constant until the years of war-time scarcity. In 1913 the 
value of Britain's motor cycle exports amounted to 
£993,267, which was more than six times as much as that of 
the next major exporter, the United States, and gave 
Britain almost 70% of the world's export trade. 44 
Year Exports Imports· 
1907 800 1,770 
1908 1,048 1,340 
1909 1,884 1,442 
1910 3,341 1,387 
1911 7,350 1,351 
1912 13,055 1,363 
1913 16,850 1,728 
1914 20,877 2,559 
1915 10,927 4,531 
1916 12,847 1,192 
Table 9.3. Exports and Imports of Motor Cycles, 
1907-191643 
The war caused a temporary contraction in the size of 
the industry, but was a significant period in the indus-
try's history, nevertheless, as motor cycle production 
continued and actually expanded for some of the firms 
supplying the armed services. 
The War 
Many research studies end in 1914 as if to suggest 
that the outbreak of war was a natural break in the normal 
run of things. In some activities this was probably so, 
but industrial activity rarely comes to an end as a result 
of war. Many industries .were much busier as a resul t of 
the war and this was the case for the motor cycle industry, 
or at least for those parts of it which did not either 
close down immediately through undue pessimism, or turn 
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over their production to armaments. 
A t the ou tbreak of wa r rna ny firms Its eized wi th panic 
which, perhaps, naturally pervaded the atmosphere at that 
time, commenced cancelling contracts in the expectancy of 
bad times, and, moreover, cut down staffs and encouraged 
many of their best engineers to join the Forces".45 Wi thin 
less than a month of the outbreak of war, however, the 
message came through from the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
to "Carry on".46 It was to be business as usual and a 
degree of stability was restored to the industry. As it 
turned out, for some firms at least, there was much money 
to be made out of the war from motor cycle production. 
The outbreak of war found the :British Army notoriously 
unprepared. It was particularly lacking in motor cycle 
despatch riders and the kind of equipment they needed. 
Attempts were made from about 1912 onwards to set up a 
volunteer force of motor' cyclists and these were taken 
further in 1913 wi th the set ti ng up of both a Territorial 
Force and the Royal Engineers, Special Reserve Motorcyclist 
Section. Results were disappointing and failed to attract 
anything like the numbers needed: "The War Office, assis-
ted by the R.A.C. and A.A., established a series of motor-
cycle committees in every military district. These have 
failed to bring in recruits, and we are face to face with 
the melancholy fact that'as far as our Regular Army (the 
Expeditionary Force and the Special Reserve) is concerned, 
we have no motor-cyclists".47 
The members of the Special Reserve were intended to 
provide their own machines, and the regulations regarding 
the standardization of motor cycles to be used in this 
capacity turned out to be quite significant. They were as 
follows: 
(a) Motorcyc les to be of a we ll-tried and approved 
make, of which adequate stocks of spare parts are avail-
able in the country, and fitted with variable speed gear 
and magneto ignition. 
(b) Wheels to be 26 in. in diameter, with not less 
than 21 in. tyres, for machines wi th engines of 500 c.c., 
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and not l e ss than 2 in. tyres for machin e s with engines 
of 350 C. c . 
(c) Engine to be single-cylinder of about 500 c.c. 
capacity, with dimensions of not less than 84 mm. bore 
and 84 mm. stroke . A certain number of horizontal twin-
cylinder machines of less capaci ty will, however, be 
accepted . 48 
This early effort did more to establish the rules by 
which military motorcycling would be governed than to 
remedy the shortage of despatch riders. When the war began 
the shortage was so great that the War Office appealed for 
motor cyc Ie volunteers and their equipment: "Each motor-
cyclist should bring his overalls, gauntlets, and goggles, 
if possible, for which, if in serviceable condition, he 
will receive an allowance of 15s. He should also bring his 
motor-cycle for inspection, when it will either be taken 
over by the Military Authorities at a valuation or be 
replaced by a new one".49 
Only a handful of motor cycles had been purchased by 
the armed forces before the war. The first order went to P 
& M in 1912 when a small number were required for testing. 
The P & M design (fig.9.7) was the oldest still in use 
Fig. 9.7. The P & M 
(liThe Motor Cycle", 9 April 1914) 
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having originated in 1900 (see pp. 154-5). It remained 
totally unchanged in principle al though unlike the Werner 
pattern in that the engine instead of being centrally-
placed was installeq so as to replace the front down-tube 
of the frame. This made for a particularly robust con-
struction and the machine proved its reliablilty over many 
years. Following the outbreak of war the P & M factory was 
the first to be taken over for its motor cycle production, 
and during the war it supplied 6,000 machines to the Air 
Force and enough spares to make three or four time that 
number.50 
Two other firms we re to pI ay a neve n grea ter part in 
the war: Triumph and Douglas. In the 1913 regulations for 
motor cyc les me ntioned above, the single cylinder 500cc, 
that is the Triumph type, was preferred. Twins were not 
generally approved except for the 350cc, horizontally-
opposed type, which could only mean the Douglas. By 1914 
Triumph and Douglas were the two largest motor cycle 
manufacturers in the country and were fortunate in the 
policy of the War Office to set standards for motor cycles 
and minimise the number of different machines used. By the 
end of the war Triumph had supplied 30,000 machines51 and 
Douglas over 25,000.52 
For some reason the War Office rejected the V-twin for 
military use (perhaps the survival of an old reputation for 
unreliabili ty), but approved it for sidecar combinations. 
The most important manufacturer in this respect was Clyno, 
the fourth firm whose production was fully committed to the 
war effort. In 1915 it doubled its capacity for the prod-
uction of sidecar outfits and was said to be working at 
full pressure day and night.53 Motor cycle-sidecar combi-
nations were used in a remarkable variety of ways, for 
normal passenger carrying, as ambulances, as machine-gun 
carriages, and even as mobile laboratories (fig. 9.8). 
ｾ｡ｮｹ＠ other firms supplied machines to the armed forces 
in smaller but substantial numbers, including BSA, New 
Imperial, Norton, Rover, Rudge, Scott, and Zenith.54 Seve-
ral supplied motor cycles to Britain's allies ｩｮｾｬｵ､ｩｮｧ＠
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James, Premier, Sunbeam, Chater-Lea and Humber, all of 
which obtained orders from the Russian government.55 
Thus any reduction in civilian demand for motor cycles 
which might have resulted from the call to arms ｾｮ､＠ the 
uncertainties of the war, was substantially offset by large 
orders for the armed forces. This factor combined with the 
reduction in productive capacity as many firms were 
required to convert to armaments production, left the motor 
56 cycle industry, or what remained of it, busier than ever, 
despite the scarcity of essential supplies. 
The shortage of raw materials, petrol and imported 
parts was a major problems for the industry. The loss of 
German imports was particularly serious since most of the 
magnetos used' in British machines were made in Germany, but 
. 57 the problem was partially remedied by American imports, 
and later by British production. 
The scarcity of petrol and its high price might have 
deterred people from taking up motorcycling but it had the 
opposite effect, since it operated to the advantage of the 
motor cycle in comparison with the car as it was rather 
more economical on fuel. The result was that many moto-
rists took up motorcycling and motor cycle use continued to 
increase in the first two years of the war, reaching a ｰ･ｾｫ＠
of 152,960 in 1916 (see Table 9.2). 
Thus demand for motor cycles .remained high and at a 
level which could not be satisfied by the British industry. 
The shortfall was met partially by an increase in imports, 
particularly from the USA.58 The number of complete motor 
cycles imported increased from 1,728 in 1913, the year 
before the war, to 4,531 in 1915.59 The country could not 
afford to maintain stich a high level of imports, however, 
particularly in time of war, and in 1916 the import of 
motor cycles'was banned.60 
The wa r itself provided the final proving ground for 
the motor cycle. Triumphs, ｄｯｵｧｬ｡ｾＧＬ＠ and P & Ms, were in 
general found to be suitable for war service with little or 
no modification. They were of good quality and strongly 
built for British roads which were little· better than those 
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on the continent. Reports, however, were somewhat conflic-
ting as to how well these machines performed. 
A despatch rider after making a tour of a "scrap heap" 
of machines either broken or worn out, :considered that many 
had been either neglected or misused; they had been ridden 
too fast over poor roads, often with the wrong kind of oil 
in the engine, and showed signs of lack of attention and 
adjustment. He concluded that there was a need to design a 
"W.D." model specially adapted for the harsh conditions in 
which it would be used.61 But despite the buckled wheels, 
the cracked valve seatings, the front fork cracked at the 
lower end, and other damage, most machines were able to do 
what they were intended to do and the majority of riders 
did not find a great deal wrong with them. 
Cpl. A.J. Sproston, a despatch rider serving in the 
"deep mud and blinding dust" of Mesopotamia, seemed to be 
well satisfied with his Douglas: 
I was never so convinced of the inherent excellence 
of the present motor cycle as I am to-day ••••• since those 
anxious days of Mons, I have seen few breakdowns directly 
traceable to faulty design or construction. The large 
number of mechanical casualties could almost wholly have 
been avoided by intelligent anticipation:of, and provi-
sion for, abnormal strains and stresses by the rider. 
The seas of ｳｬｾｭｹ＠ mud vividly recall the earlier 
days of the campaign in France. The machine slithers and 
vt'rithes beneath me as I pick my way a.round and out of the 
holes in the 'road' ••••• Crashing and smashing along, my 
poor little machine is just flung about by the execrable 
mud heaps of the plains, plunging through paths of suffo-
cating-dust. Constant recourse to my water bottle, the 
liquid now almost to boiling point from the sun's rays, 
is the only method to avoid collapse. Heated chunks of 
air waft along, as hot as the gases exuded from the 
plucky little motor. When remounting after a stop, even 
contact with the burning saddle becomes torture to the 
body. This is motor cycling at 110· in the shade. 
To digress somewhat, I would set out that this 
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wonderful behaviour of the motor cyc les, and the t rea t-
ment I have endeavoured to describe, is part of the daily 
routine. Certainly the journeys undertaken are short, 
but the accumulated mileage covered without mishap or 
repair is stupendous. In addition to drawbacks, we have 
no tools or organization to cope with breakages, and an 
all-round shortage of oil and petrol.62 
Clearly motorcycling had come a long way since the 
days when motor cycles could be expected to break down "in 
absolutely every single ride". But it was soon to be 
reserved largely for the military until the end of the war. 
Civilian motor ·cycle production was prohibited from 15 
November 1916, just twe nty years and a day after the 
Locomotive Act of 1896 made motorcycling on British roads 
practicable for the first time. 
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CHAPTER 10 
STANDARDIZATION, 1908-1916 (2): THE MOTOR CYCLE AS 
TECHNICAL PRODUCT 
As we saw in Chapter 8, what was almost certainly the 
most important period in the technical development of the 
motor cycle came to an end in 1907. From now on almost all 
attempts at a radical redesign of the standard motorcycle 
would be resisted. Development would continue, however, 
with the aim of improving the standard model and designing 
new engines which, while readily incorporated within the 
format of the standard machine, would give it greatly en-
hanced performance and new uses. 
One or two of the radically new motor cycle.designs of 
this period were successful, but were rarely imitated as a 
whole although some of the new features they introduced 
were widely adopted. It was a period of technical stan-
dardization despite the high degree of innovation which 
took place at the same time. 
Introduction 
Individual producers aim to standardize' their own 
production so as to simplify manufacture and reduce costs, 
but producers across a whole industry will aim to differen-
tiate their products from those of their competitors rather 
than make them similar. They will, however, imitate an 
industry standard when there is evidence to suggest that it 
will be to their commercial advantage to do so. When an 
industry is expanding rapidly it may be possible to imitate 
almost exactly such a standard, as represented by the 
product of another firm, and yet achieve instant commercial 
success, as did BSA. But when the industry's expansion 
slows, competition will increase and it will become neces-
sary to improve products and offer something extra so as to 
gain a competitive advantage. Competition, then, and the 
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increased innovativeness it is likely to generate, will act 
against the trend to standardization at least in the short-
run. 
There is no constancy in human affairs. At all times 
there exist conservative tendencies and innovative tenden-
cies which usually compete or conflict. Standardization is 
an aspect of the conservative tendency in that it operates 
so as to identify, select, intensify and perhaps universa-
lize the best of what already exists in human affairs while 
rejecting the remainder. Innovation may build on an exis-
ting standard or replace it with something quite new. It 
may offer a better way of dOing things or it may represent 
change for its own sake. In product development both cases 
can apply. In the interests of deve loping superior prod-
ucts there is a constant search for better ways of doing 
things, but there are times also when change is desirable 
for its own sake. However much a product has been im-
proved, is being improved, and can still be improved, 
sooner or later consumers are going to become bored with it 
and want something different. 
Thus standards are never final: they are bound to 
change, and in the process of change, any tendency or trend· 
to standardization is bound to weaken for a time. It is 
always present but is never a constant. In examing the 
realization of the motor cycle industry's first definitive 
standard, therefore, we shall find that, almost as soon as 
it had appeared, there developed new ideas of sufficient 
importance to suggest new directions of development for the 
motor cycle and, ultimately, new standards. 
The Standard and its Further Development 
From 1908 the acknowledged standard was the Triumph. 
As we saw in Chapter 8, it was a long time developi ng and 
-yet it was a conservative design. Triumph was not a firm 
to invest in new and untried technolog.1es but was usually 
quick to recognise the more basic innovations which were 
likely to stay. Thus, subject to small but necessary 
improvements, the machine would be much the same year after 
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year which ｾｯｵｬ､＠ enable consumers to get used to it and 
perhaps to recognise it as a sound, reliable product, a 
machine that would last. 
Technically, the Triumph was rated as 3ihp. It had a 
single cylinder engine with mechanically operated inlet 
valve, a carburettor of Triumph make, and magneto ignition. 
The transmission was by belt and there was only a single 
gear, although it was adjustable to different ratios. 
There were spring forks but the frame was rigid and the 
machine was still equipped with pedals. This was fairly' 
average specification at that time as can be seen by com-
paring it with the statistics of machines exhibited at the 
1908 Stanley Show, in Table 10.1. 
Motor bicycles: 
with pedals 142 
no pedals 48 
All motor cycles: 
engine single cylinder 125 
two or more cylinders 82 
valves mechanical 117 
automatic 90 
ignition magneto 178 
battery 29 
gear single 147 
multiple 60 
transmission b'3lt 190 
other 17 
forks spring 155 
rigid 52 
frame spring 17 
rigid 190 
Table 9.4. Technical Statistics of Machines Exhibited 
at the Stanley Show, 19081 
,For every item listed, the Triumph comes in the most 
popular class, yet it was among the best in terms of 
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performance, and in fact demonstrably the best when it won 
the 1908 TT. It was not to remain so for long, but mean-
while the Triumph set the standard: "It created a national 
ideal--that of a simple design, on rugged lines, executed 
in first-class materials by first-class craftsmen, with 
simplicity as the guiding principle. In outline, it was 
widely imitated, but I doubt if any rival quite succeeded 
in duplicating its staunch simplicity".2 
The Triumph was to remain the most popular motor 
bicycle until the war, but its performance in such major 
tests as the TT, was to decline substantially as more 
advanced machines, sometimes of radically new design, were 
developed by other firms.; Triumph's development policy 
remained conservative almost until 'the war years, and so 
much so that the last single-geared machines to run in the 
Senior TT, the 1911 race, were Triumphs. 3 This conserva-
tism made it relatively easy for competitors to offer 
technically superior machines. They could not compete with 
the Triumph reputation, but they could offer advanced 
features which the Triumph lacked, and they could do this 
without ever having to change the main principles on which 
the Triumph was based. 
As we have already seen, New Hudson offered a three 
speed gear and were among the first to do so, while Rudge 
developed an advanced and rather superior engine. Others. 
like Sunbeam were to offer a countershaft two or three 
speed gear when Triumph had only just introduced their hub 
gear, a system which would soon be replaced. 
The question of variable speed gears was probably the 
most important technical issue of the years immediately 
before the war. The idea was not new. Phoenix had intro-
duced a machine with a two-speed gearas early as 1902, but 
very few others had followed their lead. By 1907 many 
·firms were offering a variable pulley which enabled the 
rider to adjust the gear ratio of his machine so as to 
improve performance on hills, for example, but this system 
still allowed only' the one speed. 
When variable speed gears began to achieve more wide-
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spread acceptance, they were usually either of hub or 
contershaft type. The hub gear was built into the rear 
whee I hub and did not requir e any change in the standard 
transmission system which usually involved a single belt 
from the engine pulley to a rather large pulley on the rear 
wheel. (The BSA, fig. 9.1, had this type of transmission 
system, though it was ungeared.) 
The countershaft gear required two chains or a single 
chain plus a belt. The first connected ｾｨ･＠ engine pulley 
"to the countershaft which was placed immediately behind the 
engine, while the second chain (which could replaced by a 
belt) connected the countershaft to a sprocket or pulley on 
the rear wheel. (See. the P & M, fig. 9.7., though the 
chains here are cased.)' 
The hub gear was effective in use, 
light in weight and simple in operation. 
easy to install, 
Its main disad-
vantage was in the extra weight it placed on the rear wheel 
which migh t have a destabilising effect when the machine 
was in use. 
For various reasons the countershaft gear was 
superior, and by 1914 the debate which had continued for 
several years was coming to an end: "Wi thout a doubt, the 
counter-shaft gear is ｳｾ･｡､ｩｬｹ＠ growing in public favour, 
and as far as one can see at the moment, is the gear of the 
ｦｵｾｵｲ･Ｎ＠ Its advantages are that it is much more simple in 
construction and has infinitely fewer parts to become 
deranged and require attention. These parts can'also be 
made larger and more accessible than in the case of the hub 
gear. It allows of better weight distribution, and brings 
the kick-starter into a more convenient position. It dis-
penses with the long gear and clutch control rods, allows 
of larger diameter clutches, and involves a two step drive 
either by chain and belt, or by chain ｴｨｲｯｕｧｨｯｵｴＢＮｾ＠
In their policy regarding variable speed gears, 
Triumph was conservative but probably no more than they had 
. 
always been (see Chapter 8). The difference as compared 
with, say, 1905, was that there were now many more rela-
tively large and powerful competitors. Thus although 
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Triumph was still the largest firm with the biggest reputa-
tion, its product was losing that relative advantage in 
performance that had first enabled it to gain its pre-
ｾ･ｭｩｮ･ｮｴ＠ position. In 1913 the firm's ｰｲｯｦｾｴｳＬ＠ having risen 
from £22,048 in 1908 to £69,950 in 1912, showed the first 
decline since 1904, though down only to £68,100.5 This 
would seem to have been only a temporary reversal in 
Tri umph's expansion since profi ts were up to a new record 
in 1914 of £74,393,6 although War Office orders on behalf 
of the armed services probably accounted for at least part 
of the increase. 
But while Triumph continued to do well commercially, 
new developments were taking place in the industry which 
threatened to leave it behind. Technical progress was 
gOing far beyond the wider adoption of variable speed 
gears, and much more exciting machines than Triumph's 31hp 
model were being developed. Some of these were bound to 
influence the industry as a whole but would they be impor-
tant enough to divert motor cycle development into entirely 
new directions? 
New Directions? 
Of the newer designs, some were rather exotic, and 
radical in conception, others less so. The degree to which 
the new ideas they represented were likely to be more 
widely adopted, depended on how easily they could be incor-
porated into models not too far removed from the standard 
pattern. 
Of the more radically innovative designs, the Scott 
almost certainly did have influence elsewhere, and this 
will be considered later. The new model James, despite its 
advanced technology, was rejected and had little or no 
immediate influence on contemporary developments. What was' 
.probably the most unlikely design of the whole period was 
the TAC, but it did survive from 1909 until 1916 and so it 
deserves examination. 
The TAC (touring auto-cycle, later'called the TMC, 
touring motor cycle), was the product of the Wilkinson 
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Sword Company. As can be seen from fig.lO.l, it was a 
very unusual motor cycle and quite unconventional in design 
and appearance but extremely well equipped . It had a four-
cylinder engine, shaft drive, a three-speed gear box, and a 
car-type bucket seat, the very ultimate in motorcycling 
luxury.7 It cost £68 when first introduced, which was 
rather more expensive than the ordinary motor cycle but, 
given its rather advanced specification, it was probably 
good value for money. 
Fig. 10.1. The Wilkinson TAC 
("The Motor Cycle", 6 December 1909) 
The TAe survived rather longer than might have been 
expected for such an unusual machine, but it is doubtful if 
it had any effect on contemporary design. From the pOint 
of view of rider comfort and luxury, it represents a con-
cept, which is revived from time to time but without ever 
having much impact. 
Of rather more significance for the industry as a 
whole, were developments which concerned more conventional 
designs or which might be incorporated within the standard 
-design format, but still went far beyond the single cylin-
der Triumph type machine. Triumph had done m9st to estab-
lish in the public mind what a motor cycle should look 
like, ' but this did not preclude the development of more 
innovative designs within the Same general framework. A 
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machine could be very like the Triumph in terms of frame, 
whee Is, handle- bars, saddle, transmi ss ion, 1 u br ica tion 
system, ignition, brakes, controls, and many other smaller 
details, and yet with a different type of engine, it could 
be a very different kind of motor cycle. It was with the 
development of new types of engine and the improvement of 
older ones, that the most significant changes in the indus-
try's overall product structure began to occur. Following 
the racing successes of Matchless and others wi th V-twin 
engine models, Douglas with horizontally-opposed twins, and 
Scott with water-cooled, two-stroke twins, producers began 
to turn with increasing interest to similar types of 
engines. 
The twi n-cylinder engine for motor ｣ｹｾｬ･ｳ＠ was not a 
new idea. V-twins had been developed in the 1890s for car 
use, and motor cycles equipped with such engines had first 
become available about 1903. The single cylinder engine, 
however, had remained by far the most popular for its 
simplicity, light weight, good performance and relative 
cheapness. But twins had definite advantages and not just 
in the greater power of the bigger engines, but also in the 
smoothness of this type of engi ne in ge nera 1. They some-
:times seemed to lag in performance, however, compared with 
single cylinder machines, and in the 1907 TT the latter 
were faste r than the twins. But tht's was soon to change. 
In 1909 and 1910 the Matchless V-twins (fig. 10.2) won 
, 
the Senior TT, in 1911 the American-made Indian V-twins 
took the first three places in the same race, and in 1912 
and 1913 the winner was the Scott. Humber meanwhile had 
won the 1911 Junior TT, Douglas won it in 1912 and NUT in 
1913, all wi th twin-cylinder machines. As illustrated by 
the success of Douglas, Scott and others, a TT win was the 
best possible advertisement (see page 208) and must' have 
'increased interest in similar machines. A good indication 
of this is the increase in the proportion of twins 
exhibited at the Olympia Show, up from 34% of all motor 
cycles in 1912 to 411 in 1913.8 
Another reason for the increasing use of twin cylinder 
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Fig. 10.2. Matchless Advertisement 
("The Motor Cycle", 27 December 1909) 
machines, and particularly the bigger ones, was the growing 
popularity of motor cycle-Sidecar combinations. One firm, 
Clyno, claimed that their machine was the first to be 
developed exclusively for sidecar use,9 and, as we have 
seen, their effort was fully repaid when the war began as 
they became the main suppliers to the War Office of motor 
cycle combinations. 
The vast majority of twin-engine machines still had V-
t win eng in e s, bu t n ow anew ki n d 0 f t win be ga n t 0 a chi eve a 
degree of popularity. Of the TT winners, the success of 
the Douglas particularly resulted in an effort on the part 
' of other manufacturers to develop an imitative model. The 
horizontally-opposed engine, more easily referred to as 
"the flat twin", apart from having a rather good perfor-
mance, was seen to have various other advantages: "It is a 
feature of the flat twi n engines that they seldom .gum up. 
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They are the easiest of starters, wonderfully flexible and 
e fficient, and undoubt e dly a good d ea l of this is du e to 
the outside flywheel and its large diam e ter rendered pos-
sible by reason of the fact that it i s outside the crank 
case. Th ei r perfectly even firing is well known 
..... whilst the mechanical balance is as good as can b e 
wi th a twin".1° 
On e of the most interesting of the ne w flat twins was 
the ABC, which was equipped with overhead valves , a four-
speed countershaft gear box and chain drive. In 1914 it 
set the first world speed record by a streaml ined motor 
cycle at 80.47mph for the flying kilometre .!! Other models 
came from firms such as Brough, and Williamson. Williamson 
may possibly have had some kind of family connection with 
Douglas,12 since its 8hp water-cooled engine and gear box 
were supplied by that firm. It, like Clyno, adverti sed its 
machine (fig.10.3) as being "Th e only motorcycle y e t 
, 8 H.P. WATER-COOLED 1914 
WILLIAMSON 
1914 Features: 
Im provC!d Clutch. 
Kick 5tartC!r. 
BalancC!d Crank. 
Ｖｾ＠ in. Ground Clurance. 
Ｂ ｾ ＢＢ ＢＧ Ｌ ＼ＺＬＺＬ Ｎ［ｾＬＮＮＮＮ［ｬＮＭＧ Ｇ［＠
1914 Features I 
Improved Chain Coven 
Speci31 Mud guard •. 
10 in. Brake Drum. ' 
Automatic Lubrication. 
" 
ＧＭ ｾｾＺＺＭＭＭ Ｇ Ｍ ＭＧＢ＠ , 
The' only motorcycle yet designed, ｭ｡ｮｵｲ｡｣ｴｵｲｴ､ Ｂ Ｇ ［ ｮ ､ ｾ Ｉ ｉｊ＠ as a passenger-carrying ｾ･ｨｩ｣ｬ･ Ｎ＠
'8 l;.p. water 'cooled D.)uglas engine, and Douglas' gear box. Can carry from one to five. 
Quieter than a car, easier to drivt, canllot get the . knock. ',' , ' 
THE WILLIAMSON MOTOR , CO .• ,LTD., ----- COVENTRY. 
Fig . 10.3. Williamson Advertisement 
("Motor Cycling", 16 De cember 1913) 
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. ' 
designed, manufactured and sold as a passenger-carrying 
vehicle".13 Whether or not the claim was strictly true, 
this kind of advertising obviously paid since the firm was 
later reported to have as ｾｭｵ｣ｨ＠ business as it could cope 
with.14 
By November 1916 just before the government suspended 
civilian motor cycle production, 
ferent flat twin models on offer 
three or four years previously 
only one. 
there were thirteen dif-
to the public,15 when only 
the Douglas had been the 
No one attempted to imitate the Scott possibly because 
it was too original a design and the technology employed 
was too different from established practice. It was also 
rather expensive which may explain why it sold only in the 
hundreds while the Douglas rapidly achieved sales in the 
thousands. But its success must have encouraged and rein-
forced the development of three distinct trends which ran 
counter to the standard single cylinder machine: twin cyl-
inder engines ｷｨｩ｣ｾ＠ have already been discussed, two-stroke 
engines, and water-cooling. 
Of these, water-cooling, despite the increased in-
terest being shown in it by firms such as Rex, Williamson 
and Humber, gained only a relatively limited following at 
this time and, probably because of its cost, was likely to 
be offered "8.S an extra rather than as standard equipment 
as, for example, in the 31hp Humber. 
The two-s troke engi ne was quite another ma tter, 
however, and did, by the early war years, achieve consider-
able popularity. "The Motor Cycle" Buyers' Guide for 1913 
models listed only six machines with two-stroke engines,16 
but by the 1915 issue the number had risen to 75.17 This 
was the most important change in the overall product make-
up of the industry since the eme rge nce of the new Werner 
'type in 1901, but it represented less a challenge to older 
standard ｴｾｰ･ｳ＠ such as the Triumph, which would retain 
their popularity, than the development of an entirely new 
product class, the lightweight motor cycle. 
Motorcyclists had been calling for lighter machines 
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ever since the earliest days of the motor cycle. Many 
riders, and particularly former cyclists as most motor-
cyclists were, found even the earlier motor cycles rather 
too heavy and cumbersome for comfort. For a long time, 
however, little progress was made and, as was noted in 
Chapter 8 (page 163) early lightweights were not considered 
particularly good. More machines of better quality had 
been produced by 1907, but they still represented only a 
rather small proportion of the total number of different 
models on offer. 
Perhaps up to that time when most motor cycles were 
still rather uncomplicated and consequently not particular-
ly heavy, there was not really any great need for lighter 
machines. But each new technical development ultimately 
meant an increase in weight: bigger and more powerful 
engines were themselves heavier and required stronger and 
heavier frames, improved weather protection and better 
equipment all round, all resulted in heavier machines. The 
two-chain transmission system with countershaft gears, 
which would eventually become the universal standard, could 
alone add from 20 to 60lbs to total weight.18 
In "TheMotor Cycle" Buyers' Guide for 1908, there 
were only two machines which weighed over 2001bs. 19 By 
1913 the n umber had increased to 39.20 Some of this 
increase wa s a'ccoun ted for by the introduction of bigger, 
more powerful.machines but not all of it. The standard 
3ihp'Triumph itself increased in weight by 20lb from 1908 
to 1912?1 Thus now the need for lighter machines was all 
the more pressing. 
The development of the two-stroke engine proved to be 
a major step in this direction. The two-stroke was not a 
new idea. It had been invented back in 1880 by Dugald 
Clerk, and was first developed. for motor cycle use in 
·earlier years but without any great success until Scott's 
machine was put on the market. The Scott was no ｬｩｾｨｴﾭ
weight but attracted attention to the two-stroke and other 
manufacturers began to develop their own verSions, not in 
imitation of Scott's water-cooled twin, but in much ｾＱｭｰｬ･ｲ＠
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form as air-cooled, si ngl e cy linder machines. 
The two-stroke was the ideal e ngine for the light-
weight machine because of its si mplicity. The inlet a nd 
exhaust ports were so placed in the cy lind e r that they 
would be opened and closed by the pa ssage of the pi sto n. 
Thus there was no need for valves a nd the compl icated valve 
mechanism of the four-stroke engi n e could be d ispe nsed with 
a 1 together. This made for a v e ry light e ngin e with a 
minimum of moving parts which would not only b e r e lative ly 
simple to manufacture and ma i ntai n but also cheap. On e of 
the pioneers of this type of machine was Hu ghes Butterfield 
Bros., manu facturers of the Le vis. 
Hughes Butterfield had been carrying out ex pe r i me nt s 
on two-stroke engines since 1908, but did not produc e a 
marketable machine until 1911. It was then they e ntere d 
the industry with three model s , two classed as 2ihp (211cc) 
and one of 2!hp (269cc). Th e cheapest ( fig . 10.4) was 
priced at £33.12s compared with about £50 for the typical 
3!hp Triumph type machine. Its weight wa s only 851bs 
against 180lbs for the Triumph. Levi s motor cycles were an 
immediate success.22 
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Fig. 10.4. The Levis 2ihp Two-Stroke 
("Motor Cycling", 21 Nove mbe r 1911) 
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By the end of 1913 the new trend was apparent: 
"Perhaps the greatest tendency of all in the design of 
motorcycles is towards the ultra lightweight or motor-
cyclette, as we have termed it. This is very grati;fying to 
us, for we have devoted considerable space in the past to 
explaining that fea ther-weight machines which are exceed-
ingly cheap to purchase and run and simple to manage will 
have enormous sales. Our appeals in this direction have 
met with universal approval, and manufacturers who first 
scoffed at the idea of producing motorcyclettes are now 
busy designing them".23 
Soon even Triumph had introduced a two-stroke light-
weight, a 21hp with two-speed countershaft gear-box. It 
weighed 125lb and was priced at £42, rather more expensive 
t han man y 0 f the new I i gh t wei g h t s , bu tit was 0 f m 0 r e 
advanced specification. This was Triumph's first departure 
from their long-established standard machine, and it 
created a considerable amount of interest. In answer to 
the question, why had they adopted two-stroke practice for 
their lightweight, the answer was: "We understand it is 
solely by reason of the great simplicity of this type and 
the very few moving parts, so that there is, to all intents 
and purposes, nothing to go wrong. Taking it altogether, 
this machine is' brimful of novelties, a number of patents 
having been applied for in connection with same, and as a 
final word, we think we are right in predicting that this 
machine will appeal to a very large riding public, particu-
larly as it will be so useful and suitable for town use".24 
The commuter motor cycle was born. 
For all this substantial new development of light-
weight machines powered by two-stroke engines, there was 
little deviation from the wider standard and the mainten-
ance of the 'standard pattern was expected and called for: 
,"such a machine must possess the characteristics of reason-
able power development, ease of ｾ｡ｮ､ｬｩｮｧＬ＠ and a general 
capacity for work; in short, it must still be a motor 
bicycle ipso facto, and incorporate in its deSign, all the 
outward and visible signs of conforming to a standardized 
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principle of construction" .25 Thus the standard motor 
cycle might evolve radically in some respec ts, but in its 
overall pattern it was likely to remain much as b efo re. 
The Machine of the Future 
Apart from the development of the two-stroke and the 
flat twin, the period 1908-1916 was largely one of consoli-
dation of standard types. There were many improvements, 
however. The typical motor cycle of 1914 was far less 
likely to have pedals that in 1908 (down from 75% to 32%), 
and far more likely to have chain transmission (up from 4% 
to 34%) and a form of variable gears (up from 29% to 79%). 
The kickstarter, almost unknown in 1908, was almost univer-
sal by 1914 except for high-powered machines.26 The same 
period saw also the gradual abandonment of battery and coil 
ignition in favour of the magneto, improved layouts for 
controls, increasing attention to weather protection for 
different parts of the machine with improved forms of 
chainguards and mudguards, better brakes with increasing 
interest being shown in the internal expanding type which 
would eventually become universal, and the beginnings of 
electric lighting. 
One of the most advanced motor cycles of the period 
was the American-made "all electric" Indian (Hendee Co.) 
(fig. 10.5), introduced in 1913. At this time the typical 
machine of up-to-date specification was equipped with mag-
neto ignition which dispensed with the need for batteries, 
acetylene for lighting, and the recently introduced kick-
starter . The new Indian promised to change all that. It 
was equipped with two batteries, a dynamo to charge the 
batteries, all-electric lighting, and an electric 
starter . 27 
The electric starter had only been introduced a year 
-or two previously for cars, and it was extremely advanced 
for motor cycles which always lagged several years behind 
car technology because of weight and cost. As it turned 
out the new model was premature. Motorcyclists were not 
yet ready for electric starters and it was another fifty 
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Fig. 10. 5. The "All-Electric" Indian 
("The Motor Cycle", 6 November 1913) 
years before they were adopted for motor cycles to any 
signi fican t extent. 
Another machine which was ahead of its time was the 
ASL (Air Springs Ltd.) (fig. 10.6), introduced about 1909 
and equipped with air springs both for the front forks and 
the frame. Air springs had been developed for bicycles 
Fig. 10.6. The ASL equipped with Air Springs 
("Motor Cycling", 4 April 1910) 
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several years before, but most motor cycles still had rigid 
frames and on many the latter were retained until after the 
second world war. The idea therefore was extremely 
advanced for a moior cycle and put the ASL in the same 
category of innovativeness as the Indian. The machine was 
innovative also in its small wheels and the padded seat, 
ra the r suggest i ve of modern pract ice, which replaced the 
more typical saddle,28 but it did not achieve any great 
popularity and there were no imitators. Production ceased 
in 1915 and was not resumed after the war. 
Many other innovative and highly unusual machines were 
developed in this period, some of which went into produc-
tion while others did not progress beyond the prototype 
stage. The former included the Wooler two-stroke, the 
Pearson Cox steam motor bicycle, and the Wall auto-wheel 
which could convert any bicycle into a powered tricycle. 
Of the prototypes which did not go into production, the 
most interesting, both developed in 1913, were the Humber 
three cylinder flat twin which was described as "quite 
different to anything we have yet seen",29 and certainly 
one of the .most or igina 1 of engine des igns, and the Tri umph 
parallel twin. More than twenty years later, Triumph was 
to regain its long lost technical leadership of the indus-
try with such a model • 
. Thus for all the trend to standardization, there was 
no lack of experiment and development of some highly inno-
, 
vative technologies. This sometimes led to the brief, and 
often not so brief, appearance on the market of extreme ly 
innovative motor cycles, but it could neither halt nor 
reverse the trend. Most of the new ideas, if they were 
good and fairly cheap and not too complicated to apply, 
were eventually incorporated into the standard types of 
machine. Other ideas were often shelved for ten, twenty or 
even fifty years, before being revived, ｡ｰｰｬｩ･､ｾ＠ sometimes 
achi,eving widespread adoption. Almost all the significant 
developments in motor cycle technology of later years had 
been thought of by 1914.30 
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Conclusions 
After four years of technical leadership, Triumph had, 
by 1908, developed the machine that was soon to be recog-
nised as the i;ndustry standard. After another four years 
they had clearly lost that leadership and it was no longer 
possible to identify a single firm as the leader. This was 
the result of two factors: Triumph's tendency to conserva-
tism, and the growth of the industry, so that now, by 1912, 
there were several firms which needed to compete with 
Triumph by innovation and not simply by imitation. 
Technically, Triumph fell behind mainly as a result of 
the firm's slow adoption of variable gears. When at last 
it did adopt a system of variable gears, it was of the hub 
type which was effective but soon to be replaced by the 
superior countershaft type. 
This did not mean that Triumph's standard type of 
motor cycle was superseded; it was simply improved. 'A 
standard model can never be a static design: it must 
evolve constantly as new ideas are developed and incorpo-
ra ted wi thin it. 
But although the big single-cylinder machine remained 
the most popular model, other types of motor cycle were 
achieving an increasing share of the market. Twin-cylinder 
machines were gaining in popularity and so were light-
. weights. Apart from their engines, however, most of these 
remained much like the standard single-cylinder machine. 
, 
Thus the Douglas, which by 1914 had achieved an output to 
rival that of Triumph, was, apart from its engine, very 
much a machine of standard design. In time the twin-
cylinder machine might supersede the Single, and the light-
weight would develop into a distinct product class in the 
form of today's commuter machine, but not yet. 
Many radically new ideas were developed during the 
'period covered by this chapter but few of them gained any 
immediate acceptance. Some gained a small following, 
others had to wait many years before achieving any popula-
rity, and some ideas still have to be applied. 
The Scott was the unique machine, the exception that 
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proved the rule that consumers in general are reluctant to 
adopt the radically new product. It succeeded only because 
it was outstanding and was demonstrated to be so. Other 
highly innovative machines that lacked the competition 
success of the Scott were rejected, or survived but only as 
small-firm products with limited output. 
Thus it was the standard machine that prevailed and 
new ideas that could not be incorporated within it were 
almost invariably set aside. Ultimately it was the 
consumer who dictated this policy. Was he really so 
satisfied wi th the standard machine? This is the subject 
of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 11 
STANDARDIZATION, 1908-1916 (3): THE MOTOR CYCLE AS 
CONSUMER PRODUCT 
This chapter once more examines the motor cycle from 
the consumer point of view. It considers not just the 
vastly improved standard machine, but also how much more 
the new types of machine had to offer. 
Introduction 
During this period the motor cycle became for the 
first time a product that was no longer to be treated with 
suspicion. Its potential was widely recognised and its 
popularity grew rapidly. In 1910 a writer concluded: 
"There can be no longer any doubt that the motor-cycle has 
come to stay." Among the reasons he gave for this conclu-
sion, were the greatly increased demand for motor cycles, 
and the fact that "it is no longer necessary for a man when 
setting out on a journey to take with him practically a 
duplicate of every moving part of his engine, as ｾｴ＠ was in 
the old days. ' The only spare parts one should carry 
nowadays are limited to val-ves, sparking plugs, and belt 
fasteners". Also noted, were improved performance and 
improvemints in design which allowed greater comfort 'and 
safety to the rider.1 
Clearly by now motor cycles were much better than they 
had been even a few years before, but let us evaluate them 
not solely in t'erms of the comments of one writer, but f,rom 
the point of view of actual road performance as reported at 
the time. 
The Machine on the Road 
In writing about itA Trial of a Twin Rex", BHD 
discusses the meaning of the word "trial" and in the 
process gives us an idea of how attitudes to motor, cycle 
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performance had changed over the years following improve-
ments in the machine itself: 
"Trial" is a word of ever-changing meaning to the 
motor cyclist. Time was when it meant to me a cautious 
gambol round Hyde Park previous to a rash purchase. Then 
the hill-climbing bugbear loomed larger, and I felt no 
trial was complete that did not include the ascent of 
Westerham. Then racing theory infected me, and my trials 
took the form of an early morning run at double legal 
limit, and as prolonged as might be. Then, again, I 
learnt with some machines to use the word trial in a 
purely scriptural sense; it Is a very real trial to 
travel even a few miles on some machines. But today, 
when practically every machine is speedy, a' good hill-
climber and reliable, "trial" has been narrowed down in 
meaning,till for me it scarcely includes more than tests 
of comfort, control, and especially FLEXIBILITY (capitals 
please), the old trio of desiderata-reliability, speed, 
and hill-climbing--being taken for granted.2 
The machine did, indeed, prove to be well up to expec-
tations in terms of reliability, speed and hill-climbing, 
but was lacking in comfort which was "frankly disappoin-
ting, as the springs of the front fork were decidedly too 
. stiff for my weight, and, in addition, when Nature designed 
my legs, she had not ｦｯｲ･ｳ･ｾｮ＠ that I should ever ride a 
20in. frame. I felt in momentary danger of being forced 
out over the back' mudguard by the heavy wind 'pressure 
whenever I let the machine out; however, it is well under-
stood that this is the speed merchant's Rex. He who would 
potter in comfort is mean t to ride the heavier moun t wi th 
the cantilever seat.3 Control, however, _ was found to be 
"admirable" and flexibility particularly good, with the 
machine capable of being "s lowed right d own to balancing 
-point" and then accelerated smoothly away up to high speed. 
But what of the popular standard, the Triumph and 
similar machines produced by other manufacturers? A road 
test of a 1909 Sihp Bradbury'proved it to be of good speed 
and "we never found a hill it could not climb".4 A similar 
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machine road tested the following year, was the 3ihp 
Brown which was "a real flier-there were few other than 
T.T. machines that could show her a lead anywhere" and "she 
simply romped up ail the hills we put her a t".5 
Another Triumph type machine was produced by the Rover 
Company which had left the industry in 1906 and only just 
returned. The new model was said to have taken only six 
weeks to develop from drawing board to finished article,6 
which indicates just how easy it was to produce an effec-
tive motor cycle after some one else had shown the way. 
The new machine proved a good performer, it had good 
speed, did well on hills and was praised for its control 
layout, and all this despite a rather conservative specifi-
cation. 
The real leader at this time, however, was the 
Tri umph, and its most effect i ve testers were not specia-
lists employed by the press but intentional record break-
ers. If we ignore the Triumph's John 0' Groat's-Land's End 
records of 1909 and 1911, and its TT win of 1908, then two 
performances stand out, those of Albert Catt and Harry 
Long. 
In Chapter 8 an ｡｣｣ｾｵｮｴ＠ was given of BHD's performance 
in riding a Triumph two:hundred miles a day for six con-
secutive days. In 1910 Albert Catt set a new record by 
riding three hundred miles a day for five days, falling 
short by just over 50 miles on the sixth day because of 
technical trouble. The total mileage was 1,882 and the 
machine was again a Triumph. 7 But Catt was not satisfied 
with this, particularly when he heard that others were 
planning to break his record, and so only six months later 
he set out to improve it by raising the daily mileage to 
four hundred "and thus put the record fairly safe".8 
The first day's run was from Northampton to London and 
'then on to Edinburgh, a distance of 461 miles. Catt set 
off.at 12.30am and had covered only 33 miles when, at 2am 
the first mishap occurred, a puncture caused by a piece of 
glass. Punctures were very much the story of the day, and 
no less than eigh t had occurred before Edinburgh was 
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reached after 221 hours on the road. There were several 
other minor problems including running out of petrol miles 
away from the nearest source of supply , a problem with an 
exhaust valve which was soon put right, a period of heavy 
rain and a wrong turning which added a mile or two to the 
journey. These did not deter our hero, however, who set 
off again the next morning at 3.20am. 
That day--Edinburgh to London-"At Berwick-on-Tweed 
the roads were so shockingly greasy and there were so many 
people going to work that I was obliged to walk over the 
bridge" .9 Despite several more punctures, the main problem 
of the second day was the belt which, after being shortened 
twice, broke and then broke again, the second time flying 
off to disappear into the grass by the roadside. The 
problem of the exhaust valve also recurred but the run was 
completed, nevertheless, and despite 300 miles of rain. 
The third day-London to Exeter and back and then on 
to Northampton--"lt was a miserable, damp morning, and 
Fig. 11.1. Albert Catt 
("The Motor Cycle", 
18 May 1911) 
bitterly cold. When I reached 
Bagshot I had to dismount and 
run beside the machine to res-
tore circulation .••.. The roads 
got ve ry bad towards Exete r; 
they were all pot-holes and 
greasy •..•• several miles out of 
Exeter •.••• a car came whizzing 
round a corner at a terrific 
speed , and mi ssed me by a sma 11 
margin ••••• ! arrived at the 
Marble Arch at 7.18 p.m., where 
I checked and had tea. I was in 
an awful state and wet through, 
and nearly done up. A hasty tea 
and I was soon on my way again. 
It did not stop to rain , in places, it simply fell down, and 
on my arrival at St.Albans I was obliged to shorten the 
the belt again to get up the hill going into that town".10 
These belt problems were typically caused by rain and 
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if the weather had not been so wet would very likely not 
have occurred at all. 
11.5pm. 
The day's run was completed at 
By now the exhaustion of the rider was probably a more 
significant factor than the endurance of the machine. When 
he was called at 3.30am on the morning of the fourth day 
--Northampton to Holyhead and back--Catt refused to get up 
and would'not listen to the requests of his friends 
(Triumph agents?) to,make a start until an hour later. 
This was a better day, however, as the rain had stopped and 
there were no belt troubles, but there were two more punc-
tures. The run was completed at 11.10pm. 
The fifth day--a circuitous route from Northampton to 
Southampton and back--was also without too many problems: 
just one puncture, a stop to shorten the belt and another 
to clean the plug when the machine suddenly stopped in the 
middle of Oxford. Again the run was completed after Ilpm. 
For the sixth day, again starting and finishing in 
Northampton, no punctures or technical problems were repor-
ted. At Royston, while waiting for some friends who were 
gOing to accompany him the rest of the way, Catt reported: 
"On dismounting I found that I could hardly stand, the 
vibration from the footrests had made my feet swell so 
much. My friends soon got going, and accompanied me about 
twenty-five miles, when I suddenly found they were missing. 
I felt too tired and exhausted to wait about for them, so I 
continued".11 Thus Catt finished alone, arriVing in 
Northampton at 10pm to be met by the Mayor, members of the 
Corporation "and thousands of enthusiastic folks". 
Catt's achievement demonstrated what by now hardly 
needed to be demonstrated, that the Triumph was an extreme-
ly reliable machine. There was little mechanical trouble 
but many punctures, an exceptional number for the first two-' 
days, but hardly a day went by without at least one. 
Against this, there had been no punctures six months 
previously during Catt's first effort, so it would seem 
that some tyres even of the same make were better than 
others. The belt problems--the belt broke five times in 
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the first three days--were caused largely by the rain, and 
this was one of the major reasons why the belt had even-
tually to be replaced by the chain. Clearly there was 
still much room for improvement in the standard ｭ｡｣ｨｾｮ･Ｎ＠
Harry Long's rides were quite a different matter since 
they extended over ten months and covered 40,000 miles. 
Long was the kind of man who, had he been alive today, 
would make getting his name into the Guinness Book of 
Records his sole ambition. In 1909 he covered 12,000 miles 
on a pedal-bicycle, in 1910 he increased this to 25,000,-
and in 1911 he set out to do something similar on a motor 
cycle. Unlike Catt, he had no previous motorcycling ex-
periE7nce, and took his first ride on a motor cycle on 4th 
January at the 'Triumph works. After a few days ｩｮｳｴｲｵ｣ｴｩｯｾ＠
he se-t out on his journeys. This time, however, there were 
no frantic efforts to get from one place to another as 
quickly as possible. The rider took his time, travelled 
only during daylight hours at a modest pace, averaging 
about a thousand miles a week. What was required of the 
rider was not a high degree of riding skill nor the kind of 
physical endurance displayed by Catt, but patience and 
perseverence. 
The machine also was reported to have performed ｷ･ｬｬｾ＠
"Practically no mechanical troubles have befallen him, and 
the ride is an extraordinary tribute to the soundness and 
reliabili ty of the modern machine".12- The wear and tear on 
the Triumph, however, was much greater than suggested here 
and in addition to the periodic removal of carbon deposits 
from the engine (about every 2,000-3,000 miles), many 
repairs were needed as detailed in Table 11.1. 
Apart from these repairs, five back and three front 
tyres were worn ou t and had to be replaced together wi th 
thirteen belts-and three sparking plugs, all of which added 
_up to a very considerable amount of work, and as a corres-
pondent of "Motor Cycling" suggested: "all we have left of 
. 
the original machine are the tank, frame, cylinder and 
crankcase".14 Thus the endurance of even the best machines 
was still rather suspect. 
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mileage 
8,208 
15,752 
22,068 
23,939 
28,431 
30,662 
32,000 
35,756 
work done 
clutch overhauled 
engine overhauled; connecting rod rebushed; 
new crank pin; magneto overhauled; new 
platinum points; new carburettor body 
complete 
clutch overhauled 
new spokes fitted to back wheel; new throttle ' 
piston 
new piston; new tappet guides 
engine overhauled; new crank pin; connecting 
rod; one ring; new back mudguard and carrier; 
new front guard 
replaced pulley side ball race (ball broken); 
new inlet cam (broken at shaft) 
new flywheel spindle and cone; new fork crown 
spindle and cones; new throttle piston 
Table 11.1. Repairs to Harry Long's Triumph13 
Some correspondents thought the whole enterprise a 
waste of time which proved little,15 but it:did demonstrate 
the relative ease of riding a motor cycle great distances 
as compared with earlier days, and even for a novice 
although few novices would have had the support of the 
Tl"iumph factory. It was also wonderful publicity for 
Triumph and there is no doubt that it paid to support such 
"epic" rides. 
After these two exploits by Triumph riders, the per-
formances of other machines might sound rather anticlimac-
tic, but in fact by 1911 there were probably a number of 
,. machines at least as good as the Triumph and its imita-
.tions. The Scott was more than a match for the Triumph and 
demonstrated that it ｾ｡ｳ＠ not necessary to imitate Triumph 
in order to produce a good motor cycle. 
The 1910 Scott was rated at alhp, the same as the 
Triumph, but that was about the only way in which the two 
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machines were similar. The Scott was a water-cooled, two-
stroke twi n, had an open frame of Scott's own design, and 
was also equipped with the kick-starter which had origi-
nated with this machine, and a two-speed gear. Everyone 
of these features contributed to the Scott's convenience 
and performance from a consumer point of view and was never 
a matter of techno logy run riot as somet imes seems to be 
the case with modern products. 
One tester was particularly impressed by the engine: 
"As regards its running, it may be compared to four-
cylinder machines, the two-cylinder two-stroke engine being 
equivalent in torque to the four-cylinder four stroke type. 
This is saying a great deal, for everyone knows there is 
only a negligible amount of vibration with four-cylinder 
engines. This even impulse of the two-stroke Scott motor 
accounts in a great measure for the longevity of the tyres 
and the success of the chain transmission. Never have we 
experienced such comfort from a positive method of trans-
mission, and what is more, the Renold chains have never 
given a moment's trouble, and have only required shortening 
once in 700 miles".16 
Another tester who was more concerned with the riding 
itself, was no less comp.1imentary: "The sensations of 
driving these machines are quite unlike those experienced 
on apy other type of motor-bicycle. It is more like 
driving a very heavy and comfortable pedal bicycle propel-
led by invisible power ••••• I thought I should like to try 
starting from a standstill on the 1 in 6 gradient, so I 
turned round, kicked at the lever, took my seat, and gently 
engaged the gear, being careful to open up the throttle and 
advance the ignition at the same time. The Scott purred up 
without a murmur, and when over the steepest bit took the 
high speed in her stride. So pleased was I that I decided 
.to have a nother go, wi th the resul t that the engine took 
hold at the start with such avidity that I only escaped a 
. 
ga te by the skin of my teeth ••••• Round the corners, up the 
hills, and along the level we flew, and I could not help 
being much impressed by the way the machine held the road. 
247 
There was no leaping off the ground or bouncing of the 
wheels, but it wasalways that steady, even glide, with the 
smooth hum of the two-stroke beneath. This is largely 
accounted for by the distribution of weight on the 
Scot't".17 
There were one or two minor criticisms of the machine, 
inc I uding th e placin g of some of the con tro 1 s, bu t thi s was 
only the second. year of production and such problems could 
easily be put right. 
The Scott was of much the same weight and size as the 
Triumph; the Douglas was a lightweight in comparison but 
no less significant in its way. 
The Douglas, a horizontally-opposed twi n, wa s, like 
many of the newer machines, very easy to start. Although 
it was equipped with a starting handle, the tester found it 
to be "quit e sufficient to engage the low gear when seated, 
and to waddle with the feet until enough momentum was 
obtained to jerk the engine over compression, when the 
littletwinwould start away with extraordinaryease".18 
Gear changing also was found to be "extraordinarily 
simple" and traffic riding no problem: "traffic riding, 
even in the midst of London, presents no terrors, for when 
on top speed (51--1) one can travel at six miles an hour by 
judiciously retarding the spark and throttling down. On 
the low gear one can move absolutely at a crawl ••••• Driving 
through High Wycombe with its crowded streets ｷｾｳ＠ a perfect 
treat on the Douglas. With petrol cocks closed, spark 
retarded, and only a whiff of gas the little vibrationless 
twin was just turning over and firing on each cylinder with 
perfect regularity. There was no hit and miss, no horrid 
conking, simply the same even silky running, which is one 
of the best features of the horizontally-opposed twin-
cylinder engine".19 
The Douglas was the best of the lightweights, but the 
novice might have preferred a simpler machine. One of 
these was the 21hp Veloce which, although tested during 
adverse weather conditions, also performed, well: "On 
letting in the low gear the machine slid gently away. and 
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after slight acceleration in went the high [gear) without a 
suspicion of jerk. As far as power was concerned the low 
gear need never have been used, but we found it a great 
blessing in the thick traffic .and on the greasy roads ••••• 
Through seas of mud we churned our way all morning, and 
though the particular machine lent us was fitted up in T.T. 
style with only regulation width guards they were so well 
arranged that the mud thrown up was not excessive".20 
By 1914 there were a number of the new two-stroke 
lightweights on the market and one of these was the 2ihp 
Sun Vllilers, priced at only £33 for the two-speed model 
(£26 5s. for the single speed). Despite the weather and 
poor roads, the machine performed well on test: 
Before long the Cowey pointed to 35, and ｴｨ･ｲｾ＠ is little 
doubt that this speed could have been easily maintained, 
were it not that caution had to be exercised owing to the 
wretched potholey, muddy state of the roads. We had not 
been a quarter of an hour out of Birmingham before the 
rain came down in fine form, making our journey by no 
means pleasant, and the wet getting on to the belt caused 
slipping which did not enable the willing little engine 
to show, in road speed, the power she was developing. 
Nevertheless the 18 miles were covered in under 40 
minutes, which, all things considered, makes quite a good 
show for a 21 h.p. engined machine ••••• The feature of 
easy starting, which is common to most two-strokes was 
present, and much 'appreciated owing to the state of the 
roads; it is so much more pleasant to sit astride the 
machine, arrange one's overcoat or overalls to one's 
satisfaction, and then start the engine by paddling off, 
than having to run alongside the machine, give a flying 
leap in the saddle, with perhaps the front wheel hopping 
and sliding to its heart's content in the grease.21 
At the other end of the spectrum there was now an 
increasing number of heavyweight machines, designed prima-
rily for sidecar use, but also effective for solo riding. 
One of these was the 5-6hp (750cc) Rudge-Multi which was 
equipped with a gear that was almost infinitely variable 
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between specified limits. The machine was so powerful and 
the gearing so effective that it required little more than 
a minimal throttle opening for normal solo use,22 and at 
most half throttle for sidecar use.23 
Another sidecar machine, and one of the most notable, 
was the 5-6hp Clyno twin. This was tested over 2,000 
miles, both ways on the Land's End-John 0' Groat's route, 
during severe winter weather and with an official observer 
in attendance: 
The observer candidly admitted to me at the start that he 
had no very great opinion of the merits of a sidecar 
machine, but "after four days had elapsed and the machine 
was still running ｷｩｾｨ＠ monotonous regularity, he changed 
round completely, and became 'interested in the various 
points of merit brought out by the trial. The kick-
starter, clutch, and non-skidding properties of the side-
car were commented upon very favourably ••••• The magneto 
was painted over with shellac, which effectually prevents 
any shorting due to rain. As regards the actual ride, 
the machine ran most consistently, and the journey from 
Liverpool to John 0' Groats and back to Liverpool, a dis-
tance of 1065 miles, was accomplished without a single 
stop or adjustment of any kind, not even an oil-can being 
used ••••• We struck some lovely stretches of pure 
Devonshire mud from 3 ins. to 6 ins. deep, and the.way 
the machine and sidecar ploughed through this drew from 
the observer the remark that a ｳｩｾ･｣｡ｲ＠ must be absolutely 
skid proof ••••• I am told that any other motor vehicle on 
three or four wheels would certainly have skidded badly 
in numerous instances under the same conditions.24 
During the 2,000 miles the chain broke twice and there 
was one puncture, but no.other problems. Petrol consump-
tion averaged 50 miles to the gallon. With such machines 
,the motor cycle combination had arrived at a high degree of 
excellence, and was now able to supply the kind of 
. 
passenger-carrying performance hitherto only available to 
car owners. It had also eliminated the skid, and achieved 
all this with a degree of economy only available to the 
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motorcyclist. 
Finally, we come to the ladies. Manufacturers were 
showing considerable interest in ladies' machines in the 
pre-war years, and the new lightweights were particularly 
suitable (fig.l1.2). A short article, prompted initially 
Fig.11.2. Mur iel Hind "Tests' a 1 ihp Singer Lightweight 
("Motor Cycling", 3 January 1911) 
The lady, a successful rider in competitions, did test the 
Singer, but found it rather a "baby" after the fairly heavy 
machines she usually rode. 
by the current interest in running costs, was written by 
Miss Y.K. Bell, the rider of an 2hp O.K. Junior equipped 
with a two-speed gear. The year's running costs, including 
about £2 for repairs and spares, came to less than £6 for a 
total mileage of about 3,000. The most expensive repair 
amounted to £3 for the replacement of the front forks which 
showed signs of wear and tear after only a few months. But 
,more interesting than costs and repairs, were the comments 
which concluded the article: 
Af ter a year's experience ina 11 sorts of wea thers 
wit h my t ru sty Ii ttl e ,m ou n tIc a n a f firm t hat wit h ca r e 
and good treatment there is nothing more reliable and 
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trustworthy than a modern lightweight motorcyclette. 
The smallness and lightness of the machine, together 
with low driving position, make one feel quite safe and 
"at home" on it very quickly, and the cheery hum with I 
which the small engine tackles and surmounts all hills is 
very heartening. 
No more stuffy trains, with interminable waits at 
wayside junctions, and, on the other hand, no more back-
break and aching legs trundling across country with a 
heavy head-wind, or a scorching sun, on the old pedal-
cycle! 
But seat yourself ｾｯｭｦｯｲｴ｡｢ｬｹ＠ in the saddle at your 
own gate, paddle away (one or two pushes-off with the 
foot are quite enough to set the engine firing), look 
after two small levers and the gear-changing apparatus, 
and there you are, nothing more to think of or worry 
about till you reach your journey's end, be it 10 or 50 
miles distant. Why, there is no part of the country, 
h oweve r r emot e, which need remai n i naccess ib 1 e, "whe n 
petrol does the work.,,25 
Clearly by now there was no longer any doubt about the 
capabilities of the motor cycle in whichever form it was 
used. Good performance could be expected from all kinds of 
machine; from the standard type of middleweight which had 
evolved from the Triumph, but was now equipped with vari-
able speed gears which made it altogether more useful and a 
good ｡ｬｾＭｲｯｵｮ､･ｲ［＠ to the low-powered lightweights which 
were cheap to buy and easy to ride; the ladies' machines 
which were similar to the latter; and finally the bigger, 
more powerful machines capable of transporting sidecar and 
passenger at good speed through the worst conditions. Was 
this then the end of the road; was the motor cycle at last 
all it needed to be as far as the consumer was concerned, 
or was there still something to be desired? 
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The Consumer: 'as Be Satisfied? 
In Chapter 7 a list was presented of expectations a 
newcomer to motorcycling might have had of his machine. 
These expectations were drawn up initially fr?m the point 
of view of a cyclist turning to powered machines for the 
first time. As may be judged from the following discus-
sion, these same expectations seem to have been no less 
appropriate even in 1910 or 1914. 
1. ·It should not be too complicated to understand and 
control. 
As noted in Chapter 8, motor cycles were bound to 
; become more complicated. Complication is an inevitable 
consequence of the kind of technical development which 
results in improved performance. Could this have been 
countered by the increasing technical knowledge of the 
rider as suggested in Chapter 81 At this stage· in the 
history of the industry, the answer is probably not. In 
earlier days, only the genuine enthusiast was likely to buy 
and retain a motor cycle for any length of time. Most 
motor cycles were so poorly designed that it required a 
degree of dedication to use them to any great degree. 
This situation changed radically with the. rapid 
expansion of the market. As the motor cycle became an 
increasingly attractive propo,ition to the consumer, the 
newcomer to motorcycling must have been more and more the 
ｵｮｳｯｰｨｩｳｴｩｾ｡ｴ･､＠ novice, the average person who wanted a 
motor cycle as a form of regular transport at low cost and 
involving little additional effort beyond the riding. 
Neither the traditional motor cycles of the Triumph type 
nor the new and more sophisticated types that were deve-
loped in the years before the war,· could measure up to 
these standards. Both types were inclined to become better 
.performers but at the same time more advanced and more 
complicated. 
. 
The new two-stroke lightweights did answer the problem 
to a considerable extent, however. Two-stroke engines were 
much Simpler than other types, and lightweight machines in 
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general were often supplied in the most simplified, basic 
form so as to reduce weight and minimise cost. 
Progress was also being made with regard to controls. 
Control levers were gradually being moved from various 
locations to the handle-bars, and the foot gear change, 
eventually to become universal, had just been introduced. 
There was still far too much variation in control layouts, 
however, and this did cause problems. In 1914 there was a 
widely reported fatal accident, the cause of which was 
attributed to the rider's new machine which had control 
levers which worked in the opposite direction to those of 
his previous machine.26 This was a common design fault in 
the days before the development of human factors engineer-
ing or ergonomics, but although the accident generated a 
number of calls for the standardization of controls, there 
was no immediate result. 
2. It should start easily and having been started it 
should keep going until the rider wants it to stop. , 
In 1908 many machines were still being push started, 
but this did not appeal to everybody: "many people find 
great difficulty in getting into the saddle when once they 
have started the machine".27 The pedal start was becoming 
equally unsatisfactory since the typical motor cycle now 
weighed at least 1501b, which made pedalling rather hard 
work. Easier methods of starting were being introduced, 
however, particularly for machines ･ｱｵｩｰｰｾ､＠ with a clutch. 
These could be started while stationary and, until Scott 
invented the kick-starter, often had a car-type starting-
handle. Scott solved the problem once and for all, 
however, and by 1914 the kick-starter had become almost 
universal except in high-powered machines. 
Reliability, the ability of the machine to keep going 
until the rider wants it to stop, is the one factor which 
makes motor cycles of the post-1907 period stand out from 
earlier models. Punctures still happened too often, and 
the occasional breakdown was inevitable as it still is for 
all types of motor vehicles, but it was no longer to be 
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anticipated as a matter or course on every journey. Motor 
cyc les we re comi ng to be seen as ext reme ly reliable 
machines, and this point was often stressed in reports of 
road tests and long runs. 
3. It should have reasonable performance on level 
ground, let us say, better than a pedal cycle, ｾｴｨ･ｲｷｩｳ･＠
there would be no point in the extra expense, and it should 
go up hills (if possiblel). 
The comparison wi th the pedal cyc Ie was by now out-
dated, bu tin othe r respect s thi s expectation woul d st ill 
have applied and was at last being fully realised for the 
majority of machines. Performance on level ground was 
never bad but now it was becoming far beyond the dreams of 
earlier times. Some manufacturers began to supply certifi-
cates of performance with their new machines, and in 1908 
the 5hp twin-cylinder Rex was, according to its certifi- I 
ca te, capable of 40mph. On test, however, the machine "did 
that comfortably wi th the throttle only a quarter open".28 
By 1914 many machines were capable of 60mph and in that 
year an almost standard Norton set a new world record.29 
Later in the year Nortons were sold with a certificate 
indicating that under test the machine had achieved a speed 
of at least 65mph.30 
Performance on hills was even more improved. As vari- . 
able gears were more widely adopted, it was no longer. 
necessary to buy one of the higher powered machines in 
order to be certain of getting up a hill. By 1915 only the 
cheaper machines were still likely to be available in 
single gear form, and variable gears could be supplied for 
many of these as an extra. 
4. I t should handle in traffic, that is, speeds 
·should be variable and brakes should work. 
Traffic riding no longer had the terrors for the 
motorcyclist that had once been the case. Slow riding was 
now much easier, not only as a result of the improved' 
gearing, but also because the new types of engine tended to 
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be much more flexible than the older ones. 
Brakes also were vastly better. The belt rim brake 
was now powerful enough to lock the rear wheel if used too 
harshly, and the internal-expanding brake was slowly being 
adopted for some of the better machines. 
5. It should be reasonably stable and certainly no 
less so than an unpowered machine. 
It was too early to say at the end of our period (and 
still is) that motor cycle skids were a thing of the past, 
yet by now machines were far more stable than they had ever 
been before and skids much less likely. The lower frame, 
discussed in Chapter 8, was one reason, improved tyres 
another. A third was the development of spring frames but 
these were still rare and would remain so for some time. 
For people who were afraid of skids but nevertheless 
wanted to go on motorcycling, there was now available the 
highly stable and extremely safe motor cycle combination in 
an advanced and highly efficient form, and many riders did 
turn to sidecaring for exactly this reason. 
6. It should not be too uncomfortable to ride. 
The motor cycles of 1912 or 1914 were vastly more 
comfortable to ride than those of ten years earlier. Lower 
frames and footboards or footrests in place of pedals, made 
for a much more comfortable riding position. Spring forks 
and spring frames when fitted, together with bigger tyres, 
helped to counter the effects of uneven road surfaces. 
Vibration could still be a problem, but new engine designs 
like the Douglas flat twin could reduce it substantially. 
Improved weather protection in the form of deeper mud-
guards, and the first signs of interest in leg shields and 
windscreens promised better things for the future. Yet, as 
·we have seen, the amount of discomfort suffered by the 
motorcyclist ｯｦｴｾｮ＠ depended on himself. No motorcyclist 
was likely to feel at ease after covering four hundred 
miles in a day, yet for most ordinary purposes few need 
have had too much cause to grumble. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
If motor cycles still fell short of what they might 
be, the majority of them were by 1914 able to perform well 
up to average expectations. Probably by now the deficien-
cy, when a machine failed to meet expectations, was less a 
,matter of potential--the inadequacy of existing tech-
nology--than the failure of a particular model or com-
ponent. A cut-price model which lacked a two-speed gear, 
could still be expected to have problems on hills. A rider 
of a machine still equipped with belt transmission rather 
than chain, as many were in 1914, was almost certain to 
have problems in wet weather. Such machines could still 
perform well in favourable conditions, however, and perhaps 
'because of this, rapid adoption of new ideas rarely 
occurred. So long as older technologies still worked well 
much of the time and out-of-date models could still made a 
profit, they were likely to survive. 
Another problem was the reliability of components. As 
Albert Catt might have concluded, he was either exception-
ally unlucky in the number of punctures he experienced, or 
a particular set of tyres, even when obtained from a reli-
able manufacturer, might still prove to be sub-standard. 
Problems with poor components were still rather common and 
might let down the rider on occasion even when he was 
riding an otherwise high quality machine. 
In sum, at the end of ,twenty years of development, 
motor cycles were, in the main, easy to ｳｴ｡ｲｴｾ＠ of good 
performance in and out of traffic, up hills and down, 
reasonably safe, and offered a fair degree of comfort for 
the average rider. If there was a negative side it was not 
in the lack of improvement but in 'the slow adoption of, new 
technologies and the raising of expectations from the 
advance of technology itself. More advanced technology 
,resulted in more complicated machines, but it also indi-
cated how much more might yet be achieved and how much was 
still sometimes lacking in the machines of the day. 
The importance of this analysis of consumer satisfac-
tions rests in the fact that it is the consumer who 
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ultimately chooses--as a result of his decisions to buy or 
reject particular products--which machine or model type 
will become the standard. Once the standard has been 
established in this way, many consumers will continue to 
support it since it represents the tried and tested product 
of known reliability which helps to reduce the risk in the 
purchase decision. For reasons of this nature the Triumph 
type continued to sell well and satisfy many consumers even 
when better machines came onto the market. But from about 
1912 its importance began to decline as an increasing 
number of consumers discovered other types of machine more 
appropriate to' their needs. Thus we may ask, was the trend 
to standardization at;last being reversed? This is dis-
cussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 12 
STANDARDIZATION, 1908-1916 (4): CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter concludes the account of the standardiza-
tion phase. It examines first the relevant propositions of 
Chapter 4 covering some of the effects of the development 
of a definitive standard product, and then goes on to 
summarise the main points of the last three chapters and 
record the more general conclusions. 
The Standard and the Trend 
The industry's recognised standard ｾｯｲ＠ 1908 and 
following years was the Triumph. Despite the development 
of new types of machine such as the lightweight, the two-
I 
stroke, and the flat twin, and the further development and 
increasing popularity of older designs like the V-twin, the 
Triumph_a 3ihp (500cc) single cylinder four stroke_and 
its imitations, remained the most popular type of motor 
cycle until the war. 
The establishment of a standard can be looked on as 
the end product of the standardization process, but as we 
have seen there was no end to the development of the motor 
cycle once the standard had been established. Development 
continued, not just of the' standard model but also of new 
models which might eventually become rivals to it. From 
about 1912 or 1913 many of the new models offered by the 
manufacturers were no longer of the Triumph type. 
But the trend to standardization continued. New tech-
nologies initially created greater diversity but once they 
had been proved worthwhile many of them were more widely 
adopted and incorporated into existing standards. New 
types of product which represented obvious departures from 
the standard, began eventually to become standardized 
within their particular class. Thus lightweights, while 
for ever remaining different in some degree from the middle 
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and heavyweight machines, became increasingly standardized 
as lightweights per see But even allowing for these new 
types of machine, the first two of the propositions of 
Chapter 4 are well supported, if not the third: 
12. The appearance of a definitive standard will 
intensify imitation and stimulate research on improving the 
standard model. 
As we have seen throughout the last three chapters, 
there is no doubt of the high degree of imitation of the 
Triumph by other manufacturers. As one letter writer com-
mented: "Nearly every other motor bicycle one sees is a 
copy of the Triumph".1 
This increased development of the standard after a 
year or two was as inevitable as its widespread imitation 
in the first place and in fact was probably a result of it. 
As more firms entered the industry with imitative models, 
it became increasingly necessary to of fer some thing more 
than a pure COPYi the market became more competitive and 
there was a greater need to develop and improve the stan-
dard. Thus increasing imitation of the standard and 
increasing competition, made it more and more necessary for 
firms to divert their developmental ef;forts towards 
improving the standard and away from more innovative work. 
The most ｬｭｭ･､ｩ｡ｾ･＠ result was that after the rather 
close copies of some of the earlier imitators like BSA, a 
growing number of firms began to offer improved models. In 
1911 Rudge offered their machine with a vastly better 
engine; the result of a considerable amount of research. 
In the following year they offered their "Multi" gear at 
the same'time as New Hudson produced their 3!hp model with 
a three speed hub gear. By 1912 many firms were offering 
3!hp models with hub gears and by 1913 some had gone 
.further by producing models with countershaft gears. There 
were many other improvements to these standard models but 
. 
the adoption of variable speed gears was the most 
important. 
Thus the widespread imitation of the standard, far 
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from leading to anything in. the nature of technological 
stagnation actually stimulated its further development and 
improvement. 
13. As the definitive standard becomes more 
entrenched, more innovative products will have to be 
increasingly outstanding in order to compete with it. 
It was never easy to compete with the standard even in 
the earlier days when standards were transient and of 
relativelY'low quality, so we should expect it to become 
even more difficult to compete when the standard was of 
high quality and firmly established. Against this, deve-
lopment work was now being performed much more effectively 
so that highly innovative machines nearly always offered 
something extra and well worthwhile as compared with the 
standard. 
Something extra, however, was rarely enough to ensure 
commercial success. Many highly innovative machines were 
deve loped during this period but few of them succeeded to 
any great degree. Among the more obvious failures were the 
James and the first Veloce model. The James was replaced 
very soon by a more conventional model, while the Veloce 
remained in production but was sold in such disappointing 
numbers, that it was supplemented also by a conventional 
design. Both were very good designs and of rather advanced 
technology, perhaps too much so, but their advantages were 
probably not sufficiently visible to the consumer to over-
come the normal resistance to the radically new product. 
Among the more innovative models that may have done 
rather better were the ASL, the Wilkinson TAC, the Wooler 
two-stroke, the Douglas, the Scott and the Williamson. The 
last three of these did extremely well commercially but 
there are no production figures relating to the others and 
they may have sold only in rather small numbers so that 
they would hardly have been competitive with the standard. 
The" Douglas, although resembling the standard in 
general format, was un typical in terms of engine design to 
the extent that it was laughed at when first exhibited at 
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· . 
the Stanley Show. It did prove to be an outstanding per-
former, ｾｨｯｷ･ｶ･ｲＬ＠ and was the only machine to rival the 
Triumph in terms of production figures. The rather more 
innovative Scott, the most outstanding new design,' was able 
to match both Triumph and Douglas in popular acclaim and 
was decidedly a commercial success, but was never able to 
match them when it came to level of production. As things 
turned out, it was the only long-term survivor among the 
more radically new designs of the period. Thus in order to 
compete with the standard with a radical innovation, it was 
necessary to offer an increasingly high level of 
performance. 
If it was becoming more difficult to compete with the 
standard, the chances for an innovative machine which did 
not compete with it directly but in fact belonged to a 
different product class, whether lightweight or heavy-
weight, were rather better. Probably the majority of non-
standard machines which succeeded during this period belong 
in these classes and thus did not have to compete directly 
with the standard. The proposition would hold therefore 
despite the successful introduction of such machines as the 
lightweight Levis and the rather large Williamson. 
14. As the definitive standard becomes more sophisti-
cated, it will be easier to compete with it by offering a 
:similar but slightly inferior product at a lower price. 
Thi.s proposition was prompted by "The Economist" which 
considered: "A remarkable feature of the boom in the 
motor-cycle trade has been the large proportion of it which 
has gone to the small assembling firm, and this is why our 
imports of foreign parts have gone up. The larger firms 
take a longer view; they know the boom cannot last, and 
they will not extend their plant, nor will they reduce the 
quality of their product to reap big profits while it 
lasts. As a result the machines which have been sold most 
profitably are those which can be put together quickly with 
foreign parts, and have been largely advertised".2 
The thinking behind the proposition was that in view 
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of this observation by "The Economist", we have here a 
significant step towards the cheaper mass-produced product. 
The development of a standard product with a wide consumer 
｡ｰｰ･ｾｬ＠ was the first step. A cheaper form of production of 
such a standard product would be the second. There are 
reasons for doubt, however, that such a stage in the indus-
try's development had yet been reached since "The 
Economist" was substantially in error. 
There is no doubt ｴｨ｡ｾ＠ British imports of motor cycle 
parts did-rise substantially· in 1912, to £192,000 from 
£66,000 the previous year. 3 It is not easy to trace the 
destinations of these parts. There is little indication 
from the "Motor Cycle Buyers' Guides" for 1912 and 1913,4 
. . 
that they were incorporated into the products of estab-
lished British firms, the vast majority of which continued 
to use British made engines, carburettors, etc. If they 
did go to small assembling firms, the latter were local 
I 
dealers who were little known and certainly did not adver-
tise nationally on a noticeable scale. 
If some of the established firms were not extending 
their plant because they feared the boom was a Imost over, 
several others were expanding quite rapidly, but not in 
order to produce cheap products assembled from foreign made 
parts. There is in fact little sign of a reduction in 
product quality at this stage, and when cheaver products 
did come onto the market they were in the form of the 
simpler lightweight, two-stroke machines, which sacrificed 
little or nothing in quality despite their low price. 
The value of imported parts fell to £106,000 in 1913 
and £55,000 in 1914,5 which indicates that if there were 
firms assembling motor cycles from cheap imported parts in 
1912, they did not survive for longer than the briefest 
period. This proposition then is premature and anticipates 
a situation which did not occur until much later in the 
industry's history. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
From 1908 to the outbreak of war in 1914 the output of 
the British motor cycle industry increased more than ten-
fold. In a very few years the industry had grown from what 
was little more than an offshoot of the cycle industry and 
of small commercial significance into a major industry with 
an output worth millions of pounds a year. At the same. 
time, its export trade, once of only moderate significance, 
had come to dominate the world market, its value increasing 
to well over a million pounds a year. 
The first and most important step towards this explo-
sive growth of the British industry was the development by 
Triumph of a motor cycle which, while relatively simple in 
principle, offered a degree of performance and reliability 
which was capable of not only winning major races, but at 
the same time represented a best buy to the consumer con-
cerned only with day-to-day riding. Racing.success has 
always been the most effective form of motor cycle adverti-
sing, but it was particularly important when there was 
little difference between the standard road going machine 
and the racing model. The Triumph was literally every-
body's motor cyc Ie. 
The Triumph 3ihp motor cycle was already a major 
commercial success in 1907 when it took second place in the 
first ever TT race. When it t'ook first place in the 1908 
race it must have confirmed for. many firms, if confirmation 
were still necessary, that this was the type of machine 
they ought to be producing. The message was clear: for 
commercial success, imitate the Triumph. 
The opportunity and willingness to imitate the 
Triumpb--the first machine to win the confidence of a large 
number of consumers and retain it over a long period of 
time--was the next major step in the industry's growth. 
·From 1909 firms which had dropped out of motor cycle manu-
facture four or five years previously, along with others 
which had never produced motor cycles before, began to 
enter or re-enter the industrY with machines which were 
very much like the Triumph. Some of these new products 
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were almost exact copies, some were rather more innovative; 
but whether they were deliberately imitative or simply 
following the current fashion, there is no doubt that it 
was Triumph far more than any firm which had established 
the fashion and indicated the way motor cycle development 
should proceed. 
By 1910, to judge by the figures of motor cycle use, 
the industry was growing fast.' It maintained a high rate 
of growth right up to the outbreak of war in 1914, but not 
all of this growth can be attributed to the production of 
Triumph type machines. There was a constant flow of new 
and highly innovative models, some of them entirely un-
typical of the current standard. The new models met wi th 
mixed success. Some of them apparently failed commercially 
and were soon withdrawn; others remained in production 
suggesting they achieved a degree of success, bu t figures 
are lacking to indicate just how much; two were to be 
proved outstanding, the Douglas and the Scott. 
The relative commercial success of the Douglas and the 
Scott is illustrative of the importance of the standard 
type of machine. From their first appearance both machines 
were almost constantly in the public eye because of their 
competition successes, a,nd both proved to be exceptional 
machines from the ordinary rider's point of view also. 
Both were unconventional in design but the Douglas much 
less so then the Scott. The Douglas had a new type of 
engine installed in a standard type of frame and was con-
ventional in most other respects. The Scott was original 
in frame as well as engine design and in other respects 
also. It was substantially different in appearance from 
the standard machine. 
In 1912. both ma chines we re successfu lin the TT, the 
Scott winning the Senior race and the Douglas the Junior. 
·Yet output for the Douglas was already in the thousands 
ｷｨｩｾ･＠ for the Scott it was still in the hundreds, and 
Douglas was soon to become the largest manufacturer apart 
from Triumph while Scott remained somewhat smaller. 
Al though there may have been other factors to acco,un t for 
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this difference, for example, the Douglas was a lightweight 
and cheaper than the Scott, the greater commercial success 
of the Douglas was, despite its innovativeness, almost cer-
tainly to a large extent the result of its ｭｯｲ･ｾ｣ｯｮｶ･ｮﾭ
tional design. 
The growing success of these relatively unconventional 
machines and of the longer established V-twin, prevented 
the industry from becoming overdependent on the one stan- . 
dard and stimulated the development of new types of 
machine. This was the third major step in the industry's 
growth. 
The 3lhp Triumph was a kind of maid-of-all-work: a 
machine suitable for day-to-day riding, touring, capable of 
hauling a sidecar, and, with only minor modifications, of 
winning major races. It was a good buy for many riders, 
but less good for many others. For town or local riding a 
lighter, cheaper machine, might be better. For sidecar 
work, a more powerful, multi-cylinder machine might be 
preferred. Both of these types were developed further in 
the years immediately preceding the war, and particularly 
the lightweight. The Douglas, a lightweight, mayor may 
not have influenced the trend towards lighter machines, but 
it certainly encouraged the development of larger ones 
powered by the type of engine it had pioneered, the flat 
twin. The Scott certainly ｩｮｦｬｵ･ｮ｣ｾ､＠ the wider adoption of 
the two-stroke engine, and as it turned out, the light-
. 
weight, two-stroke machine was the cheapest one to make. 
Many new lightweights were put on the market between 
1913 and 1916, some of them costing as little as £23, about 
half the price of a basic Triumph. At such a low price 
, 
they brought motorcycling within the reach of a much wider 
section of the population than previously, and helped to 
bring abou ta substantial further expansion of the market. 
Given that this expansion was a result of not just the 
wider imitation of the standard Triumph type, but also the 
development of new types of machine, would it be correct to 
say that the trend to standardization was weakening? The 
answer to this question depends on how far the new types of 
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machine represented the development of new product classes 
(product class defined by intended use) and how far they 
were used in the same way and for the same purposes as the 
older types of machine. 
There is in fact little doubt that the new, cheap 
lightweight was the prototype of the modern commuter 
machine, and the latter can with considerable justification 
be treated as representing a different product class as 
compared with, say, the touring machine which is much 
heavier, more powerful and more expensive. Much the same 
thing might be said of the machines specially designed for 
sidecar use. Yet if the rider so wishes all motor cycles 
can be used for touring or other purposes for which they 
, 
were not specifically designed. There,are limitations 
here, however, since a heavy machine designed for sidecar 
use can easily be used for touring, but a lightweight 
cannot be used to haul a sidecar: Thus the development of 
new types of machine, particularly if the latter are inten-
ded for more specialised uses, does not necessarily run 
counter to the trend to standardization. Only if the new 
types compete directly with existing types will this be so. 
From a technica 1 poin t of view, the majori ty of even 
the more innovative machines were in harmony with the older 
ones in many respects. Both heavyweight and lightweight 
tended to follow the established pattern in terms of frame 
design and general layout. Engines might vary in accor-
dance wi th the degree and type of power needed, but igni-
tion systems, transmission systems, clutches, gear boxes, 
springing, seats, lighting, brakes, controls, and other 
features might be very much the same. Thus that the trend 
to standardization might continue and even be strengthened 
does not mean that every motor cycle would become like 
every other. The trend indicates a tendency, not a conclu-
·sion. There could be a high degree of standardization 
across all types of machine for Borne features, combined, at 
the same time, with a high degree of variation in features 
which relate to specialised uses.' 
Thus the industry grew rapidly because .of the 
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development of a reliable standard machine, the Triumph, 
the imitation and improvement of that machine by competi-
tors, and the development of new types of machine offering 
more specialised performa nce. But all of these deve lop-
ments were commercially successful only because they served 
the interests of the consumer and satisfied him to a reaso-
nable degree for the first time in the history of motor-
cyc ling. 
The reputation of the Triumph was built on its reliabi-
lity at at ime when the typical motor cycle was expected to 
be unreliable; a time when the rider was advised never to 
travel without a large collection of tools and spares. 
Until then the market was bound to remain small with most 
potential motorcyclists remaining on the sidelines along 
with some of the potential motor cycle manufacturers.' 
Once Triumph had provided the formula for a reliable 
machine, it was not difficult for other manufacturers to 
produce one with comparable if not equivalent consumer 
appeal. Some were willing to wait a while at this stage 
while others set out to woo the consumer with more and more 
improvements like, for example, twin and four-cylinder 
engines, variable speed gears, kick-starters, spring 
frames, electric lights, and so on. The new systems did 
not always work and much still remained to be done, but the 
enormous ｩｮ｣ｲｾ｡ｳ･＠ in the numbers of machines in use indi-
cates that the motor cycle was now long past the time when 
its appeal was limited to the innovative consumer with a 
taste' for "the hazardous, the rash, the daring, and the 
risky". It was now a machine for everyman or woman, 
provided he or she could afford one. 
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CHAPTER 13 
CONCLUSIONS 
The research effectively began with the problem set 
out in Chapter 1 as ｦｯｬｬｯｷｳｾ＠ to explain how the relatively 
diverse and innovative product make-up of the industry in 
its earliest days first began to evolve into one that was 
rather more standardized and conventional. 
In deciding how this problem might be investigated,' 
several secondary or methodological aims were formula ted 
under the headings: (1) historical, (2) conceptual, 
(3) analytical, (4) integrative, and (5) further research. 
Thus the research would involve a study in history, concept 
deve lopme nt, conceptua 1 ana ly sis, the me rgi ng of concept 
, 
and data with a view to achieving a better understanding of 
particular historical processes, and ultimately the consi-
deration of how far the research itself can act as a stimu-
lant to further research along similar lines. 
All of these issues will be considered in this chapter 
though sometimes under different headings. First it is 
necessary to consider 'the research as history. 
1. The Industry, 1896-1916 
After a late start because of the legal restraints of 
the Locomotive Acts, the British motor cycle industry had 
within twenty years grown to become the world's leading 
producer of motor cycles and suppliers of about 70% of the 
world trade. Yet the beginnings of the industry had 
provided not the smallest clue to this outcome. 
As a child of a thriving cycle industry, the motor 
cycle industry had no lack of parent firms, but the early 
entry to the industry of a substantial number of cycle 
manufacturers achieved little towards establishing the new 
industry. What was lacking was not the productive 
resources, but the technical know-how to turn a standard 
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bicycle or tricycle into a motor cycle. The most important 
single requirement for this operation was a knowledge of 
internal combustion engines, but such knowledge was parti-
cuiarly lacking among British engineers. Consequently it 
was not the British who led and promoted early developments 
in motor cycle manufacture but continental firms founded by 
experimenters whose main strength was a knowledge of en-
gines and a willingness to tryout almost any idea that 
occurred to them. 
With little alternative, the British industry learnt 
its trade by imitation of foreign designed machines which, 
poor as they were, did work just well enough to suggest 
that motor cycle production might just possibly become a 
viable proposition in the foreseeable future. There was 
little prospect of future progress, however, for an indus-
try based on imitation of machines which were hardly worth 
imitating since they were not good enough to attract suffi-
cient business to sustain the industry. 
By the end of the experimental period the first suc-
cessful British designed machines were beginning to emerge, 
but these were for the most part only short-term successes 
as the most important developments continued to come from 
the ｣ｯｮｴｾｮ･ｮｴＮ＠
The first of these developments was a Belgian machine, 
the Minerva, which in its simplicity of con'struction and 
basic good design for the period, triggered ·off the first 
major expansionary period of the British industry as many 
firms began motor cycle production for the first time with 
imitative models. 
Soon after the Minerva came the new pattern Werner 
which was more significant still since it was the first 
design with the potential to be developed into a long-term 
standard motor cycle to gain widespread recognition. So 
'far, even the best machines had lacked this potential in 
that they were based on designs which had only a rather 
limited capability for improvement. 
The main advantage of the new Werner was" in its engine 
placing which gave it a degree of stability which most 
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earlier machines had lacked. Imitators were not slow to 
take note and the new machine was soon widely recognised as 
the design of the future. Within two years of its appear-
ance the Minerva had been almost entirely supplanted by the 
Werner, and from then on motor cycle development became 
increasingly concentrated on improving the Werner type 
machine rather than attempting to develop new designs. 
In the years 1901-3, covering the appearanceof the 
Minerva and the new Werner, more than a hundred firms 
entered the industry (Table 13.1), production expanded, and 
it began to seem that Britain at last had a viable motor 
cycle industry. But this was not so. In 1904 with produc-
tion perhaps around ten thousand machines a year, it became 
Year 
Before 1901 
1901 
1902 
1903 
1904 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1913 
1914 
1915 
1916 
Total 
Entered 
24 
26 
50 
42 
18 
16 
6 
8 
10 
12 
10 
20 
18 
26 
11 
4 
1 
302 
Left Remainder 
5 
4 
12 
11 
20 
31 
11 
16 
3 
4 
8 
6 
12 
30 
20 
7 
200 
24 
45 
91 
121 
128 
124 
99 
96 
90 
99 
105 
117 
129 
143 
124 
108 
102 
Table 13.1. Firms Entering "and Leaving the Industry, 
1896-19161 
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apparent that the market was still rather limited and could 
not absorb such a number. By 1905 a slump had set in and 
more firms were leaving the industry than entering it. 
The failure was one of technology rather than marke-
ting. The motor cycle was still not good enough technical-
ly, still not sufficiently reliable, to attract in any 
number newcomers from among the less enthusiastic section 
of the population. The enthusiast, the adventurer, might 
be willing to accept the hardships and risks of pioneering 
motorcycling in exchange for the thrills of speed, the 
achievement of competitive events and, on a fine day, the 
rare but obvious pleasures. But the people who would one 
day play the major role:in forming the expanding market on 
which the future of the. industry depended, we re those who 
would buy motor cycles largely for utilitarian purposes, 
for riding to work or holiday touring, and would see little 
appeal in motorcycling for its own sake. 
The result was a sharp contraction in the industry 
with many firms dropping out and production in 1907 down to 
half of what it had been two or three years earlier. To 
some commentators the industry was now facing extinction: 
the young industry, never really viable in the first place, 
seemed to be little more than a passing fad. This was not 
true and the industry was never really in danger of 
extinction. 
When the industry began to contract it was a ma tter of 
the survival of the fittest for motor cycle manufacturers, 
and the fit did survive. While lesser firms were dropping 
out, Triumph and a few others were working to improve their 
products, and some of them, but Triumph in particular, were 
, 
expanding their production at this time. It was Triumph 
more than any other firm which developed the motor cycle 
into a product with long term staying power, the industry's 
'first definitive standard model and one with sufficient 
consumer appeal to generate substantial and continuing 
growth in production. 
This development of such a standard machine marked the 
end of the development phase of the industry's evolution 
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and the beginning of the standardization phase, the period 
when the product would tend to become standardized across 
the industry as a whole. The next major step towards this 
outcome was the widespread imitation of the standard 
design. 
Many firms imitated the new standard, the Triumph 
motor cycle, and from 1910 onwards the expansion of produc-
tion was extremely rapid. From 1907 to 1913 annual output 
must have increased at least tenfold earning for Britain 
world leadership of the industry. But this achievement was 
not en tire ly based on the Tr i umph mach i ne and its 
imitations. 
The :first British motor cycle design with potential 
ｬｯｮｧＭｴ･ｲｾ＠ viabil i ty appeared in 1900, and others followed 
from about 1903 onwards. Most of these machines and parti-
cularly those which appeared before 1907 were soon wi th-
drawn as their producers discovered that it was almost 
impossible to sell an innovative design at a time when the 
market was extremely limited. 
As the market expanded, however, led by the demand for 
Triumph type machines, it appears that the motor cycle in 
general was gaining increasing public acceptance. Thus 
from about 1909 onwards, new designs which three or four 
years earlier would probably have been rejected were now 
surviving and beginning to achieve a degree' of commercial 
success. 
The success of these new designs, the products of such 
firms as Scott and Douglas, owed much to their high quality 
and performance, but some of the new designs which had 
failed commercially in earlier times were probably no less 
good when compared with the typical machines of their day. 
The Phoenix Cob of 1905, a high quality innovative design, 
had failed to sell in sufficient quantities to keep the 
'firm in the industry. In contrast, the Douglas, an innova-
tive machine coming onto the market just·a few years later, 
became, after a slow start, one of the best sellers of the 
motor cycle industry. 
The new designs encouraged the development-of new 
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types of motor cycle, particularly the low-priced light-
weight machine usually powered by a two-stroke engine, 
which contributed further to the expansion of the market 
and the consolidation of the industry as a: whole. Thus the 
standard machine in the form of the Triumph type, began to 
lose ground from about 1912 onwards to other types although 
it remained the most popular design. 
The war resulted in a slow contraction of the industry 
as many firms' resources were turned over to munitions 
work, but it also brought about the widespread use of motor 
cycles by the British armed forces for the first time. For 
those firms which served this need, and particularly for 
Triumph, Douglas, Clyno and P & M, the war caused not a 
contraction in production bu t an expansion. Thus it was 
far from being a disaster for the industry even though 
motor cycle production for civilian use was banned from 
November 1916. 
In concentrating on the development of the industry in 
terms of the development of its product, the research as 
history has been able to take advantage of a considerable 
quantity of material derived from both trade and popular 
journals and not previously used for this purpose. These 
sources have been used before to provide material for 
popular studies of the development of the motor cycle, but 
never to study the development of the industry itself. 
The research, however, has neglected inevitably and by 
design' a number of other topics with relevance to the 
history of the motor cycle industry. There is a natural 
limit to how much can be achieved within any particular 
research project, and in research as potentially wide-
ranging as this, it has been necessary to restrict rather 
than widen the scope and range of the research as it has 
progressed. Thus although subjects such as capital forma-
·tion, entrepreneurship, and the type of firm have been 
given some mention in ｰ｡ｾｴｩ｣ｵｬ｡ｲ＠ cases, they have never 
been central to the research as planned and have been to a 
large extent avoided. Clearly there is work to be done in 
these areas although data might be rather limited. 
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Key issues for more immediate further discussion which 
arise from the research as history are the role of the 
product in the development of the industry; and the dif-
ferent approaches required for successful product develop-
ment in different phases of the industry's development. 
These are discussed in Section 4, "Integration". 
2. The Trend to Standardization 
The trend to standardization is a natural tendency 
observable throughout the world we know. For the most part 
it is not consciously sought, but is driven by the need to 
survive in a competitive and often hostile environment, and 
one that serves best those most capable of the necessary 
adapta tion, those who may be termed the fittest, wi th 
fitness being defined solely in environmental terms without 
reference to abstract or objective concepts of fitness. 
Thus where products are concerned, the fittest are 
those which sell to the most profi table degree. Such 
products need not be the best in terms of performance, they 
need not be of particularly good quality, they need not be 
cheap, they need not be expensive. But whatever their 
specification they must appeal to the consumer, otherwise 
they will not sell at a sufficiently high profit to survive 
in the marketplace and keep the producer in business, 
Those products most capable of achieving high profits 
will be widely imitated, and it is as a result of imitation 
that the best product in these terms will set the standard. 
Thus the trend to standardization in product development 
operates largely through imitation. 
As a preliminary to investigating the trend to stan-
dardization in the motor cycle industry, two propositions 
were formulated and presented in Chapter 4 which have some 
bearing on the matter. These are discussed below. 
1. As a new industry develops, product design across 
the industry ｾｳ＠ a whole tends to change from highly diverse 
-a multiplicity of different models--towards convergence 
around one or a few standard models. 
As we have seen in Chapters 7 and 8 particularly, 
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there were many more different product designs in the 
earlier years of the motor cycle industry than later on. 
The most obvious variation in early designs was engine 
placing, and perhaps;as many as ten or twelve different 
locations for the engine were tried before the vast 
majority of "models settled down to the one standard 
placing, low down between the two wheels, which has sur-
vived to the present day. The establishment of the latter 
position was the most important step in the development of 
the standard that eventually came to dominate motor cycle 
design. 
By 1909 the overall product make-up of the industry 
was beginning to converge around the one standard model, 
the Triumph. But motor cycle development did not stop 
there. From about 1911 or 1912 other designs began to 
achieve increasing prominence and the Triumph type began to 
lose ground somewhat although it still remained the most 
popular type of machine overall. 
But if the Triumph type were now being challenged, the 
challenge was nothing in the nature of a radical redesign. 
For the most part the new designs were not radically diffe-
rent from the Triumph except in engine type. In many 
respects including frame and basic layout, and many lesser 
details, they still resembled the Triumph and would con-
tinue to do so. 
What some of the new machines did offer, however, was 
variation in performance which indicated the possible deve-
lopment of two new product classes among motor cycles, the 
heavyweight machine particularly useful for sidecar work, 
and the cheap lightweight machine, the commuter motor cycle 
of the future. The development of motor cycles for new 
uses, which may differ somewhat from other types of 
machine, does not in any way run counter to the trend to 
'standardization itself, although it does indicate that this 
ｰｲｯｰｯｳｾｴｩｯｮ＠ should be modified to take account of different 
product classes. A commuter motor cycle is obviously not 
gOing to be the same kind of thing as a heavy duty sidecar 
machine. 
276 
2. As a new industry develops, innovation tends to 
change from the more radical in character to the more 
conventional, such as improvements to standard models. 
Truly radical innovation in motor cycle technology 
ceased to be a profitable activity with the development of 
the new Werner back in 1901 (except for the scooter which 
came very much later and outside our period). From then 
on, in order to make money with any certainty, producers 
had to concentrate on improving the Werner type. 
Early Triumph models were all imitative, first of the 
Minerva, later of the Werner, and Triumph's success in 
developing the machine which became the industry standard: 
was achieved by improving the Werner type. Even Triumph's 
"ball-bearing" engine, the first of its type, was essen-
tially an improvement on existing models rather than the 
result of a radical redesign. 
This is not to say that there was no more radical 
innovation; there were many radically new designs but they 
rarely made much money and few of them survived more than a 
few years. The only exception to this rule in our period 
was the Scott which has been discussed at length in Chapter 
9. The Scott, however, despite being an outstanding 
machine, despite achieving considerable commercial success, 
never came anywhere near to the output of less radically 
new designs like the Douglas. 
Such new machines as those with flat-twin engines like 
the Douglas, or with two-stroke engines following to some 
extent the Scott, usually resembled the Triumph in basic 
layout rather than the Scott in its radically new design. 
Thus the tendency to move away from the radical innovation 
and towards the more conventional applied even to these 
machines, and was not set aside by the development of new 
'types of engines. 
Meanwhile, there was a continuing and growing effort 
to improve on the standard Triumph type. At one time and 
particularly in 1910, it was possible for a firm >'to enter 
the industry with an almost exact copy of the Triumph and 
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make good profits almost immediately. But whether through 
increasing competition or because the firms in question 
were aiming to increase their share of the market, there 
was an increasing tendency to offer the standard machine 
wi th significant improvements like, for example, variable 
gears. These efforts helped it to retain most of its 
popularity despite the superior performance in some res-
pects of such as the Douglas, Scott and others. 
There is no doubt then that the overall product make-
up of the industry did tend to evolve from relative diver-
sity towards a few standard models. The Triumph was the 
first industry standard, but with the growing popularity of 
the V-twin engine, the development of the flat twin engine 
of the Douglas, and the deveiopment of the two-stroke 
engine, there were by 1915 arguably at least four standard 
types of machine. Yet despite the fact that a middle-
weight motor cycle like the Triumph might be powered by any 
one of these three alternative engines, in practice this 
was not usually the case. The majority of machines with 
two-stroke engines were lightweights, while the V-twin 
machines were usually heavyweights. Thus looking at any 
particular product class there was less diversity than 
might be expected given the potential range of different 
designs. 
It is apparent therefore that the trend to standardi-
zation had weakened slightly since 1910 when every firm 
seemed to be mainly interested in imitating the Triumph. 
The trend, however, was never altogether a linear pheno-
menon; it tended to wax and wane in a cyclical fashion, 
weakening temporarily after a particularly significant 
innovation, and strengthening as that innovation was more 
widely adopted. 
In the early period ending about 1902 there was a 
particularly high number of different product designs. 
Production tended to become increaSingly concentrated on 
the new Werner type which became the acknowledged standard 
about 1909 in the form of the Triumph. But from then on 
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there was a new period of significant innovation so that 
the trend to standardization which had been particularly 
strong from 1902 onwards began to weaken. Later on and 
beyond our period, the innovative flat twin and the much 
improved V-twin of the 1909-1915 period would almost disap-
pear from the market and the two-stroke would become almost 
entirely restricted to very light machines, as the trend 
strengthened again. 
Similar effects can be observed with regard to detail 
improvements. The introduction of a new kind of brake or 
gear box would initially created diversity of design until 
the innovation had become the new standard or been rejec-
ted. In the short run therefore the trend can be reversed, 
but in the long run it will'almost inevitably prevail. 
3. Analysis of the Trend 
In analysing the trend to standardization in Chapter 
2, three main elements were revealed: functional efficien-
cy standardization (FES), production efficiency standardi-
zation (PES), and marketing efficiency standardization 
(MES). Rather than use these concepts specifically as the 
basis for the discussion of more substantive issues, they 
were used instead along with other ideas in the formulation 
of the propositions presented in Chapter 4. Nevertheless, 
they are worth reconsidering at the present ｳｴ｡ｧ･ｾ＠
Where product ｾ･ｶ･ｬｯｰｭ･ｮｴ＠ is concerned, MES is clearly 
, the most important element. It is the nature of the market 
which determines the best kind of product to manufacture, 
and therefore the degree to which FES and PES are relevant. 
The role of PES is rather problematic. When motor 
cycle production began there was-a clear advantage for 
firms which based their machines on standard cycle frames 
modified to the smallest extent necessary to allow the 
,machine to carry the engine. This was a good example of 
PES and brought the expected benefits in the form of lower 
. 
production costs as compared with those machines which were 
based on nonstandard frames as for example the Holden. 
It should be 'emphasized, however, that such machines 
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as the de Dion-Bouton motor tricycle and the Werner motor 
bicyc Ie, both based on standard frame s, we re not designed 
that way for the benefits of production efficiency 
standardization. They were designed initially as experi-
mental models with no thought of production, and the stan-
dard frames used were used because they were the types most 
readily available. 
Following the lead of these firms, however, the motor 
cycle became very firmly based on the standard cycle frame. 
de Dions and Werners were the first machines that worked, 
the first recognised standards, and so as they were 
imitated the majority of motor cycles were based on the 
standard cycle frame. The continuation of such designs at 
the expense of more i nnova tive designs based on new types 
of frames, was in ·no way a result of PES. It was simply 
because once the standard cycle frame had become estab-
lished in,motor cycle design, the consumers would have 
nothing or almost nothing else. Thus the rejection of 
machines such as the Phoenix Cob and the James design of 
1908, was nothing to do with PES but was a result of consu-
mer conservatism. 
Throughout this period production methods were 
improving; there was increasing awareness of the impor-
tance of interchangeable parts, and the continuing develop-
ment of better machinery which would simplify px:oduction 
and ｩｭｰｲｯｾ･＠ the quality of components. Nevertheless, as 
pointed out in Chapter 8 (p. 177), parts were often not 
interchangeable and consumers did complain to the effect 
that machines were apparently constructed much as might 
have been the case a hundred years previously when parts 
had to be filed in order to fit. Yet the letter from Rex 
(pp. 161-2) indicated that some manufacturers were aware of 
the gains to be made from improved methods of production 
.and were taking steps in this direction. Rex though was 
one of the larger firms. For the majori ty, whose annual 
outputs were to be measured in hundreds rather than thou-, 
sands, there may have been little justification in commer-
cial terms to spend money on improving their methods of 
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production. 
Triumph, the largest firm in the industry from about 
1908, was the firm best placed to make gains from the 
introduction of the kind of advanced technology which would 
both improve quality and reduce costs at the same time. 
There is no indication, however, that they did make any 
move in this direction since their products although always 
noted for quality, were never cheap. 
The one class of product where there was some sign of 
an interaction between FES and PES, modifying design to 
reduce cost and simplify' production, was the two-stroke 
lightweight type of machine which appeared just before the 
war.: Here we find a very Simple machine being sold for not 
, 
much more than £20 because of two factors: the new and 
relatively simple two-sroke engine and the willingness to 
ignore some of the recent advances in motor cycle techno-
logy such as variable gears, and offer the most basic type 
of motor cycle. Functional efficiency was clearly being 
sacrificed to production efficiency so as to offer machines 
at the lowest possible price. 
At no time did this mean, however, that products were 
being simplified and standardized so as to facilitate the 
adoption of mass-production methods. Most of the firms 
offering the cheaper two-strokes were small with outputs of 
no more than a few hundred machines· a year and clearly had 
no need for mass production methods. Also, although these 
firms offered very simple, cheap, basic machines, they did 
not reject the more advanced technologies absolutely but 
offered them as extras. There was none of the Henry Ford 
"so long as its black" type of approach, and given such 
small outputs, this' would almost certainly have been 
premature. 
Thus production efficiency standardization was limited 
"during this period to the early adoption of the standard 
cycle frame as the basis of the moto.r cycle, and increased 
efforts to make parts that were more truly interchangeable. 
These efforts ｾｯｵｬ､＠ eventually simplify the adoption of 
mass-production methods, but that was still a very long 
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way off, and there is little evidence at this time that 
motor cycles were ever designed specifically with a view to 
improving production efficiency. There is a profound dif-
ference between improving production methods so as to manu-
facture better quality interchangeable parts and actually 
designing products with a view to making them easier to 
manufacture. 
In any case, it seems unlikely that there was any 
significant progress along these lines in the British motor 
cycle industry at that time, since as recently as 1975 the 
industry was criticized for failing to focus on "designing 
products which were intrinsically low cost to produce".2 
In fact the industry has always been inclined to design 
products mainly with reference to functional efficiency 
rather than production efficiency. 
Issues of design for improved performance (FES), 
therefore, were rather more significant. The main conflict 
or interaction among the different elements of the trend 
was between FES and MES. There was often a considerable 
lag between design potential, the most efficient design in 
functional terms, and the standard or what the consumer 
would accept. It was this lag which accounted for the 
failure of many very good innovative products which were 
placed on the market anything from five to perhaps fifty 
years before their tim.e. Exactly how much innovation or 
how much variation from the standard the consumer would 
accept 'is the subject of the last group of propOSitions 
which are discussed below. 
15. Products which are innova ti ve enough to diverge 
considerably from any existing standard, whether premature 
or otherwise, and whether in terms of price, appearance, 
basic technology or performance, may be difficult to sell 
.initially even when they offer the consumer distinct advan-
tages as compared with ｾｴｨ･ｲ＠ products. 
There is evidence for this proposition from the 
earliest days of the industry. The Ariel motor tricycle of 
1898 was technically innovative and somewhat superior to 
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the existing if rather premature standard, the de Dion-
Bouton tricycle. It was greeted initially with scepticism 
by the motorcycling press, and although opinion did even-
tually change very much i:n its favour and it sold in reaso-
nable quantities, it never made a profit. 
The Binks four-cylinder motor cycle of 1903 suffered a 
similar fate. As a design it was much more radically 
innovative than the Ariel, but it may have been difficult 
to sell more because of the high price than the new techno-
logy, since a similar but much cheaper machine, made in 
Belgium, was a commercial success and remained on the 
market for many years. 
Machines of the so called "bicar" type of 1905-6, 
usually untypical in appearance and of new technology were 
also rejected despite good performance. 
Probably the most important example of a machine which 
was initially slow to sell, was the Douglas. Of fairly new 
techno logy and moderate ly unusua 1 apppearance because of 
its innovative engine, it was laughed at when first dis-
played at one of the motor cycle shows in 1907 and not a 
single machine was ordered. Within six years it was one of 
the industry's best sellers. Thus there could be 
considerable consumer resistance even to the best of new 
products. 
16. When any product that is recognised or recognisable 
as a standard bas appeared on the market, the only ways to 
innovate successfully are either to imitate and improve on 
the standard or to develop something obviously superior in 
terms of price or performance. 
This proposition follows directly from the definition 
of the standard as the most popular product on the market. 
It does, however, provide another way of looking at the 
.standard and its consequences for innovation. Its main 
implication is that innovative products which offer little 
. 
or no visible advantage in terms of performance or price 
will fail commercially. Thus there would be little to be 
gained in developing a new type of engine if it produced 
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little of advantage as compared with established types, but 
even given that the new engine were superior, that superio-
rity would have to be obvious to the consumer before he 
could be expected to show much interest. 
This point does explain the early rejection of the 
Douglas and its later acceptance. When it first appeared 
it was obviously new and different from the existing stan-
dard, but there was as yet no evidence that it was in any 
way to be preferred. Its gradual acceptance was the result 
of two factors: consistent success in competitions and the 
growing awareness, probably spread by word of mouth from 
Douglas owners, that here was a particularly pleasant 
machine to ride, the smoothest-running machine yet 
produced. 
The road to commercial success through innovation, 
however, was much easier for those who improved on the 
standard in relatively minor ways, 1 ike, for example, the 
addition of a two-speed gear to the Minerva type as on the 
Phoenix of 1902, the improvement by Triumph of the Werner 
type later one, and the improvement of the Triumph type 
after 1910 by the addition of variable gears as in the very 
successful New Hudson machines. 
Against these examples, there were many failures (or 
only limited successes) among the more innovative machines 
which differed from the standard, and were in many ways 
superior to it, but the advantages of which were not ,suffi-
ciently visible to impress the ｣ｯｮｳｵｭ･ｲｾ＠ In present day 
terms the failure was a result of poor marketing, and it is 
significant that the most successful innovative machines 
were those that were successful in competitions and were 
widely advertised with the details of competition success 
prominently displayed. 
17. Products are more likely to be imitated when they 
are based on simple or familiar technology. 
18. Products based on new technology are more likely 
to remain exclusive. 
In that they say much the same thing although in 
284 
different ways, these two propositions can be discussed 
together. 
There is some connection here with the production 
ef ficiency aspec t, not wi thstanding wha t ha s al ready been 
said about PES. Firms at this time did not aim to design 
their products with a view to adopting cost saving produc-
tion technology; rather they tended to avoid getting 
involved in advanced technology very likely because they 
saw a better commercial opportunity in the simpler design 
based on known technology. 
As was indicated in Chapter 3, it is often advan-
tageous for the firms developing nevi products to rely on 
familiar rather than new technology, and in the period 
covered by the research it is apparent that the majority of 
firms preferred to avoid the newer technology. 
Early attempts to develop machines from first princi-
ples, that is with new types of frame and new types of 
engine specially developed for the purpose, even when 
achieving some kind of success, were almost never imitated. 
Obvious examples are the H & Wand the Holden almost no 
feature of which was incorporated into another machine. It 
was much easier to use standard cycle frames and modify 
them as required and, where engines were concerned, to do 
as de Dion-Bouton did and imitate the early Daimler engine. 
Even the electric ignition of the de'Dion-Bouton tricycle 
was too complicated for the majority, of British imitators 
and they used instead the hot tube with its simple flame 
burner. 
The great strength of the first successful motor cycle 
designs was that they were always based initially on stan-
dard tricycle or bicycle frames and were therefore easy to 
imitate. Against this it is almost impossible to find an 
imitation of a machine with a nonstandard frame. The most 
'popular of the early machines, the de Dion-Bouton tricycle, 
and the Werner and Minerva motor bicycles, were all based 
on standard cycle frames. The Triumph of a few years later 
was based on a frame which had evolved from the same stan-
dard cycle frame. The Scott was the only machine with a 
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nonstandard frame to achieve any great popularity, but 
there were no imitations. 
Among other machines which had original features which 
remained exclusive for some time, were the Phoenix with a 
two-speed gear, the FN with a four cylinder engine and 
shaft drive, and the ASL with air springs. 
Some of the simpler innovations, however, were 
imitated rather quickly. The best example of this was the 
oil pump first introduced on the Phoenix. But against 
this, the kick-starter, introduced on the Scott, and very 
simple in principle, did not become universal for several 
years. 
Probably the major factor: in imitation was relative 
advantage as compared with older technology, and the degree 
to which the advantage of the new was visible and simple to 
apply. But producers also had to take account of the 
caution of the consumer and rarely adopted an attitude of 
change for its own sake as seems to occur today rather too 
often. Although there were many complaints about products, 
there were always consumers who were quite happy with a 
product whatever its drawbacks, and justified a conserva-
tive product policy for the majority of producers, which 
tended to restrict imitation to the more standard designs 
based on familiar technology and the simpler innovations. 
19. New products which depart from the standard will 
. 
be most successful commercially when they differ only in 
terms of price or performance, will do less well when they 
differ in basic technology, and will do least well when 
they differ in appearance. In other words, it will be 
easier to trade off other factors in favour of'price or 
performance than in favour of new technology or new 
appearance. 
A departure from the standard through a reduction in 
price could hard ly be expected to reduce its saleabili ty 
provided quali ty was ma intained. Machines more expensive 
than the standard tended to do do less well though this was 
not always the case. The Sunbeam, of conventional design 
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but built to the highest standards of craftsmanship, was 
relatively expensive but a major commercial success, never-
theless . Consumers were willing to pay more for the extra 
quality. 
An improvement in performance as compared with the 
standard would rarely have affected sales for obvious 
reasons . There is no data on standard type machines which 
lacked the expected level of performance. 
Where appearance was concerned the effect was quite 
striking. The vast majority of machines of untypical ap-
pearance either failed commercially and were withdrawn 
fairly quickly, or although they remained in production for 
some time did not achieve a sufficiently high degree of 
commercial success to come to general notice. As has been 
noted already, the Scott was the only machine of substan-
tially untypical appearance to achieve a major commercial 
success. Among those which failed or were soon withdrawn 
and ignoring early experimental machines, were the Binks, 
the Phoenix Cob, the Zenith Bicar, the 1908 James, and the 
1910 Roc (fig. 13.1). All of these were of advanced 
, 
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Fig. 13.1. The Roc 
("Motor Cycling", 22 November 1910) 
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technology and not particularly cheap, but apart from the 
Binks were not expensive either. 
It is harder to find cases where new technology was 
rejected initially without at the same time being combined' 
with the effect of radically new appearance. The most 
o b v i ou s cas e is the ear 1 y r e j e c t ion 0 f e 1 e c t ric i g nit ion. 
Apart from this example, the slow adoption of much new 
technology suggests that whatever its potential for commer-
cial exploitation, producers in general remained cautious. 
There is little evidence, however, that when new technolo-
gy was applied to existing standard models they were diffi-
cuit to sell, but the lack of production figures for parti-
cular periods leaves this an open question. 
The aim of this'proposition is to suggest that there 
exists a hierachy of innovations in terms of deviation 
from. the standard, which correlates inversely with the 
chance of commercial success; that is, the higher the 
degree of deviation from the standard through innovation, 
the lower the chance of commercial success. Although evi-
dence is 1 imi ted, what evidence there is leaves no doubt 
that the most visibly radical design will be the most 
difficult to sell. Innovation that takes account of the 
existing standard and does not deviate too much from it is 
the most likely kind to succeed. 
The great s 19n1flcance of appearance .in defining the 
standard product is not hard to explain. In order to learn 
to trust a particular kind of product, consumers have to 
have a way of recognising it, and appearance is the easiest 
and most obvious way. Recognising the standard product by 
its price might seem at least as simple but this is not 
necessarily the case. Everyone recognises that quality is 
likely to be related to price but few are able to judge 
quality. A product might be of higher quality or it might 
.just be more expensive, and it can be very difficult to 
know which. Technology is even more ､ｩｾｦｩ｣ｵｬｴ＠ for the 
average consumer to understand. Even enthusiasts may for a 
time be baffled by new technology. But appearance is 
easily understood. Many people believe that if something 
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looks right it is right, and this would explain why the 
standard product will have a standard appearance and why 
products of untypical appearance are usually rejected. 
Summary 
The most important element of the trend to standardi-
zation in product development is the market. The nature of 
the market determines which product and which kind of 
product will set the standard. The standard itself will be 
largely a result of consumer preference. 
In the early motor cycle industry consumers were 
extremely reluctant to adopt a product which did not con-
form to ideas about the standard. The standard evolved 
through a long learning process on the part of producers as 
well as consumers, bu t since most consumers were already 
familiar with bicycles and tricycles, any motor cycle that 
was based on cycle technology had an obvious advantage in 
gaining consumer acceptance. This would help to explain 
why more advanced technology, particularly when it altered 
the appearance of the machine, was very likely to be rejec-
ted, and why almost all the popular machines of the entire 
period were based on cycle frames or frames which had 
evolved from cycle frames wi th a minimum of modification. 
Basic format or appearance was the most important factor in 
the acceptance or rejection pf an innovative machine. 
Technology aimed at improving functional efficiency 
was the-major factor in the development of innovative 
machines, and probably the most important cause in the 
development of machines of untypical appearance. In view 
of the unpopularity of machines of untypical appearance, 
therefore, appearance was a major limiting factor in the 
development of better motor cycles. Commercial success was 
in most cases dependent on maintaining standard appearance, 
. and therefore commercially successful innovation required 
that the innovation be incorporated within the standard 
. 
format. Technical innovation therefore in the interests of 
functional efficiency was always inhibited to some extent 
by the nature of the current market standard. It may 
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reasonably be argued in fact that technology was self-
limiting. 
There is little or no indication that at this time 
production efficiency was a;conscious factor in design, 
though producers did tend to concentrate on designs which 
were simpler to produce. But these same designs were 
generally the most popular and so this fact does not con-
stitute evidence of concern with production efficiency. 
4. Integration 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the 
relationship between the early history of the British motor 
cycle industry as studied in this research and the concepts 
which have been developed to illuminate it. Some elements 
of integration have already entered into the discussions of 
the last two sections, and also in the discussions of the 
propos i tions through Chapters 7, 8 and 12. There are two 
issues, however, that are worth further discussion: the 
role of the product as influenced by the trend to standard-
ization in the development of the industry; and the dif-
ferent approaches required for successful product develop-
ment in different phases of the industry's development. 
The Standard Product 
The most crucial event in the development of the 
industry in these early years was the development of a 
worthy standard product, a product which was, although far 
from perfect, satisfactory from a consumer point of view. 
Until the development of the Triumph model of 1907, motor 
cycles in general had a reputation for unreliability. 
Furthermore, they tended to wear out remarkably quickly. 
They could also be uncomfortable to ride, dangerous, and in 
certain Circumstances, lacking in a desirable level of 
.performance, such as, for example, the ability to go up 
hills. 
All of these factors were slowly being improved, but 
until the necessary level of reliability was aChieved, the 
motor cycle could never appeal to the wider market on which 
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the future of the industry depended. Even so, reliability 
was not enough. A standard machine did not just have to be 
reliable but also of such a design as would appeal to the 
maj or i ty of consume rs. I t may be tha t one of the un typi-:-
cal, rejected machines of the day would have served just as 
well as the Triumph in terms of performance, but it could 
not readily have become the standard because it would not 
have been acceptable to the majority of consumers. 
The significance of the trend therefore was in marking 
out a type of machine which once sufficiently developed 
could serve the whole industry as a standard. Almost as 
soon as the Triumph began to perform at the requisite 
level, it was recognised for what it was and the widespread 
imitation followed which resulted in the extremely rapid 
growth which secured for the firs t time the future of the, 
industry. 
Product Development and the Three Phases 
New products generally had a better chance of success 
if they were in phase with the industry's development. The 
most successful products during the experimental phase were 
experimental products. Inventor firms like de Dion-Bouton, 
Werner, Perks &; Birch (and later Singer who bough t their 
design), amd Minerva, were almost the only ones to do well 
.financially with products developed up to 1900. 
. 
Against this, the many imitators of these products 
(except for some of those imitating the Minerva later on), 
did rather badly. 'There were two main reasons for the 
failure of these firms. First, they lacked the basic know-
how to produce successfully imitations of even fairly 
simple machines. Second, the market was too small to 
dispose of sufficient quantities of machines to keep thirty 
or forty' imitators in business. In a small market the 
originator of the product could supply much of the demand, 
and many consumers would prefer the original product which 
was of known reputation and performance to the untried 
product of an imitator. The result for many initators was 
an output of no more than one or two machines a week which 
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was hardly worth the effort of becoming familiar with the 
new technology involved. 
The developers of this phase, those trying to improve 
ｾｸｩｳｴｩｮｧ＠ designs, did little better mainly because of the 
small size of the market combined with the high cost of 
development which was compounded at times by ignorance of 
the necessary technology. In such a small market, even a 
rather good new product like the Ariel tricycle could not 
sell in sufficient quantities to recoup development costs • 
. .. - Although. invention continued .on. a smaller scale during 
the development phase, and imitation on a much larger 
scale, the more successful firms were those which took one 
of the promising new designs and worked to improve it. 
Among these were van Hooydonk with the Phoenix, probably 
the only firm to carry out significant improvements with 
the Minerva type, and Rex and Triumph with the new Werner 
type. 
I 
Most of the imitator firms of this period did rather 
badly as indicated by the large number which entered and 
left the industry within a very few years. The inventor 
firms, those with radically new designs, did little better. 
During the standardization phase, there is no doubt at 
all that the easiest way to make money was to imitate the 
industry standard in the form of the Triumph, and some 
firms, like BSA, for example, did achieve, large output by 
imitation alone. As competition increased, however, there 
was more opportunity for producers of improved standard 
type machines, like New Hudson and Rudge. The riSing level 
of performance may also have encouraged the increasing 
demand for more innovative products provided they did not 
stray too far from the standard format. Among these were 
the Douglas, Matchless, Williamson, Clyno, and several 
others and their success does suggest a slight weakening in 
the trend to standardization. 
The Scott was the only entirely untypica1 machine of 
the standardization phase to achieve significant commercial 
success, but it was the exception which proves the rule, 
and from now on commercial success would be likely to 
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depend on producing models which, however innovative, would 
conform to a large extent to the standard format of the 
motor cycle. 
5. Further Research 
The path of this research indicates several areas in 
which further research would be worth considering. These 
include (1) studies of a similar nature to this one but 
applied to other industries; (2) studies which go beyond 
the present frames of reference that is into the more 
mature stages of industry development, but use some of the 
same concepts that have been developed here; and (3) fur-
ther work on the concepts themselves, the trend to stan-
dardization, its three main components, and the three 
phases of industry development, but perhaps with the empha-
sis on comparative studies across several industries rather 
than on single case studies., 
1. Studies of a similar nature to this one but 
applied toother industries. 
Several questions of interest arise here. One of the 
most obvious is how far is the trend to standardization 
characteristic of other industries? It appears to apply 
fairly well to the mechanical engineering industries produ-
cing consumer goods like bicycles and cars, but would it 
apply to the same extent ｴｾ＠ a large range of different 
industries? 
The conclusions of Chapters 2 and 3 to the effect that 
the trend is driven by the desire on the part of producers 
to improve their products, to produce them more efficiently 
and to sell them more effectively, plus the preference of 
consumers for the familiar product of known reliability, 
suggest it should. 
2. Studies relating to the more mature stages of 
industry development. 
The most interesting question here is the degree to 
whch the trend to standardization varies throughout the 
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life of an industry. Once an effective long-term standard 
has been established is it likely to survive indefinitely 
or will it eventually be replaced by something radically 
new, and if so, what are the necessary conditions for such 
a change? 
3. Further work on the concepts themselves. 
It would be particularly interesting to examine the 
relationship between FES, therole of design for functional 
efficiency, and PES, the role of production methods, in 
developing industries. This was not possible in the 
research because production methods in the motor cycle 
industry remained at.a relatively primitive level during 
the period covered, and there was little indication that 
products were ever designed at that time with particular 
reference to production methods. One of the questions 
which arises ,here is what are the factors which encourage 
the earlier development of interaction between FES and PES? 
Further work on the role of the different phases of 
industry developmen t should also be worth doing. Greater 
awareness of the importance of phases could provided useful 
information in a developing industry as to the degree of 
risk for firms entering the industry and what kind of 
product should be developed at a given time. 
For example, the computer industry in recent .years 
seems to have. been suffering from similar problems to those 
of ' the early motor cycle industry. There have too many 
different products, competing technologies, and too many 
firms in the industry. The result has been overproduction 
with many firms getting into difficulties and some dropping 
out. Further work on the phase question might eventually 
help to reduce these difficulties or it might simply demon-
strate that all industries have to go through such a period 
.of chaos before the emergence of a standard product and a 
consolida ted industry. 
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Product Development and History 
This research has been very much a study of product 
development, particularly in attempting to apply modern 
concepts to an historical situation. In its emphasis on 
the interaction between technology and consumer satis-
faction it represents what might be called a product deve-
lopment approach. But product development is not a con-
stant and as a new industry develops from one stage to 
another the approach to product development itself is 
likely to change. There remains therefore one major ques-
tion that deserves further examination: Did the industry's 
orientation to product development change significantly 
during the period studied? This is the subject of the 
final chapter. 
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CHAPTER 14 
CONCLUSIONS (2): PRODUCT DEVBLOPMENT 
In its general design and layout, the thesis has been 
presen ted as a study in product developmen t. . I t has 
followed the history of the motor cycle from its earliest 
days as an experimental vehicle through its troubled 
beginnings as a commercial product, to the period when for 
the first time it became commercially viable. Critical in 
the development of commercial viability was the emergence 
of a relatively standardized product, but ｷｨｾｴ＠ else did 
commercial viability mean and what were its consequences 
for the approach to product development? 
It may be argued that as soon as the industry had 
succeeded in developing a product that was reasonably 
satisfactory from a consumer point of view, it should have 
shifted its primary attention from product technology, the 
development of better products with higher performance, to 
production technology, the development of more efficient 
means of production. More efficient production technology 
would be expected to simplify and speed up production, 
reduce costs, and ultimately reduce prices. In theory at 
least, lower prices should result in increased sales so 
that the expanding output would be rapidly absorbed. As a 
further contribution to this new wave of expansion in the 
industry, it might be expected also that standardization 
would cease to be simply an almost accidental consequence 
of the drive to functional efficiency of the product and 
become an active policy on the part of the producer in the 
interests of greater production efficiency. 
If such a policy had been adopted by manufacturers not 
only ,WOUld the industry have been shifting its priority 
from product to production technology but we would expect 
to find greater attention being given also to marketing so 
as to dispose of the increased output. Marketing policies 
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themselves would be expected to change so as to emphasize 
the advantages of lower price and simplified, standardized 
products. 
The adoption of such policies would have represented a 
complete reorientation of product development in the indus-
try and a decisive transformation in the industry's charac-
ter. It would have marked the beginnings of genuine 
maturity. 
This did not happen before the first world war. Why 
it did not happen is the subject of this chapter which 
considers the issue in terms of three main topics: produc-
tion technology, prices and marketing. As we shall see, 
conditions in the industry did not lend themselves to the 
adoption of new production technology as soon ｡ｾ＠ it became 
possible in theory; prices went up when, to judge by the 
above arguments, they should have been going down; and 
marketing remained much as it had always been in the indus-
try although it was given more attention. Also, we shall 
find that the trend to standardization began to weaken at 
just the time when it should have been strengthening, 
because instead of adopting more active standardization 
policies producers turned again to product innovation. 
Introduction 
One of the main problems of dealing with the various 
issues which are relevant here, is lack of data. Product 
development orientation is hard to judge without data about 
decision-making processes concerning product selection and 
design within the firm, and this is almost entirely lac-
king. As was pointed out in Chapter 1, however, it is 
sometimes possible to infer something about the nature of 
the firm from the nature of its product. The discussion 
which follows is based on such inference and may go some 
way to remedying the lack of data about firms. 
ｾｮ＠ the earliest days of the industry product develop-
ment was quite clearly oriented towards functional effi-
ciency, that is the technical development of the product. 
What exactly would it have meant if this orientation had 
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changed towards either production or marketing? 
A production efficiency orientation means giving 
priority to production possibly at the expense of other 
considerations. Thus the main issue in design may become 
not product performance nor appeal to the consumer, but how 
to modify the product so as to facilitate production and 
reduce costs and ultimately price. There are periods in 
the history of an industry when such a strategy will pay 
provided certain conditions are met. The most essential of 
these are t ha t a produc t t ha t wa s i ni tially of poor qua Ii ty 
has been proved sufficiently effective to the consumer for 
it to develop a widespread appeal, and that consequently 
the market is expanding or likely to expand. 
The functional efficiency orientation is ｴｾ･＠ simplest 
from an organizational point of view in that it gives 
priori ty to product engineering. In comparison, the 
production orientation is rather more complex as it 
involves the whole of the production organization as well 
as the design department, the latter now being subordinated 
to the former. The marketing department is also likely to 
be subordinate and relatively undeve]:oped within such an 
arrangement as a result of the assumption, usually implicit 
in the production orientation, that lower price is the 
major factor in increasing sales. Thus its range of opera-
tion may be limited to sales promotion alone rather than 
marketing in its wider sense. It is the idea of marketing 
in its wider sense that applies when a firm adopts a 
marketing orientation. 
Marketing used to be equated with selling, that is, 
sales promotion, advertiSing, and setting up distribution 
networks through the appointment of agencies, and many 
people and, unfortunately, many firms also, still talk 
about marketing when they really mean selling. Today, 
marketing means much more than this. In its most advanced 
form ,the emphasis is placed on the consumer and what he 
wants to buy rather than on the product that the firm wants 
to make and how to sell it, which tends to be a result of 
both functional efficiency and production orientations. 
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Marketing begins therefore not with taking a finished 
product and trying to sell it, but much further back than 
that before the product has even been designed, that is 
with a screening process intended to evaluate new product 
ideas as to their viabili ty in the marketplace. It con-
tinues through product development which takes into account 
all the issues of design and production, quality and price, 
and the necessary trade-offs between them, so as to arrive 
eventually at a product which will have the widest possible 
appeal to the prospective market. Only at the end of this 
process does it become concerned with distribution and 
selling. Thus effective product development with its insi-
stence on matching the product from a technological point 
of view with the market in the form of consume: needs, is 
at the core of modern marketing thinking. 
Marketing in this form is a fairly modern development 
and we would not expect to find that it was practised in 
the British motor cycle industry before 1916. In its 
weaker, more traditional form as sales promotion, marketing 
certainly did apply and it will be discussed as such, 
in a later section. The main question that needs to be 
considered therefore is not marketing, but whether the 
industry did in fact take a decisive step towards produc-
tion orientation before 1916. As already indicated above, 
there are three major issues to be discussed here: produc-
tion technology, prices, and marketing in the form of sales 
promotion. 
Production Technology 
Up to 1900 the Br it ish motor cyc Ie industry was made 
up largely of imitators of the de Dion. The majority of 
British firms which produced de Dion copies sold so few 
machines that considerations of production efficiency could 
hard ly have en tered in to the reckoning. In fac t, the 
problems of the new technology were probably so great for 
newcomers to the industry that most of them would have been 
fully engaged in getting their products to work at all: 
that is with the functional efficiency aspect, rather than 
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production efficiency. 
The situation changed little during the development 
phase, 1901-7, since the emphasis was necessarily placed on 
improving the product for reasons which have already been 
discussed extensively in the main body of the research. 
There was, nevertheless, at this time increasing scope for 
the adoption of more efficient production methods from 
improved factory organization to increased standardization 
of components as a result of the installation of more 
modern machinery. 
The Rex letter reproduced in Chapter 8 (p. 162) sug-
gests that motor cycle firms were beginning to think along 
these lines, but Rex was then the largest producer of motor 
cycles with an annual output of perhaps a thousapd or more. 
In comparison, the majority of firms in the motor cycle 
industry had outputs of no more than a hundred or so 
machines a year, that is no more than two a week, and for 
them it may not have been economically practicable to 
invest in expensive new machinery_ The exceptions were 
firms already established in the cycle industry where such 
machinery could be used both for cycle and motor cycle 
manufacture, and the larger of these firms may well have 
invested in more advanced machinery already.1 
Thus for most firms the gains to be achieved by in-
creased attention to production efficiency were still prob-
lematic. Although progress was being made, the emphasis up 
to 1907 remained on functional efficiency with probably no 
more than a few firms making the first tentative steps 
towards a more production oriented approach. 
The most important change in the industry occurred 
after 1907 as Triumph machines came increasingly to the 
fore and promised better things for the future. Output for 
the industry as a whole does not seem to have increased 
s ignifican t ly, howeve r, unt il 1909-10 when seve ral major 
firms, entered or re-entered the industry. As some of these 
newcomers offered machines which were almost identical to 
the Triumph and which needed little improvement in order to 
ensure reasonable sales, it was possible for the first time 
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at least in theory for a firm to become thoroughly produc-
tion oriented. Outputs of upwards of a thousand machines a 
year and a rapidly expanding industry, meant that something 
approaching volume production might be possible in the not 
too distant future. This being so, there were many ideas 
afoot that might have facili tated more efficient produc-
tion, lower prices and a rapid expansion of output if the 
market could be found to absorb it. There is litt·le evi-
dence, however, that anything like this happened as a 
result of increased attention to production efficiency. 
If there had been a significant change in orientation 
away from functional efficiency and the technology of 
product design towards production efficiency, we would 
expect it to be demonstrated in various ways. First there 
. 
should be a conspicuous increase in the adoption of new 
production technologies, which should result not simply in 
increasing output but also in lower prices particularly for 
the firms with larger outputs, and relatively higher prices 
for smaller firms producing similar products. Alternative-
ly, if prices do not fall we would expect a substantial 
increase in profit per machine sold., Finally, we would 
expect rather less attention to be given to product innova-
tion and the development of technologically new models than 
previously. Production technology is discussed in more 
detail in the appendix to this chapter and the following 
paragraphs aim only to examine some of the more important 
points. 
There are three main approaches to improving produc-
tion efficiency that could have been relevant at the time: 
the installation of automatic machinery capable of produ-
cing accurately machined (that is, interchangeable) parts 
at reasonable speed; the design of products and product 
components so as to make them as simple to produce and 
assemble as possible without sacrificing the functional 
efficiency of the finished artie Ie; and improved factory 
. 
layouts leading ultimately to the installation of line 
assembly. 
The first of these was anticipated in theory in the 
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eighteenth century and achieved in practice at the 
beginning of the nineteenth. Such machinery was not 
installed in ｭｾ｣ｨ＠ of British industry until very much 
later, but it did become generally available in the second 
half of the century and was installed by firms in the motor 
cycle industry provided their output justified such an 
investment and they could obtain the necessary capital. 
Thus it is reasonable to believe that major firms were 
equipped with labour-saving machinery before the expansion 
of production dating from about 1909, and it was very 
likely the possession of such machinery that enabled some 
firms to survive the depression of 1905-8 by reducing 
costs, while others, probably those less well equipped, 
dropped out. This would account for the ｡ｰｰ｡ｲｾｮｴ＠ fall in 
prices during the same period which is discussed in the 
following section. 
The second question has already been discussed to a 
limited degree in the last chapter and it must be repeated 
that there is no evidence that motor cycle components were 
ever deSigned at that time specifically so as to simplify 
produc tion. In view of the evidence df the Boston Report 
(1975) which criticized the industry for failing to adopt 
this approach in much more recent times, it is very un-
likely that any such step could have been taken so early. 
Neither were complete motor ｣ｹ｣ｬｾｳ＠ designed in this way 
though the idea had been established in principle and put 
into practice by Henry Ford. 
The first indications of improved factory layouts in 
the cycle industry date from about 1896, but this aspect of 
production was not put on a fully scientific basis until 
after 1910 with the development of industrial engineering 
and time study.2 One of the first significant developments 
towards the adoption of such ideas in the motor cycle 
industry was the new AJS factory built about 1915. In the 
AJS ｦｾ｣ｴｯｲｹ＠ materials progressed through the building from 
one end to the other so as to reduce the time spent on 
materials handling. It was a substantial improvement on 
earlier "progress1 ve" layouts in which materials although 
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travelling in the same general direction might zigzag from 
one side of the factory to the other, and thus it was an 
important step towards line assembly. 
Line assembly was possible in theory for motor cycle 
production before the war, given the example of Henry Ford, 
but it would not be realized in the industry until many 
years later. Meanwhile, assembly was carried out by moun-
ting the motor cycle frame on some kind of' stand in an 
assembly room, and all parts were brought to that room from 
the various workshops in which they were originally manu-
factured. BSA, in 1928 possibly the largest motor cycle 
manufacturer, was still using the same method of assembly 
because of the difficulty of introducing line assembly in 
their factories.3 
We are-left with the conclusion then that apart from 
the adoption of new machinery which had begun in the l890s, 
it is unlikely that most of the developments in production 
technology that were available to the motor cycle industry 
at the time were actually applied soon enough to have any 
Significant effect on output and prices up to 1916. But 
even if more attention had been given to new production 
technology, how effective would it have been? 
In many ways the industry was still oriented to 
increasingly out-of-date craft technology, and to attitudes 
rooted in the past and which emphasized quality rather than 
cheapness and considered the new high-speed machinery 
synonymous with shoddy goods. It was generally considered 
more desirabl e to maintain quali ty than increase outpu t. 
As will be seen in the Appendix to this chapter, when BSA 
commenced production of complete bicycles in 1909, they 
raised the price as compared with the identical machine 
produced by local dealers using BSA parts, so as to empha-
size the quality of their own product. 
For similar reasons, Triumph failed to expand output 
fast ｾｮｯｵｧｨ＠ to meet the demand for their machines: "they 
recognise that they cannot adequately deal with such a 
demand by running up new works, the element of skill and 
acquired art can only be extended slowly, and so we see the 
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company turning away orders rather than, for an immediate 
profi t, jeopardizing their name for good quali t y".4 
This would suggest that the problem was not simply a 
preoccupation with quality but also a genuine lack of 
skilled labour which, given the extremely rapid expansion 
of the industry after 1908, would not have been surprising. 
The alternative solution to restricting output might have 
been to install more automatic machinery so as to simplify 
production and reduce the necessary element of skill. 
Whether changes of this nature could have been achieved 
without turning the standard Triumph motor cycle into quite 
a different product is problematic, but it is doubtful if 
Triumph could have succeeded with such a policy given not 
just commercial attitudes and working practices in the 
.. 
motor cycle industry itself, but also the.traditional forms 
of work and work organization which prevailed in British 
industry as a whole. The organizational problems of 
British working practices outlived the motor cycle 
industry. 
Clearly the industry was too much rooted in tradition 
to enable it to take the decisive step towards a more 
production oriented approach to product development. 
However, more advanced machinery was gradually being adop-
ted, but there is little evidence of a more scientific 
approach to standardization either of components or of the 
finished product. Progress was being made in terms of 
improved factory layouts, but the problem here was as 
always that the ideal layout can rarely be achieved without 
building a new factory. The idea of building a new factory 
was apparently rejected by Triumph even when demand for 
thei r machine s was more than they coul d meet, which sug-
gests that very few firms could have felt justified in 
doing so. 
Consequently the expansion of output was probably 
slower than might have been the case, and it is hard to see 
, 
anything in the nature of economies of scale being achieved 
in such an environment. The trend of price movements 
supports this conclusion. 
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Prices 
Despite the industry's apparent failure to take the 
maximum advantage from new developments in production tech-
nology, production methods did improve and outputs did 
rise. Was there sufficient improvement overall to result 
in lower prices? 
In fact, prices did not fall to any noticeable extent 
at the time when we would expect them to have fallen, that 
is after 1908. Before then they appear to have moved in a 
rather eccentric way. In earlier days until about 1904 or 
1905, prices tended to be relatively high.5 Then they 
began to fall until about 1908 when they began to rise 
again until they levelled out between 1910 and 1912 after 
which they stayed more or less constant until the war • 
.. 
Prices of early machines were often high because the 
technology was still new and firms entering the industry 
still had to undergo a kind of learning process before they 
could achieve anything like an efficient production organi-
zation. Thus the very simple Minerva type machines of 
1901-4 could cost £50 or more.6 Prices did tend to fall 
from then on, however, and at the end of 1908 it was noted 
that prices of typical machines had fallen £5-£10 in three 
years.7 Now from 1905 to 1907 the industry was contracting 
perhaps to half of its former size so it is hard to see how 
the fall in prices could have had anything to do with 
economies of scale. What probably happened was that during' 
the depression in the industry firms had to cut prices in 
order to survive so that the less efficient producers were 
driven out. 
This downward trend of prices was short-lived, how-
ever, and with the upturn and increased production, prices 
began to rise. In 1909 Ariel advertised an increase in 
price of their 3!hp model "owing to extraordinary demand" 
and the "great cost of manufacturing such a high class 
machine".8 Let us consider this point against data for a 
. 
number of firms. 
In examining price data for the industry as a whole 
as presented in "The Motor eye Ie Buyers' Guides", the major 
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difficulty is to find a reasonable number of machines with 
identical specifications. For this reason the numbers of 
machines in the following data are relatively small com-
pared with the total number of different models on offer, 
and represent in effect the particular product class rather 
than the whole industry. Nevertheless, the price situa-
tion in the remainder of the industry was not significantly 
different. 
The prices examined are for machines which were 
similar in specification to the Triumph. This does not 
mean that the machines in question were identical since 
minor differences of technology and finish would not have 
been recorded in the buyers' guides but could have accoun-
ted for differences in price. 
.. 
In the 1906 guide it was possible to find.only six 
machines with approximately similar specifications to the 
Triumph. The average price of these was £37, against the 
price of a Triumph of £43 (see Table 14.1). 
Triumph 
Average price of 
similar machines 
1906 
43 
37(6) 
1908 
48 
39(14) 
1910 1913 
49 60 
46(23) 57(12) 
Table. 14.1. Triumph Prices Compared with those of other 
British-made 3ihp single cylinder machines (3hp for 1906), 
1906-1913.9 
(Numbers of machines in brackets. All prices rounded up. 
Specifications of Triumph and similar machines: 
1906 - 3hp, single cylinder with mechanically operated 
inlet valve, belt drive and single speed; 
1908 and 1910 - as for 1906 except for 31hp engine; 
1913 - as for 1908 except for the addition of three-speed 
, 
hub gear.) 
In 1908 the average price of 14 similar machines was 
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£39 against the price of a Triumph of £48. By 1910 the 
average price of 23 similar machines had increased to £46 
against the Triumph price of £49. In 1913 with a signifi-
cant change in technology arising from the adoption of 
variable speed gears, the average price of 12 similar 
machines was £57 against £60 for the Triumph. 
Thus from abou t 1908 there was a tendency for prices 
of non-Triumph products to converge towards the ｰｲｩｾ･＠ of a 
Triumph which itself remained relatively constant. Where 
then does the question of economies of scale come into all 
this? There is little evidence that it had any signifi-
cance whatsoever. If firms in the industry had been ex-
periencing economies of scale, the products of the smaller 
firms would have been rather more expensive than those of 
<, 
the---Iarger firms. But as we have seen, Triumph, the 
largest firm, sold their products at above average not 
lower prices, and several much smaller firms were producing 
similar machines that were rather cheaper. 
Economies of scale might have been achieved as produc-
tion increased as a resul t of the larger discounts earned 
on increased orders for raw materials ｾｮ､＠ proprietory com-
ponents, but was the scale of production yet large enough 
to generate sufficient savings to allow significant price-
cutting? Again the answer is probably not. 
If we look at Triumph's profits for 1913, £66,383, 10 
and compare them wi th their motor cyc Ie output, probably 
between six and seven th9usand, then they could not have 
been making more than about £10 profit per machine sold. 
Very likely this figure should be lower, however, because 
of profits from their other operations. I1 Thus a cut of 
£5, that is about 10%, on the price of each machine, would 
have reduced their profits by half. In order to justify 
such a cut they would have had at least to double ｴｨ･ｩｾ＠
total sales. This would have been very unlikely since, as 
has been pointed out elsewhere, a price difference of up to 
I 12 10% between models has little effect on sales, and at £5 
less than its original price the Triumph would have not 
been significantly cheaper than comparable models. 
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If, however, they had been able to achieve a substan-
tial increase in output, they might have significantly 
improved their production efficiency, they might have 
achieved economies of scale, and thus have been able to 
maintain or increase profit per machine even at a lower 
price. Bu t, as we have already seen, their working prac-
tices would have made this improbable and suggest that 
Triumph was neither able nor willing to increase output at 
an accelerating rate. 
Finally, there is one other issue which may have been 
of significance. The price of a Triumph remained almost 
constant between 1908 and 1912. If at the same time 
production costs had risen then the price must have fallen 
in real terms. There is no cost data available for the 
<. 
motor cycle industry at this time, but we can consider the 
question from the point of view of the cost of living in 
general and wage levels. The cost of living in the United 
Kingdom rose about 7% from 1908 to 1912, but money wages in 
industry increased by only 2%.13 Such .figures do not 
suggest the probability of any large increase of costs in 
the motor cycle industry which couldlwell have risen no 
more than 4-5% and perhaps less. An increase of this order 
would have put only about £2 on the price of an average 
machine, not enough to have been of much significance or to 
indicate that Triumph had made any great step forward in 
terms of economies of scale by keeping prices almost 
constant. 
Thus while we do not have detailed firsthand accounts 
of productive operations within firms of the time, what 
data there are suggest either that there was little in the 
nature of economies of scale in the motor cycle industry 
before the first world war, or that if such economies were 
achieved they were not likely to have ｾ･･ｮ＠ great enough to 
have had much impact on prices to the consumer. In fact 
the evidence is quite conclusive that prices did not fall 
, 
during this period. 
It rema ins to be considered what options if any 
manufacturers had to cut prices at this time. Almost 
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certainly, given the existing price-cost relationship in 
the industry it is doubtful if they would have gained 
anything simply by cutting their prices. There was a 
substantial prejudice in the industry against price-cutting 
but there is no reason to believe that this was irrational 
from a commercial point of view. Previous experience had 
indicated that cheaper products were almost invariably of 
poorer quality and that firms that did offer good products 
at low prices often got themselves trouble. Thus price-
cutting alone was not enough. 
The way to cut prices successfully was first to up-
grade the technology so as to simplify production and 
reduce costs. It is doubtful if such a policy would have 
been possible except for the largest producers, but as we 
have seen even for these it may not have been practicable 
", 
or justified to adopt the most advanced technology. The 
scale of operations was probably not large enough to jus-
tify building new factories simply to improve production 
efficiency, while existing factories did not usually lend 
themselves to the ideal layout. Thus although attention 
was given constantly to improving ｰｲｯ､ｾ｣ｴｩｯｮ＠ efficiency the 
results were likely to have been far from optimal and, as 
we have seen, prices tended to rise rather than fall. 
How might we account for this tendency for prices to 
rise? Was there anything in the nature of a consistent 
pricing policy in the industry at this time? There is 
little relevant data on this question, but what data there 
are suggest at least the poss ibili ty of a variety of 
pricing policies across the industry as a whole. 
Triumph, in view of the demand for their machines, was 
perhaps ina posi tion to charge a premi um price for their 
machines over and above what would have been indicated by 
full cost plus normal profit. However, the fact that the 
prices of their machines remained relatively constant at a 
time when their sales were increasing, suggests that they 
did not do so. 
When BSA first entered the industry they priced their 
machines abou t £2 higher than the Triumph. This may have 
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meant a continuation of the pricing policy adopted in 
connection with their bicycles discussed above, or it may 
mean that their costs were higher because they were new to 
the industry. Certainly, however, such a firm could trade 
on its reputation. 
Against this the industry's history does give some 
examples of price cutting and it seems very likely there-
fore that some firms continued to accept lower than normal 
profits in order to keep prices down so as to maintain 
their competitive position. 
There is little evidence, however, of firms doing 
particularly well as a resul t of offering cheap machines. 
We may note, in this context, that the Douglas wa s a good 
deal cheaper than the Triumph when first ｩｮｴｲｾＮ､ｵ｣･､Ｌ＠ and 
Douglas was the only firm which began to rival ｔｲｾｵｭｰｨ＠ in 
terms of output. But their prices rose even though their 
output was increasing rapidly. 
It is possible that prices rose because the demand for 
motor cycles exceeded the productive capacity of the indus-
try. The Ariel comment about "extraordinary demand" indi-
cated above suggests this possibility! and very likely it 
provides part of the answer. But it is unlikely to be the 
major part given that Triumph prices remained virtually 
constant through the period in question. Ariel's other 
remark abou t the "grea t cost of manufacturing such a high 
class machine" is likely to be rather'more significant in 
tha tit suggest s tha t the tendency for prices to increase 
represented the general improvement in overall quality and 
technology. 
This general improvement may well have helped to bring 
the average machine up to something approaching the stan-
dard of the Triumph: "The season that has nearly passed 
has seen a remarkable growth of the motor cycle business ••• 
At the same time we have not been treated to any revolu-
tiona,ry innovations. It may be said that nothing stands 
out as one great improvement. Rather there has been a 
levelling up of design and equipmen t to something nearly 
approaching a standard of design from which there are few 
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radical departures.,,14 And it would appear that not only 
was there emerging a product of standard technology, but 
also of standard price which would explain why the prices 
\ 
of non-Triumph machines tended to converge towards that of 
the Triumph •• 
From about 1912 onwards in addi tion to the levelling 
up of technology there was also a strengthening drive 
towards product innovation per see As discussed in Chapter 
10, the fact that many firms produced what appeared to be a 
close copy of the Triumph does not mean that this strategy 
was universal. Several firms produced entirely innovative 
models at this time including ASL, Douglas, James, Scott 
and Wilkinson. Others like Rudge, entering with a machine 
which was rather similar to the Triumph in general format, 
,Co", 
devoted a great deal of time and money ､･ｶ･ｬｯｾｩｮｧ＠ an 
entirely new engine for the machine and one which represen-
ted one of the most expensive technical developments in the 
industry so far. 
These developments in general indicate that the stan-
dardizers were far from having everything their own way. 
The new technologies were having an increasing influence on 
more standard products, so that after perhaps no more than 
two or three years during which firms copld do well just by 
imitating the basic Triumph, they again had to concern 
themselves with new product technology in order to stay in 
business. Clearly the period in which product technology 
was the most important issue for the industry was far from 
over. 
This renewed interest in product innovation took place 
at just the time when we would have expected to find evi-
dence of greater efforts towards standardization, especial-
ly if the trend to standardization had evolved into a 
deliberate po licy. Thus it would seem to apply the final 
coup de gratce to any suggestion that the industry was at 
last shifting its priorities towards production efficiency, 
. 
and it is apparent therefore that any significant move 
towards a more production oriented approach was still in 
the future. Data about marketing stra tegies and the 
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approach to sales promotion offer little evidence to con-
tradict this view. 
Marketing 
As we have already seen there is little evidence to 
suggest the adoption by firms in the industry of a more 
active policy towards standardization, cost reduction and 
production efficiency between 1908 and 1916. And even if 
such a policy were adopted it almost certainly failed since 
although output increased during this period, prices also 
increased when we would have expected them to fall. A 
necessary adjunct to such a policy would have been a more 
active approach to ｭ｡ｲｫ･ｴｾｮｧ＠ and particularly sales 
promotion. 
Sales promotion in various forms was no new .. idea to 
the motor cycle industry. It was established in the cycle 
industry many years before the first motor cycle was 
produced, taking the form of advertising, publicity stunts, 
displays at the annual cycle shows, and the development of 
agency networks. 
The scanty attention given to salles promotion in the 
earliest years of the motor cycle industry demonstrates the 
general lack of confidence in the product. Most of the 
early producers never advertised in the motorcycling press 
and neither did they send their products to the annual 
cycle shows. What output they were able to dispose of was 
probably sold through local dealers. 
From about 1901, however, with the development of such 
machines as the Minerva and the Werner, the posi tion 
changed and large numbers of firms began to send their 
machines to the annual shows. But there were now so many 
firms in the industry, over a hundred, attempting to com-
pete for an extremely limited market, that neither a show 
appearance nor "straight" a.dvertising was enough. Ra ther 
more ｾ｡ｳ＠ needed in order to catch the eye of the consumer 
with the result that the period became virtually the age of 
the stunt. 
The idea. of sales promotion stunts was at least as old 
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as the cycle industry in which long distance record break-
ing was a popular activity. For the motor cycle industry 
the pattern for much future sales promotion was established 
by Egerton's run from Land's End to John-o'-Groat's on a 
Werner in 1901, the first of many "End-to-End" runs. van 
Hooydonk failed in his attempt to emulate this performance 
on his Phoenix, but did rather better on the race track. 
BHD set a new trend by his two hundred mi les in a day on an 
Excelsior in 1903, and substantially surpassed this perfor-
mance in covering two hundred miles a day for six consecu-
tive days on a Triumph in 1905. Not all of these perfor-
mances were necessarily promoted by the manufacturers for 
sales promotion purposes as was the case with the last 
mentioned, but they served as very good ｡､ｶ･ｲｴｩｳｾｮｧＬ＠ never-
theless. Performances in competitions served at least as 
well and soon firms like Triumph were employing people to 
ride for them. 
The most spectacular sales promotion efforts, however, 
were those by such firms as Noble who offered advanced 
specification machines at very low prices, and Rex with 
their very high trade-in offers.1S These were effective 
for a time, but Rex eventually got into trouble as a result 
and Noble did not survive long enough to enjoy the pros-
perity that was to come. Sales promotion alone was not 
enough to consolidate the market. A better machine was 
still required and only when that had been achieved would 
sales begin to grow significantly. No amount of sales 
promotion can sell a poor product. 
The overproduction of rather poor products was almost 
certainly the cause of the depression in the industry from 
1905 to 1907. But out of that depression Triumph emerged 
as the major firm in the industry and their product rapidly 
became the industry standard which was soon widely imi-
tated. The Triumph was a popular choice and its success 
ｰｲｯ｢｡ｾｬｹ＠ owed at least as much to its quality, performance 
and reliability as to any sales promotion effort on the 
part of the firm: "So we arri ve a t the point tha t the 
successful motorcycle is really designed by the public 
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themselves, the manufacturer's duty being to solve the 
'problems of compromise,' which result in the endeavours to 
combine comfort, appearance, weight and price".16 
The development of a popular standard with the result 
that machines across the industry as a whole tended to look 
increasingly alike (see fig. 14.1) might have generated a 
new problem for marketers, but the situation was still far 
from that which developed in the motor industry'in the 
1920s when cars were so much alike that they had to be 
differentiated by styling and other purely cosmetic modifi-
cations. 
British motor cycles were always beautifully painted 
and finished off by hand almost to the standard of a work 
of art, but this was part of the craft ｴｲ｡､ｩｴｾｯｮ＠ rather 
than a marketing exercise. In any case there was no need 
for "empty" product differentiation when there was so much 
new technology still to be applied that any producer who 
wanted to increase the attractiveness of his machines only 
had to add a new technical feature ahead of his competitors 
such as, for example, a kick-starter or an improved vari-
able gear, in order to get the consumer's attention. 
Advertising matter tends to confirm this view since it 
concentrated overwhelmingly on technical features and per-
formance. An analysis of 11 display advertisements in "The 
Motor Cycle" for 8 April 1903, found that 7 emphasized 
technical details and 3, convenience of operation or per-
formance. A similar analysis of 15 display advertisements 
in the same journal for 2 May 1904 found that 5 emphasized 
technical details, and 7 emphasized performance either in 
terms of speed, hill climbing, etc., or competition 
success. 
In later years the emphasis was overwhelmingly on 
performance. In "The Motor Cycle" for 6 May 1908, of 25 
advertisements, 11 placed the emphasis on performance in 
ｧ･ｮ･ｲｾｬＬ＠ 6 on competition success, and 8 on technical 
features. In the issue of the same journal for 2 May 1912, 
of 31 advertisements no fewer than 18 put the emphasis on 
competition success or record breaking, 9 on performance in 
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general and the remaining 4 on technical or other issues. 
Thus as the motor cycle was improved and became more 
reliable, the emphasis in advertisements gradually shifted 
away from technical issues first to performance in general 
and finally to competition success. Except for rather 
untypical machines, no attention was ever given to the 
superiori ty of a particular design even when the Minerva 
and Werner types were still apparently in competiton with 
each other in 1903. Price was rarely emphasized, was 
sometimes buried in the small print, and sometimes left out 
altogether. Curiously, an advertisement for the Ariel 
stated that "the price is right" but did not give the 
price.17 The trade-in offer campaign run by Rex and dis-
cussed in Chapter 8, was unique to them, and the ostenta-
tious price-cutting advertised by Noble was similarly 
unique. No advertisement examined gave any attention to 
superficial features like colour schemes or styling as 
might be the case today. 
There is no evidence that advertising would sell a 
machine that people did not want to buy. The Binks machine 
was advertised on a lavish scale with full page advertise-
ments (fig. 8.7) yet it did not sell and soon had to be 
withdrawn. Much the same could be said about other un-
typical machines like, for example, the various "bicars" 
and later machines like the James, and the Roc. Adver-
tising might convince the consumer that one machine was 
better than another but only so long as it was conventional 
in format and reasonably up-to-date in technology and 
preferably also a good performer on the race track. 
The new technology machines which did sell well like, for 
example, the Douglas and the Scott, achieved their success 
. in competitions first before large numbers of people would 
buy them. There is no indication that their initial accep-
tance owed anything to advertising. 
ｾ｡ｬ･ｳ＠ promotion stunts continued much as before in the 
form of "epic" rides, but were gradual'ly surpassed in 
significance by racing performance particularly after the 
establishment of the TT in 1907. A win in the TT was the 
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best possible publicity and the most effective stimulus to 
sales. It not only increased orders but also increased 
interest among prospective agents,1S and consequently firms 
began to devote an increasing effort towards racing 
success. 
Firms which lacked such success must have found it 
difficult to establish agencies so as to expand sales 
particularly when they came into competition with such 
large, long-established firms as BSA whose agency network, 
the result of long experience in the cycle industry, must 
have been a major factor in their being able to sell all of 
their first year's output of a thousand machines without 
difficulty. 
Very likely sales were stimulated also by ｴｾ･＠ develop-
ment of larger retail outlets like Wauchopes of Shoe Lane 
off Fleet Street (fig. 14.1). All of these developments 
would have favoured the larger firms at the expense of the 
smaller ones which may well have had difficulty in distri-
buting their products. In Wauchopes' advertisement all of 
the machines illustrated are the products of well known, 
long established firms. 
In sum, as the industry grew and particularly as 
motorcycling developed into an active sport, there was as 
would be expected a substantial increase in advertising and 
sales promotion in general. Bu t there is Ii ttle evidence 
from the nature of advertising and other forms of sales 
promotion that firms were becoming more interested in stan-
dardization as a cost cutting exercise or that they were 
having to adopt a purely cosmetic form of product differen-
tiation in order to sell their machines in competition with 
the similar products of other firms. 
The Step Untaken 
The aim of this final chapter has been to consider 
ｷｨ･ｴｨｾｲ＠ and to what extent the approach to product develop-
ment changed during the period covered by the research. It 
would seem likely that as the industry evolved the major 
concern in product development would shift from the initial 
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emphasis on product technology and the functional efficien-
cy of the product, first to production efficiency and 
finally to marketing. Thus as the industry matured we 
would expect to find that the trend to standardization 
itself, ｾｬｴｨｯｵｧｨ＠ represented as somewhat in the nature of 
an autonomous economic force, would tend eventually to be 
reinforced by the conscious and deliberate adoption of a 
policy of standardization for the purposes of simplifying 
production and reducing costs. The application of such a 
policy would amount to one of the most significant steps 
the industry could take in its drive towards maturity. As 
we have seen this step was not taken during the period up 
to 1916. 
The evidence that this step was not ｴ｡ｾ･ｮ＠ by the 
industry as a whole is almost as conclusive as it, can be. 
The reasons are not quite so easy to identify, but the 
major one is probably that outputs even for the largest 
firms were still too low to justify major new investment in 
ｰｲｯ､ｵｾｴｩｯｮ＠ facilities for the sake of improving production 
efficiency alone. The gains from economic standardization 
come initially from simplification, taat is the reduction 
of model types and production of different models which are 
able to use as many common components as possible. In 
pursuing such a policy, that firm would gain most which 
could concentrate its entire output on a single model. 
Triumph's early strength developed in this way. They 
concentrated their entire effort on developing a single 
model instead of dispersing it among several distinct 
types. By 1912 although sticking to the same type of 
machine, they had three models listed, a standard machine, 
what might be called a de luxe model which included addi-
tional features, and a racing model. Even if they had been 
able to concentrate their entire annual output of about six 
thousand machines on the one standard model it is doubtful 
if ｴｨｾ＠ gains in production efficiency would have been 
sufficient to facilitate a worthwhile cut in price--that is 
the kind that would have generated a big enough increase in 
demand for their machines to justify the exercise--unless 
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they had been sufficiently avant-garde to become one of the 
very first producers in the world to install assembly line 
technology. 
But rather than move in this direction, Triumph, like 
most other motor cycle firms, tended to increase the number 
of different models they produced. They did substantial 
development work on a twin-cylinder machine which never 
went into production and late in 1913 they introduced a 
lightweight model. This tendency to increase the number of 
model types became characteristic of the industry and ac-
celerated in later years. Faced with loss of sales in the 
early 1920s, BSA responded by widening their range so as to 
tap as large a segment of the market as possible. By 1963 
they were producing 42 different models for a total output 
. 
of only about 18,000. That is on average not'much more 
than 400 machines of each type.19 
When at last the industry began to produce some signi-
ficantly cheaper machines, it was not the result of produc-
tion economies but of new product technology. The develop-
ment of the two-stroke engine enabled manufacturers:to put 
on the market lightweight motor cycles pf relatively Simple 
design for not much more than £20, less than half the price 
of the popular standard types based on the Triumph. 
Indeed, in 1913 Veloce, inspired by the idea of a cheap 
'Everyman's' machine, produced its first two-stroke 
model.20 But the firm never became a large-scale producer 
and the cheaper, Simpler machines never looked like sup-
planting the established standards at that time. Economic 
standardization together with its theoretical gains were a 
dead issue and the industry remained committed primarily to 
the product itself rather than the means and methods of 
production. 
, Marketing continued as the follower rather than the 
leader, the aim being to sell what people were believed or 
known to want rather than trying to pursuade them to buy 
, 
what the manufacturers wanted to sell. But the idea that 
marketing can re-educate public taste to the extent of 
selling goods people do not really want, is probably a myth 
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anyway. The message of much of the thesi sis tha t people 
simply would not buy poor products or unanticipated innova-
tions whatever the effort in terms of advertising and sales 
promotion.21 The aim of manufacturers therefore remained 
to improve the quality of the product and to upgrade its 
technology until it could do almost everything that con-
sumers wanted. 
The motor cycles of 1908 or 1910 or even 1912, were 
still somewhat short of this standard even in terms of the 
expectations of the day. An entirely satisfactory motor 
cycle from a consumer point of view, as compared with the 
typical machine of, say, 1912, needed to be improved by the 
replacement of belt drive by a chain, the addition of a 
three-speed countershaft gearbox rather than the,cycle-type 
hub gears then in vogue, simpler starting in the form of a-
kick-starter, and a more reliable engine needing less main-
tenance and capable of going longer distances between 
overhauls. 
Even allowing that motor cycles were now selling in 
fair numbers, it would be surprising to discover mass 
production technology and economies of/scale in connection 
with a product which still needed substantial further deve-
lopment. In order to sell more motor cycles what was 
required was not just a high quality product but an even 
better one, one at least as good as the best machines 
produced immediately before the war, and this would have 
been di fficul t or even impossible to achieve a t a cu t pr ice 
given the level of output at the time. Thus although mass 
production might have been possible in theory before the 
war, it is unlikely that it could have been achieved either 
in technological or commercial terms before 1925 or 1930 at 
the earliest, notwithstanding what was realized in the 
motor industry. 
What was possible in car manufacture was well in 
advance of what might be achieved with motor cycles. Cars 
I 
were always more advanced technologically than motor cycles 
partly perhaps because of their relatively high weight and 
size which facilitated the installation of new technology, 
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but more especially because of their relatively high price. 
The standard Model T Ford, despite being a simplified 
model, was relatively sophisticated when compared with the 
typical motor cycle of the day. Thus the Tri umph was not 
to be compared with the Model T and the firm's policy to 
maintain quality rather than to raise output at the risk of 
lower quality, may well have been justified. The day of 
the mass-produced motor cycle was yet to come. 
In sum, a significant move by the industry before the 
first world war towards economic standardization resulting 
in improved production efficiency and lower prices, al-
though possible in theory was almost certainly impracti-
cable given the constraints under which it had to operate. 
If fault existed it was not so much in the industry itself 
., 
as in the prevailing industrial culture which precluded any 
speeding up of workpace, any fundamental change in tradi-
tional management and working practices. It is doubtful if 
even a Henry Ford could have changed this, but the British 
motor cycle industry never had such a man at any time in 
its entire history. 
The lessons of more recent historg confirm this view 
and we can put the situation more firmly in perspective by 
comparing it with the conclusions of the Boston report 
which described the state of affairs in the industry some 
fifty or Sixty years later. 
As far as design was concerned, this report, published 
in 1975, found that "What is lacking is the tight control 
of the design function and its close coupling to the 
requirements of marketing and production in order to 
produce integrated, cost effective models within reasonably 
short lead times". The production process was also found 
to be very much out-of-date: "The factories themselves 
contain mostly old, general purpose, fairly labour inten-
sive equipment. At Wolverhampton, for example, as many as 
60% of the machine tools may be more than twenty years 
I 
old ..... " Fi na lly, it was observed that "None of the 
existing British motorcycle designs is suitable for manu-
facturing using modern production techniques".22 
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Al though it would be unfair to jUdge the early motor 
cycle industry by modern standards, it is very likely that 
exactly the same criticisms would have been appropriate if 
they had been applied to the industry before 1914. Britain 
was in the lead but the seeds were already being sewn for 
the loss of that lead. 
Concluding Remarks 
The research is now complete. It has followed a long 
and sometimes rather tortuous route, but it has succeeded 
in what it set ou t to do. 
The trend to standardization has emerged as a major 
factor in the development of a new industry particularly 
where product development is concerned. The q.uestion of 
product standardization across the industry as a whole and 
the current status of the industry standard, are clearly of 
great significance for the success or failure of innova-
tions. Product development is in fact a result of the 
interaction between the trend to standardiza tion and the 
drive to innovate. 
Innovations, when they are techn.ically effective in 
what they are intended to do, fail for two main reasons: 
they ei ther c lash wi th the existing standard and yet are 
not of sufficient weight to replace it, or although 
apparently in harmony wi th the standard, are out of time. 
Products which are out of time can be either too early or 
too late, but features which can be incorporated within the 
existing standard resulting in significant improvement, 
will eventually be adopted. The highly innovative product 
which clashes to a considerable degree with an existing 
standard has a poor chance of success, and many major new 
product failures of recent times could probably have been 
avoided if the developers had taken notice of this fact. 
Looking at the research as product development his-
torY',it is worth noting that although some of the ideas 
used, and particularly those of Chapter 3, are based large-
lyon knowledge of present day business activity, they have 
proved no less relevant to the historical setting. There 
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seems to have been much the same division between the 
innovative minority and the conservative or cautious majo-
ri ty of consumers before the first world war as there is 
today_ 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 14 
PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY 
Production technology has not been given any great 
attention in the main body of the thesis because, as has 
already been pointed out, it had little or nothing to do 
with the development of the trend to standardization. The 
key issue in identifying the trend as it has been defined, 
has been the degree to which a given product format was 
established across the industry as a whole. Concern then 
has been with the final product, not the part, and as has 
been made c lear throughout the thesis this has never been a 
result of production technology, but rather ?f product 
technology and the response to it of the consumer. - The 
development of the product in a particular direction depen-
ded initially on its functional efficiency and secondly on 
its general form, shape and appearance. It did not depend 
on production technology. 
The standard product which emerged from the interac-
tion between product technology and ｾｨ･＠ consumer was a 
standard only in a rather broad and general sense. It was 
not a standard in terms of the kind of standard set up by 
standardization committees. There was only one such stan-
dard set up in the motor cycl e industry before the first 
world war, and that was for wheels rims. Even in particu-
lar firms there was little tendency to set up one standard 
product which would have simplified production. Rather the 
tendency was to increase the number of different models. 
It may be that this was an opportunity lost, or it may be 
that the industry was not yet ready for the gains which 
might come from an increased degree of economic and tech-
nological standardization, either because outputs were not 
yet high enough or for some other reason. The account 
which follows is an attempt to consider these questions 
, 
from the point of view of production technology in more 
detail than has been possible in the main text. It is, 
however, far from being a full treatment of the subject. 
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Steps in the Development of Production Technology 
As we have seen in Chapters 2 and 13, there have been 
several major steps in the development of production tech-
nology short of the automation and robotics of modern 
factories. These include, and this list is not necessarily 
exhaustive: 
1. craftwork to individual design; 
2. craftwork to standard pattern; 
3. interchangeable parts by automatic or partly 
automatic machines; 
4. design of components and final product so as to 
simplify production; 
5. standardization, particularly of the final 
product; 
6. design of factory layouts so as to achieve maxi-
mum efficiency short of continuous flow assembly; 
7. continuous flow assembly line. 
1. Craftwork to individual design was largely super-
seded for larger-scale production long before the develop-
ment of the motor cycle industry. It may well have sur-
vived, however, for small firms with very low outputs even 
to the days of the motor cycle industry, but it would have 
been of no great significance. 
2. Craftwork to standard pattern, or something akin 
to craftwork, was perhaps characteristic of the smaller 
firms in the industry which could not afford modern automa-
tic machinery, and no doubt accounts for the lack of 
.lnterchangeablllty of parts that was complained about in 
some letters to the motorcyling press and discussed in 
Chapter 8, page 177. This type of technology was hardly 
characteristic of the major firms which led the industry's 
rapid growth after 1907. 
3. The most Significant technology applied to the 
production of motor cycles at this time was the use of 
autom,atic machinery capable of producing parts to a high 
degree of accuracy and fully interchangeable. Such techno-
logy was not new and had been introduced in the American 
armaments industry in the 1840s, and in the British 
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armaments industry in the 1850s and 1860s. Like much of 
British industry, the cycle industry lagged in this respect 
and did not begin to adopt advanced technology until the 
late 1890s. From then on we find reports of cycle and 
motor cycle firms which did use automatic machinery • 
. 
A report of a visit to the new premises of New Hudson 
was phrased in graphic terms: "Commencing on tour in the 
general machine shops, we found it necessary to thread our 
way very carefully through the perfect maze of flying belts 
and pulleys; this shop is a veritable hive of industry, 
and embraces all the usual operations for making the 
various component parts of the frames, hubs, etc. Most of 
the machine tools here are of massive construction, and 
include some of the most recent productions in,automatic 
machinery, and not a few of the firm's own'special 
d i ,,1 es gn ••••• 
Comparable reports can be found for many other firms 
including, Bradbury, which also manufactured machine tools 
for the industry, BSA, Components (manufacturers of the 
Arie 1), James, Norton, Raleigh, Royal Enf iel d, Rudge, 
Tr iumph and others. There was a lim! t, however, to how 
much might be achieved simply by the adoption of new 
machinery. As will be seen later, much depended on how the 
machinery was to be used. 
4. The design of components and complete products so 
as to simplify production and make the best use of produc-
tion technology was one of the most important steps that 
could be taken towards the development of mass production 
techniques and the achievement of reduced costs. I t would 
require that standardization be an active policy rather 
than a relatively passive following of the market standard. 
It is more important, however, to design products that are 
easy to produce from the point of view of machine opera-
tions and assembly, than merely to standardize them. 
ｾｨｩｳ＠ was a step that was perhaps never fully appre-
ciated or realized in the entire history of the British 
motor cycle industry. Even in the 1960s the industry still 
lagged in this respect, and yet there were some in the 
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industry who began to recognise the advantages of such a 
development in much earlier days. 
One writer on the motor cycle observed that: "Within 
the limi ts of its design, and the d ema nd for it in q uan-
tity, it is safe to say that it has now reached a point 
where it is difficult to cut down the manufacturing ｣ｯｳｴＢｾ＠
The call was for a new design with fewer parts in order to 
reduce costs. Elsewhere and a few years later, 'it was 
noted: "I f he [the manufacturer] finds that the public 
demand he should supply a single-geared machine, and a two 
or three-speed model, let him design his frame so that the 
gearbox can be added without any alteration. By doing this 
he can standardize everything; and standardization means 
economy".3 Such comments tended to be disrega:rded, or to 
come too late to have any significant influence during the 
period. 
5. Greater attention to standardization of both com-
ponent and complete machine was indeed a further step, the 
advantages of which were just being recognised: "Bri tish 
manufacturers appear to be far too fond of making a few of 
several types rather than concentrating on one pattern and 
sticking to it. The result of the former policy is that 
the costs of production are doubled, and the possibility of 
a rider obtaining the correct replacement for his engine 
when he requires one are few and far between".4 This is 
another policy which was not adopted either at the time or 
in later years when in face of declining sales, producers 
might attempt to maintain output by increasing the number 
of models possibly at higher costs rather than by reducing 
costs and price.5 
6. Increasing the scale of production and thereby 
increasing profits does not necessarily reduce costs: Ｇｾｯ＠
high costs automatically disappear when profits are good? 
When all the facts are known, the plant that has high costs 
in pe;iods of low operating profit has equally high costs, 
often higher, in prosperous times, with a given plant 
layout ••••• The sales price of a finished product normally 
influences the quality put into the product, but it does 
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not necessarily govern the amount of unwarranted or wasted 
labor, material, or operating expense incurred in factory 
opera tions. Such unwarranted waste is occasioned largely 
by the improper layout of the plant".6 
Materials handling often accounts for a far greater 
proportion of costs than maChining.7 Thus improving ｾ｡｣ﾭ
tory layouts may be far more effective in reducing costs 
than installing new machines. 
Factory layout did not develop into a science until 
after 1910 with the development of industrial engineering 
and time stUdy.8 This does not mean, however, that nobody 
thought before then of how to improve factory layouts. The 
new Raleigh factory, built in 1896, was organized on the 
so-called "progressive" principle.9 The idea was that the 
,. 
emerging product would travel through the plant in "a 
direct series of progressions", that is, one imagines, as 
far as possible in the same direction so as to reduce the 
total distance travelled, speed up production and reduce 
costs. The factory was bisected by a c9vered roadway so 
that materials could enter at one end and emerge at the 
other as the finished product. But ｴｨｩｾ＠ was less effective 
in practice because materials although moving in the one 
general direction, might zigzag across the central roadway 
from one side of the factory to the other. To judge from 
the diagram of this factory (fig. 14.2), it is very likely 
that the progression of materials might be anything but 
direct. 
The new Rudge factory, built in 1906, was a six storey 
building.10 Although this factory enabled the firm to 
achieve a vastly greater output, the layout was far from 
ideal given that materials had to be transported between 
floors using slow-moving lifts. It was a better idea to 
layout the factory on one level. 
In later years, factory layout gained increasing 
attention, but it was not until the period immediately 
I 
before the war that motor cycle factories were being desig-
ned or reorganized so as to take full advantage of new 
ideas. Perhaps the first new factory to be designed wi th 
328 
oJ 0 
o 
Fig. 14.2. 
｣Ｌ ｵＧ ｲＮ ｾ ＹＧ Ｂ＠I sroAn IWHIIC 
, I , ' 'J' f -
lSn[O J" -.- ｾ＠
,.."'HI"[ 'HOf ,, ' ｾ＠ 0 ｲＮ］Ｚ］ ］ｴＺ Ｍ ＬＮＮＬＮＮ ＭＮＺ ｾＮＮＮＮＬ＠
_!oS ｾｈｏＧ＠
"OTOR ' HUI 
H,ACHI"t ｾＭ ｯ＠
CYCL[ 
' $TOIII:S mt1ttG 
MI. 
( 
Plan of the Raleigh Cycle Company's Works 
at Nottingham 
STOCK 
• !106M 
(liThe Motor-Cycle and Cycle Trader", 6 March 1914) 
I I 
1 I 
- •• , , 0,_, r' -.-.. ' ... j ... --.-.- --, ----. -.--
Mi CH'IY f "H,,\" 
.. _ ......... 1 _ ..... . 
-..... -.. r·· ..· I "" 
rtu/J. 
.... __ 1. a ••••• • • •••• ｟ ＢＮＮｾｾｾ Ｎ ｾ Ｎ＠ •• • • •• 
',1"'''''' 
I N" 
ＧＧＧＧｾ ＯＮｊ ＩＢ ＬＮＢ･＠
I ＮｉｎＧ ｾ＠
I. .. -----.l .. --.-. 
I I 
I 
--- ---j_ ..... 
Fig. 14.3. Plan of the New A.J.S. Factory at Wolverhampton 
(liThe Motor-Cycle and Cycle Trader", 30 July 1915) 
329 
..... 
reference to such considerations was built for AJS and 
completed about 1915. As can be seen from fig. 14.3 this 
was set ou t in linear fashion with the more basic opera-
tions ｳｵ｣ｾ＠ as frame building taking place at one end (left 
in the illustration), followed by the machine shop, fitting 
and finishing. This was the last major step in factory 
organization before the installation of line assembly, but 
that was still a long way off for the motor cycle industry. 
7. There is little to say here about line assembly. 
In theory it was available to the motor cycle industry as 
soon as the idea was developed by Henry Ford and became 
generally known. It was probably not practicable, however, 
given the relatively small outputs being achieved even by 
the largest firms before the first world war. In 1928, 
BSA, possibly by then the largest motor cycle ｦｩｾｭＬ＠ con-
sidered line assembly impracticable because of the large 
number of different models (13) they produced.11 
Clearly then there were limits to what new production 
technology might achieve for the motor cycle industry 
before the first wo rId wa r, either because ou tput wa s too 
small, or because the new ｴ･｣ｨｮｯｬｯｧｾ＠ was developed too 
late. There was also the problem of attitudes and prac-
tices within the industry. 
British industry was riddled with out-of-date atti-
tudes and practices rooted in the craft technology of the 
past. In order to take advantage of the new machine tech-
nology it was necessary to do much more than simply install 
the new machines. New machinery meant higher output, fas-
ter operation and faster work-pace. The British were al-
ways reluctant to commit themselves to such methods which 
as a result often did not pay: "The American pace is 
faster. The work is organised to produce a faster flow-
through. There is greater standardisation, to secure the 
economies of repetition. Factory discipline is tighter. 
Work study plays a larger role in setting production norms. 
I 
In fact, starting from about the 1880s the Americans set 
ou t to study the economising of labour in factory opera-
tions; their factory is a more 'scientific' place than the 
330 
British" .12 
In contrast, the British tended to see industrial 
production more as an art than a science: "The Triumph 
Company, to-day, have more work in hand and awaiting their 
attention than they can undertake; they recognise that 
they cannot adequa tely deal wi th such a demand by running 
up new works, the element of skill and acquired art can 
only be extended slowly, and so we see the company 'turning 
away orders rather than, for an immediate profit, 
jeopardizing their name for good quali ty".13 
Also, we may contrast this emphasis on "acquired art" 
in British industry with the thousands of engineers being 
trained at uni versi ties in others countries. In 1913 
Britain had only nine thousand university ｳｴｵ､･ｮｾｳ＠ compared 
with almost sixty thousand in Germany: Ｇｾ･ｲｭ｡ｮｹﾷｰｲｯ､ｵ｣･､＠
three thousand graduate engineers per year while in England 
and Wales only 350 graduated in all branches of science, 
technology and mathematics with first and second-class 
honours" .14 
Thus while it would appear that the motor cycle indus-
try lacked sufficient skilled labour too expand production 
in the traditional way rapidly enough to absorb all the 
demand, firms were either ｲ･ｾｵ｣ｴ｡ｮｴ＠ or unable to make the 
fullest use of the new technology to increase production. 
It was considered more important to maintain the standard 
of quality than to increase output. When BSA started to 
manufacture complete bicycles in 1909, quality was empha-
sized and the price was raised deliberately to underline 
the fact: "In view of the somewhat altered conditions, it 
was considered advisable to manufacture a complete B.S.A. 
Bicycle, under the most rigid inspection, with the world 
famed B.S.A. Fittings. There would be one grade of 
machine--the highest quality only. The machine so offered 
to the public would be listed at a higher price than that 
at which bicycles built with B.S.A. Fittings had been sold 
I • 
by local agents and makers.' The management believed that 
this would not only create a greater demand for B.S.A. 
productions, but that it would have a steadying effect on 
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the cycle trade generally".15 There were still some in the 
cycle industry even in 1916 who blamed the introduction of 
high-speed machinery for "overproduction" and "mediocrity" 
and called for attempts to improve quality by denying 
16 improvemen t of cheap machines. 
This was also the standard approach to motor cycle 
manufacture and for the most part those in the industry 
endorsed it. Otherwise it is likely that the industry 
could have achieved more economical operation and lower 
prices, thus perhaps stimulating sales significantly beyond 
the levels that were reached, and perhaps achieving even 
greater economies. But the whole idea of operating in this 
way was almost an anathema to the industry, a betrayal of 
everything it stood for: "Just a s there is no ,cu tting in 
the price, so there is no cutting in the quality.andthe 
product resulting is an honest bicycle at an honest 
price,,;17 "Quality is what the directors are aiming a t,,;18 
"The only true course to permanent popular! ty of success, 
is that of building up to a certain standard".19 
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